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THE EUTHYDEMUS
OF PLATO

HENRY FROWDE, M.A.
PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD
LONDON, EDINBURGH
NEW YORK

THE EUTHYDEMUS OF PLATO

WITH REVISED TEXT
INTRODUCTION, NOTES, AND INDICES

BY

EDWIN HAMILTON GIFFORD, D.D.

HONORARY FELLOW OF ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE,
AND FORMERLY ARCHDEACON OF LONDON

OXFORD
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

1905

PA 4278.E8 1905

OXFORD

PRINTED AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

BY HORACE HART, M.A.

PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY

TO
THE MASTER AND FELLOWS
OF
ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

THIS LITTLE VOLUME IS INSCRIBED
IN GRATEFUL REMEMBRANCE
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PREFACE

THIS edition of the *Euthydemus* is intended for the use of University Students and the Higher Forms of Public Schools. To such readers there will be little force in the objection made by some critics of a sterner mood that the dialogue is too amusing, too full of satirical humour and even broad comedy, to be worthy of so great a philosopher as Plato. On this character of the 'Literary Form' of the dialogue see the Introduction, § ii.

In revising the text I have made no new collation of manuscripts, but have depended on the critical apparatus of Schanz and the revision of the same by Burnet, except as to a few readings for which I have carefully inspected the phototype of the Codex Clarkianus in the Bodleian Library.

The only original emendations which I have ventured to introduce are 271 c γ καθ' ἃ for κατά, and 286 e γ Σὺ δ' ἐκέλευες; for οὐδὲ κελεύεις.

In attempting to determine the date of the *Euthydemus* and its relation to the *Phaedrus* I have derived most help from the Introductions to the latter dialogue by Stallbaum and Thompson, and from Lutoslawski's *Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic*.

My best thanks are due to the Delegates of the Clarendon Press for allowing the work to be published under their auspices, and to the Secretary and other officials for much valuable assistance and unfailing kindness during the passage of the volume through the press.

OXFORD :

November, 1904.

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INTRODUCTION

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THE *Euthydemus* is a conversation between Socrates and his old friend Crito, consisting chiefly of a highly dramatized narrative of a discussion in which Socrates himself had played a principal part, the other chief actor being the Sophist from whose name the dialogue takes its title.

The other persons taking part in the action are Dionysodorus, the elder brother of Euthydemus; Cleinias, an ingenuous and handsome youth of noble birth, first cousin to the famous Alcibiades; and Ctesiphon, an enthusiastic admirer of Cleinias, a high-spirited young gentleman of irascible temper and rough and ready speech, who has been previously introduced in the *Lysis* (204 C, 205 A, 206 C, D) as rallying his sentimental friend Hippothales with a boisterous kind of wit.

There are also present many pupils and admirers of the two Sophists, and on the other hand many young friends of Cleinias.

i. In the opening scene Socrates gives an account to Crito of the two Sophists with whom he had held a discussion in the Lyceum on the previous day. They were natives of Chios, who had migrated to Thurii, and being banished thence had spent many years in various parts of Greece, and had recently come to Athens as professional teachers of wisdom and virtue. The varied accomplishments which they had displayed on a former visit are extolled by Socrates with playful irony. He had never understood before what true pancratiasts were; but these men were perfect in every kind of combat. They could teach men to fight in heavy armour with the weapons of actual war, or to arm themselves with speeches for the harder conflicts of the law-courts. They had now set the crown upon pancratiastic art by making themselves masters of the 'eristic philosophy,' an irresistible method of disputation by which every statement, true and false alike, could be refuted with

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equal certainty. Let Crito come with Socrates to be taught these noble arts; it was not too late to learn, for the teachers themselves were old men, and had only learned this new system last year. If Socrates and Crito took their sons with them, they would, no doubt, be admitted as fellow pupils (271 A-272 D).

As Crito wishes to know what sort of wisdom he is to be taught, Socrates proceeds to describe what had occurred in the Lyceum. He had been sitting alone in the apodyterium, and was just rising up to go away when he was forbidden by the usual sign (τὸ δαιμόνιον) to leave his seat. The two Sophists presently enter and walk up and down in the colonnade, followed by an admiring crowd of pupils. Cleinias, accompanied by Ctesippus and other friends, comes in and sits beside Socrates. On seeing this the Sophists approach, and seat themselves, Euthydemus beside Cleinias, and Diodorus on the other side of Socrates, who introduces them to Cleinias with high commendation of their military and forensic skill. But the brothers receive these compliments with rude contempt, for they are no longer proud of such minor accomplishments, but make the loftier boast of imparting virtue more perfectly and more quickly than any other men. 'The possessors of such a power, says Socrates, must be divine: forgive my irreverent speeches, and grant us an exhibition of this marvellous wisdom: we are all eager to learn, and let the first experiment be made on Cleinias, for whose advancement in wisdom and virtue we are all most anxious' (272 D-275 C).

ii. Before attempting to describe the next scene Socrates, like the poets (Hom. *Il.* ii. 484), invokes the Muses and Mnemosyne to aid him in so great a task: cf. *Theaet.* 191 D.

Then comes the wonderful exhibition of the Sophists' skill in teaching virtue.

Euthydemus. Are those who learn the wise or the unwise (οἱ σοφοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς)?

Cleinias. The wise.

Euthydemus. Do they already know the things which they are learning?

Cleinias. No.

Euthydemus. Then the learners are the unwise (ἀμαθεῖς), not the wise, as you suppose.

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The chorus of the Sophists' followers laugh and applaud; and before Cleinias has time to recover breath Dionysodorus takes him in hand.

'Which of the schoolboys learn the dictated lesson, the clever or the stupid (οἱ σοφοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς)?'—'The clever.'—'Then the wise (οἱ σοφοὶ) are the learners, not the unwise (οἱ ἀμαθεῖς), and your answer to Euthydemus was wrong.'

Amid shouts of applause Euthydemus returns to the attack.

'Do the boys learn (μανθάνουσιν) what they know (ἐπίστανται), or what they do not know?'—'What they do not know.'—'But they know the letters?'—'Yes.'—'And the letters make up the lesson?'—'Yes.'—'Then they learn what they know, and your answer was wrong.'

Upon this Diodorus again takes up the ball: 'To learn is to receive knowledge: to know is to have knowledge. The learners receive but have not knowledge: therefore they who do not know learn, not those who know' (275 C-277 C).

Cleinias is quite bewildered, and Socrates interposes to shield him from a third attack. The Sophists, he says, are only playing with him, and dancing round him like the Corybantes, and initiating him by these preparatory rites into the Sophistic mysteries. They are tripping him up with their verbal fallacies in order to teach him that a word may be used in more senses than one. But there has been enough of such play: let them now show Cleinias how to improve in wisdom and virtue; he will himself give an example of what he means in his own simple way (277 C-278 D).

All men desire to be happy, in other words to do well (εὖ πράττειν): to this end they count many good things necessary, riches, health, beauty, noble birth, power, honour. To these must be added temperance, justice, fortitude, wisdom, and good fortune. But good fortune is already included in wisdom. In the practice of every art, in playing the flute, in reading and writing, in navigation, in war, in medicine the wise are the fortunate, and he who has wisdom has no further need of fortune.

Moreover all those good things must be used, and used rightly, in order to make men happy; and to use them rightly there must be knowledge for a guide. Without it riches and strength and

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power become even worse than useless, as giving wider opportunities for ill doing. In short all such things are in themselves neither good nor bad : wisdom alone is good, and folly bad, therefore get wisdom.

But how to get it ? Can it be taught, or does it come spontaneously ? Cleinias replies with youthful confidence, ' In my opinion it can be taught ' ; and Socrates is delighted to accept so ready a solution of the great question (278 E-282 D).

Socrates now invites either of the Sophists to discuss the same subject more scientifically, or to go on to show whether it is necessary to acquire every kind of knowledge, or only some one science that will suffice to make Cleinias wise and happy. Dionysodorus, after being assured that they truly and earnestly desire to have Cleinias made wise, argues that they wish him to be now what he is not, that is to be no longer what he now is, in fact to be destroyed. Worthy friends, to wish destruction to the boy !

' Destruction on your own head ! ' cries Ctesippus, ' for telling such an impious lie about us. '—' A lie ! ' says Euthydemus. ' Is it possible to tell a lie ? By telling the thing of which you speak you tell a real thing ; and he who tells the real thing tells the truth, and tells no lie. You can do nothing to what is not, you can only speak what is, that is, speak truth. '—' Yes, of course, ' says Ctesippus, ' he speaks in a certain way of real things, but not as they really are. '—' What do you mean ? ' says Diodorus. ' Do any speak of things as they are ? '—' Yes, gentlemen, and those who speak the truth. '—' Do good men then speak badly of what is bad ? '—' Indeed they do speak very badly of bad men, and if you do not take care, they will speak badly of you. '—' And do they speak greatly of the great, and hotly of the hot ? '—' Certainly, and speak frigidly of the frigid and their frigid arguments. '—' You are insolent, Ctesippus, insolent, I say. '—' Not so, but as a friend I advise you never to say so rudely in my presence that I wish destruction to my dearest friends ' (282 D-284 E).

Socrates again interposes to keep the peace : ' Let us not quarrel over a word ; if by " destruction " they mean making foolish and bad men wise and good, let them try the experiment on me, and boil me, if they please, as in Medea's cauldron. '—' Or they may flay me like Marsyas, ' said Ctesippus, ' only let them make virtue, not

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a bottle, out of my hide : but Dionysodorus must not call contradiction insolence.'

'Is contradiction possible?' said the Sophist. 'At all events you could not prove that you ever heard one person contradicting another.'—'That is true; but let us listen now whether I am proving it to you while Ctesippus is contradicting Dionysodorus' (see the note on the passage).

'Would you undertake to argue this? We should not contradict each other at all, if we both knew the right definition (*λόγον*) of each thing; but when neither knows the right definition, then we should contradict each other, or in this case neither would speak of the thing at all. So when I give the right definition and you some other, you do not speak of the thing itself at all, and, if you do not speak, you cannot contradict' (284 E-286 B).

Ctesippus kept silence, but Socrates said that this argument was as old as Protagoras or older, and had a wonderful way of tripping up the speaker himself as well as others. 'But you can best tell us the truth about it. Is it impossible to speak or even think what is false? Is there no such thing as ignorance, or an ignorant man? Do you really mean this?'—'Refute me if you can,' said Dionysodorus.—'Is refutation possible, if according to your argument no one speaks what is false?'—'No, it is not,' said Euthydemus.—'Neither then did I bid you refute me,' said Dionysodorus.—'Was it you then that bade me, Euthydemus: for I do not clearly understand these subtleties. However, I am going to ask perhaps a stupid question: If it is impossible to contradict, to speak or even think what is false, to be ignorant or in error, pray what are you come to teach?' (285 A-287 A).

Dionysodorus tries to evade this troublesome question: 'Why go back to former arguments? Can you make nothing of the present?'—'They are very difficult,' says Socrates, 'for what does this last phrase, "make nothing of them," mean (*ποεῖ*), except that I cannot "refute" them?'

Dionysodorus has heard enough of that word 'refute' (286 E), and insists on passing to a new question: 'Can a mere lifeless word "mean" anything?'—'It was my stupidity,' says Socrates; 'but was I right or wrong? If I was right, you cannot "refute" me: and if I was wrong, you cannot be right in saying that error

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is impossible (287 A). This is not going back to the past: for your present argument can only trip one up and then itself fall' (287 A-288 A).

Ctesippus begins again to jeer at the Sophists, but is checked by Socrates: 'They are not yet in earnest, but are playing tricks like Proteus, and must be held fast till they show themselves in their true form.' He will give them another example of the sort of teaching which he wishes them to impart, by continuing his argument with Cleinias.

It was agreed (282 D 1) that philosophy or the acquisition of knowledge is necessary to make men happy. But what kind of knowledge? Such as teaches them to make the right use of all other acquirements and advantages. Not the knowledge of healing or money-making, nor even a knowledge that would make us immortal without teaching us to use immortality aright: not the art of the speech-maker, sublime and inspired though it sometimes appears; for some know not how to use the speeches they have themselves made, and after all it is only a kind of charm for fascinating judges and assemblies. Is it then the strategic art that makes men happy?—No, says Cleinias, that is only a kind of man-hunting; and hunters and fishermen give over what they catch to cooks, and geometers and astronomers give their discoveries to dialecticians to make use of them.

iii. At this point the narrative of Socrates is interrupted by Crito, who is astonished that one so young as Cleinias should be so wise. A long conversation follows, in which Socrates explains that even the kingly art is found wanting, because it does not impart wisdom or knowledge, and its claim is only an empty boast like *ὁ Διὸς Κόρινθος* (290 E-293 A).

iv. Socrates being thus unable, as he pretends, to find the kind of knowledge that will make men happy entreats the Sophists to be serious and rescue them from their difficulty. Euthydemus boldly undertakes to prove that Socrates already possesses the knowledge of which he is in search: he knows something, nay many things, therefore he knows everything; for he cannot be both knowing and not knowing.

'Then you two also,' says Socrates, 'know everything.'—'Yes,' says Dionysodorus, 'and all men know all things, if they know

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one.'—'Good heavens!—for now I see you are in earnest—do you really know all things, such as carpentering, shoemaking, astronomy, and the number of the sands?'—'Of course we do.' At this Ctesippus bursts in with an impudent jibe: 'Does each of them know how many teeth the other has?' Some lively bantering follows, and then Euthydemus, still maintaining that Socrates, as well as themselves, knows all things, insists on having his questions answered categorically, 'Yes' or 'No,' without any exception or limitation, and thus proves to his own satisfaction that Socrates knew all things even before he was born or begotten, and before the earth and the heaven were made (293 A–296 D).

Socrates now turns their own mode of argument against them: 'Do I, or do I not, know that the good are unjust?'—'Yes,' says Euthydemus. 'You know that they are not unjust.'—'But that is not what I ask. How do I know that they *are* unjust?'—'You do not know it at all,' says Dionysodorus; but he is reprovèd by Euthydemus for spoiling the argument, by admitting that Socrates is at the same time knowing and not knowing.

'Must not your brother, who knows all things, be right?'—'Am I his brother?' says Dionysodorus, trying again to change the argument. To this Socrates replies: 'I cannot fight two at once; even Hercules called his nephew Iolaus to help him.'—'Was Iolaus any more Hercules' nephew than yours?'—'As you will not let Euthydemus answer my question, I must, I suppose, answer yours: Iolaus was Hercules' nephew, not mine at all, not being the son of my brother Patrocles.'—'Is Patrocles your brother?'—'Yes, on the mother's side, not on the father's.'—'Then he both is and is not your brother.'—'Not on the father's side: Chaeredemus was his father, Sophroniscus mine.'—'Then Chaeredemus, being different from a father, was not a father; and so Sophroniscus, in like manner being different from a father, was not a father: so you, Socrates, had no father' (296 D–298 B).

This style of argument suits Ctesippus: 'Your father, you say, is also my father, and father of all, both men and beasts; you therefore are the brother of gudgeons and puppies and little pigs.'—'So are you,' says Dionysodorus: 'your dog is a father of puppies, and he is yours; therefore he is your father, and you are the puppies' brother. When you beat your dog, you beat your own

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father.’—‘I would much rather beat your father for begetting such wise sons,’ replies Ctesippus.

Then follows an argument with Euthydemus about having too much of a good thing: a whole cartload of hellebore would be too much for a sick man, unless he were as big as the statue at Delphi; but one shield and spear would not be enough for a Geryon or Briareus (298 B-299 C).

Diodorus here comes to his brother’s aid: ‘Gold you admit is good; then the happiest man must be one who has most gold: gold in his stomach, and skull, and both eyes.’—‘Yes, indeed,’ said Ctesippus, turning to Euthydemus, ‘they say that among the Scythians the happiest and bravest men have much gold in their own skulls, and drink out of their own skulls, and holding their own heads in their hands, see into the inside.’

Euthydemus, catching at the word ‘see,’ carries on the argument by quibbling about the double meaning of *δυνατὰ ὁρᾶν*, ‘able to see,’ or ‘able to be seen,’ of *σιγῶντα λέγειν*, and *λέγοντα σιγᾶν*, until Ctesippus asks, ‘Do all things speak, or all keep silence?’—‘Neither and both,’ cries Dionysodorus; and Ctesippus with a loud laugh declares that by this ‘both’ he has ruined his argument and is beaten and done for (*ἀπόλωλε* alluding perhaps to 283 D, E).

Cleinias laughs with delight, and Ctesippus swells with pride. ‘Why do you laugh,’ says Socrates, ‘at things so important and beautiful?’—‘Are beautiful things different from beauty or the same?’ asks Dionysodorus. Socrates pretends to be puzzled and sorry to have spoken, but answers that they are different from beauty itself, though some beauty is present with each.—‘Then if an ox be present with you, you are an ox, and because I am present with you now, you are Dionysodorus?’—‘Heaven forbid,’ said Socrates.—‘But in what way must one thing be present to another in order that this other may be other (than it was)?’—‘Do you doubt about that?’—‘Of course I doubt about what is not possible.’—‘Is not the same same, and the other other? Even a child could not doubt that the other is other.’ (Socrates here confounds the Sophist by his own device of using ‘other’ in different senses; see the note on 301 B 1). ‘This point, Dionysodorus, you missed on purpose, but in other respects your dialectic is excellent.’

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Thus encouraged Dionysodorus proceeds in his own fashion to prove the propriety of boiling the cook, smiting the smith, and making pots of the potter. Further he makes Socrates admit that he may give, or sell, or slay his own animals, and that since his gods Zeus, Apollo, or Athene having souls are animals, he may give, sell, or slay them. Socrates is struck dumb, but Ctesippus cries 'Bravo Hercules, what a fine argument!' 'Is "Bravo Hercules," or "Hercules Bravo"? '—'O Poseidon, what clever arguments! I give up,' says Ctesippus; 'they are irresistible.'

Not only are the admirers of Euthydemus bursting with delight, but the very columns of the portico seem to ring with laughter and applause. Socrates, as if enchanted by the Sophists' wisdom, extols ironically their utter disregard of other men's opinions, who would be ashamed to conquer by such arguments, and slyly adds that by denying all predication (301 B 3), and declaring that nothing is either beautiful, or good, or white, they sew up other men's mouths and their own also, a delightful result that does away all offence. But the most marvellous thing is that they can teach others so quickly, as was seen when Ctesippus beat them with their own weapons. So they must not exhibit their skill in public, but only argue with each other alone, or with those who will pay them: such rare wisdom is of too great price to be made as common as water; but he begs them to receive him and Cleinias as pupils (303 B-304 B).

v. Having ended his narrative of the discussion with the Sophists Socrates playfully invites Crito to become his fellow-pupil. But Crito declines the proposal, and tells how he had met a certain person who had heard the discussion, and criticized it as an unworthy fuss about worthless matters. Philosophy itself he said was good for nothing, and Crito would have been ashamed if he had heard how Socrates gave himself up to the Sophists. Socrates ascertains that the critic was no orator, but one of the speech-writers who being neither philosophers nor statesmen, but halfway between the two, tried to disparage real philosophers as their only rivals in wisdom, and shrank from all personal discussion lest they might be worsted by the fallacious tricks of the Sophists, which they supposed to be practised by the philosophers also. Crito might well be afraid of entrusting the education of his sons to

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impostors such as the Sophists, but let him satisfy himself as to the value of true philosophy, and then both study and practise it himself, and encourage his sons to do the same (304 B-307 C).

II. THE LITERARY FORM.

In the foregoing sketch of the contents of the dialogue we see that its general form and arrangement are clearly marked.

The main subject is the narration by Socrates of a discussion between himself and the Sophists ; but this is set in the frame of a conversation between Socrates and Crito, which both forms the introduction (271 A-272 D), and is resumed in the middle (290 E-293 A) and at the end of the discussion (304 B-the end).

Apart from this conversation the narrative of the discussion itself may be regarded as a drama in five scenes distinguished by the different characters who speak in each. Cf. Bonitz, *Platonische Studien*, ii. p. 258.

Sc. 1. Euthydemus, Dionysodorus, Cleinias, Socrates (272 E-277 C).

Sc. 2. Socrates, Cleinias (277 D-282 E).

Sc. 3. Dionysodorus, Socrates, Ctesippus, Euthydemus (283 A-288 B).

Sc. 4. Socrates, Cleinias (288 B-290 D).

Sc. 5. Euthydemus, Socrates, Dionysodorus, Ctesippus (293 D-304 B).

This dramatic form is more prominent in the *Euthydemus* than in any other of the Platonic dialogues, and from the allusions to a chorus and choric dancing in 276 B and 277 D we may infer that it was consciously adopted by Plato in order to give the most vivid expression to the contrast between the methods of argument practised by Socrates and the Sophists. This peculiar character of the dialogue has been noticed by nearly every critic, and particularly by Archer Butler, *Lectures on Ancient Philosophy*, ii. 24: 'We can never rightly estimate the labours of Plato unless we regard his writings as themselves works of art no less than transcripts of doctrine. His versatility in the dramatic representation of character has made some of his dialogues far more resemble what we should call "Genteel Comedy" than a philosophical exposition. Thus the entire *Euthydemus* is nothing

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less than a *dramatic satire*, of boundless humour and variety, upon the follies of the Sophistic professors, and assuredly lies much nearer to Aristophanes than to Aristotle.'

But it is strange, as Schleiermacher remarks in his Introduction, 'that attention has always been exclusively given to this sophistical dramatizing, when to every reader the dialogue presents more important matter, a general philosophical bearing, and a visible reference to other Platonic writings.' It is not in the depth of the arguments employed, but in the liveliness of the action and the incisive force of the satire that the excellence of Plato's work is in this case to be recognized.

If therefore we ever find the *Euthydemus* regarded as little better than a farce and quite unworthy of the genius of Plato, we may wonder whether the critic has quite appreciated the subtle irony, and detected the important truths that underlie the playful language. Socrates is in fact represented throughout as giving full play to his satirical humour, and fooling the Sophists to the top of their bent by pretending to be overpowered by their arguments, to marvel at their supernatural wisdom, and even to address them as absolutely divine (273 E, 296 D). As Euthydemus and his brother are represented in the dialogue as old men, it is not likely that they were still living at the time when Plato wrote; but it is evident that they were men of a very inferior stamp, both socially and mentally, to the greater Sophists such as Protagoras or Gorgias, and were chosen to represent the degenerate class on whom the magnificent Isocrates pours such unmitigated contempt in his oration *Against the Sophists*, 291 D. It was thus easier for Plato to make the contrast between them and Socrates the more striking. Dionysodorus in particular is represented as even more shallow and ignorant than his brother (297 A): his coarse insolence and stupid attempts at wit (283 D, 297 D) serve to justify the introduction on the other side of such a character as Ctesippus. Thus the anger of Plato, guided by his dramatic instinct, finds an outlet in the quarrels of these minor characters for the unsparing sarcasm and vehement reproaches which serve as a foil to the delicate satire and ironical compliments of Socrates. We can hardly fail to be reminded how often the broadest farce is allowed to alternate with the most tragic and pathetic scenes in Shakespeare.

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III. THE GENERAL PURPOSE.

It is evident from the foregoing sketch of the contents, and is in fact universally admitted, that the main purpose of the *Euthydemus* is 'to represent the opposition of Socratic and Sophistic views with regard to their value in the training and education of youth' (Zeller, *Plato*, ch. ii, note 94).

'The peculiar point of view of the *Euthydemus* was long since rightly indicated by Welcker. . . . If we assume that Plato is here . . . attacking a corrupt kind of education, which though essentially worthless is yet through the approval of the multitude not unimportant for the moment, and that its chief excellence is therefore to be looked for not in the depth of the counter arguments but in the vigour of the action and satirical description, all agrees well under this point of view' (Bonitz, *Platon. Stud.* ii. 278). 'The vocation of philosophy to be the true educator of youth is vindicated in opposition to sophistry ("Scheinweisheit") which would usurp its place, and this through the representation of each in action' (ibid. 276 fin.).

This purpose is clearly indicated in the case of Cleinias by the desire of his friends that he should be persuaded to pursue the study of philosophy and of virtue (275 A 6), and again at the end of the dialogue in the anxiety of Crito about the education of his sons (306 D 2).

The professed aim of the two systems of education thus contrasted is the same, namely to promote the study of wisdom and virtue in all men, and especially in the young (273 D 8, 275 A 1, 278 D 3, 282 D 3). But in the *methods* adopted on either side, and in the *results* attained, there is the most striking contrast.

The Sophists employ the commonest logical fallacies and the most trifling verbal quibbles (275 D 3-277 C 7), and the result is that they fully succeed in reducing the mind of an intelligent and ingenuous youth to utter confusion, and expose him to the vulgar ridicule of their own disciples (276 B, D), while Ctesippus in revenge turns their own weapons against them with well-deserved flouts and jeers (284 E, 288 B).

In the strongest possible contrast to this exhibition of Sophistic folly Plato presents an example of true Socratic teaching.

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Its aim is to guide and encourage Cleinias in the pursuit of wisdom and virtue (278 D). The method adopted is to propose for consideration a serious and important subject, the universal desire for happiness. First there is an enumeration of the good things on which happiness is supposed to depend, and then it is shown by a scientific process of analysis—the division of concepts—that these things contribute to happiness only when rightly used under the guidance of knowledge, which does not come to a man by nature or accident, but by teaching and careful study (282 D).

In continuation (288 D) several kinds of special knowledge, rhetoric, strategy, and government, are found incapable of making men virtuous and happy, the result, so far as Cleinias is concerned, being that he takes part in the discussion with a growing intelligence that excites the admiration of Crito (290 E), while the general inference that philosophy alone can make men wise and good, though clearly indicated, is not expressed in this dialogue but left for further consideration (292 E).

In the renewal of the discussion the contrast between this example of Socratic teaching and that of the Sophists is made more glaring by a series of captious questions, quibbling answers, fallacies and paradoxes, which will be noticed more fully in a later section. Meanwhile it will be sufficient to quote an admirable description of the 'Eristic' art of disputation as practised by the Sophists, and illustrated in the *Euthydemus*, from Zeller's *Pre-Socratic Philosophy*, ii. 462, Eng. Tr.: 'We get a vivid picture of the Sophistic art of disputation, as it was constituted in later times, in Plato's dialogue of Euthydemus, and in Aristotle's Treatise on Fallacies; and though we must not forget that the one is a satire written with all poetic freedom, and the other a universal theory which there is no reason to restrict to the Sophists in the narrower sense or to anything historical, yet the harmony of these descriptions one with the other, and with other accounts, shows that we are justified in applying them in all their essential features to the Sophistic teaching. What they tell us is certainly not much to its advantage. The Eristics were not concerned about any scientific result; their object was to involve their adversary or interlocutor in confusion and difficulties from which he could find no way of escape, so that every answer that he gave seemed incorrect': *ibid.*

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NOTE. 'The ἀφύκτα ἐρωτήματα of which the Sophist boasts, *Euthyd.* 275 E, 276 E.'

Ibid. 463. 'If a discussion is uncomfortable to the Sophist, he evades it¹; if an answer is desired of him, he insists on asking questions²; if any one tries to escape from ambiguous questions by closer definition, he demands "Yes" or "No"³; if he thinks his adversary knows of an answer, he begins by deprecating all that can possibly be said on that side⁴; if he is accused of contradicting himself, he protests against bringing forward things that are done with long ago⁵. If he has no other resource, he stupefies his adversary with speeches the absurdity of which precludes any reply⁶.'

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Besides the general purpose of vindicating the claims of true science in the education of the young, and of distinguishing the Socratic teaching from that of the Sophists, there is a certain character of the dialogue that calls for further explanation. It is evident from the whole tone and temper of the discussion, and especially of the final conversation between Socrates and Crito, that it was written in a mood of unusual irritation due to some more personal cause than the standing opposition between Plato and the Sophists. It is generally supposed that this angry feeling had been roused by the envious attacks of rival teachers, and many attempts have been made to identify the persons whose doctrines are criticized or caricatured both in the body of the dialogue and in the portrait of the λογογράφος in 305 C.

The name of Lysias is naturally one of the first to occur to any one who thinks of the unfriendly feeling between him and Plato. Athenaeus, in one of his bitter attacks upon Plato (xiii. 611), quotes part of a speech of Lysias in order to take down 'the arrogance (βρένθος) of the philosophers.' The speech was written for the

¹ *Euthyd.* 287 B sqq., 297 B, 299 A, etc.

² 287 B sq., 295 B sqq.

³ 295 E sq., 297 D sqq.

⁴ Thrasy-machus in Plato, *Rep.* i. 336 C, 337 A.

⁵ This is done with the most delightful naïveté in *Euthyd.* 287 B.

⁶ *Euthyd.* 293 D, 298 D, 303 A.

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prosecution of Aeschines Socraticus, whom Lysias charges with crimes especially disgraceful to one 'who had been a disciple of Socrates, and talked so finely about justice and virtue.' Cf. *Ast. Lex. Plat.* 'Σοφιστής a Lysia dictus est Plato una cum Aeschine Socratico, ap. Aristid. c. Plat. ii.' In the oration of Aristides, p. 192, he speaks of Plato as τῶν Ῥητόρων πατέρα καὶ διδάσκαλον (*Fabric. Bibl. Gr.* vol. iv. 386).

Plato's feeling towards Lysias is sufficiently evident in the *Phaedrus*; but in the description of the λογογράφος at the end of the *Euthydemus* there is one feature which shows that it cannot be meant for him. For 'Lysias did on one memorable occasion plead his own cause. The excellent speech Κατὰ Ἐρατοσθένους was delivered by him during his brief tenure of the Athenian franchise' (Thompson, *Phaedrus*, 181, n. 8): cf. K. O. Müller, *Lit. of Ancient Greece*, 496.

Schleiermacher, in his introduction to the dialogue, suggests that Antisthenes was one of the persons whom Plato assails under the names of the less important Sophists Euthydemus and Dionysodorus.

Antisthenes (*circ.* 445–371 B.C.) was at first a pupil of Gorgias, but afterwards a devoted disciple and friend of Socrates, at whose death he was present (*Phaed.* 59 B). In imitation of the self-denial and patient endurance of Socrates, Antisthenes became the founder of the Cynic sect (*Diog. Laert.* vi. 2). The many anecdotes recorded of him contain abundant evidence of the ill-feeling which existed between him and Plato. Having been told that Plato spoke ill of him, 'It is a kinglike fate,' he said, 'to do good and to be evil spoken of.' On meeting Plato, who had been sick, 'I see,' said Antisthenes, 'you have got rid of your bile, but not of your conceit.'

Another anecdote preserved by Diogenes Laertius (iii. 35) not only suggests a cause for this ill-will, but also indicates a direct connexion between Antisthenes and a passage in our dialogue. Plato being once invited by Antisthenes to hear him read a philosophic treatise inquired what the subject was to be, and, when told that it was an argument to prove the non-existence of contradiction (περὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν), replied, 'How then do you write about it, since it is non-existent?' The argument, as Plato showed, can

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be turned round (*περιτρέπεται*), for *μὴ εἶναι* is itself a contradiction. Hereupon Antisthenes wrote a dialogue against Plato, merely changing the name to Satho.

In *Euthydemus* 285 D 7–286 B 6 there is an unmistakable allusion to this paradoxical doctrine of Antisthenes, which is also mentioned by Aristotle, *Τοφ.* i. 11, 4, and again *Μεταφῆ.* iv. 29, 4 'Ο δὲ ψευδὴς λόγος οὐδενός ἐστιν ἀπλῶς λόγος. Διὸ Ἀντισθένης ᾤετο εὐηθῶς μηθὲν ἀξιῶν λέγεσθαι πλὴν τῷ οἰκείῳ λόγῳ ἐν ἐφ' ἐνός· ἐξ ὧν συνέβαινε μὴ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν, σχεδὸν δὲ μηδὲ ψεύδεσθαι. The meaning of Aristotle in this passage is well explained by Zeller (Part i, *Outlines*, Eng. Tr. p. 118): 'In passionate contradiction to the Platonic ideas he (Antisthenes) allowed the individual being only to exist, and hence demanded that everything should receive its own name (the οἰκείος λόγος) and no other. From this he deduced the conclusion (apparently after the pattern of Gorgias) that no subject can receive a predicate of a different nature. He rejected, therefore, definition by characteristic marks; only for what was composite would he allow an enumeration of its constituent parts. What was simple might be explained by comparison with something else, but it could not be defined. With Protagoras he maintained that no man could contradict himself, for if he said what was different, he was speaking of different things. Thus he gave a thoroughly Sophistic turn to the Socratic philosophy of concepts.' Compare Zeller, *Socrates*, chap. xiii Cynic Logic; Bonitz, *Platon. Stud.* 284, who argues that the opposition between the doctrines of Antisthenes and Plato, the paradoxical form and inconsistency ('Erfolglosigkeit') in the philosophy of Antisthenes, and the ludicrous applications which might be made of his dogmas, render it quite conceivable that Plato reckoned him among the Sophists, and that he actually did so is placed beyond doubt by such passages as 283 E, 285 E.

The same opinion is expressed by Zeller (*Plato*, p. 84, note 94), who writes that in the exposition of his subject 'Plato had to do, not merely with the views of the elder Sophists and their later developments, but also . . . with Antisthenes, who seemed to him in true Sophistic fashion to destroy all possibility of cognition, to confuse Socratic with Sophistic views and thereby spoil them.'

We can well believe therefore that the satire of the *Euthydemus* was in certain passages directed against Antisthenes; but his

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character does not so fully correspond to the particular description in 304 D as to justify the opinion that he was the rhetorician and speech-writer there described.

Winckelmann (*Proleg.* xxxiv) thinks that the description of the λογογράφος is intended for Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, the Sophist who argues so vehemently against Socrates on the nature of justice in the first book of the Republic. In the *Phaedrus* he is mentioned (261 C) as a leading Sophist with Gorgias and Theodorus, and in 266 C as a teacher of rhetoric to all who would pay for it (οἱ ἂν δωροφορεῖν αὐτοῖς ὡς βασιλεῖσιν ἐθέλωσιν). Again in *Phaedr.* 267 C he is described as a master of the art of pathetic commonplace: for 'the "sorrows of a poor old man" no one is better than the Chalcedonian giant' (Jowett). In the same passage the words immediately following, ὀργίσαι τε αὖ πολλοὺς ἅμα δεινὸς ἀνὴρ γέγονεν, καὶ πάλιν ὠργισμένοις ἐπάδων κηλεῖν, ὡς ἔφη, evidently point to some boastful expressions of Thrasymachus, to which there seems to be an allusion in *Euthydem.* 290 A ἡ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐπιδῶν (τέχνη), ἔχεών τε . . . καὶ νόσων κήλησίς ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ δικαστῶν τε καὶ ἐκκλησιαστικῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄχλων κήλησίς τε καὶ παραμυθία τυγχάνει οὖσα. Not less striking is the similarity between the preceding passage of *Euthydemus* and Plat. *Pol.* 358 B Θρασύμαχος γάρ μοι φαίνεται προφαιότερον τοῦ δέοντος ὑπὸ σοῦ ὥσπερ ὄφεις κηληθῆναι.

It thus seems highly probable that Thrasymachus is alluded to in *Euthydem.* 290 A; but when Winckelmann tries to prove that he is the λογογράφος referred to in the close of the dialogue, we find that the testimony to which he appeals is quite inadequate to the conclusion. In Cic., *De Orat.* iii. 16, Thrasymachus is named among the rhetoricians 'qui minus ipsi in republica versarentur, sed huius tamen eiusdem sapientiae doctores essent, ut Gorgias, Thrasymachus, Isocrates.' Neither here nor in Quintilian, *Inst. Orator.* iii. 1 'Communes locos tractasse dicuntur Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus et Thrasymachus,' is there the slightest indication of his having written speeches for others to deliver in the law-courts, and the absence of a feature which is so prominent in the description in 304 D, 305 B, C, makes it impossible to suppose that he is the person meant.

We have therefore still to inquire who is the individual, if any, there described. In the statement of Crito, 304 E 5, that he is quoting the very words this person used (οὕτως γάρ πως καὶ εἶπε

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τοῖς ὀνόμασι) there is 'an intimation,' says Thompson, p. 181, 'that some one in particular is meant.' And the *παρονομασία*, ἀξίων ἀναξίαν, and general style of the quotation, may probably be meant to imitate the affected language of Isocrates. Certainly the description which follows seems to correspond with his character as clearly displayed in his writings.

(i) It is almost impossible to open any page of his extant orations without finding abundant evidence that he was ἀνὴρ οἰόμενος πάνυ εἶναι σοφός (*Euthyd.* 304 D), one of those who οἶονται εἶναι πάντων σοφώτατοι ἀνθρώπων, πρὸς δὲ τῷ εἶναι καὶ δοκεῖν πάνυ παρὰ πολλοῖς (305 C). A single example must suffice, taken from the *Panegyrica* (43 D), an oration published in 380 B.C., when Isocrates was fifty-five years old: 'Ἐγὼ δ' ἦν μὴ καὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἀξίως εἶπω καὶ τῆς δόξης τῆς ἐμαντοῦ καὶ τοῦ χρόνου μὴ μόνον τοῦ περὶ τὸν λόγον ἡμῖν διατριφθέντος ἀλλὰ καὶ σύμπαντος οὐ βεβίωκα, παρακελεύομαι μηδεμίαν μοι συγγνώμην ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ καταγελᾶν καὶ καταφρονεῖν' οὐδὲν γὰρ ὃ τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἄξιός εἰμι πάσχειν, εἴπερ μηδὲν τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρων οὕτω μεγάλας ποιоῦμαι τὰς ὑποσχέσεις.

(ii) The next trait, τούτων τις τῶν περὶ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια δεινῶν (304 D, 305 B), is proved to be true of Isocrates by the fact that several of such speeches are included in his remaining works. But in his latter years he was very sore at being reminded of his former occupation: 'For I know that some of the Sophists speak ill of my occupation, and say that it has to do with writing speeches for the law-courts, and in this they act just as if one should dare to call Pheidias who built the temple of Athena a doll-maker (*κοροπλάθον*), or say that Zeuxis and Parrhasius practised the same art as the sign-painters: nevertheless I have never yet taken revenge for this their detraction' (*Antidosis*, 310 B).

(iii) The sentence ῥήτωρ τις, ἣ τῶν τοὺς τοιούτους εἰσπεμπόντων, ποιητῆς τῶν λόγων οἷς οἱ ῥήτορες ἀγωνίζονται; and Ἦκιστα νῆ τὸν Δία, ῥήτωρ, οὐδὲ οἶμαι πώποτ' αὐτὸν ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβεβηκέναι (*Euthyd.* 305 B-C) point evidently at Isocrates, who from timidity and weakness of health always shrank from appearing in person in any public assembly or court (Isocr. *Panathen.* 234 D). Cf. *Antid.* 318 A 'Ἐμέ δ' οὐδεὶς πώποθ' ἑώρακεν οὔτ' ἐν τοῖς συνεδρίοις οὔτε περὶ τὰς ἀνακρίσεις οὔτ' ἐπὶ τοῖς δικαστηρίοις οὔτε πρὸς τοῖς διαιτηταῖς, ἀλλ' οὕτως ἀπέχομαι τούτων ἀπάντων ὥς οὐδεὶς ἄλλος τῶν πολιτῶν.

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Plutarch in the *Life of Isocrates*, *Mor.* 837 A, says that the only speech he ever delivered in public was this, the *De Antidosis*, which we know was not composed till 355 B.C., when he was in his eighty-second year, long after the incident to which it refers: in fact Isocrates himself explains that it was only intended to show what his manner of life had been, and how he might have pleaded in excusing himself from undertaking the trierarchy, which he had actually accepted.

(iv) The next feature in the description of the unnamed writer of speeches is thoroughly characteristic of Isocrates. Οὔτοι γάρ εἰσι μὲν, ὃ Κρίτων, οὓς ἔφη Πρόδικος μεθόρια φιλοσόφου τε ἀνδρὸς καὶ πολιτικοῦ (*Euthyd.* 305 C). Σοφοὶ δὲ ἡγοῦνται εἶναι πάντ' εἰκότως· μετρίως μὲν γὰρ φιλοσοφίας ἔχειν, μετρίως δὲ πολιτικῶν, πάντ' ἐξ εἰκότος λόγου· μετέχειν γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων ὅσον ἔδει (*ibid.* 305 D).

In these passages 'we are inevitably reminded of the description of Isocrates in the *Phaedrus*, as one in whose genius ἐνεστί τις φιλοσοφία' (Thompson, *Phaedrus*, p. 181).

We may add that the two passages exactly summarize the meaning of a long passage in the *De Antidosis*, 276-290, in which Isocrates, after protesting against the Platonic philosophy (τὴν καλουμένην ὑπὸ τινων φιλοσοφίαν οὐκ εἶναι φημί) proceeds to say σοφοὺς μὲν νομίζω τοὺς ταῖς δόξαις ἐπιτυγχάνειν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῦ βελτίστου δυναμένους, φιλοσόφους δὲ τοὺς ἐν τούτοις διατρίβοντας ἐξ ὧν τάχιστα λήψονται τὴν τοιαύτην φρόνησιν.

'The finishing touch in the picture—(v) ἐκτὸς δὲ ὄντες κινδύνων καὶ ἀγώνων καρποῦσθαι τὴν σοφίαν—agrees perfectly with the account of himself and his own way of life, which is given by Isocrates with no little self-gratulation in the *Antidosis*' (Thompson, *ibid.*). See especially *Antid.* 162 τὴν μὲν ἡσυχίαν καὶ τὴν ἀπραγμοσύνην ἀγαπῶν . . . ἔπειτα τὸν βίον ἡδίω νομίσας εἶναι τοῦτον ἢ τὸν τῶν πολλὰ πραττόντων. The expression καρποῦσθαι τὴν σοφίαν and the synonymous phrase ἀπολέλαικα τοῦ πράγματος (*Antid.* 208) both refer to the enormous payments which Isocrates received for his teaching and his speeches. That he was the person to whom this description was meant to apply will be made even more evident when we come to examine a passage in which he is mentioned by name at the close of the *Phaedrus*. 'In fact the combination of a smattering of philosophy, a measure of political knowledge, great talent as

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a writer of forensic speeches, and a boundless and intolerant vanity, is one which we find in the writings of Isocrates and in no others of that epoch' (Thompson, p. 182).

'No one will doubt any more that the episode at the end of the dialogue is aimed against Isocrates' (Sudhaus, *Rhein. Mus.* xliv. 52). 'Hunc (Isocratem) esse anonymum de quo ibi sermo est, hodie inter omnes constat' (F. Susemihl, *De Plat. Phaedro et Isocr. c. Sophistas oratione*, p. xi).

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'The date of the *Euthydemus* we have absolutely no means of determining, and, if we set aside tradition, that of the *Phaedrus* may be said perhaps to be equally uncertain' (Thompson, *Phaedrus*, Appendix ii. 183).

After such a pronouncement from the late Master of Trinity it may appear presumptuous even to try to determine the approximate dates of the two dialogues, and their mutual relation. But the attempt, I believe, is not hopeless, and in any case can hardly fail to be instructive. Several of Dr. Thompson's own remarks seem to point to what we believe to be the right conclusion.

We have seen reason to believe that Isocrates, though not mentioned by name in the *Euthydemus*, is the person indicated by the description of the clever speech-writer (λογογράφος) at the end of the dialogue.

In the *Phaedrus* Isocrates is mentioned by name in a passage which we shall have to examine carefully in its bearing upon the connexion between the two Platonic dialogues and the relation of each to the oration of Isocrates *Against the Sophists*. Before entering upon this inquiry it is desirable to draw particular attention to the fact that the three works are all concerned with the merits and faults of rival methods of education as practised by the teachers of rhetoric, by the Sophists, and by Socrates and his followers.

We begin with the *Phaedrus*.

The question concerning the date of this dialogue is difficult and much disputed. The oldest opinion, dating from the third century after Christ, is the tradition mentioned by Diogenes Laertius in the *Life of Plato*, iii. 25 λόγος δὲ πρῶτον γράψαι αὐτὸν τὸν Φαῖδρον· καὶ γὰρ ἔχει μειρακιῶδές τι τὸ πρόβλημα. From the first scholion on

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the *Phaedrus* we learn that the tradition was repeated in the fifth century by Olympiodorus, the master of Proclus: the notion that it was founded by Diogenes on the authority of Euphron (c. 240 B.C.), Panaetius (c. 143 B.C.) arose from a corrupt reading in Diog. Laer. λόγον, corrected by Cobet to λόγος. Cf. Thompson, *Phaedrus*, xxiii. H. Usener, *Abfassungszeit des platonischen Phaidros*, assigns the dialogue to the first half of 402 B.C., partly, as it seems, on the ground of the tradition, and partly upon the erroneous notion of Spengel, that the *Karà τῶν Σοφιστῶν* of Isocrates was written as much as fifty years before the *Ἀντίδοσις*, on which see p. 32 below.

A comparison of the contents and character of the *Phaedrus* with those of the dialogues known to have been written before or soon after the death of Socrates, B.C. 399, shows beyond all question that so mature a work could not possibly have been written by so young a man as Plato was at the still earlier date to which the 'tradition' would assign it. 'When Socrates died, the philosophical education of Plato had but completed its first stage. The acquaintance with other more ambitious systems which his travels enabled him to acquire or to perfect, though it never disturbed his reverence for the teacher of his youth, greatly enlarged his views of philosophy and the philosophic calling' (Thompson, *Phaedrus*, p. 154).

On the other hand a very much later date is proposed by Lutoslawski, who adopts (p. 352) a short and easy method of solving the difficulty. 'Thompson has made it evident to the attentive reader of the four dissertations accompanying his edition of the *Phaedrus* (Introduction and three Appendices) that this dialogue was written after the *Panegyricus* of Isocrates, that is after 380; and before the death of Lysias, that is before 378. This is such an exact determination of date as is possible only for a very few Platonic dialogues.'

Every student of Plato would have reason to be grateful indeed to the author of this discovery, if it were true. But unfortunately it is based upon a misapprehension of Dr. Thompson's meaning; in a note on p. 178 of his edition he compares *Phaedr.* 167 A with Isocr. *Panegyricus*, § 8, and remarks that 'Plato jeeringly attributes this boast to Tisias and Gorgias: Isocrates adopts it as his own in perfect seriousness. The date of the *Panegyricus* is B.C. 380.'

This does not mean that the *Panegyricus* was written before the

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Phaedrus, but on the contrary that Isocrates seriously appropriates what Plato has previously held up to ridicule. That Isocrates was quite capable of doing this will appear in another instance presently: see p. 31.

Lutoslawski, however, adds a more important remark: 'The same argument has been independently and with far greater assurance produced by Teichmüller in 1881 (*Literarische Fehden*, vol. i. pp. 57-82), and has never been refuted.'

Teichmüller's long argument on *The Phaedrus of Plato and the Panegyricus of Isocrates* (*Lit. Fehd.* i. 3) is summarized by Lutoslawski, p. 348. It is based upon several fundamental errors.

(1) He misunderstands the ironical nature of the prophecy concerning Isocrates in *Phaedrus* 279, on which see p. 26 below.

(2) In particular he misapplies the words τοὺς λόγους οἷς νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖ, referring them to the time at which Plato wrote instead of the *scenic date* at which Socrates speaks.

(3) He makes the same mistake as Lutoslawski on the relation between the parallel passages *Phaedr.* 167 A and *Panegyrr.* § 8.

(4) He fails to notice the statement in the *Life of Isocrates* (Plut. ii. 837 F), that 'in composing the *Panegyricus* he spent ten years, and some say fifteen.' Cf. Quintil. *Inst. Orator.* x. 5: 'Panegyricum Isocratis, qui parcissime, decem annis dicunt elaboratum.'

If we adopt this 'most moderate' statement, it is still evident that the passage *Paneg.* § 8 may have been written at any time between 390 and 380 B.C., the date of publication, and could therefore afford no closer criterion of the relative date of the passage in the *Phaedrus*.

For more trustworthy evidence we must have recourse to an examination of the contents and purpose of the *Phaedrus* itself, and of any apparent allusions to it in other dialogues of Plato or Isocrates.

During the ten or eleven years that followed the death of Socrates (399 B.C.) Plato had written and studied and taught and travelled much. In the course of his travels there had been many opportunities for personal intercourse with the leaders of the chief schools of philosophy; at Megara with Eucleides, at Cyrene with Aristippus, at Tarentum with Archytas and other Pythagoreans, at Velia with the Eleatics, and in Sicily with the Sophistical rhetoricians of the school of Corax, Tisias, and Gorgias.

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On his return to Athens in 388 B.C. with this enlarged knowledge of the existing schools of philosophy, and with the principles of his own system more clearly defined and confirmed by comparison with others, Plato was fully prepared to take a leading part in education as a public teacher of philosophy. Accordingly in the year 387 B.C. he opened his famous school in the Academy.

In Athens at this time the field of education was chiefly occupied by two classes of teachers, both as bitterly opposed to Plato as they were to each other. His old enemies the Eristic Sophists had sunk to the lowest depths of chicanery and imposture, 'their only care being to make money from the young,' Isocr. *Hel. Encom.* 209 B, while 'they put so low a value on all the virtue and happiness which they professed to impart, that they were not ashamed to accept so little as three or four minae in payment,' *Adv. Sophist.* 291 D.

Isocrates himself was not less eager to make money, but on a far grander scale, and by more magnificent professions. From the time of Pericles oratory had been the ruling power in the state, and though its influence over the passions of the democracy had too often led to crime and disaster, it was still the favourite study of all young men whose wealth and ambition prompted them to seek power and fame in the arena of politics. Isocrates was their most popular and successful teacher: in politics his only moral standard was utility, and persuasion, not truth, the end and aim of his rhetorical art.

With the Sophists Plato had already dealt in several of his earlier dialogues, and was to deal with them again even more severely at a later period. His present purpose, carried out in the *Phaedrus*, was to expose the faults of the popular system of education founded upon a shallow rhetoric, and to show the superiority of a new dialectic based upon truer principles both of science and morality. The scene was laid in the lifetime of Socrates, and was to be the mouthpiece of a philosophy which, however enlarged and ennobled by the genius of Plato, was still faithful to the teaching of his master.

'For the purpose of a discussion on rhetoric as an instrument of education, Plato had to select a speech as an example to illustrate his views' (Lutosl. p. 327). At the date when the discourse between Socrates and Phaedrus was supposed to be held, Isocrates was too young to be introduced as the most eminent rhetorician of

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the day. An older man must be taken, and it was natural to select the orator Lysias who had long enjoyed the highest reputation as a writer of speeches intended for the law-courts (*Phaedr.* 228 A, 257 B.C.). Before he became famous by his accusation of Eratosthenes (403 B.C.) he had been a teacher of rhetoric, and the written essay ascribed to him in the *Phaedrus* was probably a school-exercise of that earlier period. Cf. Lutosl. p. 327.

He is severely and justly censured by Socrates, first for the choice of such a subject, the essay being one of those ἐρωτικοὶ λόγοι of which Lysias is said to have been the first author: cf. Thompson, *Phaedr.* pp. 82, 102. When Socrates consents to show how the same subject might have been more ably and more modestly treated, he says, 'I will put a veil over my face and run through the discourse as fast as I can, lest if I look at you I should not know what to say for shame.' But the criticism of Socrates is directed chiefly against the rhetorical faults in the essay of Lysias, who 'seemed to have said the same things two or three times over, like one too barren of matter to be able to say many things on one subject . . . Also he appeared to me to make an ostentatious display of his skill in two different ways, both equally excellent as he flattered himself' (*Phaedr.* 235 A, Thompson). Again the arguments used by Lysias are described as mere commonplace platitudes, which even the worst of writers could not fail to use: they may be allowed and excused; there is no merit in inventing them, but only in the arrangement (236 A). Then after showing in an extemporary speech how the same subject might have been treated more skilfully and more effectively even on the principles of the rhetoric then in vogue, Socrates continues his criticism: 'It was a dreadful argument, *Phaedrus*, that of the speech which you brought with you, and of that which you made me utter . . . Silly and somewhat impious, and nothing could be worse than that. For if Love be something divine, he cannot be evil, though that was what both our speeches said of him. Their simplicity also was quite amusing, that having no truth nor honesty in them they made a solemn pretence of importance, in the hope of deceiving a few mannikins, and being admired by them' (243 A).

The censure was severe, and was as applicable to Isocrates as to Lysias; but Plato's purpose required yet more: it was neces-

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sary not only to criticize the defects of the fashionable rhetoric, but also to prove the superiority of his own.

Socrates therefore proceeds (244 A) to give a definition of love as a species of divine madness. The soul, he argues, both divine and human, is immortal: its proper food is beauty, wisdom, and goodness, and its triple form—desire, energy (*θυμικόν*), and reason—may be described under the image of a charioteer borne upward by winged steeds. Then in an allegory unrivalled even in Plato for brilliancy of imagination, glowing splendour of language, and sublime speculation, he shows how by the aid of philosophy the love of beauty may rise as in that winged car to a realm beyond the bounds of matter and space and time, even to the heaven of heavens where justice, temperance, and knowledge absolute dwell ever unseen by mortal eye.

At the close of his second speech Socrates offers a prayer to Eros to forgive the faults of the two former speeches, laying the blame upon Lysias for choosing such a subject, instead of studying philosophy like his brother Polemarchus (257 A, B).

In the remainder of the dialogue Socrates proposes a scheme of rhetoric founded on true principles of science and morality (259 E, 260 A).

Among the essential requirements are (1) accurate knowledge, and observance of truth and justice (260 C); (2) clear definition (265 B); (3) organic arrangement (264 D); (4) generalization by concepts (265 D); (5) classification or division into species (265 E).

‘Dialectic’ thus described is then contrasted with the barren technicalities of the popular rhetoric (266 D–267 E), such as we see exposed in the *Euthydemus*.

Further, the ‘dialectician’ must understand the motives and principles of human action, and the ‘varieties of human character, upon which he has to work in producing that “Persuasion” which is acknowledged to be the final cause of his art’ (271 A–272 B; Thompson, Introduction, p. xiv). In short, true rhetoric must be based upon philosophy and morality. It is thus apparent that the *Phaedrus* is throughout a severe criticism of the kind of rhetoric of which Lysias and Isocrates were the most eminent professors: and ‘if no names of contemporaries had been mentioned, it would not have been unreasonable to suspect that he (Isocrates) and not

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Lysias was the orator at whom Plato's censures were principally aimed' (Thompson, p. 178). In the conclusion of the dialogue they are both brought forward by name. Lysias is to be told that 'He who cannot rise above his own compilations and compositions, which he has been long turning and twisting this way and that, combining or separating one part and another, may be called poet or speech-maker, or writer of laws,' 278 E. Here the words *ἀνω κάτω στρέφων ἐν χρόνῳ, πρὸς ἄλλα κολλῶν τε καὶ ἀφαιρῶν*, 'long patching and piecing' (Jowett), though addressed to Lysias are far more applicable to Isocrates, who was said to have spent ten or even fifteen years over his Panegyric oration, and was so long in composing a letter in the name of the Athenian state to persuade Philip to make peace, that peace was made long before the letter was ready.

In 278 E Phaedrus asks, 'What message will you send to Isocrates the fair?' and the answer is, 'Isocrates is still young, Phaedrus; but I am willing to tell you what I prophesy concerning him. I think he has a genius which rises above the orations of Lysias, and a moral character of finer mould. So I should not wonder if, as he grows older, he should both surpass all rivals in his present occupation of writing speeches, and becoming dissatisfied with this should be led on to higher things by some diviner impulse: for there is by nature a sort of philosophy in the man's intellect.'

At the time when Plato wrote, this pretended prophecy had been in part fulfilled, and in part already falsified: Isocrates had become the most eminent of rhetoricians, and the bitterest enemy of what Plato taught as the only true philosophy. What then are we to think of this apparent compliment? Was it sincere or ironical? Or partly ironical and partly sincere? The date to be assigned to the *Phaedrus*, and its relation to the fragmentary oration of Isocrates *Against the Sophists*, depend in great measure on the answers to be given to these questions.

Cicero, a professed admirer of Isocrates, says that with this testimony of Plato in his favour he may disregard all other criticism (*Orator* xiii. 40). Then, after translating the passage of the *Phaedrus*, Cicero adds (42) 'Haec de adolescente Socrates auguratur: at ea de seniore scribit Plato et scribit aequalis, et quidem exagitator omnium rhetorum hunc miratur unum. Me autem qui

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Isocratem non diligunt una cum Socrate et cum Platone errare patiantur.'

Diogenes Laertius in his *Life of Plato* (iii. 9) says that he was a friend of Isocrates, resting his statement on no better reason than the fact that Praxiphanes the Peripatetic wrote a dialogue in which Plato and Isocrates were represented as holding a discussion on the Poets, the scene being laid in Plato's country house.

In recent times the question before us has been much discussed by German scholars, and by none more fully than by Eugen Holzner, *Plato's Phaedrus und die Sophistenrede des Isokrates*, Prag, 1894. He writes thus (p. 5): 'In an unprejudiced view there can be no doubt of one thing, that in those words Plato bestows real praise upon Isocrates; hereby the prophecy gains literary importance: for it must be compared with the fact that Plato and Isocrates were at open enmity. This points out the proper path of inquiry, for the business now is to seek in the works of both writers for the evidence of that former agreement of sentiment.'

Holzner then proceeds to compare the *Phaedrus* and the *Katὰ τῶν Σοφιστῶν* not with an unprejudiced mind but with the preconceived idea that 'if in the *Phaedrus* Plato appropriated thoughts of Isocrates, it will be easier to understand that he wished to speak of him in eulogistic terms in the conclusion of the work.'

This notion that Plato had borrowed his ideas from Isocrates is directly contrary to the judgement of some of the ablest students of Plato.

'Usener asserts (*Rhein. Mus.* xxxi. p. 21) that in the *Katὰ τῶν Σοφιστῶν* there is a distinct borrowing, sometimes even word for word, from the *Phaedrus*.' To this Holzner can only oppose the very feeble objection that 'Usener has omitted to prove that the relation which he establishes from the passages themselves is the only one possible.'

The passages chiefly discussed and compared are the following:—

Phaedrus 269 D.

Isocr. *Or.* xiii. § 20.

Τὸ μὲν δύνασθαι, ὦ Φαῖδρε, ὥστε δεῖν τὸν μὲν μαθητὴν πρὸς τῷ
ἀγωνιστὴν τέλειον γενέσθαι, εἰκός, τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν οἷαν χρὴ τὰ μὲν

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ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, ἔχειν ὥσπερ
τᾶλλα. Εἰ μὲν σοι ὑπάρχει φύσει
ρήτορικῶ εἶναι, ἔσει ῥήτωρ ἐλλόγι-
μος προσλαβὼν ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ
μελέτην, ὅτου δ' ἂν ἐλλίπης τού-
των, ταύτῃ ἀτελὴς ἔσει. Ὅσον δὲ
αὐτοῦ τέχνη, οὐχ ἧ Λυσίας τε καὶ
Θρασύμαχος πορεύεται δοκεῖ μοι
φαίνεσθαι ἢ μέθοδος.

εἶδη τὰ τῶν λόγων μαθεῖν, περὶ δὲ
τὰς χρήσεις αὐτῶν γυμνασθῆναι . . .
καὶ τούτων μὲν ἀπάντων συμπεσόν-
των τελείως ἔξουσιν οἱ φιλοσο-
φούντες. Καθ' ὃ δ' ἂν ἐλλειφθῇ τι
τῶν εἰρημένων, ἀνάγκη ταύτῃ χεῖρον
διακεῖσθαι τοὺς πλησιάζοντας.

According to Plato the power of becoming a perfect orator depends upon the possession of three necessary qualifications, i. A natural faculty for speaking, ii. Knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*), iii. Careful practice.

These are all indispensable: if either be wanting, the man will be in this respect imperfect. 'But so far as it is technical (*αὐτοῦ* = τοῦ δύνασθαι ὥστε ἀγωνιστὴν τέλεον γενέσθαι), the true method is not shown, I think, in the way by which Lysias and Thrasymachus proceed.'

Both Lysias and Thrasymachus had published manuals of the art of Rhetoric (*τέχνη ρητορική*), but these technical rules are expressly rejected by Plato both here and in other passages of the dialogue; cf. *Phaedr.* 269 B τὰ πρὸ τῆς τέχνης ἀναγκαῖα μαθήματα ἔχοντες ρητορικὴν ᾗθησαν ἡυρηκέναι: 271 C οἱ νῦν γράφοντες, ὧν σὺ ἀκήκοας, τέχνας λόγων πανοῦργοί εἰσι: 266 D where the usual contents of such manuals are described: see also Aristot. *Soph. Elench.* xxxiii. οὐ γὰρ τέχνην ἀλλὰ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης διδόντες παιδεύειν ὑπελάμβανον.

The real art is described by Socrates, *Phaedr.* 271 D, and consists of (1) 'a dialectical training enabling the man to "divide" and to "collect," and (2) the power of applying his science to human nature and its varieties' (Thompson): compare with this the description of a true scheme of rhetoric on p. 25 of this Introduction.

Against this usual and natural interpretation of the passage Holzner argues that 'If *ἐπιστήμη* in 269 D already meant that later Dialectic and Psychology, it would be inconceivable that Plato in the words ὅσον δὲ αὐτοῦ τέχνη denies to this orator any participation in the art. But Plato, as I believe, shows clearly enough

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what he understands by ἐπιστήμη, the mechanical instrument of Rhetoric.'

On this paradoxical interpretation Lutoslawski justly remarks (341, note)—'Strangely enough this knowledge (ἐπιστήμη, 262 D) has been misunderstood by many interpreters, as if it meant knowledge of the rules of rhetoric. Even E. Holzner, who corrects the error of those who identified this ἐπιστήμη with the following τέχνη, falls into an almost worse error in asserting the identity of ἐπιστήμη in this passage with τὰ πρὸ τῆς τέχνης ἀναγκαῖα μαθήματα 269 B.'

In the two passages thus compared it is, I think, evident that Isocrates is commenting on Plato, and adopting his thoughts so far as they can be fitted to his own more meagre art of Rhetoric. There is then no evidence, so far, that Plato having borrowed from Isocrates was anxious to propitiate him by a compliment in the close of the dialogue.

In passing to the examination of that passage we must first consider the previous state of feeling between Plato and Isocrates. There had been an enmity of long standing between the rhetoricians and Socrates and his followers. They had their representative at his trial, one of the three accusers being the orator Lycon. 'Socrates had offended them by his incessant censure of those who exercised professions of the principles of which they could give no intelligent account' (Riddell, *Apology*, x); and this 'enmity of the rhetoricians extended itself after Socrates' death to the Socratists' (ibid. p. xii, note). Of Plato's bitter resentment and continued censure there is abundant evidence in his earlier dialogues. Thus in the *Gorgias*, 503 A, Socrates describes two kinds of rhetoric, 'the one a trick of flattery and a base kind of popular declaration, the other noble, being the attempt to improve to the utmost the souls of the citizens, and the earnest striving to say what is best, whether that will prove more or less agreeable to the audience.' 'But such rhetoric as this,' says Socrates, 'you never yet saw; or if you have any one of this sort to point out among the orators, let me know at once who he is.' 'No, by my faith,' Callicles answers, 'I cannot name you any one, at any rate of the orators of the present day.'

Again, *Gorg.* 520 A, 'The Sophist and the rhetorician are the same thing, or as nearly as possible alike, as I said to Polus: but you for want of knowledge think the one, rhetoric, a very fine thing, and

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the other you despise. Whereas in truth sophistic is a finer thing than rhetoric.

Having thus ascertained the previous state of Plato's feeling towards Isocrates, we may now proceed to consider the exact meaning of the supposed compliment.

We notice first the manner in which the name of Isocrates is introduced: it shows that, though he had not been hitherto mentioned in the dialogue, its criticisms had been intended for him as well as for Lysias.

'*Soc.* Go then and tell this to your companion.

Phaedr. But what are you going to do yourself? For your own companion must by no means be passed over.

Soc. Whom do you mean?

Phaedr. The fair Isocrates. What message will you carry to him? What shall we say of him?

Soc. Isocrates is still young, Phaedrus. I am willing, however, to tell you what I prophesy of him.'

At the *scenic* date of this conversation Isocrates was barely thirty, and being twenty-two years junior to Lysias is naturally described as still young. Socrates of course speaks of him as a former companion with all kindness and courtesy, and goes on to recognize his undoubted merits, as compared with Lysias, his superior genius and finer temperament. So far all is sincere praise, undeniably true, and expressed without a touch of irony. The expectation of Socrates that as years went on he would far surpass all competitors in the kind of speeches on which he was at that time engaged, had been amply fulfilled, and Plato does not fail to recognize fully the great ability and success of Isocrates. And yet his praise would not be altogether welcome. The speeches on which he had been engaged in the lifetime of Socrates might not altogether satisfy him. This also had come to pass; but it was a sore subject with Isocrates, as we have seen above in the passage of the *Antidosis* 310 B quoted above on p. 18, and Plato's allusion to it could hardly be felt as a sincere compliment.

In further fulfilment of the prophecy Isocrates had become dissatisfied with writing forensic speeches (*δικογραφία*), and adopted a style of oratory as far superior to that as the work of Pheidias to that of a doll-maker.

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Finally Socrates expresses a hope that he may be attracted to philosophy for which he showed a natural capacity: and in fact, Isocrates was fond of dignifying his new style of oratory with the name of philosophy, though fully conscious that it was something totally different from what Socrates and Plato meant by philosophy, and that the modified admission *ἐνεστί τις φιλοσοφία* was not altogether complimentary. On the whole it seems impossible to doubt that while the pretended prophecy acknowledges the real merits of Isocrates, its praises are not unmixed with a delicate vein of satire which Isocrates could not fail to recognize.

If we now turn to the fragmentary oration of Isocrates *Katà τῶν Σοφιστῶν*, we find that in the very first words (291 A) he finds fault with the large professions of persons 'undertaking the work of education,' as Plato we know was, and especially condemns the pretension to prophesy, which had been made by some rival teacher: 'For it is evident, I suppose, to all that foreknowledge of the future is not within the power of our nature . . . and this is one of the things impossible to man.' Then a little farther on, *c. Soph.* 293 B (a passage which has received less notice than it deserves), he clearly refers again to the prophecy concerning himself in the *Phaedrus*, and tries to appropriate the ambiguous compliment, as if it were in fact well deserved: 'I should have thought it a priceless gain if there had been in philosophy so great a power as these men say; for I perhaps should not have been the hindmost therein, nor would my share have been the smallest.'

It seems impossible to doubt that in these passages there is a direct answer to the prophecy in the *Phaedrus*, and this conclusion will be confirmed by the comparison in parallel columns of the original words of these and other passages of the two dialogues, which will be found at the end of this section of the Introduction, p. 33.

We therefore agree with Zeller (*Plato*, 132, note 94) that 'Spengel is certainly right in believing that the *Phaedrus* must have been written before the speech of Isocrates *Against the Sophists*.'

Spengel's conclusion is contained in his article *Isokrates und Plato* in the *Abh. d. Akad. d. Wissenschaften zu München*, vol. vii. pp. 729-769. His argument is founded on the statements of Isocrates in the speech *De Antidosi* written in the year 355 B.C., when Isocrates was eighty-two years of age, as he is careful to mention, § 312 A:

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ἔγραφον τὸν λόγον τοῦτον οὐκ ἀκμάζων ἀλλ' ἔτη γεγωνὼς δύο καὶ ὀγδοήκοντα. In this same speech, § 207, the latter half of the speech *Against the Sophists* was recited by Isocrates 'in more elegant language, but with the same meaning as before,' οὐ γὰρ ὅτε μὲν ἦν νεώτερος ἀλαζονεύμενος φαίνομαι καὶ μεγάλας τὰς ὑποσχέσεις ποιούμενος, ἐπειδὴ δ' ἀπολέλauκαι τοῦ πράγματος καὶ πρεσβύτερος γέγονα, τηνικαῦτα ταπεινὴν ποιῶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς αὐτοῖς λόγοις χρώμενος ἀκμάζων καὶ πανόμενος αὐτῆς (v. l. ἀκμῆς).

From the words ὅτε νεώτερος ἦν and ἀκμάζων Spengel argues (p. 751) that the speech *Against the Sophists* must have been written fifty years before the *De Antidosi*, i.e. about the year 405 B.C., six years before the death of Socrates, and when Plato was about twenty-three years old.

This palpable mistake is due to a misunderstanding of the words νεώτερος and ἀκμάζων. Aristotle says that the soul is at its prime about the age of forty-nine years (*Rhet.* ii. 14, 4). Now, when an old man of eighty-two speaks of what he has done when he was 'younger' and 'in his prime,' adding that he is no longer 'in his prime,' but 'declining from it,' he does not mean to speak of a time fifty years ago, but thirty or five-and-thirty at most, i.e. between B. C. 390 (the date supposed by Lutoslawski) and B. C. 385. In this interval, namely in B. C. 388 or 387, Plato began to teach in the Academy. Stallbaum in his *Prolegomena* to the *Phaedrus* has shown, I think, good reason for believing that it was written at this time, and Zeller is of the same opinion. If this view be accepted, the order of the three works in question will be as follows:

(1) Plato, *Phaedrus*, (2) Isocrates, *Against the Sophists*, (3) Plato, *Euthydemus*. The three dialogues will thus have been all published within two or three years after B. C. 388, in which year Plato was forty-one and Isocrates forty-eight years old.

'There is no contradiction,' writes Lutoslawski (p. 211), 'from the standpoint either of logical or of stylistic development in admitting the close relation between the *Euthydemus* and Isocrates' discourse *Against the Sophists*. This relation, first noticed by Spengel and Thompson, has been since investigated by Teichmüller, Sudhaus, Dümmler, and recognized by Zeller and Susemihl, without any noteworthy opposition. According to these investigations the

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Euthydemus must have been published not before 390 and probably not much later.'

That Isocrates in the oration *Against the Sophists* is referring to Plato's *Phaedrus* will, I think, be placed beyond doubt if we set a few selected passages opposite to each other in parallel columns.

I. ON PROPHESYING.

Phaedr. 278 E Νέος ἔτι, ὦ Φαῖδρε, Ἰσοκράτης· ὁ μέντοι μαντεύομαι κατ' αὐτοῦ, λέγειν ἐθέλω.

242 C εἰμὶ δὴ οὖν μάντις.

244 C τῇ καλλίστῃ τέχνῃ, ἥ τὸ μέλλον κρίνεται.

ISOCR. 291 B εὐθὺς δ' ἐν ἀρχῇ τῶν ἐπαγγελμάτων ψευδῇ λέγειν ἐπιχειροῦσιν· οἶμαι γὰρ ἅπασιν εἶναι φανερόν ὅτι τὰ μέλλοντα προ- γιγνώσκειν οὐ τῆς ἡμετέρας φύσεως ἐστίν.

292 C περὶ μὲν τῶν μελλόντων εἰδέναι προσποιουμένους.

II. ON THE RELATION OF ISOCRATES HIMSELF TO PHILOSOPHY.

Phaedr. 279 A φύσει γάρ, ὦ φίλε, ἔνεστί τις φιλοσοφία τῇ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς διανοία.

ISOCR. 293 B Ἐγὼ δὲ πρὸ πολλῶν μὲν ἂν χρημάτων ἐτιμωσάμην τηλικούτον δύνασθαι τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, ὅσον οὗτοι λέγουσιν· ἴσως γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἡμεῖς πλείστον ἀπελείφθμεν, οὐδ' ἂν ἐλάχιστον μέρος ἀπελαύσαμεν αὐτῆς. id. *De Antidosis* 289 τὴν καλουμένην ὑπό τινων φιλοσοφίαν οὐκ εἶναι φημί.

III. ON THE INFERIORITY OF OPINION (δόξα) TO KNOWLEDGE (ἐπιστήμη).

Phaedr. 248 B ἀτελεῖς τῆς τοῦ ὄντος θέας ἀπέρχονται (αἱ ψυχαί), καὶ ἀπελθοῦσαι τροφῇ δοξαστῇ χρῶνται, 'feed on the chaff and husks of opinion' (Thompson).

260 C ὅταν οὖν ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἀγρῶν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν . . . δόξας δὲ πλήθους μεμελετηκῶς πείσῃ

ISOCR. 292 C Ἐπειδὰν κατίδωσι . . . μάλλον ὁμοροοῦντας καὶ πλείω κατορθοῦντας τοὺς ταῖς δόξαις χρωμένους ἢ τοὺς τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν ἐπαγγελλομένους κτλ.

294 D ταῦτα δὲ πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας δεῖσθαι καὶ ψυχῆς ἀνδρικῆς καὶ δοξαστικῆς ἔργον εἶναι.

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κακὰ πράττειν ἀντ' ἀγαθῶν, ποῖόν τιν' ἂν οἶε μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν ῥητορικὴν καρπὸν ὧν ἔσπειρε θερίζειν;

262 B λόγων ἄρα τέχνην, ὃ ἑταίρε, ὃ τὴν ἀλήθειαν μὴ εἰδώς, δόξας δὲ τεθηρευκώς, γελοῖαν τινά, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ἄτεχρον παρέξεται.

[That this was the fixed opinion of Isocrates is seen in a later dialogue *Panathenaiicus* 234 D, where he describes his own genius as πρὸς τοὺς λόγους οὐ τελείαν οὔτε πανταχῇ χρησίμην, ἀλλὰ δοξάσαι μὲν περὶ ἐκάστου τὴν ἀλήθειαν μᾶλλον δυναμένην τῶν εἰδέναι φασκόντων.]

291 B προσποιῶνται μὲν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ζητεῖν.

IV. ON THE COMPARATIVE MERITS OF WRITTEN AND ORAL DISCOURSE.

Phaedr. 275 A καὶ νῦν σύ, πατήρ ὧν γραμμάτων, δι' εὐνοίαν τοῦναντίον εἶπες ἢ δύναται. τοῦτο γὰρ τῶν μαθόντων λήθην μὲν ἐν ψυχαῖς παρέξει μνήμης ἀμελετησίᾳ, ἅτε διὰ πίστιν γραφῆς ἔξωθεν ὑπ' ἀλλοτρίων τύπων, οὐκ ἔνδον αὐτοὺς ὑφ' αὐτῶν ἀναμνησκομένους. Οὐκ οὖν μνήμης ἀλλ' ὑπομνήσεως φάρμακον εὔρες· σοφίας δὲ τοῖς μαθηταῖς δόξαν οὐκ ἀλήθειαν πορίζεις.

275 D Οὐκοῦν ὁ τέχνην οἰόμενος ἐν γράμμασι καταλιπεῖν καὶ αὖ ὁ παραδεχόμενος ὥς τι σαφές καὶ βέβαιον ἐκ γραμμάτων ἐσόμενον πολλῆς ἂν εὐηθείας γέμοι.

278 A ἐν δὲ τοῖς διδασκομένοις καὶ μαθήσεως χάριν λεγομένοις καὶ τῷ ὄντι γραφομένοις ἐν ψυχῇ περὶ δικαίων τε καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐν μόνοις (τούτοις) τό τε ἐναργὲς εἶναι καὶ τέλεον καὶ ἄξιον σπουδῆς.

ISOCT. 293 C Θαυμάζω δ' ὅταν ἴδω τούτους μαθητῶν ἀξιουμένους, οἱ ποιητικοῦ πράγματος τεταγμένην τέχνην παράδειγμα φέροντες λεληθάσι σφᾶς αὐτοὺς. τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδε πλὴν τούτων ὅτι τὸ μὲν τῶν γραμμάτων ἀκινήτως ἔχει καὶ μένει κατὰ ταυτόν, ὥστε τοῖς αὐτοῖς αἰεὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν χρώμενοι διατελοῦμεν, τὸ δὲ τῶν λόγων πᾶν τοῦναντίον πέπονθεν.

293 E τοῖς δὲ γράμμασιν οὐδενὸς τούτων προσεδέχσεν· ὥσθ' οἱ χρώμενοι τοῖς τοιούτοις παραδείγμασι πολὺ ἂν δικαιοτέρον ἀποτίνοιεν ἢ λαμβάνοιεν ἀργύριον, ὅτι πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας αὐτοὶ δεόμενοι παιδεύειν τοὺς ἄλλους ἐπιχειροῦσιν.

In these two passages Isocrates treats the opinion expressed in the *Phaedrus* as a mere platitude known to every body, and proving its author to be unfit for a teacher.

VI. LOGICAL PRINCIPLES AND FALLACIES

V. ON THE IMPORTANCE OF PHILOSOPHY.

239 B πολλῶν μὲν ἄλλων συνουσιῶν ἀπείργοντα καὶ ὠφελίμων ὄθεν ἂν μάλιστα ἂν ἡρ γίγνοιτο, μεγάλης αἰτίον εἶναι βλάβης, μεγίστης δὲ τῆς ὄθεν ἂν φρονιμώτατος εἴη· τοῦτο δὲ ἡ θεία φιλοσοφία τυγχάνει ὄν.

ISOCT. 294 A ἡγοῦμαι πάντας ἂν μοι τοὺς εὖ φρονούντας συνειπεῖν ὅτι πολλοὶ μὲν τῶν φιλοσοφησάντων ἰδιῶται διετελεσαν ὄντες, ἄλλοι δὲ τινες οὐδενὶ πώποτε συγγενόμενοι τῶν σοφιστῶν καὶ λέγειν καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι δεινοὶ γεγόνασιν.

VI. LOGICAL PRINCIPLES AND FALLACIES.

The chief instrument employed by the Sophists in their discussions was the ‘Sophistical Elenchus,’ a seeming but not real refutation of the opponent’s statement. The various forms of this device are fully described in a treatise ascribed to Aristotle and entitled *De Sophisticis Elenchis*. ‘Of confutation there are two kinds; for some depend on the language, and others are independent of the language. The causes dependent on language which produce the false appearance of reasoning are six in number’ (*Soph. El.* iv. 525). These are ‘Equivocation’ the ambiguity of a term (ὁμωνυμία), the ambiguity of a proposition (ἀμφιβολία), false composition (σύνθεσις), false disjunction (διαίρεσις), wrong accentuation (προσφθία), formation of words (σχῆμα λέξεως).

This arrangement was retained by subsequent writers on Logic, as for instance by Aldrich, whose explanation of the several fallacies will be found in Mansel’s *Artis Logicae Rudimenta*, Appendix, pp. 133 ff.

In the *Euthydemus* we have first several examples of the fallacy of *Equivocation*.

(i) 275 D 3 πότεροί εἰσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μανθάνοντες, οἱ σοφοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς;

(ii) 276 D 7 Πότερον γὰρ οἱ μανθάνοντες μανθάνουσιν ἢ ἐπίστανται ἢ ἄ μὴ ἐπίστανται;

The explanation is given by Plato himself in 277 E, where Socrates comforts Cleinias by telling him that the Sophists wish to teach him first the right use of words, that μανθάνω may mean

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either to acquire knowledge of something previously unknown, or to examine and understand (συνιέναι) it by the use of such knowledge.

The same explanation is given in Aristot. *Soph. El.* iv. 1 Εἰσὶ δὲ παρὰ μὲν τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν οἱ τοιοῖδε τῶν λόγων, οἷον ὅτι μανθάνουσιν οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι . . . τὸ γὰρ μανθάνειν ὁμώνυμον, τό τε ξυνιέναι χρώμενον τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τὸ λαμβάνειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην.

We observe also that the words σοφοί, ἀμαθεῖς, and ἐπίσταμαι are all used equivocally in the discussion of these two questions.

(iii) 283 D Οὐκοῦν ὅς μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, βούλεσθε αὐτὸν γενέσθαι, ὅς δ' ἔστι νῦν, μηκέτι εἶναι. The pronoun ὅς is here equivocal, being used both in its proper sense as referring to a person and in an adjectival sense like οἶος.

(iv) 283 E 9 Πότερον λέγοντα τὸ πρᾶγμα περὶ οὗ ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾖ, ἢ μὴ λέγοντα; Here also λέγειν is used in two different senses, either 'to speak of a thing,' or to 'speak (i. e. utter) a word.' 'Scilicet is qui loquitur, loquitur de re aliqua, nec nisi improprie dicitur rem loqui. Verba igitur, quae faciat loquens, omnino exsistunt et vere sunt; sed nisi res exsistant et eundem ad modum quo verba prae se ferunt ea non sunt vera' (Routh).

The original question out of which this equivocation arises, ἡ δοκεῖ σοι οἶόν τ' εἶναι ψεῦδεσθαι, is discussed at great length in *Cratyl.* 385 B, and again *Soph.* 236 E-246 A, where after examining the many difficulties involved in the dogma of Parmenides 'that not-being is' Plato comes to the conclusion that the nature of 'being' is quite as difficult to define as that of 'not-being' (ὅτι τὸ ὄν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲν εὐπορώτερον εἰπεῖν ὃ τι ποτ' ἔστιν).

(v) 284 C 2 οὐκ ἄρα τά γε μὴ ὄντα, ἔφη, λέγει οὐδεῖς. Again the fallacy lies in the assumption that to speak or think of a *thing* is the same as *doing* something to the thing itself, thereby making it a *real object* (ὥστε καὶ εἶναι ποιήσειεν ἂν καὶ ὅστις οὖν τὰ μηδαμοῦ ὄντα;) 284 B 6.

I do not understand how Bonitz explains this and the two preceding fallacies as dependent upon the identification of subject and predicate, i. e. that the λόγος τοῦ πράγματος is the same as the thing itself.

(vi) 284 D I εἰσὶ γάρ τινες οἱ λέγουσι τὰ πράγματα ὥς ἔχει; As used by Ctesippus ὥς ἔχει refers only to the true relation between

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subject and predicate, as in *Cratyl.* 385 B Ἄρ' οὖν οὗτος, ὃς ἂν τὰ ὄντα λέγῃ ὡς ἔστιν, ἀληθής· ὃς δ' ἂν ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, ψευδής; but Dionysodorus makes ὡς ἔχει refer to the conditions or qualities of the subject, and afterwards seeks refuge from the sarcasm of Ctesippus, 284 D 2, in the ambiguous use of κακῶς λέγειν, a fallacy παρ' ἀμφιβολίαν: *Sophist. El.* iv. 4.

(vii) 285 D 7 Ὡς ὄντος, ἔφη, τοῦ ἀντιλέγειν . . . ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους; Every thing has its own proper definition. If two men give the proper definition (λόγον), there is no contradiction.

If they give different definitions, they are not speaking of the same thing, and again there is no contradiction.

This rests on the assumption that the definition given, i. e. the predicate, is identical with the subject (Bonitz).

(viii) 287 C 1 τί . . . νοεῖ τοῦτο τὸ ῥήμα; Here νοεῖ is applied metaphorically to a thing without life, and the Sophist immediately seizes on the ambiguous use of the word: cf. 305 A παντὸς δὲ ῥήματος ἀντέχονται. This is an example of the second kind of ambiguity, in the use of a word in a sense which is customary but not proper (ὅταν εἰωθότες ὤμεν οὕτω λέγειν, *Soph.* *El.* iv. 4). Socrates is willing to admit his error, only it had been argued (287 A) that to err is impossible.

(ix) 293 C 4 οὐκ ἀνάγκη σε ἔχει πάντα ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιστήμονά γε ὄντα; This and several following arguments of the Sophists are examples of the fallacy 'a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter,' which is described in Aristot. *Soph.* *El.* iv. 10 τὸ ἀπλῶς, ἢ μὴ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ πῇ ἢ ποῦ ἢ ποτὲ ἢ πρὸς τι λέγεσθαι.

(x) 295 E 4 πότερον ἐπίστασαί τω ἀ ἐπίστασαι ἢ οὐ; The Sophist proceeds to argue that since Socrates 'knows all things (that he knows) always (by the same faculty),' therefore 'he knows all things always,' the limitations being disregarded. This argument is closed by a *reductio ad absurdum*, when Socrates asks (296 E 4), 'Do I know that the good are unjust?' Dionysodorus admits that Socrates does not know this, and so does not know all things.

The only resource left to the Sophists is to refuse to answer the questions of Socrates, and to insist on his answering a series of captious quibbles which they hang upon any convenient word that is casually employed by him. This neglect of methodical arrange-

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ment, far from being a fault, is part of Plato's artistic imitation of the eristic mode of argument, while he yet 'allows a definite order to peep out in this seemingly arbitrary irregularity' (Bonitz, 259, note 7).

(xi) Thus 297 E 5 Patrocles the half-brother of Socrates both *is* and *is not* his brother. Chaeredemus the father of Patrocles not being Sophroniscus the father of Socrates both is and is not a father, and Sophroniscus being different from a father (Chaeredemus) is not a father, and Socrates had no father.

(xii) 298 C 2 ἡ οἱ τὸν αὐτὸν πατέρα ὄντα οὐ πατέρα εἶναι; Hence a father of one is a father of all, and the father and mother of Euthydemus are father and mother of all kinds of animals, and Euthydemus brother of puppies and little pigs.

(xiii) 298 E 3. The dog is *yours*, Ctesippus, and he is the *father* of puppies, therefore he is *your father*, and you the puppies brother. Cf. *Soph. EL.* xxiv. 2 Ἄρ' ὁ ἀνδριᾶς σὸν ἐστὶν ἔργον, ἡ σὸς ὁ κύων πατήρ; *ibid.* 4 οἶον εἰ ὅδε ἐστὶ πατήρ, ἔστι δὲ σός. Cf. 298 C 4.

(xiv) 299 A 6. That no one wants good things in great quantities, being proved in the case of medicine, is assumed to be true universally.

Thus in the group ix-xiv the arguments of the Sophists all involve the fallacy of omitting all limitations, and passing arbitrarily 'a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter.'

(xv) 300 A 4 δυνατὰ οὖν ὄρᾶν ἐστὶ ταῦτα. Cf. *Soph. EL.* iv. 527 καὶ ἄρα ὁ ὄρᾶ τις, τοῦτο ὄρᾶ; ὄρᾶ δὲ τὸν κίονα, ὥστε ὄρᾶ ὁ κίων. Here τοῦτο is ambiguous; it may mean either τὸν κίονα or ὁ κίων. Cf. Poste, *Soph. EL.* p. 105. Cf. 300 A 2, note.

(xvi) 300 B 1 ἡ γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν τε σιγῶντα λέγειν; Cf. *Soph. EL.* iv. 523 καὶ ἄρ' ἔστι σιγῶντα λέγειν; διττὸν γὰρ καὶ τὸ σιγῶντα λέγειν, τό τε τὸν λέγοντα σιγᾶν καὶ τὸ τὰ λεγόμενα, *ibid.* x. 558. See notes on 300 B.

(xvii) 300 B 2 ἄρ' οὐδὲ λέγοντα σιγᾶν; The fallacy is the same as in xvi, for λέγοντα σιγᾶν may mean either 'a speaker's silence,' or 'silence about a speaker.'

(xviii) 301 A 6 καὶ ὅτι νῦν ἐγώ σοι πάρεμι, Διονυσόδωρος εἶ; The sense of πάρεμι here is different from that of πάρεστι in A 4 πάρεστιν μέντοι ἐκάστῳ αὐτῶν κάλλος τι. The fallacy therefore is παρ' ὁμωνυ-

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μίαν, πάρεστι being changed from its meaning as a philosophical term to its common sense of local proximity.

(xix) 301 D 3 τὸν μάγειρον κατακόπτειν. Another example of the fallacy παρ' ἀμφιβολίαν, as μάγειρον may be either subject or object of κατακόπτειν.

(xx) 303 A 1 ἄρα ἔξεστί σοι αὐτοὺς (τοὺς θεοὺς) ἀποδόσθαι; This final paradox is the result of a whole series of fallacies. 'For θεός the universal ζῶν is substituted, the possessive σός is applied to ζῶν and to θεός in different senses, and then what is true only of a particular class of ζῶα is predicated of ζῶα universally and so of θεός' (Bonitz, p. 263). Cf. *Soph. El.* v. 533 ὅταν τὸ ἐν μέρει λεγόμενον ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰρημένον ληφθῇ.

(xxi) 303 A 7 Πότερον οὖν, ἔφη, ὁ Ἡρακλῆς πυππάξ ἐστιν, κτλ.; Dionsiodorus pretends to understand the exclamation πυππάξ as a proper name, and besides this silly grammatical joke assumes that if two words stand side by side they must be in apposition.

On the fallacies thus enumerated compare Bonitz, *Platonische Studien*, ii. 266. We may add to the series the example of *Fallacia Accidentis*, 298 B 2 ἕτερος ὢν πατὴρ οὐ πατήρ ἐστιν, and the *Fallacia Plurium Interrogationum*, 300 C 7, where Ctesippus insists on a categorical answer 'Yes' or 'No' to his question, 'Do all things keep silence or speak?' See the notes on these passages. Notice also that in 301 C 1 ὡς οὐ τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερόν ἐστιν Socrates himself adopts the fallacy of equivocation, turning it against the Sophists.

Besides the long series of fallacies thus exposed, there are more important logical principles to be noticed in the dialogue.

In *Euthyd.* 301 A 'Beautiful things are not the same as absolute beauty, but some beauty is present with each of them,' we have an example of the process of *generalization by concepts* which had been already fully described in the *Meno*, 75 A ζητῶ τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ταῦτόν, κτλ. On the importance of the discovery see Lotze, *Microcosm.* ii. 319, 320: 'Long as it was since language had begun to indicate in words the general concepts of things . . . consciousness had still continued unaware of what it was about; and even for the contemporaries of Socrates it was hard to see that the convenience of using a common name for different things arose from their dependence upon something which was common to them all, and in all self-identical.'

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Of *Definition*, which follows immediately from the doctrine of *General Concepts*, we have a brief statement in *Euthyd.* 285 E 9 εἰσὶν ἐκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων λόγοι, κτλ., where right definition is shown to be necessary as the means of avoiding contradiction. This subject also had been fully treated in *Meno* 72-76.

Not less important is the question of *Predication*, and the denial of any proper union between *Subject* and *Predicate* implied but not explained in *Euthyd.* 300 E 3, where Dionysodorus asks Σὺ γὰρ ἤδη τι πώποτ' εἶδες, ὃ Σώκρατες, καλὸν πρᾶγμα; The denial began with Antisthenes the Cynic, and was adopted by Stilpo the Megarian, of whom Zeller writes, *Socrates*, p. 277: 'He rejected, as did Antisthenes, every combination of subject and predicate, since the conception of the one is different from the conception of the other, and two things with different conceptions can never be declared to be the same.'

That predication does not necessarily imply the identity of subject and predicate is shown by Plato in the *Sophist* 251 A: 'Let us inquire then how we come to predicate many names of the same thing. . . And thus we provide a rich feast for tiros, whether young or old; for there is nothing easier than to argue that the one cannot be many, or the many one; and great is their delight in denying that man is good; but man, they insist, is man, and good is good' (Jowett).

The term *Not-Being* (τὸ μὴ ὄν, τὰ μὴ ὄντα), which occurs several times in the *Euthydemus*, does not there receive its true explanation. The Sophists maintain, in accordance with the doctrine of Parmenides, that τὸ μὴ ὄν can never be the object of thought or speech or any kind of action (*Euthyd.* 284 B, 286 A). The question is treated in the same manner in the *Republic* 477 A, 478 B. The true explanation of the difficulty is first reached in the *Sophist* 237 B-238 D, where the doctrine of Parmenides is formally discussed, and in 257 B it is explained that '*Not-Being* means only different *Being*, and denotes the relation of notions which do not agree with each other' ('Ὅποταν τὸ μὴ ὄν λέγωμεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ἐναντίον τι λέγομεν τοῦ ὄντος ἀλλ' ἕτερον μόνον). Cf. Zeller, *Pre-Socr. Philos.* I. 606; Lutoslawski, p. 228.

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The term *σοφιστής* denoted in its earliest use an eminent master of some liberal art.

Thus in Pindar, *Isthm.* iv. (v.) 28 it means 'poets':

μελέταν δὲ σοφισταῖς

Διὸς ἕκατι πρόσβαλον.

It is applied to 'musicians' in a fragment of Aeschylus quoted by Athenaeus, xiv. 632 C καὶ πάντας τοὺς χρωμένους τῇ τέχνῃ ταύτῃ (τῇ μουσικῇ) σοφιστὰς ἀπεκάλουν, ὥσπερ καὶ Αἰσχύλος ἐποίησεν·

Εἴτ' οὖν σοφιστὴς καλὰ παραπαίων χέλυν.

Thamyris is described by the same term in Euripides, *Rhes.* 924:

ὄτ' ἦλθομεν . . .

Μοῦσαι μεγίστην εἰς ἔριν μελωδίας

δαινῶ σοφιστῇ Θρηκί, κάτυφλώσαμεν

Θάμυριν.

It is applied by Herodotus, ii. 49, to the priests of the Bacchic mysteries, and (iv. 95) as a title of honour to Pythagoras ('Ελλήνων οὐ τῷ ἀσθενεστάτῳ σοφιστῇ Πυθαγόρῃ), and to the wise men of Greece including Solon by name (i. 29).

When Herodotus thus wrote the name 'Sophist' had already been assumed in a special sense by one whose arrogant claims to universal knowledge, and acceptance of pecuniary reward, quickly tended to degrade an honourable title into a byword and a reproach. Protagoras first appeared in Athens about the middle of the fifth century B.C.

'It was the time when the controversies which had long been carried on in the ancient schools of philosophy had been succeeded by an interval of general lassitude, despondency, and indifference to philosophical truth, which afforded room for a new class of pretenders to wisdom, who in a sense which they first attached to the word were first called Sophists.

'They professed a science superior to all the elder forms of philosophy, which it balanced against each other with the perfect impartiality of *universal scepticism*; and an art which treated them all as instruments useless indeed for the discovery of truth, but equally capable of exhibiting a fallacious appearance of it . . .

'As according to this view there was no real difference between

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truth and falsehood, right and wrong, the proper learning of a statesman consisted in the arts of argument and persuasion by which he might sway the opinions of others on every subject at his pleasure, and these were the arts which they practised and taught' (Thirlwall, *History of Greece*, ch. xxiv).

It will be well to inquire first whether this is a fair representation of Plato's description of the Sophist, and further whether that description is confirmed by other contemporary testimony.

Plat. *Phaed.* 90 B: 'Most especially those who devote themselves to the practice of disputation end, you know, by thinking that they have become the cleverest fellows in the world, and that they alone have discovered that neither in things nor in arguments is there anything sound or sure, but that all existing objects are in a constant flux and reflux, exactly as in the Euripus, and never abide an instant in any state.'

Ibid. 91 A: 'Just at present I fear that on this very subject I am not in a philosophic mood, but, like those vulgar disputants, in a contentious humour. For they whenever they are disputing on a point are utterly regardless of the real truth of the matters in question, but are only anxious to make their own positions seem true to the hearers.'

Ibid. 101 E: 'You would not, like those Eristics (*οἱ ἀντιλογικοί*), confuse in your argument the first principle and its consequences, that is if you wished to discover any real truth.'

Meno 75 C: 'I should have told him the truth, and if the inquirer were one of those wise and Eristic and antagonistic persons I should say to him, That is what I have to say, and if I am wrong, it is your business to take up the argument and refute me.'

Rep. 454 A: 'Truly, Glaucon, said I, the power of the art of contradiction is a noble one.—Why so?—Because it seems to me that many fall into it even against their will, and think that they are reasoning when they are only disputing, because they cannot examine the question by dividing and classifying, but persist in contradicting the mere words of the argument, and practising disputation not real discussion.'

Sophist. 225 E: 'But who is the other who makes money out of private disputations (*ἐρίδων*)? There is only one true answer: he is the wonderful Sophist, of whom we are in pursuit, and who

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re-appears again for the fourth time.—Yes, for he is the money-making species, as it seems, of the Eristic art, that disputations, controversial, pugnacious, combative, acquisitive art, as our argument has now shown, in a word the Sophist.'

The extreme contrast between the stigma thus affixed by Plato to the name 'Sophist' and its original use as a title of honour is so remarkable, that we cannot wonder if historians of different schools of thought have adopted widely different explanations of so surprising a change. Until the middle of the last century it was generally believed that Plato's descriptions corresponded more or less closely to the real character and practices of the Sophists of his day. But the confidence with which this view was entertained received a sudden shock when Mr. Grote published his famous defence of the Sophists in his *History of Greece*, vol. vii. ch. 67. The effect produced by that brilliant but paradoxical essay was, however, of short duration. More exact and impartial students had no difficulty in showing that the misrepresentations alleged by the modern historian were for the most part based upon his own misinterpretation of the ancient testimony. See especially Cope's excellent article 'The Sophists' in the *Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology*, No. ii. 1854, and the same scholar's *Gorgias*, Introduction, pp. xxii, xxiii; Poste, Aristotle's *Sophistical Elenchi*, p. 100; Jowett, *Sophist*, Introd. pp. 377–380.

It was alleged by Grote (p. 486) that Plato 'stole the term Sophistes out of general circulation . . . and fastened it upon the eminent teachers of the Socratic age.' That the term was in general circulation, and that it was fastened in an unfavourable sense upon a certain class of teachers of bad eminence in the Socratic age, is easily shown by the testimony of contemporary writers other than Plato.

Thus Lysias says in his *Olympic Oration*, 912: 'I have not come hither to make petty quibbles nor to dispute about names. For I think that these are the practices of very worthless Sophists in great want of a livelihood.' Only the commencement of this oration is extant, but according to Plutarch, *Life of Lysias*, *Mor.* 836 D, it was read by him at the Olympic Festival. However this may be, it is certain that the composition could only have been undertaken in the short interval when Lysias was in possession

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of the full rights of citizenship, that is, during the Archonship of Eucleides, B.C. 403.

In that same year Thucydides returned from exile to Athens, and was still engaged in the composition of his History: a description of the Athenians which he puts into the mouth of Cleon (iii. 38) shows somewhat of his estimation of the Sophists, and the theatrical character of their public exhibitions: ἀπλῶς τε ἀκοῆς ἡδονῇ ἡσσώμενοι καὶ σοφιστῶν θεαταῖς ἐοικότες καθημένοις μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ πόλεως βουλευομένοις. The Scholiast remarks that σοφιστῶν here means ‘those who in customary language are so called, the teachers of rhetorical questions.’ Lysias was no friend of Plato, and Thucydides was too grave a writer to give currency to any slanderous gossip, so that their testimony leaves no room to doubt the existence at Athens of a distinct class of Sophists such as Plato describes. We may therefore confidently accept the further descriptions given by Xenophon and Aristotle, without attributing them to the mere prejudice or jealousy of the Socratic School.

Nothing can be more severe than the censure of Socrates himself as recorded in Xen. *Mem.* i. 6. 13 καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ὡσαύτως τοὺς μὲν ἀργυρίου τῷ βουλομένῳ πωλοῦντας σοφιστὰς ὥσπερ πόρνους ἀποκαλοῦσιν. The plural ἀποκαλοῦσιν implies that this was not an uncommon way of speaking of the Sophists. A like evil reputation is indicated in Xenophon, *De Venatione*, xiii. 8, where in a full description of their methods of teaching he adds—οἱ σοφισταὶ δ’ ἐπὶ τῷ ἐξαπατᾶν λέγουσι καὶ γράφουσιν ἐπὶ τῷ ἑαυτῶν κέρδει, καὶ οὐδένα οὐδὲν ὠφελοῦσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ σοφὸς αὐτῶν ἐγένετο οὐδεὶς οὐδ’ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρκεῖ ἐκάστῳ σοφιστὴν κληθῆναι, ὃ ἐστὶν ὄνειδος παρά γε τοῖς εὖ φρονούσι.

Aristotle’s opinion of the Sophists is sufficiently shown in a passage of the *Ethics*, ix. 1: ‘In such matters some like the principle of a “stated wage.” Those, however, who take the money beforehand, and then do nothing of what they promised, are naturally blamed in consequence of their excessive promises, for they do not fulfil what they agreed. But this course the Sophists are perhaps obliged to adopt, because no one would be likely to give money for the things which they know.’ Sir A. Grant remarks on this passage that ‘Aristotle contrasts the conduct of Protagoras (of whom he speaks honourably) with that of “the Sophists” after the profession had become regularly settled.’

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Compare *Sophistical Elenchi*, c. i: 'Now it answers the purpose of some persons rather to seem to be philosophers and not to be than to be and not to seem: for sophistry is seeming but unreal philosophy, and the Sophist a person who makes money by the semblance of philosophy without the reality; and for his success it is requisite to seem to perform the function of the philosopher without performing it rather than to perform it without seeming to do so. . . The existence of such a mode of reasoning, and the fact that such a faculty is the aim of the persons we call Sophists, is manifest' (Poste's translation).

Mr. Poste's own conclusion concerning the Sophists is expressed as follows (p. 100): 'Did the Sophist ever exist? Was there ever a class of people who professed to be philosophers and to educate, but, instead of method or a system of reasoned truth, only knew and only taught, under the name of philosophy, the game of eristic? . . . Grote says, the only reality corresponding to the name are the *disiecti membra sophistae* in all of us, the errors incidental to human frailty in the search after truth.'

On the manner in which Grote tries to disparage the testimony of Aristotle, see Cope, *Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology*, p. 160.

A question was raised by Schleiermacher in his Introduction to the dialogue whether Euthydemus and his brother were real persons and such as Plato describes them. 'Who, then, were these men, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, to deserve such notice and meet with such treatment? History is silent respecting them more than any other of the Sophists mentioned by Plato, so that we may certainly conclude that they never formed any kind of school, nay it would even seem that they were not generally men in very great repute.'

We readily agree that these itinerant professors of universal knowledge were men of no great repute; but they were none the less fit representatives on that account of the low class of Sophists of Plato's day, whom it was part of his purpose to expose. Also the testimony of history is sufficient to show that they were certainly real persons, and in some respects at least such as Plato has described them.

Dionysodorus the elder brother (283 A) is the subject of a whole

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chapter in Xenophon, *Mem. Socr.* iii. 1. 1-11. He comes to Athens pretending to teach strategy, but actually teaching nothing beyond the merest elementary tactics and those most imperfectly. 'Go back,' says Socrates, 'and ask him again: for if he knows these things and is not a shameless person, he will be ashamed after taking money to send you away untaught.' How exactly this agrees with Plato's description of the two Sophists and their pretensions may be seen by referring to *Euthyd.* 271 D, 273 C, and to the specimens of their actual teaching in the discussions which follow.

Euthydemus is mentioned by name in the *Cratylus* 386 D, where a distinction is drawn between the dogma of Protagoras that 'for every man all things really are such as they appear to him,' and the more extravagant paradox of Euthydemus, that 'all things are alike to all men at the same time and always.' Other passages in which allusions more or less evident are made to Euthydemus and Dionysodorus are *Sophist.* 251 B, C, and *Pol.* 495 C, D. But the independent testimony of Aristotle proves beyond all question both that Euthydemus was a person well known at Athens, and that he used in discussion similar fallacies to those which Plato imputes to him. Cf. *Aristot. Rhetor.* ii. 24 "Ἄλλος τὸ διηρημένον συντιθέντα λέγειν ἢ τὸ συγκείμενον διαιροῦντα· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ταῦτόν δοκεῖ εἶναι οὐκ ὄν ταῦτόν πολλάκις, ὁπότερον χρησιμώτερον, τοῦτο δεῖ ποιεῖν. Ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο Εὐθυδήμου λόγος. Οἷον τὸ εἰδέναι ὅτι τριήρης ἐν Πειραιεὶ ἐστίν· ἕκαστον γὰρ οἶδεν. Καὶ τὸν τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐπιστάμενον ὅτι τὸ ἔπος οἶδεν· τὸ γὰρ ἔπος τὸ αὐτό ἐστίν. *Soph. Elench.* xx. Καὶ ὁ Εὐθυδήμου δὲ λόγος, Ἄρ' οἶδας σὺ νῦν οὐσας ἐν Πειραιεὶ τριήρεις ἐν Σικελίᾳ ὦν; It is needless to quote the words of Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Mathem.* vii. 13, *ibid.* 48, 64, as the statements of so late a writer can add no weight to the contemporary testimony of such authors as Xenophon and Aristotle.

On this historical testimony we cannot refuse to believe that Euthydemus and Dionysodorus were real persons well known at Athens at the *scenic* date of the dialogue, and at that time elderly men like Socrates.

But a further question has been raised by Teichmüller, *Literarische Fehden*, I. ii, who maintains with much ingenuity that Dionysodorus is intended to represent Lysias. The theory is based upon the points of resemblance which may be traced between them.

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(1) Lysias and Dionysodorus each had a younger brother named Euthydemus : the occurrence therefore of this name in the dialogue would at once turn the thoughts of Plato's contemporaries to Lysias and Euthydemus, the well-known sons of Cephalus (Plat. *Rep.* 328 B).

(2) Both pairs of brothers had joined the colony which the Athenians founded at Thurii 444 B.C.

(3) Lysias was not, except for a few months, an Athenian citizen but a ξένος, though ἰσοτελής.

The two Sophists were also ξένοι (271 A).

(4) Lysias was at one time a teacher of rhetoric, having been a pupil of Tisias the founder, with Corax, of the Sicilian school of dialectic.

This was the same system as that which Diodorus and his brother are described as practising.

(5) Lysias was joint owner with his brother of a shield manufactory in Peiraeus, and had helped Thrasybulus with money, shields, and a band of mercenaries. If, as Teichmüller thinks, Euthydemus the brother of Lysias is the Sophist described by Plato, *Theaet.* 165 D, as πελταστικός ἀνὴρ μισθοφόρος ἐν λόγοις, the phrases there applied to him all relate to the art of war, ἔλλοχῶν, ἐμβολῶν, χειρωσάμενός τε καὶ ξυνδήσας, ἐλύτρον.

From Xen. *Mem.* iii. 1 we know that Dionysodorus came to Athens as a teacher of the art of strategy, and both brothers are described by Plato as masters of the art of fighting in heavy armour (ὀπλομάχοι).

(6) Lysias was the most successful writer of speeches for the warfare of the law-courts.

In the dialogue (272 A) Dionysodorus and Euthydemus are both described as τὴν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις μάχην κρατίστω καὶ ἀγωνίσασθαι καὶ ἄλλον διδάξαι λέγειν τε καὶ συγγράφεσθαι λόγους οἷους εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια, and in 273 C as οἷω τε δὲ καὶ ποιῆσαι δυνατόν εἶναι αὐτὸν αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις, ἃν τις αὐτὸν ἀδικῇ. The description is remarkably applicable to Lysias, who not only wrote speeches and taught others, but had made himself famous by the one excellent speech which he had himself delivered in court against the injuries done to him by Eratosthenes, 403 B.C.

Many other points of resemblance more or less striking are discussed by Teichmüller in a long chapter, but the examples given

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above are sufficient to show the general nature of his argument. The degree of probability resulting from it is much increased by the consideration that 'Plato in his dialogues does not rehearse old histories, as a chronicler or a novelist; but contends with living opponents and rival teachers, who disputed with him for influence over the best men of the time and especially over the young, since they professed to teach the same things as he did, only better.'

The theory is very interesting, and by no means improbable: it agrees well with the known relations of Plato and Lysias, and adds to the life and spirit of the dialogue.

VIII. TEXT.

In this edition of the *Euthydemus* the text is based upon the three chief MSS. collated by Schanz.

(1) Codex Clarkianus, n. 39 in the Bodleian Library, Oxford, written in the year 895 B.C. by Johannes Calligraphus for Arethas a Deacon of Patras, afterwards Archbishop of Caesarea in Cappadocia. This excellent MS. is very fully described by Schanz, *Novae Commentationes Platonicae*, 105-118, and by T. W. Allen in the *Preface to the Phototype edition*, 1898. In the MS. as a whole there are many corrections by the hand of the learned Archbishop himself (*Classical Review*, vol. xvi. Nos. 1 and 8). These contemporary corrections (B²) are rightly distinguished by Professor Burnet from later corrections (b). But in the *Euthydemus* there is only one legible note in the margin, and this is in the handwriting of Arethas, and refers to the word *σκληφρός*, 271 B 4.

(2) T. In the Library of St. Mark's at Venice this MS. is described as 'Append. Class. 4, cod. 1,' and by Bekker as t: it has been shown by Schanz 'to be the source of all MSS. of the second family,' except that which immediately follows.

(3) Vind., or V, distinguished by Burnet as 'W= cod. Vindobonensis 54, suppl. phil. gr. 7 = Stalbaum Vind. 1.' This MS. Schanz considered to be derived not directly from T, but from a common source, which he marked by the letter M.

In choosing between various readings I have preferred those of Cod. B as being by far the oldest and best authority, except where they are evidently corrupt or fail to give any adequate meaning to the passage.

VIII. TEXT

The text of Plato as represented in the MSS. has been subjected to much alteration by recent critics, among whom Cobet, Badham, and Schanz are especially distinguished for ingenious emendations and brilliant conjectures, often most successful, and, even when unnecessary, very attractive. In Schanz's edition of the *Euthydemus* such alterations and omissions are extremely frequent, and Professor Burnet has done good service to the students of Plato in the Oxford edition by frequently restoring the readings of the chief MSS.

I have acted on the same principle still more frequently, being convinced that it is often easier to alter the words of such an author as Plato than to understand and explain them. It is, however, the duty of an editor not to tamper with a reading authenticated by the best MSS., until he has exhausted all means within his power of elucidating the words ascribed to his author. Wherever I have ventured to differ from recent editors, I have stated my reasons in the notes.

In the matter of orthography I have been unwilling to depart unnecessarily from long-established and almost universal custom.

Thus, for example, I have retained the usual method of printing the pronoun *ὅτι* so as to distinguish it from the conjunction *ὅτι*. The usefulness of the distinction may be seen in such phrases as οὐδ' ἤδη πρὸ τοῦ *ὅτι* εἶναι οἱ παγκρατιασταί (*Euthyd.* 271 C), ἵνα εἰδῶ *ὅτι* καὶ μαθησόμεθα (272 D), σοὶ εἰς κεφαλὴν, *ὅτι* μου . . . καταψεύδει (283 E), τὸν ὑμέτερον πατέρ' ἂν τύπτοιμι, *ὅτι* μαθὼν σοφοὺς νείεις οὕτως φύσει' (299 A), οὕτω οἶδα *ὅτι* μέλλω εἰρεῖν.

Passages thus printed may have no ambiguity for a competent scholar, but they put a needless difficulty in the way of a beginner.

It is more important, however, to consider whether this mode of printing is or is not etymologically correct. The combination *ὅς τις*, *ἥ τις*, *ὅτι* is made up of two separate words, each of which is separately declined, as *Pol.* 462 C ἐν ἧ *τινι* δὴ πόλει, where, if we write *ἵτινι* as one word, the accent becomes impossible. Cf. *Plat. Epist.* vii. 347 E ὅπη τε καὶ ὅπως ἤθελε καὶ οἷς *τισι*. *Epist.* xi. 359 A ὑπὸ νόμων θέσεως καὶ ὦν *τινων*. *Legg.* ix. 864 E τῇν βλάβην ἣν ἂν *τινα* καταβλάψῃ. If therefore we were to be guided by etymology, both the pronoun and the conjunction should be written *ὅτι*, but for the

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sake of distinguishing them the conjunction is conventionally written as one word $\delta\tau\iota$.

The remarks and practice of Jannaris are inconsistent and misleading: in 610. 3 he prints ' $\delta\sigma\tau\iota\varsigma$, $\delta\tau\iota^1$,' and adds in a footnote¹, 'It should be written $\delta\tau\iota$, but ancient grammarians introduced $\delta\tau\iota$ —for which modern scholars substitute $\delta\tau\iota$ —to distinguish it from the conjunction $\delta\tau\iota$ 'that' (79).' But Jannaris himself constantly prints $\delta\tau\iota$, as in $\delta\tau\iota$ μαθών, $\delta\tau\iota$ παθών: see his Index.

Cf. Kühner-Blass I. i. 353 (§ 93 Diastole) ' $\delta\tau\iota$, nicht wie $\delta\tau\iota$.'

We may add that Schanz is mistaken in his critical note on 271 C 6, ' $\delta\tau\iota$ BT,' for Cod. B certainly has $\delta\tau\iota$.

272 A 5 ἐπιτεθείκατον B, ἐπιτεθήκατον. There is apparently no authority in the MSS. for the latter form which is adopted in the Oxford text, 1903.

In Kühner-Blass, *Ausführliche Grammatik*, § 277, p. 186, τέθεικα is described as 'nachklass'; and in § 285, p. 201, on the Doric dialect, we find 'Von τίθημι lautet das Pf. τέθεικα, τέθεμαι, so auf Inschr. ἀνατεθέκαντι.' In this case τέθεικα stood for τέθεικα.

Jannaris is of opinion that the diphthong EI arose from the insertion of a simple vertical stroke (not iota) to mark the metrical quantity of E (App. ii. 9). 'Accordingly, when representing a rhythmical or grammatical length E now begins (sixth century B.C.) to figure in the Attic inscriptions as EI (later on as Ξ or H identified with EI) . . . only in sporadic cases, the old orthography . . . remaining in universal practice down to the middle of the fifth century B.C. . . . It is only since the year 403 B.C., under the archonship of Eucleides, (that) the new spelling obtained by a public act official recognition or formal sanction' (ibid. 12). The further inference of Jannaris that 'a new system of orthography was created into which *all previous literary and many inscriptional compositions had to be transliterated*' (the italics are mine) must be regarded as a somewhat doubtful or, at least, exaggerated conjecture. It is, I believe, generally acknowledged that such forms as ἐπιτεθήκατον, and φοβῆ (2nd person *indicative* middle), are unknown to the MSS. of the Attic drama, and it would require much more evidence than has yet been alleged to prove in opposition to all MSS. that so artistic and poetic a writer as Plato at once discarded the style

VIII. TEXT

to which he had been accustomed from childhood to his twenty-fifth or twenty-sixth year in favour of an official novelty.

The Attic inscriptions of the period contained in the *Corpus Graecarum Inscriptionum* are almost exclusively legislative or magisterial decrees and public accounts. In such documents the second person naturally is not used, and there is no evidence of any such change as that of $\phi\omicron\beta\epsilon\iota$ to $\phi\omicron\beta\eta$. In the accounts $\epsilon\theta\eta\kappa\alpha\nu$ the aorist only occurs, so that there is no evidence in favour of the change to $\epsilon\pi\iota\tau\epsilon\theta\acute{\eta}\kappa\alpha\tau\omicron\nu$.

On this subject it may be well to quote an incidental remark of the author of the *New Phrynichus*, who will not be thought too conservative in the matter of orthography. Mr. Rutherford writes (p. 45): 'It is no rare experience to find the most distinguished critics advocating an alteration of all the manuscripts, simply because they have never tried to estimate, as is done in this inquiry, the extraordinary ease with which an Athenian of the best age moved among the various coexistent literary dialects of his time.'

ERRATUM

281 b 1 *before ἡγουμένη insert <ῆ>*

ΕΥΘΥΔΗΜΟΣ

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ

St. I
p. 271

ΚΡ. Τίς ἦν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ᾧ χθὲς ἐν Λυκείῳ διελέγον; **a**
ἢ πολὺς ὑμᾶς ὄχλος περιειστήκει, ὥστ' ἔγωγε βουλόμενος
ἀκούειν προσελθὼν οὐδὲν οἷός τ' ἦ ἀκοῦσαι σαφές· ὑπερκύψας
μέντοι κατείδον, καί μοι ἔδοξεν εἶναι ξένος τις ᾧ διελέγον.
τίς ἦν; 5

ΣΩ. Ὅπότερον καὶ ἐρωτᾷς, ὦ Κρίτων; οὐ γὰρ εἰς ἀλλὰ
δύ' ἦστην.

ΚΡ. Ὅν μὲν ἐγὼ λέγω, ἐκ δεξιᾶς τρίτος ἀπὸ σοῦ καθήστο·
ἐν μέσῳ δ' ὑμῶν τὸ Ἀξιόχου μειράκιον ἦν. καὶ μάλα πολὺ, **b**
ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιδεδωκέναι μοι ἔδοξεν, καὶ τοῦ ἡμετέρου οὐ
πολύ τι τὴν ἡλικίαν διαφέρειν Κριτοβούλου. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνος
μὲν σκληφρός, οὗτος δὲ προφερὴς καὶ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τὴν
ᾧ ψιν. 5

ΣΩ. Εὐθύδημος οὗτός ἐστιν, ὦ Κρίτων, ὃν ἐρωτᾷς, ὁ δὲ
παρ' ἐμὲ καθήμενος ἐξ ἀριστερᾶς ἀδελφὸς τούτου, Διουνσό-
δωρος· μετέχει δὲ καὶ οὗτος τῶν λόγων.

ΚΡ. Οὐδέτερον γινώσκω, ὦ Σώκρατες. καινοί τινες αὖ
οὔτοι, ὥς ἔοικε, σοφισταί· ποδαποί; καὶ τίς ἡ σοφία; **c**

ΣΩ. Οὔτοι τὸ μὲν γένος, ὥς ἐγὼμαι, ἐντεῦθεν ποθέν
εἰσιν ἐκ Χίου, ἀπέκησαν δὲ ἐς Θουρίους, φεύγοντες δὲ
ἐκεῖθεν πόλλ' ἤδη ἔτη περὶ τούσδε τοὺς τόπους διατρίβουσιν.
ὁ δὲ σὺ ἐρωτᾷς τὴν σοφίαν αὐτοῖν, θαυμασία, ὦ Κρίτων· **5**
πάσσοφοι ἀτεχνῶς τῷ γε, οὐδ' ἤδη πρὸ τοῦ ὅ τι εἶεν οἱ
παγκρατιασταί. τούτῳ γάρ ἐστον κομιδῇ παμμάχῳ. οὐ (καθ' ἃ)

τῷ Ἀκαρνᾶνε ἐγενέσθην τὸ παγκρατιαστὰ ἀδελφώ· ἐκείνῳ
 d μὲν γὰρ τῷ σώματι μόνον οἶω τε μάχεσθαι, τούτῳ δὲ πρῶτον
 μὲν τῷ σώματι δεινотάτῳ ἐστὸν καὶ μάχῃ, ἣ πάντων ἔστι
 κρατεῖν—ἐν ὅπλοις γὰρ αὐτῷ τε σοφῶ πάννυ μάχεσθαι καὶ
 272 ἄλλον, ὃς ἂν διδῶ μισθόν, οἶω τε ποιῆσαι—ἔπειτα τὴν ἐν
 τοῖς δικαστηρίοις μάχην κρατίστῳ καὶ ἀγωνίσασθαι καὶ
 ἄλλον διδάξαι λέγειν τε καὶ συγγράφεσθαι λόγους οἷους
 εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια. πρὸ τοῦ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα δεινῶ ἦσθην
 5 μόνον, νῦν δὲ τέλος ἐπιτεθείκατον παγκρατιαστικῇ τέχνῃ. ἡ
 γὰρ ἦν λοιπὴ αὐτοῖν μάχῃ ἀργός, ταύτην νῦν ἐξείργασθον,
 ὥστε μηδ' ἂν ἕνα αὐτοῖς οἷόν τ' εἶναι μηδ' ἀντᾶραι· οὕτω
 δεινῶ γεγόνατον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μάχεσθαι τε καὶ ἐξελέγχειν
 b τὸ ἀεὶ λεγόμενον, ὁμοίως ἑάντε ψεῦδος ἑάντε ἀληθὲς ἦ. ἐγὼ
 μὲν οὖν, ὦ Κρίτων, ἐν νῷ ἔχω τοῖν ἀνδρῶν παραδοῦναι
 ἑμαυτόν· καὶ γὰρ φατον ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ ποιῆσαι ἂν καὶ
 ἄλλον ὄντινόν· τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα δεινόν.

5 ΚΡ. Τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες; οὐ φοβεῖ τὴν ἡλικίαν, μὴ ἤδη
 πρεσβύτερος ᾖ;

ΣΩ. Ἡκιστά γε, ὦ Κρίτων, ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον ἔχων καὶ
 παραμύθιον τοῦ μὴ φοβεῖσθαι. αὐτῷ γὰρ τούτῳ, ὥς ἔπος
 εἰπεῖν, γέροντε ὄντε ἡρξάσθην ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἧς ἔγωγε
 10 ἐπιθυμῶ, τῆς ἐριστικῆς· πέρυσιν ἢ προπέρυσιν οὐδέπω ἦσθην
 c σοφώ. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἐν μόνον φοβοῦμαι, μὴ αὖ ὄνειδος τοῖν
 ξένοις περιάψω, ὥσπερ Κόννῳ τῷ Μητροβίου, τῷ κιθαριστῇ,
 ὃς ἐμὲ διδάσκει ἔτι καὶ νῦν κιθαρίζειν· ὀρώντες οὖν οἱ παῖδες
 οἱ συμφοιτηταί μου ἐμοῦ τε καταγελῶσι καὶ τὸν Κόννον
 5 καλοῦσι γεροντοδιδάσκαλον. μὴ οὖν καὶ τοῖν ξένοις τις
 ταῦτόν τοῦτο ὄνειδίσῃ· οἱ δ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἴσως φοβούμενοι
 τάχα με οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοιεν προσδέξασθαι. ἐγὼ δ', ὦ Κρίτων,
 ἐκέισε μὲν ἄλλους πέπεικα συμμαθητάς μοι φοιτᾶν πρε-
 d σβύτας, ἐνταῦθα δέ γε ἐτέρους πειράσομαι πείθειν. καὶ σὺ τί
 οὐ συμφοιτᾷς; ὥς δὲ δέλεαρ αὐτοῖς ἄξομεν τοὺς σοὺς υἱεῖς·
 ἐφιεμένοι γὰρ ἐκείνων οἶδ' ὅτι καὶ ἡμᾶς παιδεύσουσιν.

ΚΡ. Ἄλλ' οὐδὲν κωλύει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔάν γε σοὶ δοκῇ.
πρῶτον δέ μοι διήγησαι τὴν σοφίαν τοῖν ἀνδροῖν τίς ἐστίν, 5
ἵνα εἰδῶ ὅ τι καὶ μαθησόμεθα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις ἀκούων· ὥς οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμί γε εἰπεῖν
ὅτι οὐ προσεῖχον τὸν νοῦν αὐτοῖν, ἀλλὰ πάννυ καὶ προσεῖχον
καὶ μέμνημαι, καὶ σοι πειράσομαι ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἅπαντα διηγῆ-
σασθαι. κατὰ θεὸν γάρ τινα ἔτυχον καθήμενος· ἐνταῦθα, e
οὐπὲρ σύ με εἶδες, ἐν τῷ ἀποδυτηρίῳ μόνος, καὶ ἤδη ἐν ὑφ'
εἶχον ἀναστῆναι· ἀνισταμένου δέ μου ἐγένετο τὸ εἰωθὸς
σημεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον. πάλιν οὖν ἐκαθεζόμην, καὶ ὀλίγῳ
ὑστερον εἰσέρχεσθον τούτῳ—ὃ τ' Εὐθύδημος καὶ ὁ Διουν- 273
σόδωρος—καὶ ἄλλοι μαθηταὶ ἅμα αὖ πολλοὶ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν·
εἰσελθόντες δὲ περιπατεῖτην ἐν τῷ καταστέγῳ δρόμῳ. καὶ
οὐπω τούτῳ δὴ ἢ τρεῖς δρόμους περιεληλυθότε ἦσθην,
καὶ εἰσέρχεται Κλεινίας, ὃν σὺ φῆς πολὺ ἐπιδεδωκέναι, 5
ἀληθῇ λέγων· ὅπισθεν δὲ αὐτοῦ ἔρασται πάννυ πολλοὶ τε
[καὶ] ἄλλοι καὶ Κτήσιππος, νεανίσκος τις Παιανιεύς, μάλα
καλὸς τε κάγαθός τὴν φύσιν, ὅσον μὴ ὑβριστῆς [δὲ] διὰ τὸ
νέος εἶναι. ἰδὼν οὖν με ὁ Κλεινίας ἀπὸ τῆς εἰσόδου μόνον b
καθήμενον, ἀντικρυς ἰὼν παρεκαθέζετο ἐκ δεξιᾶς, ὥσπερ καὶ
σὺ φῆς. ἰδόντες δὲ αὐτὸν ὃ τε Διουνσόδωρος καὶ ὁ Εὐθύ-
δημος πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστάντες διελεγέσθην ἀλλήλοιν, ἄλλην
καὶ ἄλλην ἀποβλέποντες εἰς ἡμᾶς—καὶ γὰρ πάννυ αὐτοῖν 5
προσεῖχον τὸν νοῦν—ἔπειτα ἰόντες ὁ μὲν παρὰ τὸ μειράκιον
ἐκαθέζετο, ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ὁ δὲ παρ' αὐτὸν ἐμὲ ἐξ ἀριστερᾶς,
οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ὥς ἕκαστος ἐτύχανεν.

Ἦσπαζόμην οὖν αὐτῷ ἅτε διὰ χρόνου ἑωρακώς· μετὰ δὲ c
τοῦτο εἶπον πρὸς τὸν Κλεινίαν· ὦ Κλεινία, τῷδε μέντοι τῷ
ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ, Εὐθύδημός τε καὶ Διουνσόδωρος, οὐ τὰ σμικρὰ
ἀλλὰ τὰ μεγάλα· τὰ γὰρ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον πάντα ἐπί-
στασθον, ὅσα δεῖ τὸν μέλλοντα ἀγαθὸν στρατηγὸν ἔσεσθαι, 5
τάς τε τάξεις καὶ τὰς ἡγεμονίας τῶν στρατοπέδων καὶ ὅσα
ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι διδακτέον· οἷώ τε δὲ καὶ ποιῆσαι

δυνατὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις, ἂν τις αὐτὸν ἀδικῇ.

d Εἰπὼν οὖν ταῦτα κατεφρονήθη ὑπ' αὐτοῖν· ἐγελασάτην οὖν ἄμφω βλέψαντες εἰς ἀλλήλους, καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος εἶπεν· Οὗτοι ἔτι ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, σπουδάζομεν, ἀλλὰ παρέργοις αὐτοῖς χρώμεθα.

5 Κἀγὼ θαυμάσας εἶπον· Καλὸν ἂν τι τὸ ἔργον ὑμῶν εἴη, εἰ τηλικαῦτα πράγματα πάρεργα ὑμῖν τυγχάνει ὄντα, καὶ πρὸς θεῶν εἵпетόν μοι τί ἐστὶ τοῦτο τὸ καλόν.

Ἀρετὴν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἴομεθα οἷω τ' εἶναι παραδοῦναι κάλλιστ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ τάχιστα.

e ὦ Ζεῦ, οἶον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγετον πρᾶγμα· πόθεν τοῦτο τὸ ἔρμαιον ἡρέτην; ἐγὼ δὲ περὶ ὑμῶν διενουσῶμαι ἔτι, ὥσπερ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, ὥς τὸ πολὺ τοῦτο δευνοῖν ὄντοι, ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι, καὶ ταῦτα ἔλεγον περὶ σφῶν· ὅτε γὰρ τὸ πρότερον

5 ἐπεδημησάτην, τοῦτο μέμνημαι σφῶ ἐπαγγελιομένω. εἰ δὲ νῦν ἀληθῶς ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχeton, ἴλεω εἶητον— ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ ἔγωγε σφῶ ὥσπερ θεῷ προσαγορεύω, συγ-

274 γνώμην δεόμενος ἔχειω μοι τῶν ἐμπροσθεν εἰρημένων. ἀλλ' ὁράτον, ὦ Εὐθύδημέ τε καὶ Διονυσόδωρε, εἰ ἀληθῇ λέγετον· ὑπὸ γὰρ τοῦ μεγέθους τοῦ ἐπαγγέλματος οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν ἀπιστεῖν.

5 Ἀλλ' εἴ ἴσθι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐφάτην, τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχον.

Μακαρίζω ἄρ' ὑμᾶς ἔγωγε τοῦ κτήματος πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ μέγαν βασιλέα τῆς ἀρχῆς· τοσόνδε δέ μοι εἶπετον, εἰ ἐν νῷ ἔχeton ἐπιδεικνύναι ταύτην τὴν σοφίαν, ἢ πῶς σφῶν βεβούλευται.

10 Ἐπ' αὐτό γε τοῦτο πάρεσμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥς ἐπιδείξοντε **b** καὶ διδάξοντε, ἔάν τις ἐθέλῃ μανθάνειν.

Ὅτι μὲν ἐθελήσουσιν ἅπαντες οἱ μὴ ἔχοντες, ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἐγγυῶμαι, πρῶτος μὲν ἐγώ, ἔπειτα δὲ Κλεινίας οὐτοσί, πρὸς δ' ἡμῖν Κτήσιππός τε ὅδε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οὗτοι, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ

5 δεικνὺς αὐτῷ τοὺς ἐραστὰς τοὺς Κλεινίου· οἱ δὲ ἐτύχανον

ἡμᾶς ἤδη περιεστώμενοι. ὁ γὰρ Κτήσιππος ἔτυχε πόρρω
καθεζόμενος τοῦ Κλειώλου—κάμοι δοκεῖν ὡς ἐτύγχανεν ὁ
Εὐθύδημος ἐμοὶ διαλεγόμενος προνευκῶς εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν,
ἐν μέσῳ ὄντος ἡμῶν τοῦ Κλειώλου, ἐπεσκότει τῷ Κτησίππῳ c
τῆς θέας—βουλόμενός τε οὖν θεάσασθαι ὁ Κτήσιππος τὰ
παιδικὰ καὶ ἅμα φιλήκοος ὢν ἀναπηδήσας πρῶτος προσέστη
ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ καταντικρύ· οὕτως οὖν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐκείνων
ιδόντες περιέστησαν ἡμᾶς, οἳ τε τοῦ Κλειώλου ἐρασταὶ καὶ 5
οἱ τοῦ Εὐθυδήμου τε καὶ Διονυσόδωρου ἐταῖροι. τούτους δὴ
ἐγὼ δεικνὺς ἔλεγον τῷ Εὐθυδήμῳ ὅτι πάντες ἔτοιμοι εἶεν
μανθάνειν· ὃ τε οὖν Κτήσιππος συνέφη μάλα προθύμως d
καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, καὶ ἐκέλευον αὐτῷ κοινῇ πάντες ἐπιδείξασθαι
τὴν δύναμιν τῆς σοφίας.

Εἶπον οὖν ἐγώ· ὦ Εὐθύδημε καὶ Διονυσόδωρε, πάνν μὲν
οὖν παντὶ τρόπῳ καὶ τούτοις χαρίσασθον καὶ ἐμοῦ ἕνεκα 5
ἐπιδείξασθον. τὰ μὲν οὖν πλείστα δήλον ὅτι οὐκ ὀλίγον
ἔργον ἐπιδείξαι· τόδε δέ μοι εἶπετον, πότερον πεπεισμένον
ἤδη ὡς χρὴ παρ' ὑμῶν μανθάνειν δύναισθ' ἂν ἀγαθὸν ποιῆσαι
ἄνδρα μόνον, ἢ καὶ ἐκείνον τὸν μήπω πεπεισμένον διὰ τὸ μὴ e
οἶεσθαι ὅλως τὸ πρᾶγμα τὴν ἀρετὴν μαθητὸν εἶναι ἢ μὴ σφῶ
εἶναι αὐτῆς διδασκάλῳ; φέρε, καὶ τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα τῆς
αὐτῆς τέχνης ἔργον πείσαι ὡς καὶ διδασκτὸν ἢ ἀρετὴ καὶ οὗτοι
ὑμεῖς ἐστὲ παρ' ὧν ἂν κάλλιστά τις αὐτὸ μάθοι, ἢ ἄλλης; 5

Ταύτης μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, τῆς αὐτῆς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Διону-
σόδωρος.

Ἔμεῖς ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε, τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώ-
πων κάλλιστ' ἂν προτρέψαιτε εἰς φιλοσοφίαν καὶ ἀρετῆς 275
ἐπιμέλειαν;

Οἴομεθά γε δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Τῶν μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλων τὴν ἐπίδειξιν ἡμῖν, ἔφην, εἰς αὐθις
ἀπόθεσθον, τοῦτο δ' αὐτὸ ἐπιδείξασθον· τουτοῦ τὸν νεανίσκον 5
πέισατον ὡς χρὴ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ
χαριεῖσθον ἐμοὶ τε καὶ τουτοισὶ πᾶσιν. συμβέβηκεν γάρ τι

τοιούτου τῷ μεираκίῳ τούτῳ· ἐγὼ τε καὶ οἶδε πάντες τυγχάνομεν ἐπιθυμοῦντες ὥς βέλτιστον αὐτὸν γενέσθαι. ἔστι δὲ
 10 οὗτος Ἀξιόχου μὲν υἱὸς τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου τοῦ παλαιοῦ, αὐτα-
 b νέψιος δὲ τοῦ νῦν ὄντος Ἀλκιβιάδου· ὄνομα δ' αὐτῷ Κλεινίας.
 ἔστι δὲ νέος· φοβούμεθα δὴ περὶ αὐτῷ, οἷον εἰκὸς περὶ νέῳ,
 μή τις φθῇ ἡμᾶς ἐπ' ἄλλο τι ἐπιτήδευμα τρέψας αὐτοῦ τὴν
 διάνοιαν καὶ διαφθείρη. σφῶν οὖν ἦκετον εἰς κάλλιστον·
 5 ἀλλ' εἰ μή τι διαφέρει ὑμῖν, λάβετον πείραν τοῦ μεираκίου
 καὶ διαλέχθητον ἐναντίον ἡμῶν.

Εἰπόντος οὖν ἐμοῦ σχεδὸν τι αὐτὰ ταῦτα ὁ Εὐθύδημος
 ἅμα ἀνδρείως τε καὶ θαρραλέως, Ἀλλ' οὐδὲν διαφέρει, ὦ
 c Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἔαν μόνον ἐθέλῃ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὁ νεανίσκος.
 Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ, ἔφην ἐγώ, τοῦτό γε καὶ εἴθισται· θαμὰ γὰρ
 αὐτῷ οἶδε προσιόντες πολλὰ ἐρωτῶσιν τε καὶ διαλέγονται,
 ὥστε ἐπιεικῶς θαρρεῖ τὸ ἀποκρίνασθαι.

5 Τὰ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων, πῶς ἂν καλῶς σοι διηγη-
 σαίμην; οὐ γὰρ σμικρὸν τὸ ἔργον δύνασθαι ἀναλαβεῖν
 διεξιόντα σοφίαν ἀμήχανον ὅσῃν· ὥστ' ἔγωγε, καθάπερ οἱ
 d ποιηταί, δέομαι ἀρχόμενος τῆς διηγήσεως Μούσας τε καὶ
 Μνῆμην ἐπικαλεῖσθαι. ἤρξατο δ' οὖν ἐνθένδε ποθεῖν
 ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ὥς ἐγῶμαι· ὦ Κλεινία, πότεροί εἰσι τῶν
 ἀνθρώπων οἱ μανθάνοντες, οἱ σοφοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς;

5 Καὶ τὸ μεираκίον, ἅτε μεγάλου ὄντος τοῦ ἐρωτήματος,
 ἡρυθρίασέν τε καὶ ἀπορήσας ἔβλεπεν εἰς ἐμέ· καὶ ἐγὼ
 γνοὺς αὐτὸν τεθορυβημένον, Θάρρει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Κλεινία,
 e καὶ ἀποκρίναι ἀνδρείως, ὁπότερά σοι φαίνεται· ἴσως γάρ
 τοι ὠφελεῖ τὴν μεγίστην ὠφελίαν.

Καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος προσκύψας μοι μικρὸν
 πρὸς τὸ οὖς, πάννυ μειδιάσας τῷ προσώπῳ, Καὶ μὴν, ἔφη,
 5 σοί, ὦ Σώκρατες, προλέγω ὅτι ὁπότερ' ἂν ἀποκρίνηται τὸ
 μεираκίον, ἐξελεγχθήσεται.

Καὶ αὐτοῦ μεταξὺ ταῦτα λέγοντος ὁ Κλεινίας ἔτυχεν
 ἀποκρινάμενος, ὥστε οὐδὲ παρακελεύεσθαι μοι ἐξεγένετο

εὐλαβηθῆναι τῷ μειρακίῳ, ἀλλ' ἀπεκρίνατο ὅτι οἱ σοφοὶ 276
εἶεν οἱ μανθάνοντες.

Καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος, Καλεῖς δέ τινας, ἔφη, διδασκάλους, ἢ
οὐ;—Ὡμολόγει.—Οὐκοῦν τῶν μανθανόντων οἱ διδάσκαλοι
διδάσκαλοί εἰσιν, ὥσπερ ὁ κιθαριστῆς καὶ ὁ γραμματιστῆς 5
διδάσκαλοι δῆπου ἦσαν σοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παίδων, ὑμεῖς
δὲ μαθηταί;—Συνέφη.—Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἡνίκα ἐμανθάνετε,
οὐπω ἠπίστασθε ταῦτα ἃ ἐμανθάνετε;—Οὐκ ἔφη.—Ἄρ' οὖν
σοφοὶ ἦτε, ὅτε ταῦτα οὐκ ἠπίστασθε;—Οὐ δῆτα, ἦ δ' ὅς. b
—Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ σοφοί, ἀμαθεῖς;—Πάνυ γε.—Ὑμεῖς ἄρα
μανθάνοντες ἃ οὐκ ἠπίστασθε, ἀμαθεῖς ὄντες ἐμανθάνετε.—
Ἐπένευσε τὸ μειράκιον.—Οἱ ἀμαθεῖς ἄρα μανθάνουσιν, ὦ
Κλεινία, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἱ σοφοί, ὥς σὺ οἶει. 5

Ταῦτ' οὖν εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ, ὥσπερ ὑπὸ διδασκάλου χορὸς
ἀποσημῆναντος, ἅμα ἀνεθορύβησάν τε καὶ ἐγέλασαν οἱ ἐπό-
μενοι ἐκείνοι μετὰ τοῦ Διονυσοδώρου τε καὶ Εὐθυδήμου· καὶ c
πρὶν ἀναπνεῦσαι καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ τὸ μειράκιον, ἐκδεξάμενος
ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, Τί δέ, ὦ Κλεινία, ἔφη, ὁπότε ἀποστοματίζοι
ὑμῖν ὁ γραμματιστῆς, πότεροι ἐμάνθανον τῶν παίδων τὰ
ἀποστοματιζόμενα, οἱ σοφοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς;—Οἱ σοφοί, ἔφη 5
ὁ Κλεινίας.—Οἱ σοφοὶ ἄρα μανθάνουσιν ἀλλ' οὐχ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς,
καὶ οὐκ εὖ σὺ ἄρτι Εὐθυδήμῳ ἀπεκρίνω.

Ἐνταῦθα δὴ καὶ πάνυ μέγα ἐγέλασάν τε καὶ ἐθορύβησαν d
οἱ ἔρασταὶ τοῖν ἀνδροῖν, ἀγασθέντες τῆς σοφίας αὐτοῖν· οἱ
δ' ἄλλοι ἡμεῖς ἐκπεπληγμένοι ἐσιωπῶμεν. γνοὺς δὲ ἡμᾶς
ὁ Εὐθύδημος ἐκπεπληγμένους, ἴν' ἔτι μᾶλλον θαυμάζοιμεν
αὐτόν, οὐκ ἀνίει τὸ μειράκιον, ἀλλ' ἡρώτα, καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ 5
ἀγαθοὶ ὀρχησταί, διπλᾶ ἔστρεφε τὰ ἐρωτήματα περὶ τοῦ
αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἔφη· Πότερον γὰρ οἱ μανθάνοντες μανθάνουσιν
ἃ ἐπίστανται ἢ ἃ μὴ ἐπίστανται;

Καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος πάλιν μικρὸν πρὸς με ψιθυρίσας,
Καὶ τοῦτ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἕτερον τοιοῦτον οἶον τὸ e
πρότερον.

᾽Ω Ζεῦ, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἥ μὴν καὶ τὸ πρότερόν γε καλὸν ὑμῖν ἐφάνη τὸ ἐρώτημα.

5 Πάντ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοιαῦτα ἡμεῖς ἐρωτῶμεν ἄφυκτα.

Τοιγάρτοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δοκεῖτέ μοι εὐδοκιμεῖν παρὰ τοῖς μαθηταῖς.

Ἐν δὲ τούτῳ ὁ μὲν Κλεινίας τῷ Εὐθυδήμῳ ἀπεκρίνατο ὅτι μανθάνοιεν οἱ μανθάνοντες ἂν οὐκ ἐπίσταιντο· ὁ δὲ ἤρετο
 277 αὐτὸν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ὥνπερ τὸ πρότερον· Τί δέ; ἥ δ' ὅς, οὐκ ἐπίστασαι σὺ γράμματα;—Ναί, ἔφη.—Οὐκοῦν ἅπαντα;—
 Ὡμολόγει.—Ὅταν οὖν τις ἀποστοματίζῃ ὅτιοῦν, οὐ γράμματα ἀποστοματίζει;—Ὡμολόγει.—Οὐκοῦν ὦν τι σὺ ἐπίστασαι,
 5 ἔφη, ἀποστοματίζει, εἴπερ πάντα ἐπίστασαι;—Καὶ τοῦτο ὡμολόγει.—Τί οὖν; ἥ δ' ὅς, ἄρα σὺ <οὐ> μανθάνεις ἅπτ' ἂν ἀποστοματίζῃ τις, ὁ δὲ μὴ ἐπιστάμενος γράμματα μανθάνει;—
 Οὐκ, ἀλλ', ἥ δ' ὅς, μανθάνω.—Οὐκοῦν ἂν ἐπίστασαι, ἥ δ'
 b ὅς, μανθάνεις, εἴπερ γε ἅπαντα τὰ γράμματα ἐπίστασαι.—
 Ὡμολόγησεν.—Οὐκ ἄρα ὀρθῶς ἀπεκρίνω, ἔφη.

Καὶ οὕτω σφόδρα τι ταῦτα εἶρητο τῷ Εὐθυδήμῳ, καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος ὥσπερ σφαῖραν ἐκδεξάμενος τὸν λόγον πάλιν
 5 ἐστοχάζετο τοῦ μειρακίου, καὶ εἶπεν· Ἐξαπατᾷ σε Εὐθύδημος, ὦ Κλεινία. εἰπέ γάρ μοι, τὸ μανθάνειν οὐκ ἐπιστήμην ἐστὶ λαμβάνειν τούτου οὗ ἂν τις μανθάνῃ;—Ὡμολόγει ὁ Κλεινίας.—Τὸ δ' ἐπίστασθαι, ἥ δ' ὅς, ἄλλο τι ἢ ἔχειν ἐπιστήμην ἥδη ἐστίν;—Συνέφη.—Τὸ ἄρα μὴ ἐπίστασθαι
 c μήπω ἔχειν ἐπιστήμην ἐστίν;—Ὡμολόγει αὐτῷ.—Πότερον οὖν εἰσιν οἱ λαμβάνοντες ὅτιοῦν οἱ ἔχοντες ἥδη ἢ οἱ ἂν μὴ ἔχωσιν;—Οἱ ἂν μή.—Οὐκοῦν ὡμολόγηκας εἶναι τούτων καὶ τοὺς μὴ ἐπισταμένους, τῶν μὴ ἐχόντων;—Κατένευσε.—
 5 Τῶν λαμβανόντων ἄρ' εἰσιν οἱ μανθάνοντες, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν ἐχόντων;—Συνέφη.—Οἱ μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι ἄρα, ἔφη, μανθάνουσιν, ὦ Κλεινία, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι.

d Ἔτι δὴ ἐπὶ τὸ τρίτον καταβαλὼν ὥσπερ πάλαισμα ὥρμα ὁ Εὐθύδημος τὸν νεανίσκον· καὶ ἐγὼ γνοὺς βαπτιζόμενον τὸ

μειράκιον, βουλόμενος ἀναπαύσαι αὐτό, μὴ ἡμῖν ἀποδειλιά-
 σεις, παραμυθούμενος εἶπον· ὦ Κλεινία, μὴ θαύμαζε εἰ
 σοι φαίνονται ἀήθεις οἱ λόγοι. ἴσως γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθάνη 5
 οἶον ποιεῖτον τῷ ξένῳ περὶ σέ· ποιεῖτον δὲ ταῦτον ὅπερ
 οἱ ἐν τῇ τελετῇ τῶν Κορυβάντων, ὅταν τὴν θρόνῳσιν
 ποιῶσιν περὶ τοῦτον ὃν ἂν μέλλωσι τελεῖν. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ
 χορηγία τίς ἐστι καὶ παιδιὰ, εἰ ἄρα καὶ τετέλεσαι· καὶ νῦν
 τούτῳ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ χορεύετον περὶ σέ καὶ οἶον ὀρχεῖσθον e
 παίζοντε, ὥς μετὰ τοῦτο τελοῦντε. νῦν οὖν νόμισον τὰ
 πρῶτα τῶν ἱερῶν ἀκούειν τῶν σοφιστικῶν. πρῶτον γάρ,
 ὥς φησι Πρόδικος, περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος μαθεῖν δεῖ·
 ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐνδείκνυσθόν σοι τῷ ξένῳ, ὅτι οὐκ ᾔδησθα τὸ 5
 μανθάνειν ὅτι οἱ ἄνθρωποι καλοῦσι μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ τοιῷδε, ὅταν
 τις ἐξ ἀρχῆς μηδεμίαν ἔχων ἐπιστήμην περὶ πράγματός
 τινος ἔπειτα ὕστερον αὐτοῦ λαμβάνῃ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, καλοῦσι 278
 δὲ ταῦτον τοῦτο καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἔχων ἤδη τὴν ἐπιστήμην ταύτην
 τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ ταῦτον τοῦτο πρᾶγμα ἐπισκοπῇ ἢ πραττόμενον
 ἢ λεγόμενον—μᾶλλον μὲν αὐτὸ συνιέναι καλοῦσιν ἢ μαν-
 θάνειν, ἔστι δ' ὅτε καὶ μανθάνειν—σέ δὲ τοῦτο, ὥς οὗτοι 5
 ἐνδείκνυνται, διαλέληθεν, ταῦτον ὄνομα ἐπ' ἀνθρώποις ἐναν-
 τίως ἔχουσιν κείμενον, τῷ τε εἰδότει καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ· παρα-
 πλῆσιον δὲ τούτῳ καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ ἐρωτήματι, ἐν ᾧ
 ἡρώτων σε πότερα μανθάνουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἢ ἐπίστανται b
 ἢ ἢ μὴ. ταῦτα δὴ τῶν μαθημάτων παιδιὰ ἐστιν—διὸ καί
 φημι ἐγὼ σοι τούτους προσπαίξειν—παιδιὰν δὲ λέγω διὰ
 ταῦτα, ὅτι, εἰ καὶ πολλά τις ἢ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μάθοι,
 τὰ μὲν πράγματα οὐδὲν ἂν μᾶλλον εἰδείῃ πῇ ἔχει, προσ- 5
 παίξειν δὲ οἷός τ' ἂν εἴῃ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις διὰ τὴν τῶν ὀνο-
 μάτων διαφορὰν ὑποσκελίζων καὶ ἀνατρέπων, ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ
 σκολύθρια τῶν μελλόντων καθιζήσεσθαι ὑποσπῶντες χαίρουσι
 καὶ γελῶσιν, ἐπειδὴν ἴδωσιν ὕπτιον ἀνατετραμμένον. ταῦτα c
 μὲν οὖν σοι παρὰ τούτων νόμιζε παιδιὰν γεγονέναι· τὸ δὲ
 μετὰ ταῦτα δῆλον ὅτι τούτῳ γέ σοι αὐτῷ τὰ σπουδαῖα

ἐνδείξεσθον, καὶ ἐγὼ ὑφηγήσομαι αὐτοῖν ἵνα μοι ὃ ὑπέσχοντο
 5 ἀποδώσω. ἐφάρτην γὰρ ἐπιδείξασθαι τὴν προτρεπτικὴν
 σοφίαν· νῦν δέ μοι δοκεῖ δεῖν ψηθήτην πρότερον παῖσαι
 πρὸς σέ. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν, ὦ Εὐθύδημέ τε καὶ Διονυσόδωρε,
 d πεπαίσθω τε ὑμῖν, καὶ ἴσως ἱκανῶς ἔχει· τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ
 ταῦτα ἐπιδείξατον προτρέποντε τὸ μειράκιον ὅπως χρή
 σοφίας τε καὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμεληθῆναι. πρότερον δ' ἐγὼ σφῶν
 ἐνδείξομαι οἷον αὐτὸ ὑπολαμβάνω καὶ οἷον αὐτοῦ ἐπιθυμῶ
 5 ἀκοῦσαι. ἐὰν οὖν δόξω ὑμῖν ἰδιωτικῶς τε καὶ γελοίως αὐτὸ
 ποιεῖν, μὴ μου καταγελάτε· ὑπὸ προθυμίας γὰρ τοῦ ἀκοῦσαι
 τῆς ὑμετέρας σοφίας τολμήσω ἀπαντοσχεδιάσαι ἐναντίον
 e ὑμῶν. ἀνάσχεσθον οὖν ἀγελαστὶ ἀκούοντες αὐτοί τε καὶ
 οἱ μαθηταὶ ὑμῶν· σὺ δέ μοι, ὦ παῖ Ἀξιόχου, ἀπόκριναι.

Ἄρα γε πάντες ἄνθρωποι βουλόμεθα εὖ πράττειν; ἢ
 τοῦτο μὲν ἐρώτημα ὦν νυνδὴ ἐφοβούμην ἐν τῶν καταγελά-
 5 στων; ἀνόητον γὰρ δῆπου καὶ τὸ ἐρωτᾶν τὰ τοιαῦτα· τίς γὰρ
 οὐ βούλεται ἀνθρώπων εὖ πράττειν;—Οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐκ, ἔφη
 279 ὁ Κλεινίας.—Εἶπεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο, ἐπειδὴ βου-
 λόμεθα εὖ πράττειν, πῶς ἂν εὖ πράττοιμεν; ἄρ' ἂν εἰ ἡμῖν
 πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ εἴη; ἢ τοῦτο ἐκείνου ἔτι εὐθέςτερον; δῆλον
 γάρ που καὶ τοῦτο ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει.—Συνέφη.—Φέρε δὴ,
 5 ἀγαθὰ δὲ ποῖα ἄρα τῶν ὄντων τυγχάνει ἡμῖν ὄντα; ἢ οὐ
 χαλεπὸν οὐδὲ σεμνοῦ ἀνδρὸς πάνυ τι οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἔοικεν εἶναι
 εὐπορεῖν; πᾶς γὰρ ἂν ἡμῖν εἴποι ὅτι τὸ πλουτεῖν ἀγαθόν·
 ἢ γάρ;—Πάνυ γ', ἔφη.—Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τὸ
 b καλὸν εἶναι καὶ τᾶλλα κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἱκανῶς παρεσκευά-
 σθαι;—Συνεδόκει.—Ἄλλὰ μὴν εὐγένειαί γε καὶ δυνάμεις καὶ
 τιμαὶ ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ δῆλὰ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα.—Ὡμολόγει.—
 Τί οὖν, ἔφη, ἔτι ἡμῖν λείπεται τῶν ἀγαθῶν; τί ἄρα ἐστὶν
 5 τὸ σῶφρονά τε εἶναι καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀνδρεῖον; πότερον
 πρὸς Διός, ὦ Κλεινία, ἡγῇ σύ, ἐὰν ταῦτα τιθῶμεν ὥς
 ἀγαθὰ, ὁρθῶς ἡμᾶς θήσειν, ἢ ἐὰν μὴ; ἴσως γὰρ ἂν τις ἡμῖν
 ἀμφισβητήσκειν· σοὶ δὲ πῶς δοκεῖ;—Ἀγαθὰ, ἔφη ὁ Κλει-

νίας.—Εἶπεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ποῦ χοροῦ τάξομεν; c
 ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ἢ πῶς λέγεις;—Ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς.—Ἐνθυ-
 μοῦ δὴ μή τι παραλείπωμεν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὃ τι καὶ ἄξιον
 λόγου.—Ἀλλὰ μοι δοκοῦμεν, ἔφη, οὐδέν, ὁ Κλεινίας.—Καὶ
 ἐγὼ ἀναμνησθεῖς εἶπον ὅτι Ναὶ μὰ Δία κινδυνεύομέν γε 5
 τὸ μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν παραλιπεῖν.—Τί τοῦτο; ἢ δ' ὅς.
 —Τὴν εὐτυχίαν, ὦ Κλεινία· ὁ πάντες φασί, καὶ οἱ πάν-
 ναυτοὶ, μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἶναι.—Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη.
 —Καὶ ἐγὼ αὖ πάλιν μετανοήσας εἶπον ὅτι Ὀλίγου κατα-
 γέλαστοι ἐγενόμεθα ὑπὸ τῶν ξένων ἐγὼ τε καὶ σύ, ὦ παῖ d
 Ἀξιόχου.—Τί δή, ἔφη, τοῦτο;—Ὅτι εὐτυχίαν ἐν τοῖς ἔμ-
 προσθεν θέμενοι νυνδὴ αὖθις περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐλέγομεν.—
 Τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο;—Καταγέλαστον δήπου, ὁ πάλαι πρόκειται,
 τοῦτο πάλιν προτιθέναι καὶ δις ταῦτά λέγειν.—Πῶς, ἔφη, 5
 τοῦτο λέγεις;—Ἡ σοφία δήπου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εὐτυχία ἐστίν·
 τοῦτο δὲ κὰν παῖς γνοίη.—Καὶ ὅς ἐθαύμασεν· οὕτως ἔτι νέος
 τε καὶ εὐήθης ἐστί.—Κἀγὼ γνοὺς αὐτὸν θαυμάζοντα, Ἄρα
 οὐκ οἶσθα, ἔφη, ὦ Κλεινία, ὅτι περὶ αὐλημάτων εὐπραγίαν e
 οἱ αὐληταὶ εὐτυχέστατοί εἰσιν;—Συνέφη.—Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ'
 ἐγώ, καὶ περὶ γραμμάτων γραφῆς τε καὶ ἀναγνώσεως οἱ
 γραμματισταί;—Πάνυ γε.—Τί δέ; πρὸς τοὺς τῆς θαλάττης
 κινδύνους μὲν οἶει εὐτυχεστέρους τινὰς εἶναι τῶν σοφῶν 5
 κυβερνητῶν, ὥς ἐπὶ πάν εἰπεῖν;—Οὐ δῆτα.—Τί δέ; στρα-
 τευόμενος μετὰ ποτέρου ἂν ἥδιον τοῦ κινδύνου τε καὶ τῆς
 τύχης μετέχοις, μετὰ σοφοῦ στρατηγοῦ ἢ μετὰ ἀμαθοῦς;— 280
 Μετὰ σοφοῦ.—Τί δέ; ἀσθενῶν μετὰ ποτέρου ἂν ἡδέως
 κινδυνεύοις, μετὰ σοφοῦ ἰατροῦ ἢ μετὰ ἀμαθοῦς;—Μετὰ
 σοφοῦ.—Ἄρ' οὐκ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι εὐτυχέστερον ἂν οἶει πράτ-
 τειν μετὰ σοφοῦ πράττων ἢ μετὰ ἀμαθοῦς;—Συνεχώρει.— 5
 Ἡ σοφία ἄρα πανταχοῦ εὐτυχεῖν ποιεῖ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους.
 οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἀμαρτάνοι γ' ἂν ποτέ τι σοφία, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη
 ὀρθῶς πράττειν καὶ τυγχάνειν· ἢ γὰρ ἂν οὐκέτι σοφία εἴη.

Συνωμολογησάμεθα τελευτῶντες οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ἐν κεφα- b

λαίψ οὕτω τοῦτο ἔχειν, σοφίας παρούσης, ᾧ ἂν παρῇ μηδὲν προσδεῖσθαι εὐτυχίας· ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῦτο συνωμολογησάμεθα, πάλιν ἐπυνθανόμην αὐτοῦ τὰ πρότερον ὡμολογημένα πῶς
5 ἂν ἡμῖν ἔχοι. Ὁμολογήσαμεν γάρ, ἔφην, εἰ ἡμῖν ἀγαθὰ πολλὰ παρείη, εὐδαιμονεῖν ἂν καὶ εὖ πράττειν.—Συνέφη.—
Ἄρ' οὖν εὐδαιμονοῦμεν ἂν διὰ τὰ παρόντα ἀγαθὰ, εἰ μηδὲν ἡμᾶς ὠφελοῖ ἢ εἰ ὠφελοῖ;—Εἰ ὠφελοῖ, ἔφη.—Ἄρ' οὖν ἂν
c τι ὠφελοῖ, εἰ εἴη μόνον ἡμῖν, χρώμεθα δ' αὐτοῖς μή; οἷον σιτία εἰ ἡμῖν εἴη πολλά, ἐσθίοιμεν δὲ μή, ἢ ποτόν, πίνοιμεν δὲ μή, ἔσθ' ὃ τι ὠφελοίμεθ' ἂν;—Οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη.—Τί δέ; οἱ δημιουργοὶ πάντες, εἰ αὐτοῖς εἴη πάντα τὰ ἐπιτήδεια
5 παρεσκευασμένα ἐκάστω εἰς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον, χρῶντο δὲ αὐτοῖς μή, ἂρ' ἂν οὗτοι εὖ πράττοιεν διὰ τὴν κτῆσιν, ὅτι κεκτημένοι εἶεν πάντα ἃ δεῖ κεκτήσθαι τὸν δημιουργόν; οἷον τέκτων, εἰ παρεσκευασμένος εἴη τὰ τε ὄργανα ἅπαντα καὶ ξύλα ἱκανά, τεκταίνοιτο δὲ μή, ἔσθ' ὃ τι ὠφελοῖτ' ἂν
d ἀπὸ τῆς κτήσεως;—Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη.—Τί δέ, εἴ τις κεκτημένος εἴη πλοῦτόν τε καὶ ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν πάντα τὰ ἀγαθὰ, χρῶτο δὲ αὐτοῖς μή, ἂρ' ἂν εὐδαιμονοῖ διὰ τὴν τούτων κτῆσιν τῶν ἀγαθῶν;—Οὐ δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες.—Δεῖν ἄρα,
5 ἔφην, ὥς ἔοικεν, μὴ μόνον κεκτήσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ τὸν μέλλοντα εὐδαίμονα ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς· ὥς οὐδὲν ὄφελος τῆς κτήσεως γίγνεται.—Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.—Ἄρ'
e οὖν, ὦ Κλεινία, ἥδη τοῦτο ἱκανὸν πρὸς τὸ εὐδαίμονα ποιῆσαι τινα, τό τε κεκτήσθαι τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὸ χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς;—Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.—Πότερον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐὰν ὀρθῶς χρήται τις ἢ καὶ ἐὰν μή;—Ἐὰν ὀρθῶς.—Καλῶς γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις.
5 πλέον γάρ που οἶμαι θάτερόν ἐστιν, ἐὰν τις χρήται ὀφρὺν μὴ ὀρθῶς πράγματι ἢ ἐὰν ἑᾶ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ κακόν, τὸ δὲ οὔτε
281 κακὸν οὔτε ἀγαθόν. ἢ οὐχ οὕτω φαμέν;—Συνεχώρει.—Τί οὖν; ἐν τῇ ἐργασίᾳ τε καὶ χρήσει τῇ περὶ τὰ ξύλα μὴ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν τὸ ἀπεργαζόμενον ὀρθῶς χρῆσθαι ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἢ τεκτονική;—Οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη.—Ἀλλὰ μήν που καὶ ἐν τῇ

περὶ τὰ σκεύη ἐργασία τὸ ὀρθῶς ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἢ ἀπεργα- 5
 ζομένη.—Συνέφη.—^α Ἀρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ περὶ τὴν χρεῖαν
 ὦν ἐλέγομεν τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ἀγαθῶν, πλούτου τε καὶ ὑγιείας
 καὶ κάλλους, τὸ ὀρθῶς πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις χρῆσθαι ἐπι-
 στήμη ἦν ἡγουμένη καὶ κατορθοῦσα τὴν πρᾶξιν, ἢ ἄλλο τι; **b**
 —^β Ἐπιστήμη, ἦ δ' ὅς.—Οὐ μόνον ἄρα εὐτυχίαν ἀλλὰ καὶ
 εὐπραγίαν, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἢ ἐπιστήμη παρέχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις
 ἐν πάσῃ κτήσῃ τε καὶ πράξει.—^γ Ὡμολόγει.—^δ Ἀρ' οὖν ὦ
 πρὸς Διός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὄφελός τι τῶν ἄλλων κτημάτων ἄνευ 5
 φρονήσεως καὶ σοφίας; ἄρά γε ἂν ὄναιτο ἄνθρωπος πολλὰ
 κεκτημένος καὶ πολλὰ πράττων νοῦν μὴ ἔχων, ἢ μᾶλλον
 ὀλίγα [νοῦν ἔχων]; ὦδε δὲ σκόπει· οὐκ ἐλάττω πράττων
 ἐλάττω ἂν ἐξαμαρτάνοι, ἐλάττω δὲ ἀμαρτάνων ἦττον ἂν **c**
 κακῶς πράττοι, ἦττον δὲ κακῶς πράττων ἄθλιος ἦττον ἂν
 εἴη;—Πάνυ γ', ἔφη.—Πότερον οὖν ἂν μᾶλλον ἐλάττω τις
 πράττοι πένης ὢν ἢ πλούσιος;—Πένης, ἔφη.—Πότερον δὲ
 ἀσθενὴς ἢ ἰσχυρός;—^ε Ἀσθενής.—Πότερον δὲ ἔντιμος ἢ 5
 ἄτιμος;—^ς Ἀτιμος.—Πότερον δὲ ἀνδρεῖος ὢν [καὶ σώφρων]
 ἐλάττω ἂν πράττοι ἢ δειλός;—^δ Δειλός.—Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀργὸς
 μᾶλλον ἢ ἐργάτης;—Συνεχώρει.—Καὶ βραδὺς μᾶλλον ἢ
 ταχύς, καὶ ἀμβλὺ δῶν καὶ ἀκούων μᾶλλον ἢ ὀξύ;—Πάντα **d**
 τὰ τοιαῦτα συνεχωροῦμεν ἀλλήλοις.—^ε Ἐν κεφαλαίῳ δ', ἔφην,
 ὦ Κλεινία, κινδυνεύει σύμπαντα ἃ τὸ πρῶτον ἔφαμεν ἀγαθὰ
 εἶναι, οὐ περὶ τούτου ὁ λόγος αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ὅπως αὐτὰ γε
 καθ' αὐτὰ πέφυκεν ἀγαθὰ [εἶναι], ἀλλ' ὥς ἔοικεν ὦδ' ἔχει· 5
 ἐὰν μὲν αὐτῶν ἡγῆται ἀμαθία, μείζω κακὰ εἶναι τῶν ἐναν-
 τίων, ὅσῳ δυνατώτερα ὑπηρετεῖν τῷ ἡγουμένῳ κακῷ ὄντι,
 ἐὰν δὲ φρόνησίς τε καὶ σοφία, μείζω ἀγαθὰ, αὐτὰ δὲ καθ'
 αὐτὰ οὐδέτερα αὐτῶν οὐδενὸς ἄξια εἶναι.—Φαίνεται, ἔφη, **e**
 ὥς ἔοικεν, οὕτως, ὥς σὺ λέγεις.—Τί οὖν ἡμῖν συμβαίνει ἐκ
 τῶν εἰρημένων; ἄλλο τι ἢ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων οὐδὲν ὄν οὔτε
 ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν, τούτοις δὲ δυοῖν ὄντοις ἢ μὲν σοφία
 ἀγαθόν, ἢ δὲ ἀμαθία κακόν;—^ς Ὡμολόγει. 5

282 Ἔτι τοίνυν, ἔφη, τὸ λοιπὸν ἐπισκεψώμεθα. ἐπειδὴ
 εὐδαίμονες μὲν εἶναι προθυμούμεθα πάντες, ἐφάνημεν δὲ
 τοιοῦτοι γιγνόμενοι ἐκ τοῦ χρήσθαι τε τοῖς πράγμασιν καὶ
 ὀρθῶς χρήσθαι, τὴν δὲ ὀρθότητα καὶ εὐτυχίαν ἐπιστήμη
 5 ἢ παρέχουσα, δεῖ δὴ, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου ἅπαντα
 ἄνδρα τοῦτο παρασκευάζεσθαι, ὅπως ὥς σοφώτατος ἔσται·
 ἢ οὐ;—Ναί, ἔφη.—Καὶ παρὰ πατρός γε δήπου τοῦτο οἴο-
 μενον δεῖν παραλαμβάνειν πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ χρήματα, καὶ
 b παρ' ἐπιτρόπων καὶ φίλων τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ τῶν φασκόν-
 των ἑραστῶν εἶναι, καὶ ξένων καὶ πολιτῶν, δεόμενον καὶ
 ἰκετεύοντα σοφίας μεταδιδόναι, οὐδὲν αἰσχρὸν, ὦ Κλεινία,
 οὐδὲ νεμεσητὸν ἔνεκα τούτου ὑπηρετεῖν καὶ δουλεύειν καὶ
 5 ἑραστῇ καὶ παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτιοῦν ἐθέλοντα ὑπηρετεῖν τῶν
 καλῶν ὑπηρετημάτων, προθυμούμενον σοφὸν γενέσθαι· ἢ οὐ
 δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, ἐγώ, οὕτως;—Πάνυ μὲν οὖν εὖ μοι δοκεῖς
 c λέγειν, ἢ δ' ὅς.—Εἰ ἔστι γε, ὦ Κλεινία, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ σοφία
 διδακτὸν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου παραγίγνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώ-
 ποις· τοῦτο γὰρ ἡμῖν ἔτι ἄσκεπτον καὶ οὐπω διωμολογη-
 μένον ἐμοί τε καὶ σοί.—Ἄλλ' ἔμοιγε, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες,
 5 διδακτὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ.—Καὶ ἐγὼ ἡσθεὶς εἶπον· Ἡ καλῶς
 λέγεις, ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν, καὶ εὖ ἐποίησας ἀπαλλάξας με
 σκέψεως πολλῆς περὶ τούτου αὐτοῦ, πότερον διδακτὸν ἢ οὐ
 διδακτὸν ἢ σοφία. νῦν οὖν ἐπειδὴ σοι καὶ διδακτὸν δοκεῖ
 καὶ μόνον τῶν ὄντων εὐδαίμονα καὶ εὐτυχῇ ποιεῖν τὸν
 d ἄνθρωπον, ἄλλο τι ἢ φάλης ἀν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι φιλοσοφεῖν
 καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν νῷ ἔχεις αὐτὸ ποιεῖν;—Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη,
 ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥς οἶόν τε μάλιστα.

Καγὰρ ταῦτα ἄσμενος ἀκούσας, Τὸ μὲν ἐμόν, ἔφη, παρά-
 5 δειγμα, ὦ Διονυσόδωρέ τε καὶ Εὐθύδημε, οἷων ἐπιθυμῶ τῶν
 προτρεπτικῶν λόγων εἶναι, τοιοῦτον, ἰδιωτικὸν ἴσως καὶ
 μόλις διὰ μακρῶν λεγόμενον· σφῶν δὲ ὁπότερος βούλεται,
 ταῦτόν τοῦτο τέχνη πρᾶττων ἐπιδειξάτω ἡμῖν. εἰ δὲ μὴ
 e τοῦτο βούλεσθον, ὅθεν ἐγὼ ἀπέλιπον, τὸ ἐξῆς ἐπιδείξατον

τῷ μειρακίῳ, πότερον πᾶσαν ἐπιστήμην δεῖ αὐτὸν κτᾶσθαι, ἢ ἔστι τις μία ἣν δεῖ λαβόντα εὐδαιμονεῖν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι, καὶ τίς αὕτη. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἔλεγον ἀρχόμενος, περὶ πολλοῦ ἡμῖν τυγχάνει ὃν τόνδε τὸν νεανίσκον σοφόν 5 τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι.

Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα εἶπον, ὦ Κρίτων· τῷ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο 283 ἔσομένῳ πάνυ σφόδρα προσεῖχον τὸν νοῦν, καὶ ἐπεσκόπουν τίνα ποτὲ τρόπον ἄψοιτο τοῦ λόγου καὶ ὁπόθεν ἄρξοιτο παρακελευόμενοι τῷ νεανίσκῳ σοφίαν τε καὶ ἀρετὴν ἀσκεῖν. ὁ οὖν πρεσβύτερος αὐτῶν, ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, πρότερος ἤρχετο 5 τοῦ λόγου, καὶ ἡμεῖς πάντες ἐβλέπομεν πρὸς αὐτὸν ὡς αὐτίκα μάλα ἀκουσόμενοι θαυμασίους τινὰς λόγους. ὅπερ οὖν καὶ συνέβη ἡμῖν· θαυμαστὸν γάρ τινα, ὦ Κρίτων, ἀνὴρ b κατήρχεν λόγον, οὗ σοὶ ἄξιον ἀκοῦσαι, ὡς παρακελευστικὸς ὁ λόγος ἦν ἐπ' ἀρετῇν.

Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες τε καὶ ὑμεῖς οἱ ἄλλοι, ὅσοι φατέ ἐπιθυμεῖν τόνδε τὸν νεανίσκον σοφὸν γενέσθαι, πότε- 5 ρον παίζετε ταῦτα λέγοντες ἢ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐπιθυμεῖτε καὶ σπουδάζετε;

Κἀγὼ διενεόηθην ὅτι ᾠθητήν ἄρα ἡμᾶς τὸ πρότερον παίζειν, ἥνίκα ἐκελεύομεν διαλεχθῆναι τῷ νεανίσκῳ αὐτῷ, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα προσεπαισάτην τε καὶ οὐκ ἐσπουδασάτην· 10 ταῦτα οὖν διανοηθεὶς ἔτι μᾶλλον εἶπον ὅτι θαυμαστῶς c σπουδάζοιμεν.

Καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, Σκόπει μήν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅπως μὴ ἕξαρνος ἔσει ἂ νῦν λέγεις.—Ἐσκεμμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὐ γὰρ μή ποτ' ἕξαρνος γένωμαι.—Τί οὖν; ἔφη· φατέ 5 βούλεσθαι αὐτὸν σοφὸν γενέσθαι;—Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.—Νῦν δέ, ἢ δ' ὅς, Κλεινίας πότερον σοφός ἐστιν ἢ οὐ;—Οὐκ οὖν φησὶ γέ πω· ἐστιν δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐκ ἀλαζών.—Ὑμεῖς δέ, ἔφη, βούλεσθε γενέσθαι αὐτὸν σοφόν, ἀμαθὴ δὲ μὴ εἶναι; d —Ὡμολογοῦμεν.—Οὐκοῦν ὅς μὲν οὐκ ἐστιν, βούλεσθε αὐτὸν γενέσθαι, ὅς δ' ἐστι νῦν, μηκέτι εἶναι.—Καὶ ἐγώ

ἀκούσας ἐθορυβήθη· ὁ δέ μου θορυβουμένου ὑπολαβών,
 5 Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἔφη, ἐπεὶ βούλεσθε αὐτὸν ὃς νῦν ἐστὶν
 μηκέτι εἶναι, βούλεσθε αὐτόν, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἀπολωλέναι; καίτοι
 πολλοῦ ἂν ἄξιοι οἱ τοιοῦτοι εἶεν φίλοι τε καὶ ἑρασταί,
 οἷτινες τὰ παιδικὰ περὶ παντὸς ἂν ποιήσαιντο ἐξολωλέναι.

e Καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος ἀκούσας ἠγανάκτησέν τε ὑπὲρ τῶν
 παιδικῶν καὶ εἶπεν· ὦ ξέने Θούριε, εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον,
 ἔφη, ἦν εἰπεῖν, εἶπον ἄν· “Σοὶ εἰς κεφαλὴν,” ὃ τι μαθὼν μου
 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καταψεύδει τοιοῦτον πρᾶγμα, ὃ ἐγὼ οἶμαι
 5 οὐδ’ ὅσιον εἶναι λέγειν, ὥς ἐγὼ τόνδε βουλόμην ἂν ἐξολω-
 λέναι.

Τί δέ, ἔφη, ὦ Κτήσιππε, ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ἡ δοκεῖ σοι οἶόν
 τ’ εἶναι ψεύδεσθαι;—Νὴ Δία, ἔφη, εἰ μὴ μαίνομαι γε.—
 Πότερον λέγοντα τὸ πρᾶγμα περὶ οὗ ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾗ, ἢ μὴ
 284 λέγοντα;—Λέγοντα, ἔφη.—Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ λέγει αὐτό, οὐκ
 ἄλλο λέγει τῶν ὄντων ἢ ἐκείνο ὅπερ λέγει;—Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;
 ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος.—Ἐν μὴν κακείνῳ γ’ ἐστὶν τῶν ὄντων, ὃ
 λέγει, χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων.—Πάνυ γε.—Οὐκοῦν ὁ ἐκείνο
 5 λέγων τὸ ὄν, ἔφη, λέγει;—Ναί.—Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὃ γε τὸ ὄν
 λέγων καὶ τὰ ὄντα τᾶληθῇ λέγει· ὥστε ὁ Διονυσόδωρος,
 εἴπερ λέγει τὰ ὄντα, λέγει τᾶληθῇ καὶ οὐδὲν κατὰ σοῦ
 ψεύδεται.

b Ναί, ἔφη· ἀλλ’ ὁ ταῦτα λέγων, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος, ὦ
 Εὐθύδημε, οὐ τὰ ὄντα λέγει.

Καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος, Τὰ δὲ μὴ ὄντα, ἔφη, ἄλλο τι ἢ οὐκ
 ἔστιν;—Οὐκ ἔστιν.—Ἄλλο τι οὖν οὐδαμοῦ τά γε μὴ ὄντα
 5 ὄντα ἐστίν;—Οὐδαμοῦ.—Ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως περὶ ταῦτα, τὰ μὴ
 ὄντα, πράξειεν ἂν τίς τι, (ὥστε καὶ εἶναι) ποιήσειεν ἂν καὶ
 ὁστισοῦν τὰ μηδαμοῦ ὄντα;—Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσι-
 ππος.—Τί οὖν; οἱ ῥήτορες ὅταν λέγωσιν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ,
 οὐδὲν πράττουσι;—Πράττουσι μὲν οὖν, ἢ δ’ ὅς.—Οὐκοῦν
 c εἴπερ πράττουσι, καὶ ποιοῦσι;—Ναί.—Τὸ λέγειν ἄρα πρᾶτ-
 τειν τε καὶ ποιεῖν ἐστίν;—Ὡμολόγησεν.—Οὐκ ἄρα τά

γε μὴ ὄντ', ἔφη, λέγει οὐδεὶς—ποιοῖ γὰρ ἂν ἤδη τί· σὺ δὲ ὠμολόγηκας τὸ μὴ ὂν μὴ οἶόν τ' εἶναι μηδένα ποιεῖν— ὥστε κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον οὐδεὶς ψευδῇ λέγει, ἀλλ' εἴπερ 5 λέγει Διονυσόδωρος, τὰληθῇ τε καὶ τὰ ὄντα λέγει.

Νῆ Δία, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος, ὦ Εὐθύδημε· ἀλλὰ τὰ ὄντα μὲν τρόπον τινὰ λέγει, οὐ μέντοι ὥς γε ἔχει.

Πῶς λέγεις, ἔφη ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, ὦ Κτήσιππε; εἰσὶν γάρ τινες οἱ λέγουσι τὰ πράγματα ὥς ἔχει;—Εἰσὶν μέντοι, d ἔφη, οἱ καλοὶ τε καγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ τὰληθῇ λέγοντες.—Τί οὖν; ἡ δ' ὅς· τὰγαθὰ οὐκ εὔ, ἔφη, ἔχει, τὰ δὲ κακὰ κακῶς;—Συνεχώρει.—Τοὺς δὲ καλοὺς τε καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ὁμολογεῖς λέγειν ὥς ἔχει τὰ πράγματα;—Ὅμολογῶ.—Κακῶς ἄρα, ἔφη, 5 λέγουσιν, ὦ Κτήσιππε, οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τὰ κακὰ, εἴπερ ὥς ἔχει λέγουσιν.—Ναὶ μὰ Δία, ἡ δ' ὅς, σφόδρα γε, τοὺς γοῦν κακοὺς ἀνθρώπους· ὦν σύ, ἐάν μοι πείθῃ, εὐλαβήσῃ εἶναι, ἵνα μὴ σε οἱ ἀγαθοὶ κακῶς λέγωσιν. ὥς εὔ ἴσθ' ὅτι κακῶς e λέγουσιν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τοὺς κακοὺς.—Καὶ τοὺς μεγάλους, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος, μεγάλως λέγουσι καὶ τοὺς θερμοὺς θερμῶς;—Μάλιστα δήπου, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος· τοὺς γοῦν ψυχροὺς ψυχρῶς λέγουσιν τε καὶ φασὶν διαλέγεσθαι.—Σὺ μὲν, ἔφη ὁ 5 Διονυσόδωρος, λαιδορῇ, ὦ Κτήσιππε, λαιδορῇ.—Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἡ δ' ὅς, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε, ἐπεὶ φιλῶ σε, ἀλλὰ νοθεύω σε ὥς ἐταῖρον, καὶ πειρώμαι πείθειν μηδέποτε ἐναντίον ἐμοῦ οὕτως ἀγροίκως λέγειν ὅτι ἐγὼ τούτους βούλομαι ἐξολωλέναι, οὓς περὶ πλείστου ποιούμεναι. 285

Ἐγὼ οὖν, ἐπειδὴ μοι ἐδόκουν ἀγριωτέως πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἔχειν, προσέπαιζόν τε τὸν Κτήσιππον καὶ εἶπον ὅτι ὦ Κτήσιππε, ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ χρῆναι ἡμᾶς παρὰ τῶν ξένων δέχεσθαι ἃ λέγουσιν, ἐὰν ἐθέλωσι διδόναι, καὶ μὴ ὀνόματι 5 διαφέρεισθαι. εἰ γὰρ ἐπίστανται οὕτως ἐξολλύναι ἀνθρώπους, ὥστ' ἐκ πονηρῶν τε καὶ ἀφρόνων χρηστούς τε καὶ ἔμφρονας ποιεῖν, καὶ τοῦτο εἴτε αὐτῶ ἡνῆρκατον εἴτε καὶ παρ' ἄλλου του ἐμαθέτην φθόρον τινὰ καὶ ὄλεθρον τοιοῦτον, b

ὥστε ἀπολέσαντες πονηρὸν ὄντα χρηστὸν πάλιν ἀποφῆναι·
 εἰ τοῦτο ἐπίστασθον—δῆλον δὲ ὅτι ἐπίστασθον· ἐφάτην
 γοῦν τὴν τέχνην σφῶν εἶναι τὴν νεωστὶ ἡύρημένην ἀγαθοὺς
 5 ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐκ πονηρῶν—συγχωρήσωμεν οὖν
 αὐτοῖν αὐτό· ἀπολεσάντων ἡμῖν τὸ μειράκιον καὶ φρόνιμον
 ποιησάντων, καὶ ἅπαντάς γε ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἄλλους. εἰ δὲ ὑμεῖς
 c οἱ νέοι φοβεῖσθε, ὥσπερ ἐν Καρὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ ἔστω ὁ κίνδυνος·
 ὡς ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πρεσβύτης εἰμί, παρακινδυνεύειν ἔτοι-
 μος καὶ παραδίδωμι ἑμαυτὸν Διονυσιοδώρῳ τούτῳ ὥσπερ τῇ
 Μηδείᾳ τῇ Κόλχῃ. ἀπολλύτω με, καὶ εἰ μὲν βούλεται,
 5 ἐψέτω, εἰ δ' ὅ, τι βούλεται, τοῦτο ποιεῖτω· μόνον χρηστὸν
 ἀποφηνάτω.

Καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος, Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἔφη, καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Σώκρατες,
 ἔτοιμός εἰμι παρέχειν ἑμαυτὸν τοῖς ξένοις, καὶ ἔαν βούλων-
 ται δέρειν ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ νῦν δέρουσιν, εἴ μοι ἢ δορὰ μὴ εἰς
 d ἀσκὸν τελευτήσῃ, ὥσπερ ἡ τοῦ Μαρσύου, ἀλλ' εἰς ἀρετὴν.
 καίτοι με οἶεται Διονυσόδωρος οὕτοσὶ χαλεπαίνειν αὐτῷ·
 ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ χαλεπαίνω, ἀλλ' ἀντιλέγω πρὸς ταῦτα ἃ μοι
 δοκεῖ πρὸς με μὴ καλῶς λέγειν. ἀλλὰ σὺ τὸ ἀντιλέγειν,
 5 ἔφη, ὦ γενναῖε Διονυσόδωρε, μὴ κάλει λοιδορεῖσθαι· ἕτερον
 γάρ τί ἐστι τὸ λοιδορεῖσθαι.

Καὶ Διονυσόδωρος, Ὡς ὄντος, ἔφη, τοῦ ἀντιλέγειν, ὦ
 Κτήσιππε, ποιῇ τοὺς λόγους;

e Πάντως δήπου, ἔφη, καὶ σφόδρα γε· ἢ σύ, ὦ Διονυσό-
 δωρε, οὐκ οἶε εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν;

Οὐκουν σύ γ' ἄν, ἔφη, ἀποδείξαις πώποτε ἀκούσας οὐδενὸς
 ἀντιλέγοντος ἑτέρου ἑτέρῳ.

5 Ἀληθῇ λέγεις, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ ἀκούωμεν νῦν εἴ σοι ἀποδεί-
 κνυμι ἀντιλέγοντος Κτησίππου Διονυσιοδώρῳ.

Ἦ καὶ ὑπόσχοις ἂν τούτου λόγον;

Πάννυ, ἔφη.

Τί οὖν; ἢ δ' ὅς· εἰσὶν ἐκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων λόγοι;—

10 Πάννυ γε.—Οὐκοῦν ὥς ἔστιν ἕκαστον ἢ ὥς οὐκ ἔστιν;—

ὥς ἔστιν.—Εἰ γὰρ μέμνησαι, ἔφη, ὦ Κτήσιππε, καὶ ἄρτι 286
 ἐπεδείξαμεν μηδένα λέγοντα ὥς οὐκ ἔστι· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὄν
 οὐδεὶς ἐφάνη λέγων.—Τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο; ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Κτήσιπ-
 πος· ἥττόν τι ἀντιλέγομεν ἐγὼ τε καὶ σύ;—Πότερον οὖν,
 ἢ δ' ὅς, ἀντιλέγομεν ἂν τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος λόγον ἀμφό- 5
 τεροι λέγοντες, ἢ οὕτω μὲν ἂν δήπου ταῦτα λέγοιμεν;—
 Συνεχώρει.—Ἄλλ' ὅταν μηδέτερος, ἔφη, τὸν τοῦ πράγματος
 λόγον λέγῃ, τότε ἀντιλέγομεν ἂν; ἢ οὕτω γε τὸ παράπαν b
 οὐδ' ἂν μεμνημένος εἴη τοῦ πράγματος οὐδέτερος ἡμῶν;—
 Καὶ τοῦτο συνωμολόγει.—Ἄλλ' ἄρα, ὅταν ἐγὼ μὲν τὸν τοῦ
 πράγματος λόγον λέγω, σὺ δὲ ἄλλου τινὸς ἄλλον, τότε
 ἀντιλέγομεν; ἢ ἐγὼ λέγω μὲν τὸ πρᾶγμα, σὺ δὲ οὐδὲ λέγεις 5
 τὸ παράπαν; ὁ δὲ μὴ λέγων τῷ λέγοντι πῶς (ἂν) ἀντιλέγοι;

Καὶ ὁ μὲν Κτήσιππος ἐσίγησεν· ἐγὼ δὲ θαυμάσας τὸν
 λόγον, Πῶς, ἔφην, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε, λέγεις; οὐ γάρ τοι
 ἀλλὰ τοῦτόν γε τὸν λόγον πολλῶν δὴ καὶ πολλάκις ἀκηκῶς c
 ἀεὶ θαυμάζω—καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀμφὶ Πρωταγόραν σφόδρα ἐχρῶντο
 αὐτῷ καὶ οἱ ἔτι παλαιότεροι· ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀεὶ θαυμαστός τις
 δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ τοὺς τε ἄλλους ἀνατρέπων καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτόν
 —οἶμαι δὲ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρὰ σοῦ κάλλιστα πεύ- 5
 σεσθαι. ἄλλο τι ψευδῇ λέγειν οὐκ ἔστιν;—τοῦτο γὰρ
 δύναται ὁ λόγος· ἢ γάρ;—ἀλλ' ἢ λέγοντ' ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἢ
 μὴ λέγειν;

Συνεχώρει.

Πότερον οὖν ψευδῇ μὲν λέγειν οὐκ ἔστι, δοξάζειν μέντοι d
 ἔστιν;

Οὐδὲ δοξάζειν, ἔφη.

Οὐδ' ἄρα ψευδῆς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δόξα ἔστι τὸ παράπαν.

Οὐκ ἔφη.

5

Οὐδ' ἄρα ἀμαθία οὐδ' ἀμαθεῖς ἄνθρωποι· ἢ οὐ τοῦτ' ἂν
 εἴη ἀμαθία, εἴπερ εἴη, τὸ ψεύδεσθαι τῶν πραγμάτων;

Πάνν γε, ἔφη.

Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

10 Οὐκ ἔφη.

Λόγου ἔνεκα, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε, λέγεις τὸν λόγον, ἵνα δὴ ἄτοπον λέγῃς, ἢ ὡς ἀληθῶς δοκεῖ σοι οὐδεὶς εἶναι ἀμαθὴς ἀνθρώπων;

e Ἀλλὰ σύ, ἔφη, ἔλεγξον.

Ἥ καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, ἐξελέγξαι, μηδεὺς ψευδομένον;

Οὐκ ἔστιν, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος.

5 Οὐδ' ἄρα ἐκέλευον, ἔφη, ἐγὼ Ἰννυδῆ, ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, ἐξελέγξαι; τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὃν πῶς ἂν τις κελεύσαι;

Σὺ δ' ἐκέλευες; ὅτι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, τὰ σοφὰ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ εὖ ἔχοντα οὐ πάννυ τι μαθάνω, ἀλλὰ πα-
 287 ἄλλα συγγίγνωσκε. ὅρα δέ· εἰ γὰρ μήτε ψεύδεσθαι ἔστιν
 μήτε ψευδῇ δοξάζειν μήτε ἀμαθῇ εἶναι, ἄλλο τι οὐδ' ἐξαμαρ-
 τάνειν ἔστιν, ὅταν τίς τι πράττῃ; πράττοντα γὰρ οὐκ
 ἔστιν ἀμαρτάνειν τούτου ὃ πράττει· οὐχ οὕτω λέγετε;

5 Πάννυ γ', ἔφη.

Τοῦτό ἐστιν ἤδη, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ φορτικὸν ἐρώτημα. εἰ
 γὰρ μὴ ἀμαρτάνομεν μήτε πράττοντες μήτε λέγοντες μήτε
 διανοούμενοι, ὑμεῖς, ὦ πρὸς Διός, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, τίνος
 διδάσκαλοι ἦκετε; ἢ οὐκ ἄρτι ἔφατε ἀρετὴν κάλλιστ' ἂν

b παραδοῦναι ἀνθρώπων τῷ ἐθέλουτι μαθάνειν;

Εἴτ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Διονυσόδωρος ὑπολαβὼν, οὕτως
 εἰ Κρόνος, ὥστε ἂν τὸ πρῶτον εἴπομεν νῦν ἀναμνησκει, καὶ
 εἰ τι πέρυσιν εἶπον, νῦν ἀναμνησθήσει, τοῖς δ' ἐν τῷ παρόντι

5 λεγομένοις οὐχ ἕξεις ὃ τι χρῆ;

Καὶ γάρ, ἔφην ἐγώ, χαλεποὶ εἰσιν, πάννυ εἰκότως· παρὰ
 σοφῶν γὰρ λέγονται—ἐπεὶ καὶ τούτῳ τῷ τελευταίῳ παγ-
 χάλεπον χρῆσασθαι ἔστιν, ὦ λέγεις. τὸ γὰρ “Οὐκ ἔχω ὃ τι
 χρῶμαι” τί ποτε λέγεις, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι ὡς

οὐκ ἔχω ἐξελέγξαι αὐτόν; ἐπεὶ εἶπέ, τί σοι ἄλλο νοεῖ τοῦτο c
τὸ ῥῆμα, τὸ “Οὐκ ἔχω ὃ τι χρήσωμαι τοῖς λόγοις”;

Ἄλλ’ ὃ σὺ λέγεις, ἔφη, τούτῳ γ’ οὐ πάνυ χαλεπὸν
χρησθαι· ἐπεὶ ἀποκρίναι.

Πρὶν σὲ ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε; 5

Οὐκ ἀποκρίνη; ἔφη.

Ἦ καὶ δίκαιον;

Δίκαιον μέντοι, ἔφη.

Κατὰ τίνα λόγον; ἦν δ’ ἐγώ· ἡ δὴλον ὅτι κατὰ τόνδε,
ὅτι σὺ νῦν πάσσοφός τις ἡμῖν ἀφίξαι περὶ λόγους, καὶ οἶσθα 10
ὅτε δεῖ ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ ὅτε μή; καὶ νῦν οὐδ’ ἂν ὅτιοιεν d
ἀποκρίνει, ἅτε γιννώσκων ὅτι οὐ δεῖ;

Λαλεῖς, ἔφη, ἀμελήσας ἀποκρίνασθαι· ἀλλ’, ὠγαθέ, πείθου
καὶ ἀποκρίνου, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ὁμολογεῖς με σοφὸν εἶναι.

Πειστέον τοίνυν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, καὶ ἀνάγκη, ὥς ἔοικεν· σὺ 5
γὰρ ἄρχεις. ἀλλ’ ἐρώτα.

Πότερον οὖν ψυχὴν ἔχοντα νοεῖ τὰ νοοῦντα, ἢ καὶ τὰ
ἄψυχα;

Τὰ ψυχὴν ἔχοντα.

Οἶσθα οὖν τι, ἔφη, ῥῆμα ψυχὴν ἔχον; 10

Μὰ Δία οὐκ ἔγωγε.

Τί οὖν ἄρτι ἤρου ὃ τι μοι νοοῖ τὸ ῥῆμα; e

Τί ἄλλο γε, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ἡ ἐξήμαρτον διὰ τὴν βλακείαν;
ἢ οὐκ ἐξήμαρτον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς εἶπον, εἰπὼν ὅτι
νοεῖ τὰ ῥήματα; πότερα φῆς ἐξαμαρτάνειν με ἢ οὐ; εἰ γὰρ
μὴ ἐξήμαρτον, οὐδὲ σὺ ἐξελέγξεις, καίπερ σοφὸς ὢν, οὐδ’ 5
ἔχεις ὃ τι χρῆ τῷ λόγῳ· εἰ δ’ ἐξήμαρτον, οὐδ’ οὕτως ὀρθῶς
λέγεις, φάσκων οὐκ εἶναι ἐξαμαρτάνειν. καὶ ταῦτα οὐ πρὸς 288
ἂ πέρυσιν ἔλεγες λέγω. ἀλλὰ ἔοικεν, ἔφη ἐγώ, ὦ Διονυσό-
δωρέ τε καὶ Εὐθύδημε, οὗτος μὲν ὁ λόγος ἐν ταὐτῷ μένειν
καὶ ἔτι ὥσπερ τὸ παλαιὸν καταβαλὼν πίπτειν, καὶ ὥστε
τοῦτο μὴ πάσχειν οὐδ’ ὑπὸ τῆς ὑμετέρας πω τέχνης ἐξηυρη- 5
σθαι, καὶ ταῦτα οὕτως θαναμαστῆς οὔσης εἰς ἀκρίβειαν
λόγων.

Καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος, Θαυμάσιά γε λέγεται, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες
 b Θούριοι εἴτε Χῖοι εἴθ' ὀπόθεν καὶ ὅπη χαίρετον ὀνομαζόμενοι·
 ὥς οὐδὲν ὑμῖν μέλει τοῦ παραληρεῖν.

Καὶ ἐγὼ φοβηθεὶς μὴ λαιδορία γένηται, πάλιν κατεπράϋ-
 νον τὸν Κτήσιππον καὶ εἶπον· ὦ Κτήσιππε, καὶ νυνδὴ ἂ
 5 πρὸς Κλεινίαν ἔλεγον, καὶ πρὸς σὲ ταῦτα ταῦτα λέγω, ὅτι
 οὐ γινώσκεις τῶν ξένων τὴν σοφίαν ὅτι θαυμασία ἐστίν.
 ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐθέλετον ἡμῖν ἐπιδείξασθαι σπουδάζοντε, ἀλλὰ τὸν
 Πρωτέα μιμείσθον τὸν Αἰγύπτιον σοφιστὴν γοητεύοντε ἡμᾶς.
 c ἡμεῖς οὖν τὸν Μενέλαον μιμώμεθα, καὶ μὴ ἀφιώμεθα τοῖν
 ἀνδροῖν ἕως ἄν ἡμῖν ἐκφανῇτον ἐφ' ᾧ αὐτῷ σπουδάξεται·
 οἶμαι γάρ τι αὐτοῖν πάγκαλον φανείσθαι, ἐπειδὰν ἄρξωνται
 σπουδάζειν. ἀλλὰ δεώμεθα καὶ παραμυθώμεθα καὶ προσευχώ-
 5 μεθα αὐτοῖν ἐκφανῆναι. ἐγὼ οὖν μοι δοκῶ καὶ αὐτὸς πάλιν
 ὑφηγησάσθαι οἷω προσεύχομαι αὐτῷ φανῆναί μοι· ὅθεν γὰρ
 d τὸ πρότερον ἀπέλιπον, τὸ ἐξῆς τούτοις πειράσομαι, ὅπως ἂν
 δύνωμαι, διελθεῖν, ἐάν πως ἐκκαλέσωμαι καὶ ἐλεήσαντέ
 με καὶ οἰκτίραντε συντεταμένον καὶ σπουδάζοντα καὶ αὐτῷ
 σπουδάσῃτον.

5 Σὺ δέ, ὦ Κλεινία, ἔφην, ἀνάμνησόν με πόθεν τότ' ἀπε-
 λίπομεν. ὥς μὲν οὖν ἐγῶμαι, ἐνθένδε ποθέν. φιλοσοφη-
 τέον ὠμολογήσαμεν τελευτώντες· ἦ γάρ;—Ναί, ἦ δ' ὅς.—
 Ἡ δέ γε φιλοσοφία κτήσις ἐπιστήμης· οὐχ οὕτως; ἔφην.
 —Ναί, ἔφη.—Τίνα ποτ' οὖν ἂν κτησάμενοι ἐπιστήμην ὀρθῶς
 e κτησαίμεθα; ἄρ' οὐ τοῦτο μὲν ἀπλοῦν, ὅτι ταύτην ἥτις ἡμᾶς
 ὀνήσει;—Πάνυ γ', ἔφη.—Ἄρ' οὖν ἂν τι ἡμᾶς ὀνήσειεν, εἰ
 ἐπισταίμεθα γινώσκειν περιόντες ὅπου τῆς γῆς χρυσίον
 πλείστον κατορύσσεται;—Ἴσως, ἔφη.—Ἀλλὰ τὸ πρότερον,
 5 ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦτό γε ἐξηλέγξαμεν, ὅτι οὐδὲν πλεόν, οὐδ' εἰ
 ἄνευ πραγμάτων καὶ τοῦ ὀρύττειν τὴν γῆν τὸ πᾶν ἡμῖν
 χρυσίον γένοιτο· ὥστε οὐδ' εἰ τὰς πέτρας χρυσᾶς ἐπισταί-
 289 μεθα ποιεῖν, οὐδενὸς ἂν ἀξία ἢ ἐπιστήμη εἴη. εἰ γὰρ μὴ καὶ
 χρῆσθαι ἐπιστησόμεθα τῷ χρυσίῳ, οὐδὲν ὄφελος αὐτοῦ

ἐφάνη ὃν· ἡ οὐ μέμνησαι; ἔφην ἐγώ.—Πάνυ γ', ἔφη, μέμνημαι.—Οὐδέ γε, ὥς ἔοικε, τῆς ἄλλης ἐπιστήμης ὄφελος γίνεταί οὐδέν, οὔτε χρηματιστικῆς οὔτε ἱατρικῆς οὔτε ἄλ- 5 λης οὐδεμιᾶς, ἣτις ποιεῖν τι ἐπίσταται, χρῆσθαι δὲ μὴ ᾧ ἂν ποιήσῃ· οὐχ οὕτως;—Συνέφη.—Οὐδέ γε εἴ τις ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ὥστε ἀθανάτους ποιεῖν, ἄνευ τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι τῇ **b** ἀθανασίᾳ χρῆσθαι οὐδὲ ταύτης ἔοικεν ὄφελος οὐδέν, εἴ τι δεῖ τοῖς πρόσθεν ὁμολογημένοις τεκμαίρεσθαι.—Συνεδόκει ἡμῖν πάντα ταῦτα.—Τοιαύτης τινὸς ἄρα ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμης δεῖ, ὦ καλὲ παῖ, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν ἣ συμπέπτωκεν ἅμα τό τε ποιεῖν 5 καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι χρῆσθαι τούτῳ ὃ ἂν ποιῇ.—Φαίνεται, ἔφη.—Πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἡμᾶς λυροποιούς δεῖν εἶναι καὶ τοιαύτης τινὸς ἐπιστήμης ἐπηβόλους. ἐνταῦθα **c** γὰρ δὴ χωρὶς μὲν ἡ ποιοῦσα τέχνη, χωρὶς δὲ ἡ χρωμένη, διήρηται δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πέρι· ἡ γὰρ λυροποιικὴ καὶ ἡ κιθαριστικὴ πολὺ διαφέρειτον ἀλλήλοις. οὐχ οὕτως;—Συνέφη.—Οὐδὲ μὴν αὐλοποιικῆς γε δῆλον ὅτι δεόμεθα· καὶ γὰρ αὕτη 5 ἐτέρα τοιαύτη.—Συνεδόκει.—'Αλλὰ πρὸς θεῶν, ἔφην ἐγώ, εἰ τὴν λογοποιικὴν τέχνην μάθοιμεν, ἅρᾳ ἔστιν αὕτη ἣν ἔδει κεκτημένους ἡμᾶς εὐδαίμονας εἶναι;—Οὐκ οἶμαι, ἔφη, ἐγώ, ὁ Κλεινίας ὑπολαβών.

Τίνι τεκμηρίῳ, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, χρῆ; **d**

Ὅρῳ, ἔφη, τινὰς λογοποιούς, οἱ τοῖς ἰδίοις λόγοις, οἷς αὐτοὶ ποιοῦσιν, οὐκ ἐπίστανται χρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ οἱ λυροποιοὶ ταῖς λύραις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἄλλοι δυνατοὶ χρῆσθαι οἷς ἐκεῖνοι εἰργάσαντο, οἱ λογοποιεῖν αὐτοὶ ἀδύνατοι· δῆλον οὖν 5 ὅτι καὶ περὶ λόγους χωρὶς ἡ τοῦ ποιεῖν τέχνη καὶ ἡ τοῦ χρῆσθαι.

Ἰκανόν μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφην ἐγώ, τεκμήριον λέγειν, ὅτι οὐχ αὕτη ἔστιν ἡ τῶν λογοποιῶν τέχνη, ἣν ἂν κτησάμενός τις εὐδαίμων εἴη. καίτοι ἐγὼ ᾧμην ἐνταῦθά που φανήσεσθαι **e** 10 τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἣν δὴ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν. καὶ γάρ μοι οἷ τε ἀνδρες αὐτοὶ οἱ λογοποιοί, ὅταν συγγένωμαι αὐτοῖς, ὑπέρ-

σοφοι, ὦ Κλεινία, δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ τέχνη αὐτῶν
θεσπεσία τις καὶ ὑψηλή. καὶ μέντοι οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν· ἔστι

5 γὰρ τῆς τῶν ἐπιδῶν τέχνης μόριον μικρῷ τε ἐκείνης ὑπο-
290 δεστέρα. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐπιδῶν ἔχεών τε καὶ φαλαγγίων
καὶ σκορπίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων τε καὶ νόσων κήλησίς
ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ δικαστῶν τε καὶ ἐκκλησιαστῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
ὄχλων κήλησίς τε καὶ παραμυθία τυγχάνει οὕσα· ἡ σοί,
5 ἔφην ἐγώ, ἄλλως πως δοκεῖ;

Οὐκ, ἀλλ' οὕτω μοι φαίνεται, ἔφη, ὥς σὺ λέγεις.

Ποῖ οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, τραποίμεθ' ἂν ἔτι; ἐπὶ ποίαν τέχνην;
'Εγὼ μὲν οὐκ εὐπορῶ, ἔφη.

'Αλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐμὲ οἶμαι ἡρῆκεναι.

10 Τίνα; ἔφη ὁ Κλεινίας.

b 'Η στρατηγική μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφην ἐγώ, τέχνη παντὸς μᾶλλον
εἶναι ἢν ἂν τις κτησάμενος εὐδαίμων εἴη.

Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Πῶς; ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

5 Θηρευτική τις ἦδε γέ ἐστιν τέχνη ἀνθρώπων.

Τί δὴ οὖν; ἔφην ἐγώ.

Οὐδεμία, ἔφη, τῆς θηρευτικῆς αὐτῆς ἐπὶ πλεον ἐστὶν ἢ
ὅσον θηρεῦσαι καὶ χειρώσασθαι· ἐπειδὰν δὲ χειρώσωνται
τοῦτο ὃ ἂν θηρεύωνται, οὐ δύνανται τούτῳ χρῆσθαι, ἀλλ' οἱ
10 μὲν κυνηγέται καὶ οἱ ἀλιῆς τοῖς ὀψοποιοῖς παραδιδόασιν, οἱ
c δ' αὖ γεωμέτραι καὶ οἱ ἀστρονόμοι καὶ οἱ λογιστικοί—θηρευ-
τικοὶ γάρ εἰσι καὶ οὗτοι· οὐ γὰρ ποιοῦσι τὰ διαγράμματα
ἕκαστοι τούτων, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὄντα ἀνευρίσκουσιν—ἄτε οὖν χρῆ-
σθαι αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι, ἀλλὰ θηρεῦσαι μόνον,
5 παραδιδόασιν δῆπου τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς καταχρῆσθαι αὐτῶν τοῖς
εὐρήμασιν, ὅσοι γε αὐτῶν μὴ παντάπασιν ἀνόητοί εἰσιν.

Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ κάλλιστε καὶ σοφώτατε Κλεινία·
τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει;

Πάννυ μὲν οὖν. καὶ οἷ γε στρατηγοί, ἔφη, οὕτω τὸν αὐτὸν
d τρόπον, ἐπειδὰν ἡ πόλιν τινὰ θηρεύωνται ἢ στρατόπεδον,

παραδιδόασι τοῖς πολιτικοῖς ἀνδράσιν—αὐτοὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἐπί-
 στανται χρῆσθαι τούτοις ἃ ἐθήρυσαν—ὥσπερ οἶμαι οἱ
 ὀρτυγοθήραι τοῖς ὀρτυγοτρόφοις παραδιδόασιν. εἰ οὖν, ἡ δ'
 ὅς, δεόμεθα ἐκείνης τῆς τέχνης, ἣτις ᾧ ἂν κτήσεται ἡ ποι- 5
 ήσασα ἡ θηρευσάμενη αὐτὴ καὶ ἐπιστήσεται χρῆσθαι, καὶ ἡ
 τοιαύτη ποιήσει ἡμᾶς μακαρίους, ἄλλην δὴ τινα, ἔφη,
 ζητητέον ἀντὶ τῆς στρατηγικῆς.

ΚΡ. Τί λέγεις σύ, ᾧ Σώκρατες; ἐκεῖνο τὸ μεираάκιον e
 τοιαῦτ' ἐφθέγγετο;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ οἶει, ᾧ Κρίτων;

ΚΡ. Μὰ Δί' οὐ μέντοι. οἶμαι γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐγώ, εἰ ταῦτ'
 εἶπεν, οὔτ' Εὐθύδημον οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ἔτ' ἀνθρώπου 5
 δεῖσθαι εἰς παιδείαν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἄρα, ᾧ πρὸς Διός, μὴ ὁ Κτήσιππος ἦν ὁ ταῦτ'
 εἰπών, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ μέμνημαι;

ΚΡ. Ποῖος Κτήσιππος;

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ΣΩ. Ἄλλα μὴν τόδε γε εὖ οἶδα, ὅτι οὔτε Εὐθύδημος οὔτε
 Διονυσόδωρος ἦν ὁ εἰπὼν ταῦτα· ἀλλ', ᾧ δαιμόνιε Κρίτων,
 μή τις τῶν κρειττόνων παρὼν αὐτὰ ἐφθέγγετο; ὅτι γὰρ
 ἤκουσά γε ταῦτα, εὖ οἶδα. 5

ΚΡ. Ναὶ μὰ Δία, ᾧ Σώκρατες· τῶν κρειττόνων μέντοι
 τις ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καὶ πολὺ γε. ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔτι τινὰ
 ἐζητήσατε τέχνην; καὶ ἡὔρετε ἐκεῖνην ἢ οὐχ ἡὔρετε, ἥς
 ἔνεκα ἐζητεῖτε;

ΣΩ. Πόθεν, ᾧ μακάριε, ἡὔρομεν; ἀλλ' ἡμεν πάννυ γελοῖοι· b
 ὥσπερ τὰ παιδιά τὰ τοὺς κορύδους διώκοντα, αἰεὶ ᾧόμεθα
 ἐκάστην τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αὐτίκα λήψεσθαι, αἱ δ' αἰεὶ ὑπέξέ-
 φευγον. τὰ μὲν οὖν πολλὰ τί ἂν σοι λέγοιμι; ἐπὶ δὲ δὴ
 τὴν βασιλικὴν ἐλθόντες τέχνην καὶ διασκοπούμενοι αὐτὴν 5
 εἰ αὕτη εἴη ἢ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν παρέχουσά τε καὶ ἀπεργαζο-
 μένη, ἐνταῦθα ὥσπερ εἰς λαβύρινθον ἐμπεσόντες, οἰόμενοι
 ἤδη ἐπὶ τέλει εἶναι, περικάμψαντες πάλιν ὥσπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς
 ζητήσεως ἀνεφάνημεν ὄντες καὶ τοῦ ἴσου δεόμενοι ὅσουςπερ c
 ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἐζητοῦμεν.

ΚΡ. Πῶς δὴ τοῦτο ὑμῖν συνέβη, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ φράσω. ἔδοξε γὰρ δὴ ἡμῖν ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ
5 ἡ βασιλικὴ τέχνη ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι.

ΚΡ. Τί οὖν δὴ;

ΣΩ. Ταύτῃ τῇ τέχνῃ ἢ τε στρατηγικὴ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι
παραδιδόναι ἄρχειν τῶν ἔργων ὧν αὐταὶ δημιουργοὶ εἰσιν,
ὥς μόνῃ ἐπισταμένῃ χρῆσθαι. σαφῶς οὖν ἔδόκει ἡμῖν αὕτη
10 εἶναι ἣν ἐζητοῦμεν, καὶ ἡ αἰτία τοῦ ὀρθῶς πράττειν ἐν τῇ
d πόλει, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς κατὰ τὸ Αἰσχύλου ἱαμβεῖον μόνῃ ἐν
τῇ πρύμνῃ καθῆσθαι τῆς πόλεως, πάντα κυβερνῶσα καὶ
πάντων ἄρχουσα πάντα χρήσιμα ποιεῖν.

ΚΡ. Οὐκοῦν καλῶς ὑμῖν ἔδόκει, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Σὺ κρινεῖς, ὦ Κρίτων, ἐὰν βούλῃ ἀκούειν καὶ τὰ μετὰ
ταῦτα συμβάντα ἡμῖν. αὐθις γὰρ δὴ πάλιν ἐσκοποῦμεν
ὧδέ πως· Φέρε, πάντων ἄρχουσα ἡ βασιλικὴ τέχνη τί ἡμῖν
e ἀπεργάζεται ἔργον ἢ οὐδέν; Πάντως δήπου, ἡμεῖς ἔφαμεν
πρὸς ἀλλήλους. Οὐ καὶ σὺ ἂν ταῦτα φαίης, ὦ Κρίτων;

ΚΡ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ἂν φαίης αὐτῆς ἔργον εἶναι; ὥσπερ εἰ σὲ
5 ἐγὼ ἐρωτῶην, πάντων ἄρχουσα ἡ ἱατρικὴ ὧν ἄρχει, τί ἔργον
παρέχεται; οὐ τὴν ὑγίειαν (ἂν) φαίης;

ΚΡ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἡ ὑμετέρα τέχνη ἡ γεωργία, πάντων ἄρχουσα
292 ὧν ἄρχει, τί ἔργον ἀπεργάζεται; οὐ τὴν τροφήν ἂν φαίης
τὴν ἐκ τῆς γῆς παρέχειν ἡμῖν;

ΚΡ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἡ βασιλική, πάντων ἄρχουσα ὧν ἄρχει, τί
5 ἀπεργάζεται; ἴσως οὐ πάννυ γ' εὐπορεῖς.

ΚΡ. Μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡμεῖς, ὦ Κρίτων· ἀλλὰ τοσόνδε γε οἶσθα,
ὅτι εἴπερ ἐστὶν αὕτη ἣν ἡμεῖς ζητοῦμεν, ὠφέλιμον αὐτὴν δεῖ
εἶναι.

ΚΡ. Πάνν γε.

10

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀγαθόν γέ τι δεῖ ἡμῖν αὐτὴν παραδιδόναι;

ΚΡ. Ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀγαθὸν δέ γέ που ὠμολογήσαμεν ἀλλήλοις ἐγώ τε ἡ
καὶ Κλεινίας οὐδὲν εἶναι ἄλλο ἢ ἐπιστήμην τινά.

ΚΡ. Ναί, οὕτως ἔλεγες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔργα, ἃ φαίη ἂν τις πολιτικῆς
εἶναι—πολλὰ δέ που ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη, οἷον πλουσίους τοὺς 5
πολίτας παρέχειν καὶ ἐλευθέρους καὶ ἀστασιástους—πάντα
ταῦτα οὔτε κακὰ οὔτε ἀγαθὰ ἐφάνη, ἔδει δὲ σοφοὺς ποιεῖν
καὶ ἐπιστήμης μεταδιδόναι, εἴπερ ἔμελλεν αὕτη εἶναι ἡ
ὠφελουσά τε καὶ εὐδαίμονας ποιοῦσα.

c

ΚΡ. Ἔστι ταῦτα· τότε γοῦν οὕτως ὑμῖν ὠμολογήθη, ὥς
σὺ τοὺς λόγους ἀπήγγειλας.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἡ βασιλικὴ σοφοὺς ποιεῖ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους
καὶ ἀγαθοὺς;

5

ΚΡ. Τί γὰρ κωλύει, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἄρα πάντας καὶ πάντα ἀγαθοὺς; καὶ πᾶσαν
ἐπιστήμην, σκυτοτομικὴν τε καὶ τεκτονικὴν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας
ἀπάσας, αὕτη ἡ παραδιδουσά ἐστιν;

ΚΡ. Οὐκ οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

10

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τίνα δὴ ἐπιστήμην; ἢ τί χρησόμεθα; τῶν d
μὲν γὰρ ἔργων οὐδενὸς δεῖ αὐτὴν δημιουργὸν εἶναι τῶν μήτε
κακῶν μήτε ἀγαθῶν, ἐπιστήμην δὲ παραδιδόναι μηδεμίαν
ἄλλην ἢ αὐτὴν ἑαυτήν. λέγωμεν δὴ οὖν τίς ποτέ ἐστιν
αὕτη, ἢ τί χρησόμεθα; βούλει φῶμεν, ὦ Κρίτων, ἢ ἄλλους 5
ἀγαθοὺς ποιήσομεν;

ΚΡ. Πάνν γε.

ΣΩ. Οἳ τί ἔσονται ἡμῖν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ τί χρήσιμοι; ἢ ἔτι
λέγωμεν ὅτι ἄλλους ποιήσουσιν, οἳ δὲ ἄλλοι ἐκεῖνοι ἄλλους;
ὅ τι δέ ποτε ἀγαθοὶ εἰσιν, οὐδαμοῦ ἡμῖν φαίνονται, ἐπειδὴ περ e
τὰ ἔργα τὰ λεγόμενα εἶναι τῆς πολιτικῆς ἡτιμάσαμεν, ἀλλ'
ἀτεχνῶς τὸ λεγόμενον ὁ Διὸς Κόρινθος γίγνεται, καὶ ὅπερ

ἔλεγον, τοῦ ἴσου ἡμῖν ἐνδεῖ ἢ ἔτι πλέονος πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τίς
 5 ποτέ ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐκείνη ἢ ἡμᾶς εὐδαίμονας ποιήσῃ;

ΚΡ. Νῆ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς πολλήν γε ἀπορίαν,
 ὥς ἔοικεν, ἀφίκεσθε.

ΣΩ. Ἐγωγε οὖν καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Κρίτων, ἐπειδὴ ἐν ταύτῃ
 293 τῇ ἀπορίᾳ ἐνεπεπτώκη, πᾶσαν ἤδη φωνὴν ἠφίεω, δεόμενος
 τοῦν ξένου, ὥσπερ Διοσκόρω ἐπικαλούμενος, σῶσαι ἡμᾶς,
 ἐμέ τε καὶ τὸ μεираκίον, ἐκ τῆς τρικυμίας τοῦ λόγου, καὶ
 παντὶ τρόπῳ σπουδάσαι, καὶ σπουδάσασατας ἐπιδείξαι τίς
 5 ποτ' ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἧς τυχόντες ἂν καλῶς τὸν ἐπίλοιπον
 βίον διέλθοιμεν.

ΚΡ. Τί οὖν; ἠθέλησέν τι ὑμῖν ἐπιδείξαι ὁ Εὐθύδημος;

ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; καὶ ἡρξατό γε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, πάνν μεγαλο-
 φρόνως τοῦ λόγου ὤδε—

b Πότερον δὴ σε, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην,
 περὶ ἣν πάλοι ἀπορεῖτε, διδάξω, ἢ ἐπιδείξω ἔχοντα;

᾽Ω μακάριε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔστι δὲ ἐπὶ σοὶ τοῦτο;

Πάνν μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

5 Ἐπιδείξον τοίνυν με νῆ Δί', ἔφη ἐγώ, ἔχοντα· πολὺ γὰρ
 ῥᾶον ἢ μανθάνειν τηλικόνδε ἄνδρα.

Φέρε δὴ μοι ἀπόκριναι, ἔφη· ἔστιν ὃ τι ἐπίστασαι;—Πάνν
 γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ πολλά, σμικρά γε.—Ἄρκεί, ἔφη. ἄρ' οὖν
 δοκεῖς οἷόν τέ τι τῶν οὐτῶν τοῦτο ὃ τυγχάνει οἶν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο
 c μὴ εἶναι;—Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.—Οὐκοῦν σὺν ἔφη,
 ἐπίστασθαί τι;—Ἐγωγε.—Οὐκοῦν ἐπιστήμων εἶ, εἴπερ ἐπί-
 στασαι;—Πάνν γε, τούτου γε αὐτοῦ.—Οὐδὲν διαφέρει· ἀλλ'
 οὐκ ἀνάγκη σε ἔχει πάντα ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιστήμονά γε οἶτα;
 5 —Μὰ Δί', ἔφη ἐγώ· ἐπεὶ πολλὰ ἄλλ' οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι.—
 Οὐκοῦν εἴ τι μὴ ἐπίστασαι, οὐκ ἐπιστήμων εἶ.—Ἐκείνου γε,
 ὦ φίλε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.—Ἦττον οὖν τι, ἔφη, οὐκ ἐπιστήμων
 εἶ; ἄρτι δὲ ἐπιστήμων ἔφησθα εἶναι· καὶ οὕτως τυγχάνεις ὧν
 d αὐτὸς οὗτος ὃς εἶ, καὶ αὖ πάλιν οὐκ εἶ, κατὰ ταῦτ' ἅμα.

ἔλεον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔλθόντες· τὸ γὰρ περὶ ἡμῶν, καὶ ἐν
 πόλει λέγουσιν πᾶσι ὅτι ἐπίσταται δαίμων τὴν ἐπιστήμην
 ἢν ἐξουσίᾳς, ὥς ἐν τούτῳ δαίμοντι ἐστὶν τὸ αἶμα δαίμα τε
 καὶ μὴ, εἴπερ ἐν ἐπίσταται, ὅπαντα ἐπίσταται—ὅτι γὰρ ὅ
 ὅτι δὲν ἐπιστήμῃ τε καὶ ἀεπιστήμῃ ὅμι—ἀπὸ δὲ πάντα
 ἐπίσταται, ἀδαιδῶς ἐν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ ἔγωγε ὅμι ὅτις λέγω,
 καὶ τούτῳ ἐστὶν τὸ σῶφρον;

Ἀλλὰ σῶφρον γὰρ ἐν ἐξέλεγχον, ἔφη, ὦ Σόκράτης. ε

Τὸ δὲ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ ἔλθόντες, οὐκ ἐπίσταται τῶν
 αἰσῶν πόθους; ἔγωγε γὰρ τὰ μετὰ αἰσῶν ἐστὶν ἐν πόλει καὶ
 μετὰ Λαμπροθύμῳ τούτῳ, φέρεται κεφαλῇ, ὥς ὅτι πᾶσι
 ὁρμητικῶς. ἀπὸ μὲν, οὐκ αἶμα τὰ μετὰ ἐπίσταται τῶν
 ὅτων, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐπίσταται;

Ἐκιντὴ γὰρ, ἔφη, ὦ Σόκράτης, ὁ Λαμπροθύμος.

Ὡς λέγουσιν, ἔφη ἐγώ, ἀλλ' αἶμα ὅμι ἐπίσταται;

Καὶ μάλιστα, ἦ δ' ὦ.

Ὡς δὲν, ἔφη ἐγώ, ἐπίσταται, ἐπαυλῆς καὶ ἰσχυρῆς; 234

Ὡς δὲν, ἔφη καὶ αἶμα γὰρ πρὸς, εἴπερ καὶ ἐν ἐπίσταται, πάντα
 ἐπίσταται.

ὦ Ζεῦ, ἔφη ἐγώ, ὥς ὁρμητικῶς λέγουσιν καὶ ὁρμητικῶς μάλιστα
 περὶ πόθους. μὴν καὶ αἶμα ὅμι πᾶσι ὁρμητικῶς πᾶσι ἐπί-
 στανται, ἦ αἰδῶ;

Ὅτι γὰρ αἶμα, ἔφη, τὰ μετὰ ἐπίσταται, τὰ δ' οὐκ ἐπι-
 στανται, καὶ αἶμα ὅμι ἐπιστήμῃς τε καὶ ἀεπιστήμῃς.

Ἀλλὰ τί; ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

Πᾶσι, ἦ δ' ὦ, πάντα ἐπίσταται, εἴπερ καὶ ἐν. 10

ὦ πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Λαμπροθύμῳ—ἔγωγε γὰρ
 μὴ ἐστὶν ὅμι ὅμι σπυλῆς, καὶ μάλιστα ὅμι πρὸς αἶμα
 σπυλῆς—ἀπὸ τῷ ὅτι πάντα ἐπίσταται; ὅτι
 τεκτονικῇ καὶ σκεπτικῇ;

Πάντ' γ', ἔφη. 11

Ἦ καὶ νεορροφεῖν ἰσχυρῶς ἐστὶν;

Καὶ ναὶ μὴ Δία καττάειν, ἔφη.

Ἡ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοὺς ἀστέρας ὁπόσοι εἰσὶ, καὶ τὴν ἄμμον;

10 Πάνυ γε, ἥ δ' ὅς· εἴτ' οὐκ ἂν οἶει ὁμολογήσαι ἡμᾶς;

Καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος ὑπολαβών· Πρὸς Διός, ἔφη, Διουν-
c σόδωρε, τεκμήριόν τί μοι τούτων ἐπιδείξατον τοιόνδε, ᾧ
εἴσομαι ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγετον.

Τί ἐπιδείξω; ἔφη.

Οἶσθα Εὐθύδημον ὁπόσους ὀδόντας ἔχει, καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος
5 ὁπόσους σύ;

Οὐκ ἔφαρκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, ἀκοῦσαι ὅτι πάντα ἐπιστάμεθα;

Μηδαμῶς, ἥ δ' ὅς, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἔτι ἡμῖν μόνον εἶπατον καὶ
ἐπιδείξατον ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγετον· καὶ ἂν εἶπητον ὁπόσους
ἐκάτερος ἔχει ὑμῶν, καὶ φαίνησθε γνόντες ἡμῶν ἀριθμη-
10 σάντων, ἥδη πεισόμεθα ὑμῖν καὶ τᾶλλα.

d Ἐγούμενω οὖν σκώπτεσθαι οὐκ ἠθέλητην, ἀλλ' ὡμο-
λογησάτην πάντα χρήματα ἐπίστασθαι, καθ' ἐν ἑκαστον
ἐρωτώμενοι ὑπὸ Κτησίππου. ὁ γὰρ Κτήσιππος πάνυ ἀπαρα-
καλύπτως οὐδὲν ὃ τι οὐκ ἠρώτα τελευτῶν, καὶ τὰ αἰσχιστα, εἰ
5 ἐπισταίστην· τῷ δὲ ἀνδρειότατα ὁμόσε ἦτην τοῖς ἐρωτήμασιν,
ὁμολογοῦντες εἰδέναι, ὥσπερ οἱ κάπροι οἱ πρὸς τὴν πληγὴν
ὁμόσε ὠθούμενοι, ὥστ' ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτός, ᾧ Κρίτων, ὑπ'
ἀπιστίας ἠναγκάστην τελευτῶν ἐρέσθαι [τὸν Εὐθύδημον] εἰ
e καὶ ὀρχεῖσθαι ἐπίσταιτο ὁ Διουνσόδωρος· ὁ δέ, Πάνυ, ἔφη.

Οὐ δῆπου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἐς μαχαίρας γε κυβιστᾶν καὶ
ἐπὶ τροχοῦ δινεῖσθαι τηλικούτος ὢν, οὕτω πόρρω σοφίας
ἦκεις;

5 Οὐδέν, ἔφη, ὃ τι οὔ.

Πότερον δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πάντα νῦν μόνον ἐπίστασθον ἢ
καὶ αἰεί;

Καὶ αἰεί, ἔφη.

Καὶ ὅτε παιδία ἦστον καὶ εὐθὺς γενόμενοι ἠπίστασθε
10 πάντα;

Ἐφάτην ἅμα ἀμφοτέρω.

Καὶ ἡμῖν μὲν ἄπιστον ἐδόκει τὸ πρᾶγμα εἶναι· ὁ δ' 295
Εὐθύδημος, Ἄπιστεῖς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες;

Πλὴν γ' ὅτι, (ἦν δ') ἐγώ, εἰκὸς ὑμᾶς ἐστί σοφοὺς εἶναι.
Ἄλλ' ἦν, ἔφη, ἐθελήσης μοι ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἐγὼ ἐπιδείξω
καὶ σὲ ταῦτα τὰ θαυμαστὰ ὁμολογοῦντα. 5

Ἄλλὰ μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἥδιστα ταῦτα ἐξελέγχομαι. εἰ γάρ
τοὶ λέληθα ἐμαυτὸν σοφὸς ὢν, σὺ δὲ τοῦτο ἐπιδείξεις ὥς
πάντα ἐπίσταμαι καὶ ἀεὶ, τί μείζον ἔρμαιον αὐτοῦ ἂν εὔροιμι
ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ;

Ἀποκρίνου δὴ, ἔφη. 10

Ὡς ἀποκρινουμένου ἐρώτα. b

Ἄρ' οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιστήμων του εἶ ἢ οὐ;—
Ἐγωγε.—Πότερον οὖν ᾧ ἐπιστήμων εἶ, τούτῳ καὶ ἐπίστασαι,
ἢ ἄλλῳ τῷ;—Ὡς ἐπιστήμων. οἶμαι γὰρ σε τὴν ψυχὴν
λέγειν· ἢ οὐ τοῦτο λέγεις; 5

Οὐκ αἰσχύνει, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἐρωτώμενος ἀντερωτᾷς;

Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἀλλὰ πῶς ποιῶ; οὕτω γὰρ ποιήσω
ὅπως ἂν σὺ κελεύῃς. ὅταν μὴ εἰδῶ ὃ τι ἐρωτᾷς, κελεύεις
με ὅμως ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐπανερέσθαι;

Ὑπολαμβάνεις γὰρ δήπου τι, ἔφη, ὃ λέγω; c

Ἐγωγε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

Πρὸς τοῦτο τοίνυν ἀποκρίνου ὃ ὑπολαμβάνεις.

Τί οὖν, ἔφην, ἂν σὺ μὲν ἄλλῃ ἐρωτᾷς διανοοῦμενος, ἐγὼ
δὲ ἄλλῃ ὑπολάβω, ἔπειτα πρὸς τοῦτο ἀποκρίνωμαι, ἔξαρκεῖ 5
σοὶ ἔαν μηδὲν πρὸς ἔπος ἀποκρίνωμαι;

Ἐμοιγε, ἢ δ' ὅς· οὐ μέντοι σοὶ γε, ὥς ἐγῶμαι.

Οὐ τοίνυν μὰ Δία ἀποκρινούμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρότερον
πρὶν ἂν πύθωμαι.

Οὐκ ἀποκρινεῖ, ἔφη, πρὸς ἃ ἂν ἀεὶ ὑπολαμβάνῃς, ὅτι ἔχων 10
φλυαρεῖς καὶ ἀρχαιότερος εἶ τοῦ δέοντος.

Καγὼ ἔγνων αὐτὸν ὅτι μοι χαλεπαῖνοι διαστέλλονται τὰ d
λεγόμενα, βουλόμενός με θηρεῦσαι τὰ ὀνόματα περιστήσας.
ἀνεμνήσθην οὖν τοῦ Κόννου, ὅτι μοι κακέϊνος χαλεπαίνει

ἐκάστοτε ὅταν αὐτῷ μὴ ὑπέικω, ἔπειτά μου ἦττον ἐπιμελεῖται
 5 ὥς ἀμαθοῦς ὄντος· ἐπεὶ δὲ οὖν διενενοήμην καὶ παρὰ τοῦτον
 φοιτᾶν, ᾧήθην δεῖν ὑπέικειν, μή με σκαιὸν ἡγησάμενος
 φοιτητὴν μὴ προσδέχοιτο. εἶπον οὖν· Ἄλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ σοι,
 e Εὐθύδημε, οὕτω ποιεῖν, ποιητέον· σὺ γὰρ πάντως που
 κάλλιον ἐπίστασαι διαλέγεσθαι ἢ ἐγώ, τέχνην ἔχων ἰδιώτου
 ἀνθρώπου. ἐρώτα οὖν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς.

Ἀποκρίνου δὴ, ἔφη, πάλιν, πότερον ἐπίστασαι τῷ α
 5 ἐπίστασαι, ἢ οὐ;—Ἐγωγε, ἔφην, τῇ γε ψυχῇ.

296 Οὗτος αὖ, ἔφη, προσαποκρίνεται τοῖς ἐρωτωμένοις. οὐ
 γὰρ ἔγωγε ἐρωτῶ ὅτῳ, ἀλλ' εἰ ἐπίστασαι τῷ.

Πλέον αὖ, ἔφην ἐγώ, τοῦ δέοντος ἀπεκρινάμην ὑπὸ ἀπαι-
 δευσίας. ἀλλὰ συγγίγνωσκέ μοι· ἀποκρινοῦμαι γὰρ ἤδη
 5 ἀπλῶς ὅτι ἐπίσταμαί τῳ α ἐπίσταμαι.—Πότερον, ἢ δ' ὅς,
 τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ γ' αἰεὶ, ἢ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τούτῳ, ἔστιν δὲ
 ὅτε ἐτέρῳ;—Ἀεὶ, ὅταν ἐπίστωμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τούτῳ.

Οὐκ αὖ, ἔφη, παύσει παραφθεγγόμενος;

Ἄλλ' ὅπως μὴ τι ἡμᾶς σφήλην τὸ “αἰεὶ” τοῦτο.

b Οὐκουν ἡμᾶς γ', ἔφη, ἀλλ' εἶπερ, σέ. ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου·
 ἢ αἰεὶ τούτῳ ἐπίστασαι;—Ἀεὶ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ δεῖ ἀφελεῖν
 τὸ “ὅταν.”—Οὐκοῦν αἰεὶ μὲν τούτῳ ἐπίστασαι· αἰεὶ δ' ἐπιστά-
 μενος πότερον τὰ μὲν τούτῳ ἐπίστασαι ᾧ ἐπίστασαι, τὰ δ'
 5 ἄλλῳ, ἢ τούτῳ πάντα;—Τούτῳ, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἅπαντα, α γ'
 ἐπίσταμαι.

Τοῦτ' ἐκεῖνο, ἔφη· ἦκει τὸ αὐτὸ παράφθεγμα.

Ἄλλ' ἀφαιρῶ, ἔφην ἐγώ, τὸ “α γ' ἐπίσταμαι.”

Ἀλλὰ μὴδὲ ἔν, ἔφη, ἀφέλῃς· οὐδὲν γάρ σου δέομαι.

c ἀλλὰ μοι ἀπόκριναι· δύναιο ἂν ἅπαντα ἐπίστασθαι, εἰ μὴ
 πάντα ἐπίσταιο;

Τέρας γὰρ ἂν εἴη, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

Καὶ ὅς εἶπε· Προστίθει τοίνυν ἤδη ὅτι βούλει ἅπαντα
 5 γὰρ ὁμολογεῖς ἐπίστασθαι.

Ἔοικα, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐπειδήπερ γε οὐδεμίαν ἔχει δύναμιν τὸ
 “ἂ ἐπίσταμαι,” πάντα δὲ ἐπίσταμαι.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι ὁμολόγηκας ἐπίστασθαι τούτῳ ᾧ ἐπίστα-
 σαι, εἴτε ὅταν ἐπίστη εἴτε ὅπως βούλει· αἰεὶ γὰρ ὁμολόγηκας
 ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἅμα πάντα. ὁῦλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ παῖς ὢν 10
 ἠπίστω, καὶ ὅτ’ ἐγίγνου, καὶ ὅτ’ ἐφύον· καὶ πρὶν αὐτὸς d
 γενέσθαι, καὶ πρὶν οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν γενέσθαι, ἠπίστω
 ἅπαντα, εἴπερ αἰεὶ ἐπίστασαι. καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία, ἔφη, αὐτὸς
 αἰεὶ ἐπιστήσκει καὶ ἅπαντα, ἃν ἐγὼ βούλωμαι.

Ἀλλὰ βουληθείης, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὦ πολυτίμητε Εὐθύδημε, 5
 εἰ δὴ τῷ ὄντι ἀληθῇ λέγεις. ἀλλ’ οὐ σοι πάννυ πιστεύω
 ἱκανῶ εἶναι, εἰ μὴ σοι συμβουληθείῃ ὁ ἀδελφός σου οὐτοσὶ
 Διονυσόδωρος· οὕτω δὲ τάχα ἄν. εἶπετον δέ μοι, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ—
 τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα οὐκ ἔχω ὑμῖν πῶς ἀμφισβητοῖν, οὕτως e
 εἰς σοφίαν τερατώδεσιν ἀνθρώποις, ὅπως ἐγὼ οὐ πάντα
 ἐπίσταμαι, ἐπειδὴ γε ὑμεῖς φατε—τὰ δὲ τοιάδε πῶς φῶ
 ἐπίστασθαι, Εὐθύδημε, ὥς οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες ἀδικοὶ εἰσιν;
 φέρε εἰπέ, τοῦτο ἐπίσταμαι ἢ οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι;

5

Ἐπίστασαι μέντοι, ἔφη.

Τί; ἦν δ’ ἐγώ.

Ὅτι οὐκ ἀδικοὶ εἰσιν οἱ ἀγαθοί.

Πάννυ γε, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, πάλαι. ἀλλ’ οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ· ἀλλ’ 297
 ὥς ἀδικοὶ εἰσιν οἱ ἀγαθοί, ποῦ ἐγὼ τοῦτο ἔμαθον;

Οὐδαμοῦ, ἔφη ὁ Διονυσόδωρος.

Οὐκ ἄρα ἐπίσταμαι, ἔφη, τοῦτο ἐγώ.

Διαφθείρεις, ἔφη, τὸν λόγον, ὁ Εὐθύδημος πρὸς τὸν 5
 Διονυσόδωρον, καὶ φανήσεται οὐτοσὶ οὐκ ἐπιστάμενος, καὶ
 ἐπιστήμων ἅμα ὢν καὶ ἀνεπιστήμων. Καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος
 ἠρυσθρίασεν.

Ἀλλὰ σύ, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Εὐθύδημε; οὐ δοκεῖ
 σοι ὀρθῶς ἀδελφὸς λέγειν ὁ πάντ’ εἰδώς;

b

Ἀδελφὸς γάρ, ἔφη, ἐγώ εἰμι Εὐθυδήμου, ταχὺ ὑπολαβὼν
 ὁ Διονυσόδωρος;

Κἀγὼ εἶπον· Ἐασον, ὦγαθέ, ἕως ἂν Εὐθύδημός με διδάξῃ
 5 ὥς ἐπίσταμαι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ὅτι ἄδικοί εἰσι, καὶ μὴ
 μοι φθονήσῃς τοῦ μαθήματος.

Φεύγεις, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Διουνυσόδωρος, καὶ οὐκ
 ἐθέλεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

Εἰκότως γ', εἶπον ἐγώ· ἥττων γάρ εἰμι καὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου
 10 ὑμῶν, ὥστε πολλοῦ δέω μὴ οὐ δύο γε φεύγειν. πολὺ γάρ
 c πού εἰμι φανλότερος τοῦ Ἡρακλέους, ὃς οὐχ οἷός τε ἦν τῇ
 τε ὕδρα διαμάχεσθαι, σοφιστρία οὔσῃ καὶ διὰ τὴν σοφίαν
 ἀνιείσῃ, εἰ μίαν κεφαλὴν τοῦ λόγου τις ἀποτέμοι, πολλὰς
 ἀντὶ τῆς μίας, καὶ καρκίνῳ τινὶ ἑτέρῳ σοφιστῇ ἐκ θαλάττης·
 5 ἀφιγμένῳ, νεωστί μοι δοκεῖν καταπεπλευκότι· ὃς ἐπειδὴ
 αὐτὸν ἐλύπει οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ λέγων καὶ δάκνων,
 τὸν Ἰόλεων τὸν ἀδελφιδοῦν βοηθὸν ἐπεκαλέσατο, ὁ δὲ αὐτῷ
 d ἱκανῶς ἐβοήθησεν. ὁ δ' ἐμὸς Ἰόλεως [Πατροκλῆς] εἰ ἔλθοι,
 πλεον ἂν θάτερον ποιήσειεν.

Ἀπόκριναι δὴ, ἔφη ὁ Διουνυσόδωρος, ὁπότε σοι ταῦτα
 ὑμνηται· πότερον ὁ Ἰόλεως τοῦ Ἡρακλέους μᾶλλον ἦν
 5 ἀδελφιδοῦς ἢ σός;

Κράτιστον τοίνυν μοι, ὦ Διουνυσόδωρε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀπο-
 κρίνασθαί σοι. οὐ γὰρ μὴ ἀνῆς ἐρωτῶν, σχεδόν τι ἐγὼ
 τοῦτ' εὖ οἶδα, φθονῶν καὶ διακωλύων, ἵνα μὴ διδάξῃ με
 Εὐθύδημος ἐκείνο τὸ σοφόν.—Ἀποκρίνου δὴ, ἔφη.—Ἀπο-
 10 κρίνομαι δὴ, εἶπον, ὅτι τοῦ Ἡρακλέους ἦν ὁ Ἰόλεως ἀδελ-
 e φιδοῦς, ἐμὸς δ', ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν. οὐ γὰρ
 Πατροκλῆς ἦν αὐτῷ πατήρ, ὁ ἐμὸς ἀδελφός, ἀλλὰ παρα-
 πλῆσιον μὲν τοῦνομα Ἰφικλῆς, ὁ Ἡρακλέους ἀδελφός.—
 Πατροκλῆς δέ, ἢ δ' ὅς, σός;—Πάνυ γ', ἔφην ἐγώ, ὁμομή-
 5 τριός γε, οὐ μέντοι ὁμοπάτριος.—Ἀδελφὸς ἄρα ἐστί σοι
 καὶ οὐκ ἀδελφός.—Οὐχ ὁμοπάτριός γε, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἔφην·
 ἐκείνου μὲν γὰρ Χαιρέδημος ἦν πατήρ, ἐμὸς δὲ Σωφρονίσκος.
 —Πατήρ δὲ ἦν, ἔφη, Σωφρονίσκος καὶ Χαιρέδημος;—Πάνυ
 298 γ', ἔφην· ὁ μὲν γε ἐμὸς, ὁ δὲ ἐκείνου.—Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἕτερος

ἦν Χαιρέδημος τοῦ πατρός;—Τοῦμοῦ γ', ἔφην ἐγώ.—'Αρ' οὖν πατὴρ ἦν ἕτερος ὢν πατρός; ἢ σὺ εἶ ὁ αὐτὸς τῷ λίθῳ; —Δέδοικα μὲν ἔγωγ', ἔφην, μὴ φανῶ ὑπὸ σοῦ ὁ αὐτός· οὐ μέντοι μοι δοκῶ.—Οὐκοῦν ἕτερος εἶ, ἔφη, τοῦ λίθου; — 5
 Ἔτερος μέντοι.—'Αλλο τι οὖν ἕτερος, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὢν λίθον οὐ λίθος εἶ; καὶ ἕτερος ὢν χρυσοῦ οὐ χρυσὸς εἶ;—'Εστι ταῦτα. —Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ Χαιρέδημος, ἔφη, ἕτερος ὢν πατρὸς οὐκ ἂν πατὴρ εἴη.—'Εοικεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ πατὴρ εἶναι.

Εἰ γὰρ δῆπου, ἔφη, πατὴρ ἐστὶν ὁ Χαιρέδημος, ὑπολαβὼν b
 ὁ Εὐθύδημος, πάλιν αὖ ὁ Σωφρονίσκος ἕτερος ὢν πατρὸς οὐ πατὴρ ἐστὶν, ὥστε σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπάτωρ εἶ.

Καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος ἐκδεξάμενος, Ὁ δὲ ὑμέτερος, ἔφη, αὖ πατὴρ οὐ ταῦτὰ ταῦτα πέπονθεν; ἕτερός ἐστιν τοῦμοῦ πατρός; 5
 —Πολλοῦ γ', ἔφη, δεῖ, ὁ Εὐθύδημος.—'Αλλά, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὁ αὐτός;—'Ο αὐτὸς μέντοι.—Οὐκ ἂν συμβουλοίμην. ἀλλὰ πότερον, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἐμὸς μόνον ἐστὶ πατὴρ ἢ καὶ τῶν c
 ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων;—Καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἔφη· ἢ οἶε τὸν αὐτὸν πατέρα ὄντα οὐ πατέρα εἶναι;—'Ωιμην δῆτα, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος.—Τί δέ; ἢ δ' ὅς· χρυσὸν ὄντα μὴ χρυσὸν εἶναι; ἢ ἀνθρωπον ὄντα μὴ ἀνθρωπον;—Μὴ γάρ, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιπ- 5
 πος, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, τὸ λεγόμενον, οὐ λίνον λίνῳ συνάπτεις· δεινὸν γὰρ λέγεις πρᾶγμα εἰ ὁ σὸς πατὴρ πάντων ἐστὶν πατήρ.—'Αλλ' ἐστὶν, ἔφη.—Πότερον ἀνθρώπων; ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Κτήσιππος, ἢ καὶ ἵππων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων ζώων;—Πάντων, ἔφη.—'Η καὶ μήτηρ ἢ μήτηρ;—Καὶ ἡ μήτηρ γε. d
 —Καὶ τῶν ἐχίνων ἄρα, ἔφη, ἢ σὴ μήτηρ μήτηρ ἐστὶ τῶν θαλαττίων.—Καὶ ἡ σὴ γ', ἔφη.—Καὶ σὺ ἄρα ἀδελφὸς εἶ τῶν κωβιῶν καὶ κυναρίων καὶ χοιριδίων.—Καὶ γὰρ σύ, ἔφη.—(Κάπρος) ἄρα σοι πατήρ ἐστι καὶ κύων.—Καὶ γὰρ 5
 σοί, ἔφη.

Αὐτίκα δέ γε, ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, ἂν μοι ἀποκρίνη, ὦ Κτήσιππε, ὁμολογήσεις ταῦτα. εἰπὲ γάρ μοι, ἐστι σοι κυων;—Καὶ μάλα πονηρός, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος.—'Εστὶν οἶν

e αὐτῷ κυνίδια;—Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, ἕτερα τοιαῦτα.—Οὐκοῦν πατήρ ἐστιν αὐτῶν ὁ κύων;—Ἐγωγέ τοι εἶδον, ἔφη, αὐτὸν ὀχεύοντα τὴν κύνα.—Τί οὖν; οὐ σὸς ἐστιν ὁ κύων;—Πάνυ γ', ἔφη.—Οὐκοῦν πατήρ ὦν σὸς ἐστιν, ὥστε σὸς πατήρ
5 γίγνεται ὁ κύων καὶ σὺ κυναρίων ἀδελφός;

Καὶ αὖθις ταχὺ ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, ἵνα μὴ πρότερόν τι εἴποι ὁ Κτήσιππος, Καὶ ἔτι γέ μοι μικρόν, ἔφη, ἀποκρίναι· τύπτεις τὸν κύνα τοῦτον;—Καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος γελάσας, Νῆ τοὺς θεούς, ἔφη· οὐ γὰρ δύναμαι σέ.—Οὐκοῦν
10 τὸν σκυτοῦ πατέρα, ἔφη, τύπτεις;

299 Πολὺ μέντοι, ἔφη, δικαιότερον τὸν ὑμέτερον πατέρα τύπτωμαι, ὃ τι μαθὼν σοφοὺς νειῖς οὕτως ἔφυσεν. ἀλλ' ἦ που, ὦ Εὐθύδημε [ὁ Κτήσιππος], πόλλ' ἀγαθὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ὑμετέρας σοφίας ταύτης ἀπολέλαυκεν ὁ πατήρ ὁ ὑμέτερός
5 τε καὶ τῶν κυνιδίων.

Ἄλλ' οὐδὲν δεῖται πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὦ Κτήσιππε, οὗτ' ἐκεῖνος οὔτε σύ.

Οὐδὲ σύ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, αὐτός;

Οὐδὲ ἄλλος γε οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων. εἰπέ γάρ μοι, ὦ
b Κτήσιππε, εἰ ἀγαθὸν νομίζεις εἶναι ἀσθενεῖν φάρμακον πιεῖν ἢ οὐκ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ σοι, ὅταν δέηται ἢ εἰς πόλεμον ὅταν ἦ, ὅπλα ἔχοντα μᾶλλον λέναι ἢ ἄνοπλον.—Ἐμοιγε, ἔφη. καίτοι οἴμαί τί σε τῶν καλῶν ἑρεῖν.—Σὺ
5 ἄριστα εἴσεις, ἔφη· ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ὡμολόγεις ἀγαθὸν εἶναι φάρμακον, ὅταν δέῃ, πίνειν ἀνθρώπῳ, ἄλλο τι τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὥς πλεῖστον δεῖ πίνειν, καὶ καλῶς ἐκεῖ ἔξει, ἐὰν τις αὐτῷ τρίψας ἐγκεράσῃ ἐλλεβόρου ἄμαξαν;—Καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος εἶπεν· Πάνυ γε σφόδρα, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἐὰν ἦ γε
c ὁ πίνων ὅσος ὁ ἀνδρὶας ὁ ἐν Δελφοῖς.—Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, καὶ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ἐπειδὴ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ὅπλα ἔχειν, ὥς πλεῖστα δεῖ ἔχειν δόρατά τε καὶ ἀσπίδας, ἐπειδήπερ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν;—Μάλα δήπου, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος· σὺ δ' οὐκ οἶει, ὦ Εὐθύδημε,
5 ἀλλὰ μίαν καὶ ἐν δόρῳ;—Ἐγωγε.—Ἡ καὶ τὸν Γηρυόνην ἄν,

ἔφη, καὶ τὸν Βριάρεων οὕτως σὺ ὀπλίσεις; ἐγὼ δὲ ὦμην σὲ δεινότερον εἶναι, ἅτε ὀπλομάχην ὄντα, καὶ τόνδε τὸν ἑταῖρον.

Καὶ ὁ μὲν Εὐθύδημος ἐσίγησεν· ὁ δὲ Διονυσόδωρος πρὸς τὰ πρότερον ἀποκεκριμένα τῷ Κτησίππῳ ἤρετο, Οὐκοῦν καὶ d χρυσίον, ἧ δ' ὅς, ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἔχειν;—Πάνυ, καὶ ταῦτά γε πολὺ, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος.—Τί οὖν; ἀγαθὰ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι χρῆναι ἀεὶ τ' ἔχειν καὶ πανταχοῦ;—Σφόδρα γ', ἔφη.—Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ χρυσίον ἀγαθὸν ὁμολογεῖς εἶναι;— 5 Ὡμολόγηκα μὲν οὖν, ἧ δ' ὅς.—Οὐκοῦν ἀεὶ δεῖ αὐτὸ ἔχειν καὶ πανταχοῦ καὶ ὥς μάλιστα ἐν ἑαυτῷ; καὶ εἴη ἂν εὐδαιμονέστατος εἰ ἔχοι χρυσίου μὲν τρία τάλαντα ἐν τῇ γαστρὶ, e τάλαντον δ' ἐν τῷ κρανίῳ, στατήρα δὲ χρυσοῦ ἐν ἑκατέρῳ τῷφθαλμῷ;—Φασί γε οὖν, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος, τούτους εὐδαιμονεστάτους εἶναι Σκυθῶν καὶ ἀρίστους ἄνδρας, οἳ χρυσίον τε ἐν τοῖς κρανίοις ἔχουσιν πολὺ τοῖς ἑαυτῶν, 5 ὥσπερ σὺ νυνδὴ ἔλεγες τὸν κύνα τὸν πατέρα, καὶ ὁ θαυμασιώτερόν γε ἔτι, ὅτι καὶ πίνουσιν ἐκ τῶν ἑαυτῶν κρανίων κεχρυσωμένων, καὶ ταῦτα ἐντὸς καθορῶσιν, τὴν ἑαυτῶν κορυφὴν ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ἔχοντες.

Πότερον δὲ ὀρώσω, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος, καὶ Σκύθαι τε καὶ 300 οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι τὰ δυνατὰ ὀρᾶν ἢ τὰ ἀδύνατα;—Τὰ δυνατὰ δήπου.—Οὐκοῦν καὶ σύ, ἔφη;—Κἀγώ.—Ὅρᾳς οὖν τὰ ἡμέτερα ἱμάτια;—Ναί.—Δυνατὰ οὖν ὀρᾶν ἐστὶν ταῦτα.—Ὑπερφυῶς, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος.—Τί δέ; ἧ δ' ὅς.—Μηδέν. 5 σὺ δὲ ἴσως οὐκ οἶει αὐτὰ ὀρᾶν· οὕτως ἡδὺς εἶ. ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖς, Εὐθύδημε, οὐ καθεύδων ἐπικεκοιμηῆσθαι καί, (εἰ) οἶόν τε λέγοντα μηδὲν λέγειν, καὶ σὺ τοῦτο ποιεῖν.

Ἡ γὰρ οὐχ οἶόν τ', ἔφη ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, σιγῶντα b λέγειν;—Οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν, ἧ δ' ὅς ὁ Κτήσιππος.—Ἄρ' οὐδὲ λέγοντα σιγᾶν;—Ἔτι ἤττον, ἔφη.—Ὅταν οὖν λίθους λέγῃς καὶ ξύλα καὶ σιδήρια, οὐ σιγῶντα λέγεις;—Οὐκ οὐν εἰ γε ἐγώ, ἔφη, παρέρχομαι ἐν τοῖς χαλκείοις, ἀλλὰ φθεγγόμενα 5 καὶ βοῶντα μέγιστον τὰ σιδήρια λέγεται, ἔάν τις ᾤψῃται·

ὥστε τοῦτο μὲν ὑπὸ σοφίας ἔλαθες οὐδὲν εἰπών. ἀλλ' ἔτι μοι τὸ ἕτερον ἐπιδείξατον, ὅπως αὖ ἔστιν λέγοντα σιγᾶν.

c Καί μοι ἐδόκει ὑπεραγωνιᾶν ὁ Κτήσιππος διὰ τὰ παιδικά.

Ὅταν σιγᾷς, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος, οὐ πάντα σιγᾷς;—Ἐγώ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς.—Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ λέγοντα σιγᾷς, εἴπερ τῶν ἀπάντων ἔστιν τὰ λέγοντα.—Τί δέ; ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος, οὐ σιγᾷ 5 πάντα;—Οὐ δήπου, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος.—Ἀλλ' ἄρα, ὦ βέλτιστε, λέγει τὰ πάντα;—Τά γε δήπου λέγοντα.—Ἀλλὰ, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλὰ τὰ πάντα σιγᾷ ἢ λέγει;

d Οὐδέτερα καὶ ἀμφότερα, ἔφη ὑφαρπάσας ὁ Διονυσόδωρος· εὖ γὰρ οἶδα ὅτι τῇ ἀποκρίσει οὐχ ἕξεις ὃ τι χρῆ.

Καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος, ὥσπερ εἰώθει, μέγα πάννυ ἀνακαγχάσας, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἔφη, ὁ ἀδελφός σου ἐξημφοτέρικεν τὸν λόγον, 5 καὶ ἀπόλωλέ τε καὶ ἡττηται. Καὶ ὁ Κλεινίας πάννυ ἥσθη καὶ ἐγέλασεν, ὥστε ὁ Κτήσιππος ἐγένετο πλεῖον ἢ δεκαπλάσιος. ὁ δέ μοι (δοκεῖ) ἅτε πανοῦργος ὢν, ὁ Κτήσιππος, παρ' αὐτῶν τούτων αὐτὰ ταῦτα παρηκηκοίη· οὐ γάρ ἔστιν ἄλλων τοιαύτη σοφία τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων.

e Κἀγὼ εἶπον· Τί γε λᾶς, ὦ Κλεινία, ἐπὶ σπουδαίοις οὕτω πράγμασιν καὶ καλοῖς;

Σὺ γὰρ ἤδη τι πώποτ' εἶδες, ὦ Σώκρατες, καλὸν πρᾶγμα; ἔφη ὁ Διονυσόδωρος.

5 Ἐγώ γε, ἔφην, καὶ πολλά γε, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε.

301 Ἄρα ἕτερα ὄντα τοῦ καλοῦ, ἔφη, ἢ ταῦτα τῷ καλῷ;

Κἀγὼ ἐν παντὶ ἐγενόμην ὑπὸ ἀπορίας, καὶ ἡγούμην δίκαια πεπονθέναι ὅτι ἔγρυξα, ὅμως δὲ ἕτερα ἔφην αὐτοῦ γε τοῦ καλοῦ· πάρεστιν μέντοι ἐκάστῳ αὐτῶν κάλλος τι.

5 Ἐὰν οὖν, ἔφη, παραγένηταί σοι βοῦς, βοῦς εἴ, καὶ ὅτι νῦν ἐγὼ σοι πάρεμι, Διονυσόδωρος εἶ;

Εὐφήμεί τοῦτό γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

Ἀλλὰ τίνα τρόπον, ἔφη, ἐτέρου ἐτέρῳ παραγενομένου τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον ἂν εἴη;

Ἄρα τοῦτο, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἀπορεῖς; Ἦδη δὲ τοῖν ἀνδροῖν b
τὴν σοφίαν ἐπεχείρουν μιμεῖσθαι, ἅτε ἐπιθυμῶν αὐτῆς.

Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἀπορῶ, ἔφη, καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἅπαντες
ἀνθρωποι ὃ μὴ ἔστι;

Τί λέγεις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ᾧ Διονυσόδωρε; οὐ τὸ καλὸν καλόν 5
ἐστὶν καὶ τὸ αἰσχροὺν αἰσχροὺν;—Ἐὰν ἔμοιγε, ἔφη, δοκῇ.—
Οὐκοῦν δοκεῖ;—Πάνν γ', ἔφη.—Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ταῦτόν ταῦτόν
καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον; οὐ γὰρ δήπου τό γε ἕτερον ταῦτόν, ἀλλ'
ἔγωγε οὐδ' ἂν παῖδα ᾤμην τοῦτο ἀπορῆσαι, ὥς οὐ τὸ ἕτερον c
ἕτερόν ἐστιν. ἀλλ', ᾧ Διονυσόδωρε, τοῦτο μὲν ἐκὼν παρήκας,
ἐπεὶ τὰ ἄλλα μοι δοκεῖτε ὥσπερ οἱ δημιουργοὶ οἷς ἕκαστα
προ ἡκεῖ ἀπεργάζεσθαι, καὶ ὑμεῖς τὸ διαλέγεσθαι παγκάλως
ἀπεργάζεσθαι.

Οἶσθα οὖν, ἔφη, ὅ τι προσήκει ἐκάστοις τῶν δημιουργῶν;
πρῶτον τίνα χαλκεύειν προσήκει, οἶσθα;—Ἐγωγε· ὅτι χαλ-
κέα.—Τί δέ, κεραμεύειν;—Κεραμέα.—Τί δέ, σφάττειν τε
καὶ ἐκδέρειν καὶ τὰ μικρὰ κρέα κατακόψαντα ἔψειν καὶ ὀπτᾶν;
—Μάγειρον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.—Οὐκοῦν ἐὰν τις, ἔφη, τὰ προσή- d
κοντα πράττη, ὀρθῶς πράξει;—Μάλιστα.—Προσήκει δέ γε,
ὥς φῆς, τὸν μάγειρον κατακόπτειν καὶ ἐκδέρειν; ὠμολόγησας
ταῦτα ἦ οὐ;—Ὡμολόγησα, ἔφην, ἀλλὰ συγγνώμην μοι ἔχε.
—Δῆλον τοίνυν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὅτι ἂν τις σφάξας τὸν μάγειρον καὶ 5
κατακόψας ἐψήσῃ καὶ ὀπτήσῃ, τὰ προσήκοντα ποιήσῃ· καὶ
ἐὰν τὸν χαλκέα τις αὐτὸν χαλκεύῃ καὶ τὸν κεραμέα κεραμεύῃ,
καὶ οὗτος τὰ προσήκοντα πράξει.

Ἦ Πόσειδον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἥδη κολοφῶνα ἐπιτιθεῖς τῇ e
σοφίᾳ. ἄρα μοί ποτε αὕτη παραγενήσεται ὥστε μοι οἰκεία
γενέσθαι;

Ἐπιγνοίης ἂν αὐτήν, ᾧ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οἰκείαν γενο-
μένην;

Ἐὰν σύ γε βούλῃ, ἔφην ἐγώ, δῆλον ὅτι.

Τί δέ, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὰ σαυτοῦ οἶει γιγνώσκειν;

Εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις· ἀπὸ σοῦ γὰρ δεῖ ἄρχεσθαι,
τελευτᾶν δ' εἰς Εὐθύδημον τόνδε.

- 10 Ἄρ' οὖν, ἔφη, ταῦτα ἡγῇ σὰ εἶναι, ὧν ἂν ἄρξης καὶ ἐξῇ
 302 σοι αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι ὅ τι ἂν βούλῃ; οἶον βοῦς καὶ πρόβατον,
 ἄρ' ἂν ἡγοῖο ταῦτα σὰ εἶναι, ἃ σοι ἐξείη καὶ ἀποδόσθαι
 καὶ δοῦναι καὶ θῦσαι ὅτῳ βούλοιο θεῶν; ἃ δ' ἂν μὴ οὕτως
 ἔχῃ, οὐ σά;
- 5 Καγὼ (ἦδη γὰρ ὅτι ἐξ αὐτῶν καλόν τι ἀνακύψοιτο τῶν
 ἐρωτημάτων, καὶ ἅμα βουλόμενος ὅτι τάχιστ' ἀκοῦσαι)
 Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφην, οὕτως ἔχει· τὰ τοιαῦτά ἐστιν μόνα
 ἐμά.—Τί δέ; ζῶα, ἔφη, οὐ ταῦτα καλεῖς ἃ ἂν ψυχὴν ἔχῃ;
- b —Ναί, ἔφην.—Ὁμολογεῖς οὖν τῶν ζῶων ταῦτα μόνα εἶναι
 σά, περὶ ἃ ἂν σοι ἐξουσία ἦ πάντα ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἃ νυνδὴ
 ἐγὼ ἔλεγον;—Ὁμολογῶ.—Καὶ ὅς, εἰρωνικῶς πάνυ ἐπισχῶν
 ὥς τι μέγα σκοπούμενος, Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔστιν
- 5 σοι Ζεὺς πατῶς;—Καὶ ἐγὼ ὑποπτεύσας ἤξευν τὸν λόγον
 οἷπερ ἐτελεύτησεν, ἀπορόν τινα στροφὴν ἐφευρόν τε καὶ
 ἐστρεφόμεν ἥδην ὥσπερ ἐν δικτύῳ εἰλημμένος· Οὐκ ἔστιν, ἦν
 δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Διουνσόδωρε.—Ταλαίπωρος ἄρα τις σύ γε ἄνθρω-
- c πος εἶ καὶ οὐδὲ Ἀθηναῖος, ᾧ μήτε θεοὶ πατῶοί εἰσιν μήτε
 ἱερὰ μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν.—Ἐα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,
 ὦ Διουνσόδωρε, εὐφήμει τε καὶ μὴ χαλεπῶς με προδίδασκε.
 ἔστι γὰρ ἔμοιγε καὶ βωμοὶ καὶ ἱερὰ οἰκεία καὶ πατῶα καὶ
- 5 τὰ ἄλλα ὅσαπερ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἀθηναίοις τῶν τοιούτων.—
 Εἰτα τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἔφη, Ἀθηναίοις οὐκ ἔστιν Ζεὺς ὁ πατῶος;
 —Οὐκ ἔστιν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὕτη ἡ ἐπωνυμία Ἰώνων οὐδενί,
 οὔθ' ὅσοι ἐκ τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως ἀπῶκισμένοι εἰσὶν οὔθ' ἡμῖν,
- d ἀλλὰ Ἀπόλλων πατῶος διὰ τὴν τοῦ Ἰωνος γένεσιν· Ζεὺς
 δ' ἡμῖν πατῶος μὲν οὐ καλεῖται, ἔρκειος δὲ καὶ φράτριος,
 καὶ Ἀθηναία φρατρία.—Ἀλλ' ἄρκεί γ', ἔφη ὁ Διουνσόδωρος·
 ἔστιν γάρ σοι, ὥς ἔοικεν, Ἀπόλλων τε καὶ Ζεὺς καὶ Ἀθηνᾶ.
- 5 —Πάνυ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.—Οὐκοῦν καὶ οὗτοι σοὶ θεοὶ ἂν εἴεν;
 ἔφη.—Πρόγονοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ δεσπότες.—Ἀλλ' οὖν σοί
 γε, ἔφη· ἢ οὐ σοὺς ὠμολόγηκας αὐτοὺς εἶναι;—Ὡμολόγηκα,
 ἔφην· τί γὰρ πάθω;—Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, καὶ ζῶα εἰσιν οὗτοι οἱ

θεοί; ὁμολόγηκας γὰρ ὅσα ψυχὴν ἔχει ζῶα εἶναι. ἢ οὗτοι ε
οἱ θεοὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ψυχὴν;—Ἐχουσιν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.—Οὐκοῦν
καὶ ζῶά εἰσιν;—Ζῶα, ἔφην.—Τῶν δέ γε ζώων, ἔφη, ὁμο-
λόγηκας ταῦτ' εἶναι σά, ὅσα ἄν σοι ἐξῇ καὶ δοῦναι καὶ
ἀποδόσθαι καὶ θῦσαι δὴ θεῷ ὅτῃ ἂν βούλῃ.—Ὁμολόγηκα, 5
ἔφην· οὐκ ἔστιν γάρ μοι ἀνάδυσσις, ὦ Εὐθύδημε.—Ἴθι δὴ μοι
εὐθύς, ἢ δ' ὅς, εἰπέ· ἐπειδὴ σὸν ὁμολογεῖς εἶναι τὸν Δία
καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους θεούς, ἄρα ἔξεστί σοι αὐτοὺς ἀποδόσθαι 303
ἢ δοῦναι ἢ ἄλλ' ὅ τι ἂν βούλῃ χρῆσθαι ὥσπερ τοῖς ἄλλοις
ζώοις;

Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Κρίτων, ὥσπερ πληγεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου,
ἐκείμην ἄφωνος· ὁ δὲ Κτήσιππός μοι ἰὼν ὡς βοηθήσων, 5
Πυππὰξ ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ἔφη, καλοῦ λόγου.—Καὶ ὁ Διονυσό-
δωρος, Πότερον οὖν, ἔφη, ὁ Ἡρακλῆς πυππὰς ἔστιν ἢ ὁ
Πυππὰξ Ἡρακλῆς;—Καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος, ὦ Πόσειδον, ἔφη,
δεινῶν λόγων. ἀφίσταμαι· ἀμάχω τῷ ἄνδρῃ.

Ἐνταῦθα μέντοι, ὦ φίλε Κρίτων, οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐ τῶν b
παρόντων ὑπερεπήνεσε τὸν λόγον καὶ τῷ ἄνδρῃ, καὶ γελῶντες
καὶ κροτοῦντες καὶ χαίροντες ὀλίγου παρετάθησαν. ἐπὶ μὲν
γὰρ τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἐφ' ἐκάστοις πᾶσι παγκάλως ἐθορύβουν
μόνοι οἱ τοῦ Εὐθύδημου ἐρασταί, ἐνταῦθα δὲ ὀλίγου καὶ οἱ 5
κίονες οἱ ἐν τῷ Λυκείῳ ἐθορύβησάν τ' ἐπὶ τοῖν ἀνδρῶν καὶ
ῆσθησαν. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτω διετέθην, ὥστε
ὁμολογεῖν μηδένας πώποτε ἀνθρώπους ἰδεῖν οὕτω σοφούς, c
καὶ παντάπασι καταδουλωθεὶς ὑπὸ τῆς σοφίας αὐτοῦν ἐπὶ
τὸ ἐπαινεῖν τε καὶ ἐγκωμιάζειν αὐτῷ ἐτραπόμην, καὶ εἶπον·
ὦ μακάριοι σφὼ τῆς θαυμαστῆς φύσεως, οἱ τοσοῦτον πρᾶγμα
οὕτω ταχὺ καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ ἐξείργασθον. πολλὰ μὲν 5
οὖν καὶ ἄλλα οἱ λόγοι ὑμῶν καλὰ ἔχουσιν, ὦ Εὐθύδημέ τε
καὶ Διονυσόδωρε· ἐν δὲ τοῖς καὶ τοῦτο μεγαλοπρεπέστατον,
ὅτι τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν σεμνῶν δὴ καὶ δοκούντων
τὶ εἶναι οὐδὲν ὑμῖν μέλει, ἀλλὰ τῶν ὁμοίων ὑμῖν μόνον. d
ἐγὼ γὰρ εὖ οἶδα ὅτι τούτους τοὺς λόγους πάννυ μὲν ἂν ὀλίγοι

- ἀγαπῶεν ἄνθρωποι ὅμοιοι ὑμῖν, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι οὕτω νοοῦσιν
αὐτούς, ὥστ' εὖ οἶδα ὅτι αἰσχυνθεῖεν ἂν μᾶλλον ἐξελέγχοντες
5 τοιούτοις λόγοις τοὺς ἄλλους ἢ αὐτοὶ ἐξελεγχόμενοι. καὶ
τόδε αὖ ἕτερον δημοτικόν τι καὶ πρᾶον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις·
ὁπόταν φῆτε μήτε καλὸν εἶναι μηδὲν μήτε ἀγαθὸν πρᾶγμα
μήτε λευκὸν μηδ' ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων μηδέν, μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν
e ἐτέρων ἕτερον, ἀτεχνῶς μὲν τῷ ὄντι συρράπτετε τὰ στόματα
τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὥσπερ καὶ φατέ· ὅτι δ' οὐ μόνον τὰ τῶν
ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ δόξαίτε ἂν καὶ τὰ ὑμέτερα αὐτῶν, τοῦτο πάννυ
χαρίεν τέ ἐστίν καὶ τὸ ἐπαχθὲς τῶν λόγων ἀφαιρεῖται. τὸ
5 δὲ δὴ μέγιστον, ὅτι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει ὑμῖν καὶ τεχνικῶς
ἐξηρῆται, ὥστ' ἐ(ν) πάννυ ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ ὄντινόν ἂν μαθεῖν
ἀνθρώπων· ἔγνω ἔγωγε καὶ τῷ Κτησίππῳ τὸν νοῦν προσέ-
χων ὥς ταχὺ ὑμᾶς ἐκ τοῦ παραχρήμα μιμῆσθαι οἷός τε ἦν.
304 τοῦτο μὲν οὖν τοῦ πράγματος σφῶν τὸ σοφὸν πρὸς μὲν τὸ
ταχὺ παραδιδόναι καλόν, ἐναντίον δ' ἀνθρώπων διαλέγεσθαι
οὐκ ἐπιτήδειον, ἀλλ' ἂν γέ μοι πείθῃσθε, εὐλαβήσεσθε μὴ
πολλῶν ἐναντίον λέγειν, ἵνα μὴ ταχὺ ἐκμαθόντες ὑμῖν μὴ
5 εἰδῶσιν χάριν. ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μὲν αὐτῷ πρὸς ἀλλήλῳ μόνῳ
διαλέγεσθον· εἰ δὲ μὴ, εἴπερ ἄλλου τοῦ ἐναντίου, ἐκείνου
μόνου ὃς ἂν ὑμῖν διδῶ ἄργύριον. τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα, ἐὰν
b σωφρονῇτε, καὶ τοῖς μαθηταῖς συμβουλευσέτε, μηδέποτε
μηδενὶ ἀνθρώπων διαλέγεσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ ὑμῖν τε καὶ αὐτοῖς·
τὸ γὰρ σπάνιον, ὧ Εὐθύδημε, τίμιον, τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ εὐωνό-
τατον, ἄριστον ὄν, ὥς ἔφη Πίνδαρος. ἀλλ' ἄγετε, ἦν δ'
5 ἐγώ, ὅπως καμὲ καὶ Κλεινίαν τόνδε παραδέξεσθον.
Ταῦτα, ὧ Κρίτων, καὶ ἄλλα ἅττα ἔτι βραχέα διαλε-
χθέντες ἀπῆμεν. σκόπει οὖν ὅπως συμφοιτήσεις παρὰ τῷ
c ἀνδρὲ, ὥς ἐκείνῳ φατὸν οἶω τε εἶναι διδάξαι τὸν ἐθέλοντ'
ἀργύριον διδόναι, καὶ οὕτε φύσιν οὐθ' ἡλικίαν ἐξείργειν
οὐδεμίαν—ὃ δὲ καὶ σοὶ μάλιστα προσήκει ἀκοῦσαι, ὅτι οὐδὲ
τοῦ χρηματίζεσθαί φατον διακωλύειν οὐδέν—μὴ οὐ παρα-
5 λαβεῖν ὄντινόν εὐπετῶς τὴν σφετέραν σοφίαν.

ΚΡ. Καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φιλήκοος μὲν ἔγωγε καὶ ἡδέως ἂν τι μανθάνοιμι, κινδυνεύω μέντοι καὶ γὰρ εἶς εἶναι τῶν οὐχ ὁμοίων Εὐθυδήμῳ, ἀλλ' ἐκείνων ὧν δὴ καὶ σὺ ἔλεγες, τῶν ἡδίων ἂν ἐξελεγχόμενων ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων d λόγων ἢ ἐξελεγχόντων. ἀτὰρ γελοῖον μὲν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ νουθετεῖν σε, ὅμως δέ, ἃ γ' ἤκουον, ἐθέλω σοι ἀπαγγεῖλαι. τῶν ἀφ' ὑμῶν ἀπιόντων ἴσθ' ὅτι προσελθὼν τίς μοι περιπατοῦντι, ἀνὴρ οἰόμενος πάννυ εἶναι σοφός, τούτων 5 τις τῶν περὶ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια δεινῶν, Ὡ Κρίτων, ἔφη, οὐδὲν ἀκροᾷ τῶνδε τῶν σοφῶν;—Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὐ γὰρ οἷός τ' ἢ προσστὰς κατακούειν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄχλου.—Καὶ μήν, ἔφη, ἄξιόν γ' ἦν ἀκοῦσαι.—Τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ.—Ἵνα ἤκουσας ἀνδρῶν διαλεγόμενων οἷ νῦν e σοφώτατοί εἰσι τῶν περὶ τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους.—Καὶ γὰρ εἶπον· Τί οὖν ἐφαίνοντό σοι;—Τί δὲ ἄλλο, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἢ οἷάπερ αἰεὶ ἂν τις τῶν τοιούτων ἀκούσαι ληρούντων καὶ περὶ οὐδενὸς ἀξίων ἀναξίαν σπουδὴν ποιουμένων; (οὕτως γάρ πως καὶ 5 εἶπεν τοῖς ὀνόμασιν).—Καὶ ἐγώ, Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη, χαρίεν γέ τι πρᾶγμά ἐστιν ἢ φιλοσοφία.—Ποῖον, ἔφη, χαρίεν, ὦ μακάριε; οὐδενὸς μὲν οὖν ἄξιον. ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ νῦν παρεγένου, 305 πάννυ ἂν σε οἶμαι αἰσχυρῆσθαι ὑπὲρ τοῦ σεαυτοῦ ἐταίρου· οὕτως ἦν ἄτοπος, ἐθέλων ἑαυτὸν παρέχειν ἀνθρώποις οἷς οὐδὲν μέλει ὅτι ἂν λέγωσιν, παντὸς δὲ ῥήματος ἀντέχονται. καὶ οὗτοι, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, ἐν τοῖς κράτιστοί εἰσι τῶν 5 νῦν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι οἱ ἐπὶ τῷ πράγματι διατρίβοντες φαῦλοί εἰσιν καὶ καταγέλαστοι. Ἐμοὶ δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐδόκει οὐκ ὀρθῶς ψέγειν οὐθ' οὗτος οὐτ' εἴ τις ἄλλος ψέγει· τὸ b μέντοι ἐθέλει διαλέγεσθαι τοιούτοις ἐναντίον πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων ὀρθῶς μοι ἐδόκει μέμφεσθαι.

ΣΩ. Ὡ Κρίτων, θαυμάσιοί εἰσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες. ἀτὰρ οὐπω οἶδα ὅ τι μέλλω ἐρεῖν. ποτέρων ἦν ὁ προσελθὼν 5 σοι καὶ μεμφόμενος τὴν φιλοσοφίαν; πότερον τῶν ἀγωνί-

σασθαι δειῶν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις, ῥήτωρ τις, ἢ τῶν τοὺς τοιοῦτους εἰσπεμπόντων, ποιητῆς τῶν λόγων οἷς οἱ ῥήτορες ἀγωνίζονται;

c ΚΡ. Ἦκιστα νῆ τὸν Δία ῥήτωρ, οὐδὲ οἶμαι πρόποτ' αὐτὸν ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβεβηκέναι· ἀλλ' ἐπαίειν αὐτόν φασι περὶ τοῦ πράγματος νῆ τὸν Δία καὶ δειῶν εἶναι καὶ δεινοὺς λόγους συντιθέναι.

5 ΣΩ. Ἦδη μανθάνω· περὶ τούτων καὶ αὐτὸς νυνδὴ ἔμελλον λέγειν. οὔτοι γάρ εἰσιν μὲν, ὧ Κρίτων, οὗς ἔφη Πρόδικος μεθόρια φιλοσόφου τε ἀνδρὸς καὶ πολιτικοῦ, οἷονται δ' εἶναι πάντων σοφώτατοι ἀνθρώπων, πρὸς δὲ τῷ εἶναι καὶ δοκεῖν πάνυ παρὰ πολλοῖς, ὥστε παρὰ πᾶσιν εὐδοκιμεῖν

d ἐμποδῶν σφίσιν εἶναι οὐδένας ἄλλους ἢ τοὺς περὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἀνθρώπους. ἡγοῦνται οὖν, ἐὰν τούτους εἰς δόξαν καταστήσωσιν μηδενὸς δοκεῖν ἀξίους εἶναι, ἀναμφισβητήτως ἤδη παρὰ πᾶσιν τὰ νικητήρια εἰς δόξαν οἷσθαι σοφίας

5 πέρι. εἶναι μὲν γὰρ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ σφᾶς σοφωτάτους, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἰδίοις λόγοις ὅταν ἀποληφθῶσιν, ὑπὸ τῶν ἀμφὶ Εὐθύδημον κολούεσθαι. σοφοὶ δὲ ἡγοῦνται εἶναι πάνυ εἰκότως· μετρίως μὲν γὰρ φιλοσοφίας ἔχειν, μετρίως δὲ πολιτικῶν,

e πάνυ ἐξ εἰκότος λόγου—μετέχειν γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων ὅσον ἔδει, ἐκτὸς δὲ ὄντες κινδύνων καὶ ἀγώνων καρποῦσθαι τὴν σοφίαν.

ΚΡ. Τί οὖν; δοκοῦσί σοί τι, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγειν; οὐ γάρ τοι ἀλλὰ ὃ γε λόγος ἔχει τινὰ εὐπρέπειαν τῶν ἀνδρῶν.

5 ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἔχει ὄντως, ὦ Κρίτων, εὐπρέπειαν μᾶλλον
306 ἢ ἀλήθειαν. οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον αὐτοὺς πείσαι ὅτι καὶ ἀνθρωποὶ καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ὅσα μεταξύ τινωιν δυοῖν ἐστίν καὶ ἀμφοτέροιον τυγχάνει μετέχοντα, ὅσα μὲν ἐκ κακοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ, τοῦ μὲν βελτίω, τοῦ δὲ χείρω γίγνεται· ὅσα δὲ ἐκ δυοῖν
5 ἀγαθοῖν μὴ πρὸς ταῦτόν, ἀμφοῖν χείρω πρὸς ὃ ἂν ἐκάτερον ἢ χρηστὸν ἐκείνων ἐξ ὧν συνετέθη· ὅσα δ' ἐκ δυοῖν κακοῖν συνεθέντα μὴ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ ὄντοι ἐν τῷ μέσῳ ἐστίν, ταῦτα
b μόνα βελτίω ἐκατέρου ἐκείνων ἐστίν, ὧν ἀμφοτέρων μέρος

μετέχουσιν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡ φιλοσοφία ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ πρᾶξις, πρὸς ἄλλο δὲ ἑκατέρω, οὗτοι δ' ἀμφοτέρων μετέχοντες τούτων ἐν μέσῳ εἰσὶν, οὐδὲν λέγουσιν—ἀμφοτέρων γάρ εἰσι φαυλότεροι—εἰ δὲ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν, τῶν 5 μὲν βελτίους, τῶν δὲ χείρους· εἰ δὲ κακὰ ἀμφοτέρα, οὕτως ἂν τι λέγοιεν ἀληθές, ἄλλως δ' οὐδαμῶς. οὐκ ἂν οὖν οἶμαι αὐτοὺς ὁμολογῆσαι οὔτε κακῶ αὐτῶ ἀμφοτέρω εἶναι οὔτε τὸ μὲν κακόν, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθόν· ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι οὗτοι ἀμφοτέρων μετέχοντες ἀμφοτέρων ἡττους εἰσὶν πρὸς ἑκάτερον πρὸς ὃ ἢ τε πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ φιλοσοφία ἀξίω λόγου ἐστὸν, καὶ τρίτοι ὄντες τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ζητοῦσι πρῶτοι δοκεῖν εἶναι. 5 συγγιγνώσκειν μὲν οὖν αὐτοῖς χρὴ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ μὴ χαλεπαίνειν, ἡγεῖσθαι μέντοι τοιούτους εἶναι οἷοί εἰσιν· πάντα γὰρ ἄνδρα χρὴ ἀγαπᾶν ὅστις καὶ ὅτιοῦν λέγει ἐχόμενον φρονήσεως πρᾶγμα καὶ ἀνδρείως ἐπεξιὼν διαπονείται. d

ΚΡ. Καὶ μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ αὐτὸς περὶ τῶν νιέων, ὥσπερ ἀεὶ πρὸς σε λέγω, ἐν ἀπορίᾳ εἰμὶ τί δεῖ αὐτοῖς χρήσασθαι. ὁ μὲν οὖν νεώτερος ἔτι καὶ σμικρὸς ἐστὶν, Κριτόβουλος δ' ἤδη ἡλικίαν ἔχει καὶ δεῖται τινος ὅστις 5 αὐτὸν ὀνήσει. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ὅταν σοὶ συγγένωμαι, οὕτω διατίθεμαι ὥστ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ μανίαν εἶναι τὸ ἔνεκα τῶν παίδων ἄλλων μὲν πολλῶν σπουδὴν τοιαύτην ἐσχηκέναι, καὶ περὶ τοῦ γάμου ὅπως ἐκ γενναιοτάτης ἔσονται μητρός, καὶ e περὶ τῶν χρημάτων ὅπως ὡς πλουσιώτατοι, αὐτῶν δὲ περὶ παιδείας ἀμελήσαι· ὅταν δὲ εἷς τινα ἀποβλέψω τῶν φασκόντων ἂν παιδεῦσαι ἀνθρώπους, ἐκπέπληγμαι καὶ μοι δοκεῖ εἷς ἕκαστος αὐτῶν σκοποῦντι πάννυ ἀλλόκοτος εἶναι, 5 ὥς γε πρὸς σὲ τάληθ' εἰρήσθαι· ὥστε οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως 307 προτρέπω τὸ μειράκιον ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν.

ΣΩ. ὦ φίλε Κρίτων, οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι ἐν παντὶ ἐπιτηδεύματι οἱ μὲν φαῦλοι πολλοὶ καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι, οἱ δὲ σπουδαῖοι ὀλίγοι καὶ παντὸς ἄξιοι; ἐπεὶ γυμναστικὴ οὐ καλὸν δοκεῖ 5 σοι εἶναι, καὶ χρηματιστικὴ καὶ ῥητορικὴ καὶ στρατηγία;

ΚΡ. Ἔμοιγε πάντως δῆπον.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἐν ἐκάστη τούτων τοὺς πολλοὺς πρὸς
b ἕκαστον τὸ ἔργον οὐ καταγελάστους ὀρᾷς;

ΚΡ. Ναὶ μὰ τὸν Δία, καὶ μάλα ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἦ οὖν τούτου ἕνεκα αὐτός τε φεύξῃ πάντα τὰ
ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ τῷ νείῃ οὐκ ἐπιτρέψεις;

5 ΚΡ. Οὐκ οὐν δίκαιόν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Μὴ τοίνυν ὅ γε οὐ χρὴ ποιεῖ, ὦ Κρίτων, ἀλλ' ἐάσας
χαίρειν τοὺς ἐπιτηδεύοντας φιλοσοφίαν, εἴτε χρηστοί εἰσιν
εἴτε πονηροί, αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα βασανίσας καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ,
c εἴαν μὲν σοι φαίνεται φαῦλον ὄν, πάντ' ἄνδρα ἀπώτρεπε,
μὴ μόνον τοὺς νείεις· εἴαν δὲ φαίνεται οἷον οἶμαι αὐτὸ ἐγὼ
εἶναι, θαρρῶν δίδωκε καὶ ἄσκει, τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο, αὐτός
τε καὶ τὰ παιδία.

NOTES ON THE TEXT OF
EUTHYDEMUS

NOTES

ἐν Λυκείῳ. Cf. Pausanias i. 44: 'The Lyceum is named from 271
Lycus the son of Pandion, but was from the first considered, as it a 1
is now, a temple of Apollo, who was here first called Lyceus.'
After Aristotle had made the περίπατος, or covered walk, of the
Lyceum the place for teaching his pupils, a scene very similar
to that which is described in the *Euthydemus* occurred there. In
the *Panathenaicus* 236 D Isocrates says that he had heard how
'some three or four of the vulgar Sophists who pretend to know
everything had been sitting in the Lyceum' and railing against
him.

ἡ πολὺς. The affirmative ἡ in Plato usually begins an answer to 2
a previous speaker, as in *Pol.* 453 E, 530 C, 567 E, *Euthyphr.* 14 B:
but Heindorf's proposal to omit it here is rightly rejected by
Bekker as too arbitrary.

περιεστήκει. The common reading is περιεστήκει: but Schanz,
Praef. xiii, refers to Choeroboscus, *Dict.* 596, 27 ἐγένετο εἰστήκειν
διὰ τῆς εἰ διφθόγγου.

ὑπεκύψας, 'having leant over.' Cf. Hom. *Epigr.* xiv. 22 ὅς δέ χ' 3
ὑπεκύψῃ, πνρὶ τούτου πᾶν τὸ πρόσωπον φλεχθείη.

Ὅπότερον BT. Cf. *Lys.* 212 C ὁπότερος οὖν αὐτῶν ποτέρου φίλος 6
ἐστίν; *Pol.* 348 B Ὅποτέρως οὖν σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀρέσκει, 'Gentler and
less direct than ποτέρως, Would you tell me which of the two ways
you prefer? Cf. *Euthyd.* 271 B' (Jowett and L. Campbell). On
Pol. 348 B, cf. Adam: 'Hermann writes ποτέρως, but the text ought
not to be changed either here or in *Euthyd.* 271 A.' In *Lys.*
212 C there is apparently no various reading, and it would be
difficult to accommodate Hermann's remarkable conjecture ὁ πότερος,
adopted by Adam, to ὁποτέρως, *Pol.* 348 B. Cf. Jann. 2038: 'The
use of the relatives in indirect questions brought them into
association with the ordinary or direct interrogatives, and thus

rendered them admissible in questions also, *especially in A dialogue*, i.e. in the dialogue of Classical Antiquity, 500-300 B.C.

8 τρίτος ἀπὸ σοῦ, 'next but one to you,' Socrates himself being counted in.

b 1 Ἀξιόχου. Cf. Ps.-Plat. *Axioch.* 364 A Κλεινίαν δρῶ τὸν Ἀξιόχου. The sons of the elder Alcibiades were Cleinias (Hdt. viii. 17) and Axiochus, and their sons were the famous Alcibiades and this younger Cleinias, who were therefore first cousins.

3 ἡλικίαν. The first meaning of the word is 'size,' 'stature,' as in Lucian, *Vera Hist.* i. 40 ἄνδρας μεγάλους ὅσον ἡμισταδιαίους τὰς ἡλικίας. But 'stature' being in early years an indication of 'age,' ἡλικία is commonly used in the latter sense, as here.

ἐκεῖνος μὲν . . . οὗτος δέ. These words are wrongly referred by Routh and Winckelmann to the two Sophists. In correcting this error Stallbaum seems to fall into another by referring ἐκεῖνος to Cleinias, and οὗτος to Critobulus. In reality ἐκεῖνος indicates the one who is thought of as more remote (ἐκεῖ, *yonder*), being only incidentally mentioned, namely Critobulus, οὗτος the nearer in thought, namely Cleinias, of whom Crito has been chiefly speaking. Cf. Xen. *Mem.* i. 3, 13 τοῦτο τὸ θηρίον, ὃ καλοῦσι καλὸν καὶ ὠραῖον, τοσοῦτον δεινότερόν ἐστι τῶν φαλαγγίων, ὅσῳ ἐκεῖνα μὲν ἀψάμενα, τοῦτο δὲ οὐδ' ἀπτόμενον, εἰάν τις αὐτὸ θεᾶται, ἐνὶ ἡσὶ τι. Demosth. *De Cherson.* 108 τὸ βέλτιστον αἰεὶ, μὴ τὸ ῥᾶστον ἅπαντας λέγειν· ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο μὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσις αὐτὴ βαδιεῖται, ἐπὶ τοῦτο δὲ τῷ λόγῳ δεῖ προάγεσθαι διδάσκοντα τὸν ἀγαθὸν πολίτην. Cf. Kühner-Blass, *Gr. Gr.* § 467.

Schanz, *N. C. P.* p. 69, understands ἡλικίαν as referring to 'stature,' and ἐκεῖνος to Cleinias, and quotes Xen. *Conv.* iv. 11-12 as proving the superior beauty of Critobulus, though the passage evidently means the very reverse. For after speaking of his own desire to be thought handsome Critobulus says: 'I take more delight in looking upon Cleinias than in all other beautiful things in the world: and I would choose rather to be blind to all other beautiful things than to him alone. And I am vexed by the night and by sleep, because I do not see him, but most thankful to the day and the sun, because they show me Cleinias again.'

4 σκληφρὸς T, σκληφρος B, 'thin,' 'slender,' 'puny': cf. Hesych. σκληφροί· οἱ ἰσχροὶ καὶ λεπτοὶ τοῖς σώμασιν. Schol. in *Euthyd.* σκληφρὸς ὁ τῷ μὲν χρόνῳ πρεσβύτερος, τῇ δὲ ὥφει νεώτερος δοκῶν.

Προφερὴς δὲ ὁ τῷ μὲν χρόνῳ νεώτερος, τῇ δὲ ὕψει πρεσβύτερος. In B there is a marginal note on σκληφρος· Οὕτω λέγεται καὶ παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλει ὁ ἰσχνὸς καὶ λεπτὸς τὸ σῶμα. Cf. Aristot. *Somn.* iii. 17, *Probl.* i. 30, 14, where σκληφροί is a better reading than Bekker's σκληροί.

καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τὴν ἔψιν, 'of a noble presence': so Plato describes Parmenides, *Parmen.* 127 B. In Xen. *Conviv.* iii. 7, iv. 10, v. 1 Cleinias is represented as especially proud of his acknowledged beauty.

μετέχει BT. Heindorf's conjecture μετείχε, adopted by Stallbaum 8 and Badham, is quite unnecessary. Socrates is referring to the custom of the two brothers, not merely to yesterday's exhibition.

καινοὶ τινες αὐτοὶ, ὥς ἔοικε, σοφισταί. This sentence formerly 9 assigned by Ficinus, Routh, and others to Socrates, is rightly transferred by recent editors to Crito. The conjecture, ὥς ἔοικε, is much more appropriate to Crito than to Socrates, who knew all about the two Sophists. Stallbaum after σοφισταί interpolates Σω. Naί. unnecessarily.

αὐ, 'again,' implies that in Crito's opinion they had already had Sophists enough in Athens.

ἐντεῦθεν ποθεν, i.e. from some part of Greece including the islands. C 2

Θουρίους. Thurii or Thurium was a town of Magna Graecia on 3 the Gulf of Tarentum, deriving its name from a neighbouring fountain Thuria. After the destruction of Sybaris by the people of Crotona an Athenian colony was sent out by Pericles (*circa*. 443 B.C.) to found a new city near the ruins. The history of Sybaris and Thurii is given by Strabo, 263, and more fully by Diodorus Siculus, xii. 9-11.

φεύγοντες. Heindorf's conjecture φυγόντες is unnecessary, as φεύγειν means not only 'to go into exile,' but also 'to be in exile.' Both these meanings are well illustrated by Hdt. vi. 103 Κίμωνα τὸν Στησαγόρεω κατέλαβε φυγεῖν ἐξ Ἀθηνῶν Πεισίστρατον τὸν Ἱπποράτεος· καὶ αὐτῷ φεύγοντι Ὀλυμπιάδα ἀνελεῖσθαι τεθρίππων συνέβη.

ἐκείθεν, i.e. from Thurii. Heindorf points out the error in the 4 statement of Athenaeus xi. 506 ὀνειδίζειν αὐτοῖς (τὸν Πλάτωνα) καὶ τὴν ἐκ Χίου τῆς πατρίδος φυγὴν, ἀφ' ἧς ἐν Θουρίοις κατωκίσθησαν.

περὶ τοῦσδε τοὺς τόπους, i.e. Greece, in distinction from Italy or Magna Graecia.

- 5 ὁ δὲ σὺ ἐρωτᾷς τὴν σοφίαν αὐτοῖν, 'but as to what you ask about their wisdom.' Cf. Xen. *Anab.* v. 5, 20 ὁ δὲ λέγεις βία παρελθόντας σκηνοῦν, vi. 1, 29 ὁ δὲ ὑμεῖς ἐννοεῖτε, ὅτι ἦττον ἂν στείσις εἶη, *Oecon.* c. 15, 6 ὁ δὲ εἶπας ὡς δεῖ μαθεῖν . . . καὶ ἃ δεῖ ποιεῖν, καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὁπότε ἕκαστα, *Hier.* c. 6, 12 ὁ δὲ ἐζήλωσας ἡμᾶς, ὡς τοὺς μὲν φίλους μάλιστα εὖ ποιεῖν δυνάμεθα, *Hellen.* ii. 3, 45 ἃ δ' αὖ εἶπας, ὡς ἐγὼ εἰμι οἷος αἰεὶ ποτε μεταβάλλεσθαι.

In such passages 'the neuter *ὃ*, referring to what follows, stands at the beginning of a proposition, in order to carry back the thoughts to a preceding assertion' (Matth. *Gk. Gr.* 478). Very similar to this is the use of *quod* in Latin: cf. Madvig, *Lat. Gr.* 398, Obs. 2.

τὴν σοφίαν. For the accusative after ἐρωτᾷς cf. *Protag.* 351 E τὴν ἡδονὴν αὐτὴν ἐρωτῶν εἰ οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ἐστίν. *Phileb.* 19 B.

θαυμασία, ᾧ Κρίτων B, Stallbaum, Schanz. This reading is better than any of the variations proposed. The sense is quite clear: 'What is their wisdom? A marvellous wisdom, Crito, they are absolutely all-wise.'

- 6 πάσσοφοι ἀτεχνῶς τῷ γε B, Vind. Cf. Kühner-Blass, *Gr. Gr.* 459. i., who refers to 291 A I Ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε εὖ οἶδα, and *Polit.* 305 C τό γε δὴ κατανοητέον, and adds 'mit durchaus epischer Färbung.' For τῷ γε Bekker and Stallbaum adopt ὡς ἔγωγε T, Ficinus 'equidem,' and regard τῷ γε as an error of transcription arising from the accidental omission of ὡς in ἀτεχνῶς ὡς ἔγωγε, and the subsequent change of EΓ into T.

If the latter reading were adopted, ὡς would have its consecutive sense, 'so that I did not even know before what pancratiasts were.' Cf. Hdt. i. 163, ii. 135; Xen. *Cyr.* v. 4, 11.

But the reading of BV is not to be set aside without absolute necessity. 'Apud Platonem saepius quam apud alios scriptores articulus demonstrativi pronominis munere fungitur' (Schanz, *N. C. P.* p. 79).

ὃ τι εἶεν. On the recent fashion of printing both the pronoun and the conjunction as one word, ὅτι, see Introduction, p. 48.

- 7 παγκρατιασταί. Cf. Schol. in Plat. *Pol.* 338 C παγκρατιαστῆς ὁ παγκράτιον ἀγωνιζόμενος* ἐστὶ δὲ τοῦτο ἀγὼν τις ἐξ ἀτελοῦς πάλης καὶ ἀτελοῦς πυγμῆς συγκείμενος.

οὐ (καθ' ἃ) τῷ Ἀκαρνᾶνε ἐγενέσθην. κατὰ B, Vind. ἐγενέσθην is

omitted in T, and by Schanz and C. F. Hermann (Teubner), and placed by Badham after μάχεσθαι.

But the tense of ἐγενέσθην shows that its subject is τῷ Ἀκαρνᾶνε, not the Sophists, and instead of removing ἐγενέσθην we need only for κατὰ read καθ' α̃. A careful inspection of Codex Clarkianus shows that there has been an erasion after the first α in κατὰ (*sic*). Cf. Xen. *Mem.* iv. 6, 5 ὁ εἰδὼς ἃ ἐστὶ νόμιμα, καθ' ἃ δεῖ πως ἀλλήλοις χρῆσθαι, νόμιμος ἂν εἴη. *Hellen.* i. 7, 29 αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα, καθ' ἃ καὶ αἱ ἀμαρτίαι δοκοῦσι γεγενῆσθαι.

καὶ μάχη, ἥ πάντων ἔστι κρατεῖν TV, ἔστι om. B : Schanz omits ἥ d 2 and ἔστι, Madvig conjectures μάχη ἥ πάντων κρατεῖ, Badham and Burnet omit the whole clause. Ficinus follows the text of TV : 'hi vero corpore primum pugnare maxime possunt, et eo genere pugnae quo omnia (omnes?) superantur.' Heindorf, rightly retaining the text of TV, explains it as follows : 'Pugnae genere, quod verum est παγκράτιον. Spectant haec liquido ad superiora illa ὅτι εἶναι οἱ παγκρατιάσται.' But the real meaning of the clause is most clearly shown by what immediately follows, ἐν ὅπλοις γὰρ . . . μάχεσθαι. The art of fighting in armour with the real weapons of war was the perfection of military training, as described by Nicias, *Lach.* 181 E, 'he who understands this art could certainly not be hurt at all by any single assailant, perhaps not even by many, but in every way would thus have an advantage.' In *Gorg.* 456 D ἔμαθέ τις πυκτεύειν τε καὶ παγκρατιάζειν καὶ ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι, ὥστε κρείττων εἶναι καὶ φίλων καὶ ἐχθρῶν, the most important art is named last. Cf. *Legg.* 813 E, 833 E.

καὶ ἀγωνίσασθαι. Schanz omits καὶ without sufficient reason : in 272 ἀγωνίσασθαι there is an allusion to speaking in person, which is here a 2 contrasted with teaching others.

συγγράφεισθαι λόγους, 'to get speeches composed.' Cf. Quintil. 3 *Inst. Orat.* ii. 15 'Socrates inhonestam sibi credidit orationem quam ei Lysias reo composuerat ; et tum maxime scribere litigatoribus quae illi pro se ipso dicerent erat moris, atque ita iuri quo non licebat pro altero agere fraus adhibebatur.'

παγκρατιαστικῇ τέχνῃ. 'Vellem, interiecto articulo, τῇ παγκρα- 5 τιαστικῇ τέχνῃ' (Heindorf). The article would be out of place, or at least, unnecessary, as 'pancratiastic art' is not here limited to the well-known bodily exercise.

- 6 ἀργός. Cf. Eur. *Phoen.* 766 ἐν δ' ἐστὶν ἡμῖν ἀργόν. Schol. ἀργόν· ἄ-ρακτον καὶ παραλελειμμένον, ὀφείλον γενέσθαι καὶ μὴ γενόμενον (Heindorf).
- 7 μῆδ' ἀντάραι. Cf. Demosth. 24 Λακεδαιμονίοις μὲν ποτε, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαίων ἀντήρατε. Thuc. iii. 32; Xen. *Cyr.* v. 4, 25.
- 8 ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μάχεσθαι, an allusion to ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι, 'to fight in their armour of words.'
- b 2 παραδοῦναι ἑμαυτόν, 'to give myself over as a pupil.' Cf. 285 c παραδίδωμι ἑμαυτὸν Διονυσιοδώρῳ τούτῳ. *Legg.* vii. 811 E τοὺς νέους αὐτοῖς παραδίδόναι διδάσκειν τε καὶ παιδεύειν.
- 7 ἔχων T, ἔχω B; cf. 285 E ἀκούω B (Schanz).
- 8 παραμύθιον τοῦ μὴ φοβεῖσθαι. The article with the infinitive expresses the purpose or effect of the παραμύθιον. Cf. Aesch. *Prom.* V. 243 ἐξελευσάμην βροτοὺς τοῦ μὴ διαρραισθέντας εἰς Ἄιδου μολεῖν. See Hermann on Viger, *De Idiot. Gr.* not. 271. Paley's suggestion that in τοῦ μὴ two constructions are mixed, τὸ μὴ for ὥστε μὴ, and τοῦ μολεῖν is unnecessary.
- 9 τῆς σοφίας ἧς ἔγωγε ἐπιθυμῶ, τῆς ἐριστικῆς. Diogenes Laertius in his life of Protagoras (ix. 55) names first in a list of the works of Protagoras then extant Τεχνὴ ἐριστικῶν. In Plato the word ἐριστικός first appears in *Lys.* 211 B ἀλλὰ ὅρα ὅπως ἐπικουρήσεις μοι, εἴάν με ἐλέγχειν ἐπιχειρήῃ ὁ Μενέξενος· ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι ἐριστικός ἐστιν; In the *Meno*, 80 E, the argument that a man cannot inquire about that which he knows, or about that which he does not know, is termed an ἐριστικός λόγος, and contrasted with the doctrine that the soul is immortal and knows all things by reminiscence: 'and therefore we must not believe this ἐριστικῷ λόγῳ for it would make us idle, and is sweet to the ear of the feeble.' Cf. *Meno* 75 C, *Soph.* 225 D.
- In Aristot. *Soph. El.* xi we find the following definition: 'Eristice is illegitimate fighting in disputation. The competitor who is bent on victory at all hazards sticks at no artifice; no more does the eristic reasoner. If victory is his final motive, he is called contentious and eristic (ἐριστικοὶ καὶ φιλέριδες); if professional reputation and lucre, sophistic. For Sophistic is, as I said before, a money-making art' (Poste).
- c 1 αὖ B, αὐτός T. αὖ has its usual sense 'again,' for Socrates adds that he had already brought disgrace upon one of his teachers.

περιάψω, 'hoc proprie adhibetur de infamia vel labe, qua quem 2 aspergimus' (Heindorf). Cf. Lysias 164, 1 εἰ σωθεὶς αἰσχροῦς ὀνειδῇ καὶ ἔμαντῶ καὶ ἐκείνοις περιάψω.

Κόννη τῷ Μητροβίου. Cf. 295 D, *Menex.* 235 E. On the supposed identity of Κόννος with Κοινῆς, who gave the name to a comedy of Ameipsias, see the long dissertation of Winckelmann, *Prolegomena*, cap. viii.

τῷ κιθαριστῇ . . . κιθαρίζειν. Badham proposed to omit the former, and Schanz the latter, but without authority or necessity. On the affinity of music to philosophy cf. *Lach.* 188 D καὶ κομιδῇ μοι δοκεῖ μουσικὸς ὁ τοιοῦτος εἶναι ἁρμονίαν καλλίστην ἡρμωσμένος οὐ λύραν οὐδὲ παιδιᾶς ὄργανα, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ζῆν ἡρμωσμένος. Athen. 632 C Κάμοι δὲ διὰ τοῦτο φαίνεται φιλοσοφητέον εἶναι περὶ μουσικῆς. Καὶ γὰρ Πυθαγόρας ὁ Σάμιος, τηλικαύτην δόξαν ἔχων ἐπὶ φιλοσοφία καταφανὲς ἐστὶν ἐκ πολλῶν οὐ παρέργως ἀψάμενος μουσικῆς . . . τὸ δὲ ὅλον ἔοικεν ἢ παλαιὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων σοφία τῇ μουσικῇ μάλιστα εἶναι δεδομένη . . . καὶ πάντας τοὺς χρωμένους τῇ τέχνῃ ταύτῃ σοφιστὰς ἀπεκάλουν, ὥσπερ καὶ Αἰσχύλος ἐποίησεν 'Εἶτ' οὖν σοφιστὴς καλὰ παραπαίων χέλυν.'

οἱ συμφοιτηταί μου ἐμοῦ τε . . . BT. Badham omits μου, for 4 which Stallbaum and Schanz adopt μοι from Vindob. But it is not likely that μοι, if original, would be changed into μου immediately before ἐμοῦ. There is not the same reason for μοι here as in συμμαθητάς μοι φοιτᾶν below. In B there is a light stroke, seemingly meant for a comma, between μου, and ἐμοῦ.

ἴσως φοβούμενοι τάχα. 'Obvius hic apud Atticos pleonasmus in 6 Platone quidem frequentissimus est. ἴσως τάχ' ἂν *Tim.* 38 E, *Legg.* iii. 676 C, 686 D, *Apol.* 31 A' (Heind.).

καὶ σὺ τί οὐ συμφοιτᾷς; ὥς Winckelmann. The objection to the d 1 reading of the best MSS. καὶ σὺ τί που συμφοίτα' ἴσως BT is that πού seems never to be joined with an imperative.

ἄξομεν T et ^aἐξομεν Vind., ἔξομεν B. 'And as a bait for them we 2 will take with us your sons.'

νείας. 'The late accusative singular νεία, reprehended by Phrynichus, with its consort νείας, has not found its way into any Attic text' (Rutherford, *N. Phryn.* 143). Cf. Kühner-Blass, i. § 138 Anmerk. 3: Schanz, *Plat. Legg.* Praef. p. viii. § 5 'P. Foucart hanc observationem ex inscriptionibus Atticis elicit (*Revue de Philologie*, i. 35): une série d'exemples, depuis le

cinquième siècle jusqu'au deuxième avant notre ère, montre que, au moins en prose, les Athéniens employaient toujours la forme *ύός*.' Schanz adds: 'In Clarkiano huius scripturae, quod sciam, nullum

est vestigium; in Parisino omnibus fere locis *ύός* reperitur.' The Codex Clarkianus being our best authority in the *Euthydemus*, which is not contained in the Parisinus, I have not taken upon myself to rewrite our chief MS. in respect of this word.

6 ὅ τι καὶ μαθησόμεθα, 'what it is we are going to learn.' On the force of καὶ see Riddell, *Plat. Apol.* 176.

7 οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις ἀκούων, 'iam iam audies.' The ordinary explanation, 'you cannot hear it too soon,' is far better than Hermann's elaborate and confusing note on Viger, *De Idiotismis Gr.* 320. Cf. Kühner-Jelf, § 694, Obs. 2.

E I κατὰ θεὸν γὰρ τινα. Cf. *Plat. Legg.* iii. 682 A κατὰ θεὸν πως εἰρημένα καὶ κατὰ φύσιν. The phrase is generally used in a favourable sense, 'by some good providence,' but sometimes in a bad sense, as in *Eur. Iph. in Aul.* 411 Ἑλλὰς δὲ σὺν σοὶ κατὰ θεὸν νοσεῖ τινα, 'according to the will of some god.'

3 ἀναστῆναι, 'to rise up and go away.' Cf. *Plat. Protag.* 311 A ἀναστάντες εἰς τὴν αὐλὴν περιϋμνεν. *Phaed.* 116 A ἀνίστατο εἰς οἴκημά τι ὥς λουσόμενος.

τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον. Cf. *Phaedr.* 242 B. In the *Apologia* 31 D Socrates describes this as a divine intimation which had come to him ever since he was a child (θεῶν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον . . . ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον): he calls it a voice which only came to forbid something that he was about to do, but never commanded him to do anything. It was no kind of personal being, no 'genius familiaris,' nor any 'strange god,' as Meletus had misrepresented it in his indictment, but a sudden and spontaneous impression and conviction, which Socrates regarded as a divine intimation. This was usually prohibitive according to Plato, as here, forbidding him to move: but according to Xenophon, *Mem.* i. 1, 4, it was positive as well as negative, bidding as well as forbidding. For fuller accounts see Zeller, *Socrates* 82; Riddell, *Plato's Apology of Socrates*, Appendix A; Xen. *Mem.* Kühner, *Proleg.* 22; Plutarch. *Mor.* 575, *De Genio Socratis*; W. Pater, *Plato* 78; Montaigne, *Of Prognostications*: 'The Daemon of Socrates, &c.'

μαθηταί. By placing this immediately before ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν Badham 273 makes the connexion more evident. a 2

καὶ ἄλλοι μαθηταὶ ἅμα αὖ πολλοὶ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν. αὖ is found in B, but omitted in T Vind., and altered by Schanz to αὐτοῖν. If retained it may be rendered 'besides' or 'also,' as in *Protag.* 323 A τόδε αὖ λαβὲ τεκμήριον, 326 A οἱ τ' αὖ κιθαρισταί. Badham places μαθηταί immediately before ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν, in order to make the connexion clearer, 'disciples as it seemed to me.' Without this transposition Ficinus gives the same sense: 'et alii multi cum illis, qui illorum mihi discipuli videbantur.' Schanz supposes that ξένοι or some such word has dropped out before ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν. There is probably some error in the text of B, for αὖ seems to be superfluous after καὶ ἄλλοι μαθηταὶ ἅμα, 'and disciples besides with them.' On αὖ and other 'expletives' see Jannaris 1700 (1).

εἰσελθόντες δὲ περιεπατείτην BT, εἰσελθόντε π. Vind. 'probavit 3 Cobet' (Schanz). The dual and plural are so frequently interchanged in the context that it is hardly necessary to alter the reading of BT.

δρόμῳ. Cf. Ruhnck. *Tim. Lex.* Δρόμοι sunt loca cursibus destinata, sive ambulacra publica. *Theaet.* 15 B ἄρτι γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἔξω δρόμῳ ἠλείφοντο. Ubi Scholiastes: τόποι τινὲς ἦσαν, ὁ μὲν ἐκτὸς ἄστεος, ὁ δὲ ἐντὸς, ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς τελουμένων ὑπὸ τῶν νέων Δρόμοι καλούμενοι. Cf. *Phaedr.* 227 A κατὰ τὰς ὁδοὺς ποιοῦμαι τοὺς περιπάτους· φησὶ γὰρ ἀκοπωτέρους εἶναι τῶν ἐν τοῖς δρόμοις.

οὕπῳ . . . περιεληλυθότε ἦσθην, καὶ εἰσέρχεται. On this use of καὶ 4 after a definition of time, so frequent in the New Testament, cf. 277 B οὕπῳ . . . ταῦτα εἶρητο . . . καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος . . . Thuc. i. 50 Ἦδη δὲ ἦν ὅψε καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἐξαπίνης πρύμναν ἐκρούοντο. Xen. *Cyr.* ii. 1, 10 σχεδὸν τε ἔτοιμα ἦν καὶ τῶν Περσῶν οἱ ὁμότιμοι παρήσαν. *Anab.* i. 2, 18.

πολλοὶ τε [καὶ] ἄλλοι καὶ Κτήσιππος. Cf. Schanz, *Nov. Com. Plat.* 6 p. 56 'quod coniectando invenimus, optimo libro Clarkiano confirmatum vidimus, qui καὶ omisit.'

Παιανιεύς. Paeania was a borough (δῆμος) of the tribe Pandionis. 7 Demosthenes belonged to Paeania.

ὅσον μὴ ὕβριστής [δὲ] διὰ τὸ νέος εἶναι BT. Winckelmann omits 8 δέ as an error caused by διὰ following, and compares 301 B Ἦδη δὲ τοῖν ἀνδροῖν τὴν σοφίαν ἐπεχείρουν μιμεῖσθαι, where for δέ cod. B has

διά. ὅσον μὴ ὑβριστής quite literally means 'as far as he was not boisterous,' i.e. 'except that he was boisterous.' The construction is the same as in *Phaed.* 64 D καθ' ὅσον μὴ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη μετέχειν αὐτῶν, 'except so far as it is absolutely necessary to have to do with them': *ibid.* 83 A πείθουσα δὲ ἐκ τούτων μὲν ἀναχωρεῖν ὅσον μὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς χρησθαι. *Plut. Timol.* iii. πρῶτος διαφερόντως ὅσα μὴ σφόδρα μισοτύραννος εἶναι.

b 1 ἀπὸ τῆς εἰσόδου, 'having from the entrance caught sight of me sitting alone.'

4 ἐπιστάντε διελεγίσθην, 'stopped short and began to talk to each other.' Cf. 172 A καὶ γὰρ ἐπιστὰς περιέμεινα. *Symph.* 212 D ἐπιστήναι ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας.

ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην ἀποβλέποντε, sc. ὄψιν, 'glancing now and then.' 'Usitatus fuisset ἄλλη καὶ ἄλλη' (Heind.); but that would have meant 'this way and that,' which is not the meaning here.

6 ἰόντε, 'they came and sat down, one of them, Euthydemus, beside the youth, and the other beside myself on the left.'

7 Εὐθύδημος B, ὁ Εὐθύδημος T. Schanz adopts the article in his edition, 1880, though he had shown in the *Novae Commentationes Platonicae*, p. 64, that it is often omitted even in a renewed mention of the name as in 289 E, 294 C, 297 B, D, and elsewhere frequently.

παρ' αὐτὸν ἐμέ. Winckelmann reads παρ' αὐτὸν ἐμέ, and for the position of αὐτὸν between a preposition and its case refers to *Pol.* 371 D τοῖς δὲ ἀντὶ αὐτὸν ἀργυρίου διαλλάττειν: *Politic.* 302 D ἐκ δ' αὐτῶν μὴ πολλῶν ἐκ δ' αὐτῶν πολλῶν: *Phaed.* 71 A ἀπὸ δ' αὐτοῦ ἐτέρου. For τὸν ἐμέ cf. *Theaet.* 166 A γέλωτα δὴ τὸν ἐμέ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπέδειξε. The conjecture though simple and ingenious is unnecessary.

c 2 μέντοι seems to have an explanatory as well as an assertive force, giving a reason why he welcomed them: 'These two gentlemen, you know, Cleinias, are skilled not in trifling things, but in those of great importance.'

6 καὶ ὅσα ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι διδασκλέον. Schanz brackets μάχεσθαι, following Badham, but suggests as a better reading καὶ ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι, omitting both ὅσα and διδασκλέον. There seems to be no need for any alteration in the text of the MSS., 'and all necessary teaching to fight in arms.'

d 1 κατεφρονήθην is the inference which Socrates drew from their looks and laughter: 'I saw that they despised me.'

βλέψαντες εἰς ἀλλήλους B, βλέψαντες^ε εἰς ἀλλήλους^ω T. Cf. Plat. 2 *Phaedr.* 278 B νῶ καταβάντε ἐς τὸ Νυμφῶν, where καταβάντες (Steph.) may be due to the ἐς following. Here, however, βλέψαντες was probably the original reading, corresponding to ἀλλήλους, for ἀλλήλω T² is a very doubtful correction. On the combination of a dual subject with a plural participle see Kühner-Blass, § 368; Jannaris, *Gk. Gr.* 1172; Xen. *Mem.* i. 2, 33 καλέσαντες ὁ τε Κριτίας καὶ ὁ Χαρικλῆς τὸν Σωκράτην τὸν τε νόμον ἐδεικνύτην αὐτῷ.

τὸ ἔργον . . . πάρεργα, 'your work must be something grand, if 5 matters so great as these are your amusements.'

᾽Ω Ζεῦ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. The reading of BT, ἔφην ἦν δ' ἐγώ, may e 1 probably have arisen from a marginal quotation or reminiscence of 294 A ᾽Ω Ζεῦ, ἔφην ἐγώ, since ἔφην in our present passage is an evident gloss or interpretation.

λέγετον πρᾶγμα. Cobet would omit λέγετον without any sufficient reason.

έρμαϊον. Any great good fortune or unexpected gain was 2 attributed to the influence of Hermes. Cf. 295 A, *Symp.* 217 A έρμαϊον ήγησάμην εἶναι καὶ εὐτύχημα ἐμὸν θαυμαστόν. Ruhnke. *Tim. Lex.* 'Ερμαϊον' εύρεμα. Stallb. Plat. *Phaedr.* 107 C 'έρμαϊον interpret Scholiasta est τὸ ἀπροσδόκητον κέρδος' ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς τιθεμένων ἀπαρχῶν, ἃς οἱ ὁδοιπόροι κατεσβίουσι' ταῖτας δὲ τῷ Ἑρμῇ ἀφιερῶουσιν ὡς ὄντι καὶ τούτῳ ἐνὶ τῶν ἐνοδίων θεῶν.' Preller, *Gr. Myth.* 403.

τοῦτο is not to be joined with τὸ πολύ, but is explained by ἐν 3 ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι, 'clever for the most part in this, I mean in fighting in armour.'

ἐπεδημησάτην BV, γρ. T; ἐπεδημέτην T. The imperfect would 5 imply that they were at home in Athens, the aorist that they came to it as visitors. Cf. *Protag.* 310 E ἔτι γὰρ παῖς ἦν ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἐπεδήμησεν.

τοῦτο μέννημαι σφῷ ἐπαγγελλομένῳ. 'Non satis notum est Graecos verbis recordandi participia temporis praesentis adiungere . . . *Charm.* 156 A μέννημαι Κριτία τῷδε συνόντα σε, *Prot.* 359 C μέννησαι, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ταῦτα ἀποκρινόμενος;' (Schanz, *Nov. Com. Plat.* p. 70).

ἴλεω εἶητον, 'be merciful.' Cf. Plat. *Phaedr.* 257 A ἀλλὰ τῶν 6 προτέρων τε συγγνώμην καὶ τῶνδε χάριν ἔχων, εὐμενὴς καὶ ἴλεως τήν

ἑρωτικὴν μοι τέχνην, ἣν ἔδωκας, μίτε ἀφέλῃ μίτε πηρώσης δι' ὀργήν: *ibid.* 'εὐμενὴς καὶ ἱλεως solennis est dictio de diis *volentibus propitiisque*' (Heind.).

274 ἐλέγετον BT, 'sed *ἐ in ras. additum videtur* in B' (Schanz).

a 2 'Videte utrum vera loquamini' (Ficinus). Stallbaum sees no reason to alter the reading of the MSS.

7 μέγαν βασιλέα. As every one knew who the 'Great King' was the article was unnecessary, as in the case of a proper name. Cf. Xen. *Mem.* iii. 5, 26 ἐν τῇ βασιλείῳ χώρῃ: *ibid. Conv.* iii. 13 τὰ βασιλείῳ χρήματα.

b 2 ὅτι μὲν B, ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν T. That ἀλλά is an unnecessary addition is shown by Schanz, *N. C. P.* p. 63, quoting *Pol.* 412 B, *Phaed.* 87 A.

οἱ μὴ ἔχοντες. 'Intell. αὐτῇν' (Stallbaum): i. e. 'the unwise will wish to learn of you'; a rather sarcastic compliment.

3 ἐγγυῶμαι. The active voice means 'to give a pledge,' the middle 'I pledge myself,' that is 'I make myself an ἐγγυητής or bail.' Cf. *Protag.* 336 D ἐπεὶ Σωκράτῃ γε ἐγὼ ἐγγυῶμαι μὴ ἐπιλήσασθαι.

7 κάμοι δοκεῖν ὥς. Badham rightly argues that ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν BT refers to ἐπεσκότει, not to ἔτυχε καθεζόμενος, which was not a matter of opinion but of evident fact. He therefore reads κάμοι δοκεῖν ὥς, or ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖν ὥς, either of which is preferable to the awkward conjecture of Schanz πόρρω καθεζόμενος τοῦ Κλεινίου ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν ὥσθ' ὥς.

c 1 ἱεσκότει. The verb seems to be used by Plato only here, but is not uncommon in the Orators and Polybius, and occurs also in Aristot. *Rhet.* i. 1, 7 ἐπισκοτεῖν τῇ κρίσει τὸ ἴδιον ἢ δὴ ἡ λυπηρόν.

d 2 αὐτῷ Bt, αὐτῷ T. Here T has been corrected, probably from B.

6 ἐπιδείξατον BV, ἐπιδείξασθον T. The reading of B is retained by Winckelmann, Stallbaum, Badham, and Schanz, and justified by 274 A ὥς ἐπιδείξοντε καὶ διδάξοντε, and the many passages of Plato quoted by Winckelmann. As the exhibition is to be made at the request of others, not for their own sake, the active is the right voice, not the middle as in 278 C 4.

τὰ μὲν οὖν πλείστα, 'the main part.'

e 2 τὸ πρᾶγμα τὴν ἀρετὴν. Hirschig and Badham would omit τὸ πρᾶγμα, and Cobet τὴν ἀρετὴν, changing αὐτῆς into αὐτοῦ. Possibly τὸ πρᾶγμα is a marginal gloss intended to explain the use of μαθητόν as a predicate of τὴν ἀρετὴν. Cf. Plutarch, *Mor.* 439 Ὅτι διδασκόν

ἡ ἀρετή. Schanz however (*N. C. P.* p. 70) defends τὸ πρᾶγμα, referring to *Prot.* 327 A τοῦτου τοῦ πράγματος τῆς ἀρετῆς. See also Jann. *Gk. Gr.* 1178^b.

φέρει, like *age* in Latin, is often found before a question, as if 3 pressing for an immediate answer: 'Come, tell me.' Cf. Plat. *Gorg.* 514 D φέρε πρὸς θεῶν, αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης πῶς ἔχει τὸ σῶμα πρὸς ὑγίειαν; *Legg.* i. 633 C τὴν ἀνδρείαν δὲ φέρε τί θῶμεν; Aristoph. *Thesmoph.* 788 φέρε δὴ νυν, | εἰ κακὸν ἔσμεν, τί γαμεῖθ' ὑμεῖς;

ἄλλης B², ἄλλως BT: the correction in B was probably made by 5 Arethas.

ἂν προτρέψαιτε. Winckelmann retains the reading of BT, προ- 275 τρέψετε, but the future indicative with ἂν is, to say the least, so a 1 unusual that προτρέψαιτε is certainly to be preferred. Schanz refers to 278 C 4, where there is a similar variation between ἐνδείξασθον B, ἐνδείξαισθον T, and ἐνδείξασθον Vind. i.

υῖός. Schanz and Burnett read υῖός, without any remark. Cf. 10 Zonaras, 1763, ap. Lobeck. *Phryn.* 40 'Υός, ἄνευ τοῦ ι, Ἀττικοί. Rutherford, *New Phryn.* 143: 'It is probable that throughout the Attic period the iota was never written. At all events Herwerden (*Lapid. de Dial. Att. Test.* pp. 11, 12) distinctly states that in no Attic inscription of a good age does any form but υῖός appear except in verse, and even in that case υῖός, υῖεῖς, &c. are sometimes found. . . . The reason for the prevalence of υῖός, υῖεός, &c. in the manuscripts of Attic writers is not far to seek. Those forms gradually took the place of υῖός, υῖεός, &c., in stone records after the time of Alexander.' In Homer, *Il.* vi. 130, xvii. 575, 590, iv. 473, v. 612, vii. 47, where the word is printed with a diphthong, a *short syllable is required*. See 272 D 2, note.

αὐτανέψιος, 'own cousin': see 271 B 1, note. Cf. Eur. *Heracleid.* 987 ἦδη γε σοὶ μὲν αὐτανέψιος γεγώς. Aesch. *Suppl.* 933, 984.

περὶ αὐτῷ B, περὶ αὐτοῦ T. Both constructions occur frequently, b 2 the dative chiefly in cases of *fearing for* or the contrary. Cf. Thuc. i. 60 δεδιότες περὶ τῷ χωρίῳ. *Phaed.* 114 D θαρρεῖν χρή περὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ψυχῇ.

εἰ μὴ τι διαφέρει ὑμῖν. The same phrase occurs in Plat. *Lach.* 187 D 5 εἰ οὖν ὑμῖν μὴ τι διαφέρει.

ἄμα ἀνδρείως τε καὶ θαρραλέως. Badham objects to ἄμα: 'Absurde 8 praeponitur ἄμα duabus rebus tam similibus quam sunt ἀνδρεία et

θάρρος.' Schanz, *N. C. P.* p. 71 replies: 'At ἄμα non pertinet ad ἀνδρείως καὶ θαρραλέως, sed ad ἔφη,' i. e. 'No sooner had I spoken than Euthydemus said,' &c. But in fact 'bravely' and 'confidently' are not synonymous, and ἔφη is too far from ἄμα to be referred to it by 'hyperbaton.'

C 1 ἀποκρίνεσθαι B, ἀποκρίνασθαι T: cf. C 3 τὸ ἀποκρίνασθαι B, τὸ ἀποκρίνεσθαι T. In both passages B gives the better reading: in dependence on the present εἰν ἐθέλη, indicating a *general* willingness to answer, ἀποκρίνεσθαι alone is right. In C 3 the aorist ἀποκρίνασθαι is rightly used of the answer to be given to a *particular* question: cf. 275 E I ἀπόκριναι ἀνδρείως.

2 Ἀλλὰ μὲν δῆ, 'Why, in truth.' Cf. *Gorg.* 466 B, 471 A, 492 E, 506 B, D.

6 τὸ ἔργον δύνασθαι. Schanz, *ibid.* p. 71, quotes *Xen. Cyr.* ii. 2, 11 τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν θίγειν ὑμέτερον τὸ ἔργον.

ἀναλαβεῖν διεξιόντα, literally 'to recollect in narrating.' Cf. *Plat. Arrol.* 18 D σκιαμαχεῖν ἀπολογούμενον, 'to fight with shadows in defending myself.'

7 διεξιόντα, 'going through in detail': cf. *Plat. Phaed.* 84 C πολλὰς γὰρ δὴ ἔτι ἔχει ὑποψίας καὶ ἀντιλαβὰς, εἴ γε δὴ τις αὐτὰ μέλλει ἱκανῶς διεξιέναι.

σοφίαν ἀμήχανον ὄσην. ἀμήχανον as well as ὄσην agrees with σοφίαν. Cf. *Pol.* ix. 588 A ἀμηχάνῳ δὴ ὅσῳ πλείονι νικήσει, vii. 527 E ἀμηχάνως ὥς εὖ δόξεις λέγειν.

d 1 Μούσας τε καὶ Μνήμην. Cf. *Phaedr.* 237 A Ἄγετε δὴ, ὦ Μοῦσαι, ξύμ μοι λάβεσθε τοῦ μύθου. It is evident that Μνήμη is here not one of the Muses, but their mother, who is more commonly called Μνημοσύνη. *Plat. Theaetet.* 191 D τῆς τῶν Μουσῶν μητρὸς Μνημοσύνης. *Aesch. Prom. V.* 461 μνήμην θ' ἀπάντων μουσομήτορ' ἐργάτιν. Cf. *Paus.* 795 'The sons of Aloeus thought the Muses were three in number, and named them Μελέτη, Μνήμη, and Ἀοιδή.' *Hom. Hymn in Herm.* 429 Μνημοσύνην μὲν πρῶτα θεῶν ἐγέραιρεν ἀοιδῇ | μητέρα Μουσῶων. *Il.* ii. 491 Ὀλυμπίδες Μοῦσαι, Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο | θυγατέρες. *Od.* xxiv. 60 Μοῦσαι δ' ἐννέα πᾶσαι. *Hes. Theog.* 53:

Μοῦσαι Ὀλυμπιάδες, κουραὶ Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο,
τὰς ἐν Πιερίῃ Κρονίδῃ τέκε πατρὶ μιγείσα
Μνημοσύνη.

On the various families of Muses see *Plut. Mor.* 703; *Diod. Sic.* iv. 7; *Cic. De Nat. Deor.* iii. 21.

μεγάλου. 'H. I. idem est quod χαλεποῦ, prorsus ut Latine 5
magna quaestio dicitur pro difficili. *Hipp. Mai.* 287 B οὐ μέγα
 ἐστὶ τὸ ἐρώτημα, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολὺ τούτου χαλεπώτερα ἂν ἀποκρίνασθαι
 ἐγὼ σε διδάξαιμι' (Heindorf). Cic. *Tusc.* i. 4, 23 'magna quae-
 stio est.'

ἐβλεπεν B, 'began to look,' or 'kept looking': ἐνέβλεψεν T, 'cast 6
 a look.'

πάνυ μειδιάσας, 'with a broad smile.'

e 4

ἐξεγένετο. Cf. *Parmen.* 128 E οὐδὲ βουλεύσασθαι ἐξεγένετο. *Isocr.* 8
De Antidos. 312 οὕτως ἂν ἐκγενέσθαι μοι μάλιστα διαλεχθῆναι περὶ
 ἀπάντων ὧν τυγχάνω βουλόμενος.

κιθαριστής. The 'cithara,' 'cittern,' or 'guitar' was very similar 276
 to the lyre, on which see the article *Lyra* in Smith's *Dict. of Gk.* a 5
and R. Antiquities.

γραμματιστής in Herodotus means the scribe or registrar who
 kept the accounts of a treasury (ii. 28, iii. 123), or numbered the
 army of Xerxes (vii. 100): but here it evidently means the 'writing-
 master,' as in 277 A, and *Charm.* 159 C ἐν γραμματιστοῦ τὰ ὅμοια
 γράμματα γράφειν ταχὺ ἢ ἡσυχῇ;

εἰ μὴ σοφοί, ἀμαθεῖς. The Sophist's trick depends wholly upon b 2
 the unfair use of σοφοί and ἀμαθεῖς in two different senses, as
 referring (1) to the wish and ability to learn, (2) to the fact of being
 at present learned or unlearned. The remedy for this fallacy is to
 define the sense in which the terms are used in the present
 question.

Οἱ ἀμαθεῖς ἔρα [σοφοί] μανθάνουσιν B: σοφοί is omitted in T 4
 Vind. If retained, as by Winckelmann and Stallbaum, it must
 be taken proleptically, 'learn to be wise.' But a superfluous idea
 is thus brought into the argument, and σοφοί is better omitted, as
 by most editors.

ὥσπερ ὑπὸ διδασκάλου χορὸς ἀποσημήναντος. Cf. Ps.-Aristot. *De* 6
Mundo vi. 20 καθάπερ δὲ ἐν χορῷ κορυφαίου κατάρξαντος συνεπηχεῖ
 πᾶς ὁ χορὸς ἀνδρῶν κτλ.

ἀνεθορύβησαν, 'cheered.' 'Vox anathorubein propria est de *secunda* 7
admurmuratione. *Isocrat. Panath.* 291 οὐκ ἐθορύβησαν, ὁ ποιεῖν
 εἰώθασιν ἐπὶ τοῖς χαριέντως διελεγμένοις, ἀλλ' ἀνεβόησαν.'

ἐκδεξάμενος, 'took up the discourse,' a metaphor from catching c 2
 a ball or anything passed from hand to hand: cf. 277 B ὥσπερ

σφαῖραν ἐκδεξάμενος τὸν λόγον. 298 A. *Symphos.* 189 A ἐκδεξάμενον οὖν ἔφη εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀριστοφάνη.

3 ἀποστοματίζου. Cf. Ruhnke. *Tim. Lex.* Ἀποστοματίζειν ἀπὸ μνήμης λέγειν. 'Timaeus et ex eo Suidas h. l. (277 A) exponunt *memoriter recitare, ore, non scripto, proferre*. At Pollux ii. 102 Ἀποστοματίζεσθαι δὲ τοὺς παῖδας Πλάτων που λέγει, ἡγουν ὑπὸ τῶν διδασκάλων ἐρωτᾶσθαι τὰ μαθήματα, ὡς ἀπὸ στόματος λέγειν. Polluci consentit vetus Grammaticus apud Suidam: Ἀποστοματίζειν φασὶ τὸν διδάσκαλον, ὅταν κελεύῃ τὸν παῖδα λέγειν ἅττα ἀπὸ στόματος.' In our present passage the former interpretation is to be preferred, for in ἀποστοματίζου ὑμῖν the dative shows that it is the master who speaks ἀπὸ μνήμης and ἀπὸ στόματος. In St. Luke xi. 53, ἀποστοματίζειν αὐτὸν περὶ πλείονων, the other sense is to be preferred, 'to make Him speak off-hand of many things,' as is evident from the accusative αὐτόν, and from what follows, *θηρεῦσαί τι ἐκ τοῦ στόματος αὐτοῦ*.

4 ἐμάνθανον . . . τὰ ἀποστοματιζόμενα. Cf. Aristot. *De Soph. Elench.* iv. 526 εἰσὶ δὲ παρὰ μὲν τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν οἱ τοιοῦτοι τῶν λόγων, οἷον ὅτι μανθάνουσιν οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι τὰ γὰρ ἀποστοματιζόμενα μανθάνουσιν οἱ γραμματικοί τὸ γὰρ μανθάνειν ὁμώνυμον, τό τε ξυνιέναι χρώμενον τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τὸ λαμβάνειν ἐπιστήμην. See Introduction § vi. In this passage οἱ γραμματικοί are of course the pupils, 'those who know their letters,' as in Xen. *Mem.* iv. 2, 20.

7 οὐκ εὖ σύ Burnet: 'οὐκ εὐθύς BT: οὐκ εὖ scripsit Schanz.' This good correction by Schanz is still further improved by Burnet's addition of σύ.

d 1 καὶ πάνν μέγα T Vind. It is of course possible that μέγα, which is omitted in B, may be an interpolation, as Schanz seems to suppose, from 300 D μέγα πάνν ἀνακαγχάσας: on the other hand πάνν ἐγέλασαν is a very questionable phrase, while the constant use of neuter adjectives with γελᾶν, and of μέγα with similar verbs such as λέγειν, βοᾶν, φωνεῖν, ᾄδειν, makes the omission of it here very doubtful.

5 ἡρώτα καί, 'T Vind. ἡρώτα B: seclussit Schanz' (Burnet). It is more likely that καί should have been dropped out in B than ἡρώτα interpolated in T. Vind., and Schanz therefore was not justified in omitting the clause.

ὥσπερ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ὀρχησταί. The dancers in a chorus reversed their course in the strophe and antistrophe, but something more complicated than this is indicated in the next words.

διπλᾷ ἔστρεφε, 'began to give a double twist to his questions on 6 the same point.' Stallbaum refers to Aristoph. *Thesmoph.* 982 ἔξαιμε δὴ προθύμως διπλὴν χάριν χορείας. Cf. Hesych. διπλῇ ὀρχήσεως ἰδως.

μανθάνουσιν ἂ ἐπίστανται ἢ ἂ μὴ ἐπίστανται; The same para- 7 doxical question is brought forward in *Meno* 80 E: 'Do you see what an eristic argument this is that you are importing, that it is forsooth impossible for a man to inquire about either what he knows or what he does not know.' The solution depends on the double meaning of μανθάνω as explained in Arist. *Soph. El.* iv. 526 and 529 μανθάνει νῦν γράμματα, εἴπερ ἐμάνθανεν ἂ ἐπίσταται.

ὕμιν BT Vind. The reading of all the MSS. seems to have e 3 been too hastily rejected in favour of ἡμῖν the conjecture of Stephanus, which is followed by Ficinus. But in the answer of Socrates there is a fine irony involved in καλὸν ὑμῖν ἐφάνη, 'the former question was a fine revelation for you.' For this sense of ἐφάνη, indicating a wonderful or unexpected appearance, cf. 294 A ὦ Ζεῦ, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὥς θανμαστὸν λέγεις καὶ ἀγαθὸν μέγα πεφύκει. *Pol.* 368 D ἔρμαιον ἂν ἐφάνη.

ἔρωτῶμεν ἄφυκτα, 'in all our questions of this kind we leave no 5 escape.'

ἂ οὐκ ἐπίσταιντο. In 276 D, ἂ μὴ ἐπίστανται, there is merely a 9 *supposition* that the learners are ignorant. In the answer there is a definite assertion, which in direct oration would be μανθάνουσιν ἂ οὐκ ἐπίστανται.

οὐκ ἐπίστασαι σὺ γράμματα; The ambiguity of the question is 277 noticed by Aristotle, *Rhet.* ii. 24, 3 τὸν τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐπιστάμενον ὅτι τὸ α ἱ ἔπος οἶδεν τὸ γὰρ ἔπος τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστίν.

ἄρα σὺ (οὐ) μανθάνεις Γ (Coislinianus) Routh, Heindorf: BT omit 6 οὐ. From the antithetical clause ὁ δὲ μὴ ἐπιστάμενος . . . μανθάνει it is evident that both σὺ and οὐ are necessary.

There is a similar confusion in *Phaedr.* 230 C, D, where σὺ (CY) is twice corrupted into οὐ (OY) both in B and T, also in 286 E σὺ δ' ἐκέλευες;

ἢ δ' ὅς. ἔφη B Vind., εἰδώς T. The origin of the corrupt εἰδώς 8 is shown in Routh's ingenious conjecture ἢ δ' ὅς.

ὥσπερ σφαῖραν ἐκδεξάμενος. Cf. Plut. *De Genio Socratis*, ii. 582 F b 4 ὁ δὲ μὴ δεξόμενος ὥσπερ σφαῖραν εὖ φερομένην κατήσχυεν ἀτελῇ

πεσοῦσαν. The game of passing the ball to and fro was called in Latin 'ludere datatim,' Plaut. *Circulio*, ii. 3, 17.

- 6 τὸ μανθάνειν οἶκ' ἐπιστήμην ἐστὶ λαμβάνειν; Cf. 276 C 4 note.
C 2 ἢ οἱ ἂν μὴ ἔχωσιν; Burnet, 'ἔχωσιν huc transp. Badham: post μὴ BT: *secl.* Schanz.' ἔχωσιν is certainly wanted in the question rather than in the answer.

- d 1 ἐπὶ τὸ τρίτον . . . ὥσπερ πάλαισμα. The victory in wrestling was not gained till the third fall. Cf. Aesch. *Eumen.* 586 'Ἐν μὲν τόδ' ἤδη τῶν τριῶν παλαισμάτων. Plat. *Pol.* 583 B, *Phaedr.* 256 B τῶν τριῶν παλαισμάτων τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς Ὀλυμπιακῶν.

καταβαλῶν Heindorf, καταβαλὼν BT, om. Badham, Schanz. καταβαλῶν cannot be omitted unless τὸν νεανίσκον is omitted also (Cobet). If καταβαλὼν is retained it can only mean 'after throwing the youth was once more setting out for the third bout.' But the future is better.

- 2 βαπτιζόμενον. Cf. Plut. *Mor.* 9 B ψυχὴ τοῖς μὲν συμμέτροις αὔξεται πόνοις, τοῖσδ' ὑπερβάλλουσι βαπτίζεται.
5 ἀήθεις T, is much better than ἀληθεῖς B Vind. which Winckelmann tries to defend.
7 τῇ τελετῇ τῶν Κορυβάντων. Cf. Lucian, *De Saltat.* 272 Πρῶτον δέ φασι 'Ρεῖαν ἡσθεῖσαν τῇ τέχνῃ ἐν Φρυγίᾳ μὲν τοὺς Κορύβαντας ἐν Κρήτῃ δὲ τοὺς Κουρήτας ὀρχεῖσθαι κελεῦσαι. Ibid. 277 'Ἐὼ λέγειν ὅτι τελετὴν οὐδὲ μίαν ἀρχαίαν ἔστιν εὐρεῖν ἄνευ ὀρχήσεως. Ibid. σὺν ῥυθμῷ καὶ ὀρχήσει μνείσθαι. Hence the phrase ἐξορχεῖσθαι τὰ μυστήρια. Cf. Eur. *Bacch.* 123; Hor. *Od.* i. 16, 7; Preller, *Gr. Myth.* 656; Lobeck, *Aglaoph.* 640, 1153; Verg. *Aen.* iii. 111; Ov. *Met.* iv. 282; Lucian, *Tragoedo-Podagra* 36:

παραπλήγες δ' ἀμφὶ ῥόπτροις
κελαδοῦσι Κρητὶ ῥυθμῷ
νόμον Κορύβαντες εὐάν.

On the dance of the Corybantes see Smith's *Dict. Class. Antiq.* SALTATIO, 1005 a.

- 9 χορηγία BTV: χορεία t, V marg. As it was the office of the Choregus (χορηγία) to supply a chorus for the dramatist, the use of the word here implies that the Sophists were providing a similar entertainment, and at the same time indicates the dramatic character of the dialogue.

εἰ ἄρα καὶ τετίλεισαι. In this use of εἰ ἄρα there is an

ellipsis of the apodosis: 'as you know, if, that is, you have been initiated.'

τὰ πρῶτα τῶν ἱερῶν, 'the first part of the Sophistic mysteries.' ^{e 2} There is a similar allusion to the greater and lesser mysteries in *Sympos.* 210 A ταῦτα μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐρωτικά ἴσως, ὃ Σώκρατες, κὰν σὺ μνηθεῖς· τὰ δὲ τέλεα καὶ ἐποπτικά, ὧν ἔνεκα καὶ ταῦτ' ἔστιν, εἰάν τις ὀρθῶς μετή, οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ οἷός τ' ἂν εἴησ.

ὥς φησι Πρῶδικος. Cf. *Charm.* 163 D καὶ γὰρ Πρῶδικον μυρία τινὰ 4 ἀκήκοα περὶ ὀνομάτων διαιρῶντος. *Crat.* 384 B εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐγὼ ἤδη ἠκηκόη παρὰ Πρῶδικου τὴν πεντηκονταδράχμον ἐπίδειξιν . . . εἰδέναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος· νῦν δὲ οὐκ ἀκήκοα, ἀλλὰ τὴν δραχμιαίαν. Cf. *Aristot. Rhet.* xiv. 9 Τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἔφη Πρῶδικος, ὅτε νυστάζοιεν οἱ ἀκροαταί, παρεμβάλλειν τῆς πεντηκονταδράχμον αὐτοῖς. *Aristophanes*, before he had learned to appreciate Socrates, contrasts him unfavourably with Prodicus (*Nub.* 361). On the philological works ascribed to Prodicus see *Jann. Gk. Gr.* App. ii. 12, note 1.

ταύτη τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ. Cf. *Aristot. Soph. El.* iv, quoted in the note ^{a 2} 278 on 276 C 4.

ταῦτόν ὄνομα ἐπ' ἀνθρώποις ἐναντίως ἔχουσιν κείμενον. The fallacy ⁶ depending on the equivocal use of words is described by *Aristot. Categ.* i. 1 Ὁμώνυμα λέγεται ὧν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὃ δὲ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος, οἷον ζῶον ὃ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ γεγραμμένον, i.e. ζῶον may mean either a living man, or a picture.

σκολύθρια, 'stools': a word occurring only here in Plato. Cf. ^{b 8} *Ruhnck. Tim. Lex.* Σκολύθρια· ταπεινὰ διφρία παρὰ τοῖς Θεοσάλοις, ἃ τινες θρανία καλοῦσιν.

αὐτοῖν ἵνα μοι BT. Winckelmann regarding the repetition of the c syllable ἱν as a corruption conjectures αὐτοῖν ἃ μοι, and the alteration is adopted by Schanz in opposition to the best MSS. The only change required is to correct the itacism ἀποδώσειν in BT into ἀποδώσιν, as Burnet does with many MSS.

ἐπιδείξασθαι BT, ἐπιδείξεσθαι Steph. Schanz. The change to the 5 future is quite unnecessary; cf. *Hdt.* i. 53 προλέγουσαι Κροίσῳ . . . μεγάλην ἀρχὴν μιν καταλῦσαι. *Plat. Sympos.* 193 D ἐλπιδας παρέχεται . . . ἡμᾶς . . . εὐδαίμονας ποιῆσαι. *Phaed.* 97 B πολλὴ ἐλπίς κτήσασθαι. *Thuc.* v. 22 οὐκ ἔφασαν δέξασθαι. Cf. *Routh* 'ἐπιδείξεσθαι Steph. Edit. veteri relictā lectione sine idonea causa opinor.'

παῖσαι T, παίξαι B, παῖξαι Vt. Cf. *Rutherford, N. Phryn.* p. 91: 6

'The Attic form was doubtless *παίσομαι*, as all forms with *ξ*, like *παίξας* and *πέπαιγμα*, were unquestionably un-Attic, and should be removed, with manuscript authority, from such passages as Plato, *Euthyd.* 278 c.'

νῦν δέ μοι δοκεῖ BT, *νῦν δ', ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ* Heindorf, Bekker, Schanz, *νῦν δέ, μοι δοκεῖ*, Stallbaum, Badham, Burnet. Heindorf's dictum, 'Immo ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ut semper scribitur in hac formula (v. Reitz ad Lucian. *de Astrolog.* 9),' seems to have misled subsequent editors. In Lucian ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκέει is at the beginning of a sentence, where of course the enclitic *μοι* is impossible, and the pronoun in antithesis to *τῶν ἄλλων* is necessarily emphatic. Stallbaum writes 'etiam *μοί* ita in parenthesi collocari nuper a multis est observatum.' It is better to leave the reading of BT unaltered, instead of inserting commas to make *μοι δοκεῖ* into a formal parenthesis: cf. *Menex.* 236 B where all editors agree in writing *ὅτε μοι δοκεῖ συνετίθει*. See the note on 297 C *νεωστί μοι δοκεῖν*.

d 1 *πεπαίσθω* T, 'let there be an end of this sport,' a less discourteous phrase than *πεπαύσθω* B, 'let this be stopped.'

7 *ἀπαντοσχεδιάσαι* V, *ἀπ' αὐτὸ σχεδιάσαι* B, *αὐτοσχεδιάσαι* T. The verb *αὐτοσχεδιάζω* is found both in earlier dialogues, *Euthyphro* 5 A, 16 A, *Apol.* 20, and in later *Crat.* 413 D, *Phaedr.* 236 D, as well as in Thucydides, Xenophon, and Aristotle. The compound with *ἀπό* seems to occur only in this passage, and, for the intensive force of *ἀπό*, may be compared with *ἀπανθαδιζόμενος* *Apol.* 37 A, *ἀπαναισχυνητῆσαι* *ibid.* 31 B, *ἀποτολμάω* *Pol.* 503 B.

e 1 *ἀνάσχεσθον* T: *ἀνάσχετον* B does not give the meaning required.

3 'Ἀρά γε πάντες . . . 289 B is used in an abridged form by Iamblichus, *Protrept.* C 5.

εὖ πράττειν, 'to do well.' 'An ambiguous phrase. In its usual acceptation it would rather mean "faring well" than "acting well." It occurs in the *Gorgias* of Plato, p. 507 C, in a way which seems to contain the transition between these two ideas—*πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τὸν σῶφρονα, ὥσπερ διήλθομεν, δίκαιον ὄντα καὶ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ ὅσιον ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι τελέως, τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς πράττειν ἃ ἂν πράττη, τὸν δ' εὖ πράττοντα μακάριόν τε καὶ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι, τὸν δὲ πονηρὸν καὶ κακῶς πράττοντα ἄθλιον*. Aristotle was at no pains to solve the ambiguity. Cf. *Eth.* vi. 2, 5.' (GRANT, *Aristot. Eth.* i. 4, 2.)

Εἶεν is frequently used, as here, in passing on from one point to 279 another. 'Well then, as to the next point.' Cf. Reisig ad Soph. a 1 *Oed. Col.* 1308 'εἶεν] Hac voce utuntur Graeci in omni genere sermonis, ubi ad alia progrediuntur; atque est plane, ut Grammatici definiunt, συγκατάθεσις μὲν τῶν εἰρημένων, συναφή δὲ πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα.'

σεμνοῦ ἀνδρός, 'the task of a great man.' 'σεμνὸς ἀνὴρ est quem 6 alias dicit οὐ φαῦλον' (Heind.). Cf. 303 C τῶν σεμνῶν δὴ καὶ δοκούντων τι εἶναι.

εὐπορεῖν, 'to be well provided.' Cf. Plat. *Ion* 533 A εὐπορεῖ ὃ τι 7 εἶπη, a passage which shows that εὐρεῖν (T) is an unnecessary change.

τὸ ὑγιαίνειν. Health is rightly put before beauty and riches in 8 Plat. *Legg.* 661 A λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἄριστον μὲν ὑγιαίνειν, δεύτερον δὲ κάλλος, τρίτον δὲ πλοῦτος. Cf. *Meno* 87 E ὑγίεια, φάμεν, καὶ ἰσχύς καὶ κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος δῆ.

τάλλα κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἱκανῶς παρεσκευάσθαι. Cf. Iambl. *Protrept.* b 1 ὥστε ἱκανῶς αὐτὸ παρεσκευάσθαι πρὸς τὴν κατὰ φύσιν συμμετρίαν καὶ κρᾶσιν καὶ ῥώμην.

ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ. Iamblichus completes the phrase by adding πατρίδι. 3 ποῦ χοροῦ. The choir or band of the cardinal virtues, or rather c 1 of goods in general, is incomplete without σοφία. Routh compares Aristeid. *Or. pro Milliad.* ii. 161 Μιλτιάδην δὲ τὸν ἐν Μαραθῶνι ποῦ χοροῦ τάξομεν.

παραλείπωμεν BT: Cobet, followed by Schanz, alters this to παρε- 3 λίσσωμεν. But the subjunctive is rightly retained by Burnet, being defended by Heindorf on the ground that ἐνθυμοῦ expresses anxious care, as in *Hipp. Mai.* 300 D ἐνθυμοῦμαι, ὦ ἑταῖρε, μὴ παύσῃς πρὸς με.

Ὀλίγον . . . ἐγενόμεθα, 'we were near to becoming.' Cf. Plat. *Apol.* 9 22 A ἔδοξάν μοι ὀλίγον δεῖν τοῦ πλείστου ἐνδεεῖς εἶναι: ibid. 17 A ὀλίγον ἔμμαντοῦ ἐπελαθόμεν.

ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν, 'in our former list.' d 2

Ἡ σοφία δῆπου . . . εὐτυχία ἐστίν. The pretence of having for- 6 gotten to include εὐτυχία, and then remembering that it was included in σοφία, is intended to draw especial attention to the contrast between the Socratic doctrine, that virtue consists in wisdom or true knowledge, and the view of the Sophists that it is the result of good fortune, a kind of divine gift, as in the *Meno* 99 C. Cf. *Euthyd.*

280 B σοφίας παρούσης, ᾧ ἂν παρῇ μηδὲν προσδεῖσθαι εὐτυχίας. Bonitz, *Platon. Stud.* 251 note, observes that it is difficult to find (in German, as it is in English) a single word expressing the two meanings of εὐτυχία, an accidental concurrence of favourable circumstances, and success resulting from the agent's judicious choice of means.

7 καὶ παῖς γνοίη. Cf. 301 C I οὐδ' ἂν παῖδα ᾧμην τοῦτο ἀπορῆσαι. *Lys.* 205 C I, *Symph.* 204 B.

καὶ ὅς. Here, as in ἡ δ' ὅς, we see that ὅς was in its original sense demonstrative.

E 1 περὶ αὐλημάτων εὐπραγίαν, 'success in flute-tunes.' 'εὐπραγίαν delendum videtur' (Schanz). On the contrary εὐπραγίαν is most appropriate as carrying on the idea that εὐτυχία is an element in εὖ πράττειν.

280 'Αρ' οὐκ . . . ὅτι, 'Is it not because . . .?' 'Vulgo ἄρ' οὖν.' 'Nusquam vidi οὖν infelicius positum, 'Αρ' οὐκ ex Platónico more reposui: sic enim loqui solet qui alterius responsum ante capit' (Badham). Οὖν has probably been introduced here, because ἄρ' οὖν occurs so frequently in the context immediately following, 280 B (*bis*), D, 281 A, B.

B 1 ἐν κεφαλαίῳ, 'in general,' i.e. as a summary induction from the particular cases mentioned.

2 ᾧ ἂν παρῇ, a good emendation supplied from Casaubon's unpublished notes by Routh: it indicates the subject to be understood before προσδεῖσθαι, which is left without any subject by the reading ὅταν παρῇ BT Vind. 1.

4 πῶς ἂν ἡμῖν ἔχοι, 'how our former agreements would stand,' i.e. how they would be affected by this conclusion about σοφία. Badham's conjecture ἄρ' for ἄν is therefore no improvement.

C 1 ὠφελοῖ, εἰ εἴη Iamblichus: ὠφελοίη η B: ὠφελοῖη εἰ ἦν T. The scribes of B and T both seem to have been misled by glancing back at ὠφελοῖ ἢ εἰ ὠφελοῖ. Iamblichus is, of course, a much earlier witness to the true reading.

2 ποτόν. After σίτια the plural would be more usual, as in *Protag.* 314 A, 334 A, *Phaedr.* 259 C, *Pol.* 332. But Stallbaum retains ποτόν as the reading of all MSS., and Winckelmann quotes in support of it a similar combination in Max. Tyr. *Or.* xxxi. 108 ἐμπιπλάμενοι ποτοῦ καὶ σιτίων.

4 οἱ δημιουργοὶ πάντες. The term δημιουργός, 'one who works for

the people,' includes all who practise any profession, trade, or craft for pay, from physicians to artisans.

δεῖν BT Vind.; δεῖ Iamblichus. I have allowed the reading of d 4 the MSS. to stand, but not without hesitation. It is more likely that δεῖν should have been altered to δεῖ, in order to make the construction regular, than the reverse. Cf. Aesch. *Persae* 188 τούτῳ στάσιν τιν', ὥς ἐγὼ 'δοκοῦν ὀρᾶν, τεύχειν ἐν ἀλλήλαιοι: and Soph. *Trach.* 1238 ἀνὴρ ὅδ', ὥς ἔοικεν, οὐ νεμεῖν ἐμοὶ φθίνοντι μοῖραν. But in these passages the infinitive follows ὥς ἔοικεν, and the passages quoted by Winckelmann, to prove that it may precede, are not altogether convincing. More satisfactory, so far as poetry is concerned, is the passage Aesch. *Pers.* 564 τυτθὰ δ' ἐκφυγεῖν ἄνακτ' αὐτὸν ὥς ἀκούομεν.

ὥς οὐδὲν ὀφελος τῆς κτήσεως γίγνεται, BT. For ὥς Iamblichus 6 has ἥ, *Protrept.* c.v., which has been adopted by Routh, Schanz, and Burnet. Schanz, however, had previously written (*N. C. P.* p. 74): 'Amplecterer ergo Routhii coniecturam (?), ni artis palaeographicae rationem spretam viderem; nam permutationis verborum ἥ et ὥς nullum novi exemplum.' Stallbaum retains ὥς, laying an emphasis on τῆς κτήσεως, as does Ficinus: 'nihil enim *sola* possessio iuvat.' This is justified by the consideration that τῆς κτήσεως here, like τὴν τούτων κτήσιν in D 4, still connotes the negative idea expressed in χρῶτο δὲ αὐτοῖς μὴ and μόνον κεκτηῖσθαι.

'Ἀρ' οὖν . . . οὔτε ἀγαθόν, D 7-281 A I, quoted by Stobaeus, *Florileg.* 7 103, 29.

ἤδη τοῦτο ἱκανόν T, Stob. This is strangely corrupted in B into e 1 the senseless ὁ δὲ τούτῳ καλλίῳ. ἤδη means 'at once,' i. e. 'without anything more,' 'of itself.' Cf. *Gorg.* 486 E εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι . . . ταῦτ' ἤδη ἐστὶν αὐτὰ τὰληθῆ. On the various uses of ἤδη in Plato cf. Lutoslawski, 106, 118.

ἥ καὶ ἐὰν μὴ; BT. καί, omitted by Stobaeus, is necessary to the 4 exact sense, 'an etiam si non recte?' (Ficinus).

καλῶς γε, Stob., a necessary emendation of καλῶς δέ, BTv.

θάτερον, 'harm,' is often used as equivalent to τὸ κακόν, in order 5 to avoid a word of ill omen. Cf. 297 D πλέον ἂν θάτερον ποιήσειεν, 'would do more harm than good.'

ἄλλο τί . . . ἥ ἐπιστήμη; 'is that which effects the right use 281 anything else than knowledge of carpentering?' a 3

- 3 τὸ ἀπεργαζόμενον ὀρθῶς χρῆσθαι. A second τό seems to be required before ὀρθῶς, as in A 5 and A 8; ἀπεργάζομαι is apparently not one of the verbs which are followed by the anarthrous infinitive; cf. Jannaris 2085.
- 4 ἀλλὰ μὴν που καί, 'but surely also in the work pertaining to household furniture.' The whole sentence ἀλλὰ μὴν που . . . Συνέφη is bracketed by Hirschig and Badham, but without apparent reason.
- 6 τὴν χρείαν, 'the use' in the sense of 'usefulness.' Cf. *Gorg.* 480 A τίς ἡ μεγάλη χρεία ἐστὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς;
- 8 τὸ ὀρθῶς πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις χρῆσθαι. Bracketed by Schanz without good reason: for τό Badham would prefer τοῦ, but the accusative rightly represents the area or extent of the verb's action: 'in regard to the right use of all these was it knowledge that leads the way?' Cf. *Soph. Philoct.* 99 τὴν γλῶσσαν, οὐχὶ τᾶργα, πάνθ' ἡγουμένην, 'the tongue in all things takes the lead.'
- b 1 ἦν (ἡ) ἡγουμένη. The article ἡ seems to have been dropped out. Badham supplied it, but omitted ἦν, which is supported by BT.
- 2 οὐ μόνον ἄρα εὐτυχίαν ἀλλὰ καὶ εὐπραγίαν. Cf. *Aristot. Eth. Eud.* vii. 14, 1 'Ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ μόνον ἡ φρόνησις ποιεῖ τὴν εὐπραγίαν καὶ ἀρετὴν, ἀλλὰ φαμεν καὶ τοὺς εὐτυχεῖς εὖ πράττειν ὥς καὶ τῆς εὐτυχίας εὖ ποιούσης εὐπραγίαν καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τῆς ἐπιστήμης, σκεπτέον ἂρ' ἐστὶ φύσει ὁ μὲν εὐτυχὴς ὁ δ' ἀτυχὴς, ἡ οὐ; On this passage Zeller, *Plato* 51, n. 13 writes: 'Eudemus, *Eth. Eud.* vii. 14 (1247 b 15) must refer to the *Euthydemus* (279 D sq., 281 B), inasmuch as what is here quoted as Socratic is to be found there and there only.' *Eth. Eud.* vii. 13, 10 καὶ ὀρθῶς τὸ Σωκρατικόν, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἰσχυρότερον φρονήσεως. 'Ἄλλ' ὅτι ἐπιστήμην ἔφη οὐκ ὀρθόν' ἀρετὴ γάρ ἐστι καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη. Cf. *Plut. Moral.* 440 B οὐκοῦν ἔτι γελοιότερος ὁ μόνον τὴν φρόνησιν μὴ διδακτὴν ἀποφαίνων, ἧς ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν ὄφελος οὐδὲν οὔτε ὄνησις ἐστίν;
- 7 ἡ μάλλον ὀλίγα; The words νοῦν ἔχων, which follow in BT, are omitted by Iamblichus, and rightly rejected by Badham and Schanz. For in the following argument there is no place for an antithesis between νοῦν ἔχων and νοῦν μὴ ἔχων, but only between πολλά and ὀλίγα 'Would a man devoid of understanding be benefited by possessing and by doing many things, or rather (by possessing and by doing) few things?'
- c 2 ἦττον δὲ κακῶς πράττων, 'and doing less ill.' The phrase κακῶς πράττειν may mean either 'to do evil' or 'to do (fare) badly.'

Socrates here falls into the same fallacy as the Sophists by using *πράττων* in two different senses, but the purpose and effect of his argument are totally different. Cf. *Charmid.* 172 A *ἐν πάσῃ πράξει καλῶς καὶ εὖ πράττειν ἀναγκαῖον . . . τοὺς δὲ εὖ πράττοντας εὐδαίμονας εἶναι*. See Heindorf's note on that passage.

Πότερον οὖν ἂν μᾶλλον ἐλάττω κτλ., 'In which case then would a 3 man be more likely to do fewer things, if he were poor or rich?' 'Cave μᾶλλον cum ἐλάττω coniungas, quod fecit Heindorfius' (Stallbaum).

ἔντιμος ἢ ἄτιμος; Cobet would substitute ἐπίτιμος, but Schanz, 5 *N. C. P.* p. 75, rightly argues that ἔντιμος and ἄτιμος are both referred to social as well as legal honour, while ἐπίτιμος is limited to the latter.

ἀνδρεῖος ὦν. The addition [καὶ σώφρων] seems to be inappropriate, 6 and is rejected by Badham and Schanz.

ἐν κεφαλαίῳ κτλ. 'To sum up then, Cleinias,' said I, 'as to all d 2 things which we at first said were good, the argument probably does not turn upon this question, how they are by nature good of themselves alone.' In the beginning of the sentence σύμπαντα is the subject of κινδυνεύει and of an infinitive dependent upon it, such as ταύτῃ σκοπεῖσθαι δεῖν (Stallbaum); but Plato afterwards passes by an anacoluthon to περὶ τούτου ὁ λόγος αὐτοῖς εἶναι, 'a change of construction in consequence of the more convenient form of the continuation' (Engelhardt ap. Lutosl. 76).

πέφυκεν ἀγαθὰ [εἶναι]. There is no objection to the construction 5 πέφυκεν εἶναι, which occurs in *Legg.* 723 D, 870 B, but εἶναι is omitted in B Vind., and apparently added in T from Iamblichus.

μείζω κακὰ εἶναι. The infinitive depends on ᾧδ' ἔχει. Cf. *Phaed.* 6 70 C εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, πάλιν γίνεσθαι ἐκ τῶν ἀποθανόντων τοὺς ζῶντας (Winckelmann).

ὄν. The participle is dependent on συμβαίνει, the effect of which e 3 extends to the whole passage. The same construction is found in *Pol.* 490 C ξυνέβη προσῆκον τούτοις ἀνδρία, and in *Crat.* 422 A, *Menex.* 237 C. The infinitive is, however, more usual, as in *Phaed.* 74 A, 92 B, *Parmen.* 134 A.

τὸ λοιπόν, i.e. the conclusion that remains to be drawn.

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ἐπειδὴ T: ἐπειδὴ δέ B: ἐπειδὴ δὴ Stallbaum's conjecture, which a 1 illustrates the origin of the error in B as a repetition of the last syllable in ἐπειδὴ.

- 2 ἐφάνημεν . . . γιγνόμενοι, 'it was shown that we become.'
- 4 ἐπιστήμη ἢ παρέχουσα. Supply ἐφάνη from ἐφάνημεν. Iamblichus has ἐστίν: Heindorf, Bekker, and Badham without authority add ἦν, 'is, as we said.'
- 5 ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου. The same phrase is found in *Pol.* 499 A, *Legg.* 938 C. The dative is much more usual.
- 6 τοῦτο, used here in its 'prospective' sense, is explained by ὅπως κτλ.
- 7 καὶ παρὰ πατρός γε δήπου τοῦτο οἰόμενον . . . ὑπηρετεῖν. 'And when a man thinks that this is what he ought certainly to receive much rather than money from his father, and from guardians and friends, especially those who profess to love him, whether strangers or citizens, and entreats and beseeches them to impart wisdom,—for this purpose, Cleinias, there is no cause for shame or blame in serving or slaving either for a lover or for any man, and being willing to perform any honourable service from the desire to become wise.'

With this passage Routh compares *Sympos.* 184 C *γενόμεσθαι* κτλ., where the same subject is treated at length in the speech of Pausanias.

- b 6 ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι; . . . Πάνυ μὲν οὖν εὖ κτλ. 'Or do you not think so? Nay, I think you speak quite rightly.'
- c 1 Εἰ ἔστι γε. 'Yes, Cleinias,' said I, 'if at least wisdom can be taught.'
- 4 'Αλλ' ἔμοιγε . . . 'But in my opinion, Socrates, it can be taught.'
- 6 ἀπαλλάξας. 'Pro ἀπαλλάττων' (Heind.). Stallbaum corrects Heindorf's error, showing that the aorist is required to express a single and as it were momentary action, and comparing *Phaed.* 60 C εὖ γ' ἐποίησας ἀναμνήσας με: *Xen. Cyr.* i. 14, 3, and many other passages.
- 8 διδασκὸν δοκεῖ καὶ . . . ποιεῖν. Badham adds εἶναι after δοκεῖ on account of ποιεῖν following. The construction δοκεῖ διδασκόν may be compared with 289 B οὐδὲ ταύτης ἔοικεν ὄφελος οὐδέν, and *Gorg.* 475 E ὁ ἔλεγχος . . . οὐδὲν ἔοικεν. *Tim.* 37 D καθάπερ οὖν αὐτὸ τυγχάνει ζῶον αἰδίων.

The question, εἰ διδασκὸν ἢ ἀρετή, in other words the relation of knowledge to virtue, has been already discussed in several of the early dialogues and especially in the *Protagoras*, where Socrates

begins by denying but ends by affirming that virtue can certainly be taught. Cf. *Protag.* 361 B.

οἷον ἐπιθυμῶ τῶν προτρεπτικῶν λόγων εἶναι. In the reading of BT, d 5 οἷον . . . τῶν προτρεπτικῶν λόγων, τῶν προτρεπτικῶν cannot well stand without a substantive: Routh proposed to read οἷον and λόγων, and this emendation is accepted by Stallbaum, οἷον being regarded as a rather unusual form of attraction, 'my example of what I desire protreptic arguments to be': Schanz prefers the emendation found in Cod. Angelic. C. I. 4, a copy of B, οἷον ἐπιθυμῶ τὸν προτρεπτικὸν λόγον εἶναι. Cobet cuts the knot by omitting the whole clause.

ἰδιωτικὸν ἴσως κτλ., 'unskilful perhaps and long and ill-ex-6 pressed.'

ταῦτὸν τοῦτο τέχνη πρᾶττων ἐπιδειξάτω, 'give us a specimen of 8 treating this same subject according to rules of art.'

τὸ ἐξῆς κτλ., 'show the youth what follows in order from the e 1 point at which I left off.'

ἥν δεῖ λαβόντα εὐδαιμονεῖν, 'which he must acquire in order to be 3 happy.' Cf. 289 C ἥν ἔδει κεκτημένους ἡμᾶς εὐδαίμονας εἶναι. *Pol.* 427 B. In this construction δεῖ properly applies to the notion of λαβόντα, κεκτημένους, &c.

ὥσπερ γὰρ ἔλεγον. Coislin.²: γάρ om. BTV.

τυγχάνει ὃν κτλ. For a full discussion of this use of τυγχάνω 5 with a participle see Rutherford, *N. Phryn.* p. 342, and cf. 290 A 4, *Tim.* 19 A, *Theaet.* 165 C, *Protag.* 313 C ὁ σοφιστὴς τυγχάνει ὦν ἔμπορος τις, 2 Macc. iii. 9.

ᾄψοιντο Heindorf: ᾄψαιντο BTV. Schanz regards ᾄψαιντο as an 283 error in the original archetype. Cf. Xen. *Conv.* iii. 2 ἐξηγοῦ ποίων a 3 λόγων ἀπτόμενοι μάλιστα ἂν ταῦτα ποιοῖμεν.

θαυμασίους . . . θαυμαστόν. Plato seems to use either form in- 7 differently both of things and persons: cf. Riddell, *Digest*, § 314.

κατήρχεν λόγον. The accusative after the active voice of this b 2 verb is unusual in prose: but see Pind. *Nem.* iii. 10 ἄρχε δ' οὐρανοῦ πολυνεφέλα κρέοντι, θύγατερ, δόκιμον ἔμνον. Cf. Kühner-Blass, *Gr. Gr.* § 416, Anmerk 7. After the middle voice the accusative is not uncommon in poetry: Hom. *Od.* iii. 445 χέρνιβά τ' οὐλοχύτας τε κατήρχετο. Eur. *Hec.* 685 κατάρχομαι νόμον βακχεῖον. *Or.* 949 κατάρχομαι στεναγμόν. A poetical construction is not out of place in such a writer as Plato, after a formal invocation of the Muses, 276 D.

- 4 Εἰπέ μοι, with a plural vocative, is found also in *Protag.* 311 D εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκράτης τε καὶ Ἰππόκράτες.
- 8 ὥθητήν ἄρα, 'they supposed, as I thought: ' ἄρα refers to 278 D ταῦτα μὲν οὖν . . . πεπαίσθω τε ὑμῖν καὶ ἴσως ἰκανῶς ἔχει.
- C 4 ἔξαρνος ἔσει ἂ νῦν λέγεις. Cf. *Charm.* 158 C ἐξάρνω εἶναι τὰ ἔρω-
τώμενα.
- 5 Τί οὖν; ἔφη. Schanz's conjecture ἦ οὖν is quite arbitrary and unnecessary.
- 7 οὐκ οὖν φησὶ γέ πω. Stallbaum quotes many instances of the separation of πω from the negative, *Men.* 72 D, 83 E, *Pol.* 434 D &c.
- 8 ἀλαζών, 'untruthful,' one who wanders (ἀλᾶται) from the truth; 'mendax' (Heindorf). Stallbaum, with Ficinus ('iactabundus') and Winckelmann, retains the more usual meaning as explaining why Cleinias does not claim to be σοφός, 'he says at least that he is not yet wise, for he is no braggart.'
- d 2 ὅς μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν. As ὅς is sometimes used in the sense of οἷος, the Sophist prepares to play upon the double meaning. Cf. *Soph. Ajax* 1259 μαθὼν ὅς εἰ φύσιν. *Eur. Suppl.* 737 δρῶμέν τε τοιαῦθ' ἂν σὺν τυγχάνης θέλων. *Plat. Phaedr.* 243 E ἔωσπερ ἂν ᾗς ὅς εἰ.
- 4 ὑπολαβὼν . . . ἔφη, 'took me up and said.'
ἀπολωλέναι, 'to be dead,' or 'destroyed.'
καίτοι πολλοῦ ἂν ἀξιοί κτλ. 'Very precious forsooth must such friends and lovers be!'
- e 2 εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον, ἔφη, ἦν εἰπεῖν, 'if it were not rather a rude thing to say.' The same phrase is used in *Apol.* 32 D.
- 3 Σοὶ εἰς κεφαλὴν, 'In caput tuum istuc recidat,' sc. τὸ ἀπολωλέναι: 'On your head be it.' Cf. *Aristoph. Plut.* 525, 669, *Pax* 1063 H. ὦ μέλειο θνητοὶ καὶ νήπιοι, *Tr.* ἐς κεφαλὴν σοί.
ὅ τι μαθὼν. Cf. 299 A, *Apol.* 36 B τί ἀξιός εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀπο-
τίσαι, ὅ τι μαθὼν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἦγον, 'for having taken it into my head not to lead a quiet life.' As the indirect form of τί μαθὼν the phrase must be written with the pronoun ὅ τι, not with the conjunction ὅτι: cf. Hermann ad Viger, *De Idiot. Gr.* 758. The latter could only be justified if μαθὼν were ever used alone in this sense. Schanz, following Hermann on Viger, *De Idiotism.* 759 sq., wrongly changes μαθὼν into παθὼν. The two phrases are rightly distinguished by L. and Sc., *Lex. manthano*. 'Τί

μαθών; on what *belief* or *persuasion* . . .? implying voluntary action:—τί παθών; on what *compulsion*? or, 'What ailed you to do this or that?'

καταψεύδει . . . ἐξολωλέναι, 'falsely charge me and the rest of us 4 with a thing of which I think it wicked even to speak,—as that I should wish my friend here to be dead.'

Badham omits the latter part of the sentence, ὥς . . . ἐξολωλέναι, but without reason.

οἶόν τε εἶναι ψεύδεσθαι. Cf. *Sophist.* 236 E 'How it is possible to 7 speak anything false or to suppose that it really exists, and to say this without being involved in a contradiction, is difficult in the extreme. Why so? Because the statement has the boldness to assume that Not-being exists. But when we were boys the great Parmenides testified to us from first to last both in prose and in metre in these words—"For this you ne'er can learn that non-existent things exist." The fallacy depends on the ambiguity of the phrase λέγειν τι, meaning properly 'to speak about a thing,' and only improperly 'to speak a thing.' The *words* spoken do exist as words, but are not true unless the *thing* exists, and exists as it is spoken of (Routh). Examples of the fallacy παρ' ἀμφιβολίαν are given in the *Soph. El.* iv. 4 (527), among them δυνατὰ ὁρᾶν and σιγῶντα λέγειν 300 B.

Πότερον λέγοντα, 'by speaking or by not speaking the thing that may be in question?'

οὐκ ἄλλο λέγει τῶν ὄντων, 'he speaks no other existing thing than 284 that very thing which he speaks.' τῶν ὄντων is bracketed by a 2 Badham and Schanz, but rightly retained by Burnet. See the next note.

Ἐν μὴν κακείνῳ γ' ἐστὶν τῶν ὄντων. This καί proves that there has 3 been a previous mention of τῶν ὄντων. 'Moreover that which he speaks is one existing thing, independently of the rest.'

τᾷληθῇ rejected by Badham, so as to leave the statement, 'he 6 that speaks τὸ ὄν speaks also τὰ ὄντα.' But the alteration is unnecessary. The extension of τὸ ὄν into καὶ τὰ ὄντα is justified by the comprehensive phrase περὶ οὗ ἂν ᾗ ὁ λόγος. Ficinus renders rightly: 'Enim vero quicunque quod est quaeve sunt dicit, vera loquitur.'

Ναί, ἔφη· ἄλλ' ὁ ταῦτα λέγων. Ctesippus admits that Diodorus b 1

speaks truth, *if* he speaks that which is; but then immediately adds that this condition is not fulfilled in the present case. Stallbaum argues that $\delta\tau\alpha\upsilon\tau\alpha$ λέγων means Euthydemus, 'the present speaker'; but it is the falsehood of Dionysodorus that is under discussion throughout the argument, as is evident from C 5 ἀλλ' εἴπερ λέγει Διονυσόδωρος, τάληθῇ τε καὶ τὰ ὄντα λέγει.

Plato is referring throughout the passage 283 E 7—284 C 6 to the doctrine of Parmenides, 'Only that which can be can be thought,' as stated in his *Proëm.* 33-40, and more briefly in 43 Χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ' ἐὸν ἔμμεναι, ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι, μὴδὲν δ' οὐκ εἶναι· τὰ σ' ἐγὼ φράζεσθαι ἄνωγα. Cf. Mullach, *Fragmenta Philos. Gr.* i. 118, and Zeller, *Pre-Socr. Philos.* i. 584.

3 Τὰ δὲ μὴ ὄντα κτλ. 'But is it not the fact that non-existing things are not?'

4 Ἄλλο τι κτλ. 'Then non-existing things are nowhere existing?' The whole question and answer, Ἄλλο τι... Οὐδαμοῦ, are omitted by Badham, but only the second ὄντα by Schanz: this ὄντα, however, is supported by the following τὰ μηδαμοῦ ὄντα.

6 (ὥστε καὶ εἶναι). This is Hermann's excellent emendation of various corruptions in the MSS., ὥς γε Κλεινία BV, ὥσγ' ἐκλεινία T, with the marginal conjecture ὥστ' ἐκεῖνα in T Vind. Κλεινία is certainly wrong, for Cleinias is not included among those of whom Ctesippus says in E 3 μου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καταψεύδει. Also ἐκεῖνα is very questionable as a repetition of ταῦτα τὰ μὴ ὄντα, and at all events superfluous, whereas καὶ εἶναι adds much to the force of the passage: 'Is it possible that any one, whosoever he may be, could do anything about these non-existing things so as to make the things that exist nowhere actually to exist?' Badham and Schanz bracket τὰ μὴ ὄντα, as not absolutely necessary. The fallacy employed is that of the equivocal use of words, and, in this instance, of the word λέγειν. He who speaks speaks *about* something cannot properly be said *to speak the thing* ('rem loqui'). The *words* which he utters in speaking have a real existence, but unless the *things* really exist in the mode indicated by the words, these are not true. *Cratyl.* 385 B ὅς ἂν τὰ ὄντα λέγῃ ὡς ἔστιν, ἀληθής· ὅς δ' ἂν ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, ψευδής; Ναί. 'Quod innuit quoque Ctesippus infra' (Routh). Cf. 283 E 7, note.

C 1 εἴπερ πράττουσι, καὶ ποιοῦσι, 'if they do, they also make.' Cf.

Charmid. 163 B οὐ ταῦτόν καλεῖς τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πράττειν; Οὐ μέντοι, ἔφη. Ibid. ποιήσιν πράξεως καὶ ἐργασίας ἄλλο ἐνόμιζεν.

Οὐκ ἄρα τά γε μὴ ὄντ', ἔφη, λέγει οὐδείς. 'No one then, said he, ² speaks what is not; for (in speaking) he would at once make something; and you have admitted that it is impossible for any one to make what is not.' In ποιοῖ γὰρ ἂν ἦδη τί Heindorf would either omit τί or substitute αὐτά, meaning τὰ μὴ ὄντα. Cf. *Sophist.* 238 C οὔτε φθέγξασθαι δυνατόν ὀρθῶς οὔτ' εἰπεῖν οὔτε διανοηθῆναι τὸ μὴ ὂν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἀδιανοήτόν τε καὶ ἄρρητον καὶ ἀφθεγκτον καὶ ἄλογον.

κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον TV: λόγον om. B. 'Huius ellipsis alterum ⁵ exemplum novimus nullum' (Stallb.).

Εἰσὶν μέντοι . . . 'Surely there are. Gentlemen, and those who ^d ¹ speak the truth.'

τοὺς γοῦν ψυχροὺς . . . 'of the frigid they speak frigidly, and call ^e ⁴ them frigid disputants.' Cf. Aristot. *Rhet.* iii. 3, ¹ τὰ ψυχρά, 'faults of taste'; Isocr. *Ad Nicocl.* 21 D εὐρήσεις γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοὺς μὲν σεμννομένους ψυχροὺς ὄντας. Athen. vi. 40 ἀηδὴς καὶ ψυχρός. Cic. *De clar. Orat.* 178 'lentus in dicendo et paene frigidus.'

λοιδορεῖ, 'you are abusive': λοιδορεῖ BT, 'go on with your ⁶ abuse'; but Heindorf's correction has been generally accepted, the middle voice being as usual as the active, and confirmed here by λοιδορεῖσθαι 285 D 5. Cf. *Charm.* 154 A; *Conv.* 213 D.

ἀγριωτέρως . . . ἔχειν BT, 'to be rather savage': ἀγροικότερως V, ²⁸⁵ ^a ² 'rather rude,' perhaps adopted from 283 E 2 ἀγροικότερον.

δέχεσθαι ἃ λέγουσιν, εἰάν ἐθέλωσι διδόναι BT. Badham would read ⁵ δέχεσθαι ἂν ἐθέλωσι διδόνται, so as to express the proverb more neatly. Cf. *Gorg.* 499 C κατὰ τὸν παλαιὸν λόγον τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν, καὶ τοῦτο δέχεσθαι τὸ διδόμενον, 'to make the best of what you have, and accept what is offered.' Hdt. ix. 111 ὡς μάθης τὰ διδόμενα δέκεσθαι.

μὴ ὀνόματι διαφέρεισθαι, 'not to quarrel about a word,' *sc.* ἐξολωλέναι 283 D.

εἶτε καὶ παρ' ἄλλου του ἐμαθέτην. This seems to be one of many ⁸ allusions in the dialogue to Protagoras, who is represented as boasting that those who became his pupils would grow better and better every day (*Protag.* 318 A), and that he knew better than all others how to make men virtuous (ibid. 328 A).

Ϟ1 ὥσπερ ἐν Καρὶ ἐν ἔμοι ἔστω ὁ κίνδυνος. Socrates offers himself as a *vile corpus* for experiment. Cf. *Lach.* 187 B σκοπεῖν χρὴ μὴ οὐκ ἐν τῷ Καρὶ ὑμῖν ὁ κίνδυνος κινδυνεύηται, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς υἷεσι τε καὶ ἐν τοῖς τῶν φίλων παισὶ. The epithet βαρβαροφώνων applied to the Carians by Homer, *Il.* ii. 867 is critically discussed by Strabo 661. The Carians were the first mercenary soldiers, and Carian slaves were numerous: cf. Aristoph. *Aves* 764 εἰ δὲ δοῦλός ἐστι καὶ Κὰρ ὥσπερ Ἑξηκεστίδης, | φυσάτω πάππους παρ' ἡμῖν. There is a still older proverb in Hom. *Il.* ix. 378 ἐχθρὰ δέ μοι τοῦ δῶρα, τίω δέ μιν ἐν καρὸς αἴσῃ. But the quantity of καρὸς forbids our referring it, as the Scholiast does, to the Carians. The meaning is 'pili facio.'

3 ὥσπερ τῇ Μηδείᾳ τῇ Κόλχῳ. The first article is emphatic, 'the famous Medea.' Cf. *Ov. Met.* vii. 164-349, where Medea, after restoring Aeson to youth, persuades the daughters of Pelias to cut their father in pieces and boil him. *Apollod.* i. 9, 27 καὶ τοῦ πιστεῦσαι χάριν κριὸν μελεῖσασα καὶ καθεψήσασα ἐποίησεν ἄρνα. On a vase in the British Museum, found at Canino in Etruria, the ram restored to youth is seen jumping out of the pot: see Murray's *Greek and Roman Antiq.* OLLA. For the form Κόλχῳ compare the Latin 'venena Colcha' (*Hor. Od.* ii. 13, 8), 'Colchus an Assyrius' (*id. Ars Poet.* 118).

5 εἰ δ', ὃ τι βούλεται. Cf. *Alcib.* i. 114 B. *Pol.* 432 A εἰ μὲν βούλει, φρονήσῃ· εἰ δὲ βούλει, ἰσχυῖ, εἰ δέ, καὶ πλήθει. *Sympos.* 212 C εἰ μὲν βούλει, ὥς ἐγκώμιον εἰς Ἑρωτα νόμισον εἰρῆσθαι, εἰ δέ, ὅτι καὶ ὅπη χαίρεις ὀνομάζων, τοῦτο ὀνόμαζε. From these passages it is evident that after εἰ δέ we must understand not μὴ or ἄλλο τι, as proposed by Stephanus and others, but βούλεται. See also *Cratyl.* 407 D; *Legg.* 688 B.

9 δέρειν. Cf. Aristoph. *Nub.* 439:

νῦν οὖν χρήσθων ὃ τι βούλονται·
 τουτὶ τό γ' ἐμὸν σῶμ' αὐτοῖσιν
 παρέχω τύπτειν, πεινῇν, διψῇν,
 αὐχμεῖν, ῥιγῶν, ἄσκον δείρειν.

d 1 ἡ τοῦ Μαρσύου. Cf. *Hdt.* vii. 26 'Here too, in this market-place (Celaenae) is hung up to view the skin of the Silenus Marsyas, which Apollo, as the Phrygian story goes, stripped off and placed there.' *Xen. Anab.* i. 2, 8.

8 ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους; 'Do you argue upon the supposition that there

is such a thing as contradiction?' Aristot. *Top.* i. 11, 4 gives as an example of a paradoxical opinion *ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν, καθάπερ ἔφη Ἀντισθένης*. Cf. *Introd.* p. 15; Zeller, *Plato*, note 94.

Οὐκουν σύ γ' ἄν, ἔφη, ἀποδείξαις πώποτε ἀκούσας κτλ. 'You cer- e 3
tainly, said he, could not prove that you have ever heard,' &c. For the construction of ἀκούσας referring to the subject of ἀποδείξαις cf. Eur. *Orest.* 802 ποῦ γὰρ ὦν δείξω φίλος; *Med.* 548 ἐν τῷδε δείξω πρῶτα μὲν σοφὸς γεγώς. *Bacch.* 47. Plat. *Menex.* 242 E οὔτοι γὰρ ἐνταῦθα ἔδειξαν . . . τοίτους νικῶντες ἰδίᾳ.

'Ἀληθῇ λέγεις, ἔφη. Ctesippus admits that he cannot prove that 5
he has heard: to himself it is proved by his own sense of hearing, but this cannot be demonstrated to another. A principle of wide application: 'No proof can establish the existence of that within a man of which he alone has the final cognisance' (B. F. Westcott). There is no reason therefore for turning ἀληθῇ λέγεις into a question. The sense is vigorously expressed by Jowett: 'Indeed, said Ctesippus; then now you may hear me contradicting Dionysodorus.'

ἀλλὰ ἀκούμεν νῦν εἴ σοι ἀποδείκνυμι T. In B ἀκούω μὲν is probably a mere error of transcription. Stallbaum retains the reading of T, and explains it simply and well: 'But let us hear now whether I prove it to you, while Ctesippus contradicts Dionysodorus.' Badham's conjectural emendation, ἀκούων μὲν νυνὶ σοι ἀποδείκνυμι, 'I am proving to you now that I hear Ctesippus contradicting Dionysodorus,' is very ingenious, and at first sight attractive; but it is open to the same objection that Ctesippus could not prove that he himself heard.

ὑπόσχοις ἂν τούτου λόγον; Cf. *Protag.* 338 D ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἐγὼ 7
ἀποκρίνωμαι ὁπείσ' ἂν οὗτος βούληται ἐρωτᾶν, πάλιν οὗτος ἐμοὶ λόγον ὑποσχέτω ὁμοίως. It is evident from this passage that λόγον ὑπέχειν, like δοῦναι λόγον, means to give a reason in answer to a question, so that 'quaerenti respondere' (Winckelmann) and 'rationem reddere' (Stallbaum) are both implied in the phrase. Cf. *Gorg.* 465 A; Xen. *Mem.* iv. 4, 9; Aristot. *Rhet.* i. 1, 1.

εἰσιν ἐκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων λόγοι; 'Have all things their proper 9
definitions?' Cf. *Legg.* 895 E Ὡς δὲ ψυχὴ τοῦνομα, τίς τούτου λόγος;

Οὐκοῦν ὡς ἔστιν ἕκαστον . . . ; 'Of each therefore as it is, or as it 10
is not?'

- 286 τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὄν οὐδεὶς ἐφάνη λέγων, 'for it was shown that no one speaks that which is not.' This refers to 284 C 2 Οὐκ ἄρα τά γε μὴ ὄντ', ἔφη, λέγει οὐδεὶς.
- 5 <τόν> τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος λόγον ἀμφότεροι λέγοντες, 'if we both gave the definition of the same thing.' <τόν> omitted in BT, but added by Heindorf, is adopted by most subsequent editors, except Stallbaum. The article is required by the previous statement (285 E 9) that each thing has its proper definition. Cf. *Theaet.* 200 B: 'If a man knows both knowledge and ignorance, does he think that one of them which he knows is another which he knows? Or if he knows neither, does he suppose that one which he knows not is another which he knows not? Or if he knows one and not the other, does he think that the one which he knows is the one which he does not know, or that the one which he does not know is the one which he knows.' In a later passage of *Theaet.* 208 C knowledge is declared to be the power of 'Definition by the characteristic difference' (L. Campbell), i.e. λόγον εἰπεῖν, and in the *Euthydemus* this is assumed as already settled.
- 6 λέγοντες V, γνόντες BT. The reading of V corresponds better to τὸν τοῦ πράγματος λόγον, immediately following.
- b 5 ἢ ἐγὼ λέγω . . . 'Or do I describe the thing, and you describe nothing at all?'
- 6 <ἀν> ἀντιλέγοι. In BT ἀν is omitted, probably because of the ἀν- immediately following: ἀν is found in one MS., and is perhaps rightly adopted, though not indispensable, 'the boundary between absolute and hypothetical possibility and hypothetical possibility being naturally uncertain' (Bernhardy, *Gr. Synt.* 411).
- 9 οὐ γάρ τοι ἀλλὰ τοῦτόν γε, 'for in very truth,' more emphatic than οὐ γὰρ ἀλλά. Cf. 305 E 3.
- c 2 οἱ ἀμφὶ Πρωταγόραν. The doctrine of Protagoras based upon the assumption that sensation is knowledge is criticized by Plato, *Theaet.* 152-172. See especially 160 C, D: 'Then my perception is true to me, for it is always inseparable from my own being: and according to Protagoras I am the judge to myself of what is and of what is not to me . . . How then, if I never err (ἀψευδὴς ὢν) and never trip in my conception of things being or becoming, can I fail of knowing that which I perceive? . . . Then you were quite right in affirming that knowledge is only perception, and the meaning

turns out to be the same, whether with Homer and Heracleitus and all that company you say that all is motion and flux, or, with the great sage Protagoras, that man is the measure of all things' (Jowett in part). This theory (well summarized by L. Campbell, n. 16) is then criticized by Socrates. Cf. Diog. L. ix. 8, 51; Sext. Emp. *Hydrotyp.* A 216.

καὶ οἱ ἔτι παλαιότεροι. Cf. *Theaet.* 152 E ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὐδέποτε³ οὐδέν, αἰεὶ δὲ γίγνεται. καὶ περὶ τούτου πάντες ἐξῆς οἱ σοφοὶ πλὴν Παρμενίδου συμφερέσθων, Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς κτλ. *Cratyl.* 429 D Ἄρα ὅτι ψευδῇ λέγειν τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἄρα τοῦτό σοι δύναται ὁ λόγος; συχνοὶ γάρ τινες οἱ λέγοντες, ὦ φίλε Κράτυλε, καὶ νῦν καὶ πάλαι. This mention of Protagoras in connexion with Heracleitus points to the fact noticed by Schleiermacher in his Introduction to the *Theaetetus* (Dobson, p. 91): 'The dialogue begins with showing that the Protagorean denial of a general standard of knowledge and the Heracleitic theory of the flux of all things, and of *Becoming* alone remaining to the exclusion of all *Being*, as well as the principle here tried throughout which sets up Perception, and Perception alone, for knowledge, do all refer to one another, and form one system.' Cf. Pater, *Plato*, p. 100.

ἀνατρέπων καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτόν. When Antisthenes invited Plato to hear⁴ him lecture περὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν, Plato asked how he could write about this doctrine, and showed that it could be turned round and destroyed itself (διδάσκοντος ὅτι περιτρέπεται, Diog. L. iii. 35). Cf. 288 A 4.

ἄλλο τι ψευδῇ λέγειν οὐκ ἔστιν;—τοῦτο γὰρ δύναται ὁ λόγος· ἢ γάρ;⁶ The statement that it is impossible to contradict is here declared by Socrates to be equivalent to saying, 'It is impossible to speak falsehood.' The phrase τοῦτο δύναται ὁ λόγος occurs in *Cratyl.* 429 D, quoted above on C 3.

ψευδῇ λέγειν μὲν Vat. Θ, Bekker, Badham. 'Vulgarem ordinem, ᾧ¹ ψευδῇ μὲν λέγειν, immutandum fuisse nobis plane persuasimus' (Stallbaum).

τὸ ψεύδεσθαι τῶν πραγμάτων, 'the misrepresentation of things.'⁷ The preceding statement concerning ψευδὴς δόξα gives to ψεύδεσθαι a meaning inclusive of false opinion as well as false statement. Stallbaum refers to *Apolog.* 22 D καὶ τούτου μὲν οὐκ ἐψεύσθη: Lysias 156, 2 πολλῶν ἐψεύσθητε τῆς οὐσίας, i. e. 'You were mistaken

about many men's property'; with which compare Antiph. *Or.* v. 134, 40 καθ' ὃ τι δ' ἂν ψευσθῇτε τάληθοῦς, κατὰ τοῦτο ἀπόλλυμαι.

- 11 Λόγου ἔνεκα, *dicis causa*, 'for form's sake.' Cf. *Lach.* 196 C ὁρῶμεν μὴ Νικίας οἶεται τι λέγειν καὶ οὐ λόγου ἔνεκα ταῦτα λέγει. *Crito* 46 D νῦν δὲ κατάδηλος ἄρα ἐγένετο (ὁ λόγος) ὅτι ἄλλως ἔνεκα λόγου ἐλέγετο.

ἵνα δὴ ἄτοπον λέγῃς, 'in order to state a paradox.'

- e 1 'Αλλὰ σύ, ἔφη, ἔλεγξον, 'Nay, it is for you to refute me.'

- 5 Οὐδ' ἄρα ἐκέλευον, ἔφη, ἐγὼ νυνδὴ, ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, ἐξελέγξαι BT. This reading of the best MSS. has been altered very much for the worse by recent editors into Οὐδ' ἄρα ἐκέλευεν, ἔφην ἐγώ, νυνδὴ Διονυσόδωρος ἐξελέγξαι. For the order of the words in BT compare 289 C Οὐκ οἶμαι, ἔφη, ἐγώ, ὁ Κλεινίας ὑπολαβών. Translate therefore: 'Neither then did I,' said Dionysodorus, 'bid you just now to refute me.' νῦν δὴ refers to E 1 'Αλλὰ σύ, ἔφη, ἔλεγξον. See also 287 B 2, 297 A 5, and the examples collected by Riddell, *Digest*, § 288, of 'Clauses intermingled by Hyperbaton.'

- 6 (Σὺ δ' ἐκέλευες;) Σὺ δὲ κελεύεις; Vind. marg., Οὐδὲ κελεύεις B, Vind., om. T, Stallb. On the frequent corruption in B of ου for συ see note on 277 A 6. The question is put by Socrates, who pretends to be confused and in doubt which of the Sophists had bidden him, just as in 290 E 7 he pretends not to remember whether Cleinias or Ctesippus had been speaking. The emphatic position of Σὺ shows that a different person, not Dionysodorus, is now addressed: 'Was it you that were bidding me? For, Euthydemus,' said I, 'I do not at all understand these clever arguments, not even those that are right, but I have only a dull sort of idea.' The imperfect ἐκέλευες is better than κελεύεις, as corresponding to ἐκέλευον in E 5.

- 287 ἄλλο τι οὐδ' ἐξαμαρτάνειν ἔστιν; 'Is it not impossible even to make a mistake?'

- 8 τίνας διδάσκαλοι ἤκετε; Cf. *Theaet.* 161 C: 'For if truth is only sensation, and one man's discernment is as good as another's, and no man has any superior right to determine whether the opinion of any other is true or false, but each man, as we have several times repeated, is to himself the sole judge, and everything that he judges is true and right, why should Protagoras be preferred to the place of wisdom and instruction, and deserve to be well paid, and we

poor ignoramus have to go to him, if each one is the measure of his own wisdom' (Jowett). The same argument stated so summarily in the *Euthydemus* is one of many indications that this dialogue is later than the *Theaetetus*.

οὕτως εἰ Κρόνος; 'Are you such a dotard?' Cf. Aristoph. *Nub.* b 2 929 Οὐχὶ διδάξεις τοῦτον Κρόνος ὦν. Plut. 581 Κρονικαῖς λήμας ὄντως λημώντες. Diog. L. ii. 111 Εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι διακηκούτες Εὐβουλίδου, ἐν οἷς καὶ Ἀπολλώνιος ὁ Κρόνος, οὗ Διόδωρος Ἀμεινίου Ἰασεὺς καὶ αὐτὸς Κρόνος ἐπὶ κλην, περὶ οὗ φησι Καλλιμάχος ἐν ἐπιγράμμασιν

Αὐτὸς ὁ Μῶμος

ἔγραφεν ἐν τοίχοις 'ὁ Κρόνος ἐστὶ σοφός.'

νὺν ἀναμνήσκει . . . νὺν ἀναμνησθήσει. 'Nescio quomodo (haec) 3 inter se possint iungi, putoque interpolationem statuendam esse' (Schanz, *N.C.P.* p. 77). In his text Schanz brackets νὺν ἀναμνησθήσει, but this leaves καὶ εἴ τι πέρυσιν εἶπον in an unusual position.

χαλεποί. The masculine is used as if λόγους had been used instead 6 of λεγομένοις (Baïter), or with it (Heindorf).

τί, Heindorf's conjecture for ὅ τι, is rejected by Stallbaum, who 9 explains the indirect ὅ τι as in 271 A 6; but in the present passage τί is more likely to have been changed into ὅ τι, which occurs here so frequently, than the converse.

ἢ δῆλον ὅτι ὥς. After ὅτι we must mentally repeat λέγεις.

νοεῖ, 'means.' Cf. *Crat.* 407 E τί καὶ νοεῖ τὸ ὄνομα; ἐννοεῖ, the C 1 reading of BT, is apparently not used in this manner: this is the only passage quoted by L. and Sc. νοεῖ and νοοῖ occur immediately below. Cf. Stallbaum.

Οὐκ ἔχω ὅ τι χρῆσθαι T: χρῆσομαι B, which Stallbaum prefers: 2 but as only a single action is in question, and not a continuance in the future, the aorist is to be preferred here, as in 306 D, *Gorg.* 466 A, *Phaed.* 95 A.

'Ἄλλ' ὃ σὺ λέγεις κτλ. 'Nay, but your phrase,' referring to νοεῖ, 3 as is evident from the following discussion in D 7.

τοῦτω <γ' οὐ> πάνυ χαλεπὸν χρῆσθαι, 'with this it is not at all difficult to deal.' The whole clause is omitted by Burnet, leaving the former part of the sentence incomplete and unintelligible. Badham's ingenious conjecture γ' οὐ for τῷ is accepted by Schanz. For τοῦτω τῷ Bekker and Stallbaum adopt the Aldine reading τοῖτο τό, which, like Hermann's τοῦτω τοι, gives an intelligible but less

appropriate meaning: 'It is this phrase of yours (*νοεῖ*) that *is so difficult* to deal with.' Dionysodorus tries to shift the discussion from his own phrase, οὐχ ἔξεις ὅ τι χρῆν, which he finds too much like οὐκ ἐξελέγξεις, to that of Socrates, νοεῖ τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα, which he says 'is *not at all difficult* to deal with,' as he tries to show, D 7.

- d 1 οὐδ' ἄν BT: ἄν is omitted by Badham and Schanz, but defended by Ast, *Lex. Plat.*, and Stallbaum, on the ground that the indicative, present, or future may stand in the same sentence with ἄν, provided that ἄν is not joined with the verb, and does not make the whole sentence conditional, but affects only an accessory word or phrase.

- e 4 εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐξήμαρτον. On this passage Lutoslawski remarks (211): 'To the right belief explained in the *Meno* Plato adds in the *Euthydemus* (284 A, 287 E) his explanation of error and wrong belief, whose existence is proved against the Sophists by the hypothetical method taught in the *Meno*.'

- 288 ἐν ταύτῳ μένιν. Cf. *Phaed.* 86 E ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται ἔτι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὁ
a 3 λόγος εἶναι, 'It appears to me that the argument remains just where it was,' i.e. has made no advance. *Theaet.* 200 A οὐκοῦν μακρὰν περιελθόντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν πρώτην πάρεσμεν ἀπορίαν. *ibid.* C εἰς ταῦτον περιτρέχειν μυριάκις οὐδὲν πλέον ποιοῦντες.

- 4 ὥσπερ τὸ παλαιόν, i.e. in the time of Protagoras and earlier, 286 C 2.

καταβαλὼν πίπτειν. Cf. 286 C 4 τοὺς τε ἄλλους ἀνατρέπων καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτόν.

ὥστε τοῦτο μὴ πάσχειν . . . ἐξηυρῆσθαι. Cf. 303 E 6 ἐξηύρηται ὥστε.

- 8 ὦ ἄνδρες Θούριοι εἴτε Χῖοι. Cf. 271 C 3.

- b 1 εἴθ' ὁπόθεν καὶ ὅπη κτλ., 'or from whatever place and in whatever way you like to be named.'

- 8 τὸν Αἰγύπτιον σοφιστήν. Cf. Hom. *Od.* iv. 385 ἀθάνατος Πρωτεύς Αἰγύπτιος, ὅς τε θαλάσσης πάσης βένθεα οἶδε. Plat. *Phaedr.* 275 B Ὡς Ὁ Σώκρατες, ῥαδίως σὺ Αἰγυπτίους καὶ ὁδοπαοὺς ἂν ἐθέλῃς λόγοις ποιεῖς. A reminiscence of Plato's recent visit to Egypt.

- c 1 Μενέλαον μιμώμεθα. Cf. *Od.* iv. 456:

ἀλλ' ἢ τοι πρῶτιστα λέων γένετ' ἠϋγένης,
αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα δράκων καὶ πάρδαλις ἥδὲ μέγας σῖς·
γίγνετο δ' ὕγρον ὕδωρ καὶ δένδρεον ὑψιπέτηλον.
ἡμεῖς δ' ἀστεμφέως ἔχομεν τετληότι θυμῷ.

ἐκφανήτον ἐφ' ᾧ αὐτὼ σπουδάζετον. Cf. C 5 ἐκφανῆναι, 'to show 2 themselves.' Translate: 'Until they let us see the object about which they are themselves in earnest.' Cf. *Pol.* 497 C δηλός δὲ οὖν εἶ ὅ τι μετὰ τοῦτο ἐρήσει.

οἶμαι γάρ τι αὐτοῖν πάγκαλον φανεῖσθαι, 'for I think that some- 3 thing very splendid in them will appear.' Cf. *Apolog.* 17 A μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν ἐθαύμασα' (Stallb.).

ἐγὼ οὖν μοι δοκῶ. 'I am inclined therefore myself to indicate 5 again the character in which I beseech them to appear.' For ὑφηγήσασθαι Heindorf proposes ὑφηγήσεσθαι, and Schanz changes καί into κἄν, but neither is necessary: 'Vult enim Socrates statim et e vestigio uno aliquo commonstrare exemplo quales sibi illos apparere cupiat: unde recte utitur aoristo, quem etiam libri tumentur omnes' (Stallb.).

ἐάν πως t, πᾶν ὅπως BT: 'Nisi putas critici esse elegantes d 2 lectiones captare recipies quae boni libri tibi praebent' (Schanz, *N. C. P.* p. 78).

συντεταμένον, 'intent': cf. Xen. *Oecon.* ii. 18 γνώμη συντεταμένη ἐπιμελουμένους.

ἡ δὲ φιλοσοφία κτήσις ἐπιστήμης. 'While in the *Protagoras* the 8 word "philosophy" was still used in the meaning of love of wisdom (335 D, 342 D), here we see it defined as acquisition of knowledge (288 D), and the dialectician, who had received his first rules in the *Meno*, becomes the highest judge of every particular knowledge (290 C)' (Lutoslawski, p. 210).

ἄρ' οὐ τοῦτο μὲν ἀπλοῦν; Cf. *Pol.* 545 E ἡ τόδε μὲν ἀπλοῦν; 'absque e 1 ulla exceptione validum' (Ast).

εἰ ἐπισταίμεθα γινώσκειν περιόντες, 'if we knew how to go about 2 and learn.'

ἐξηλέξαμεν, 'we fully proved.' Cf. *Phaedr.* 273 B; Thuc. 5 iii. 64 ἃ δὲ ἡ φύσις αἰεὶ ἐβούλετο, ἐξηλέγχθη ἐς τὸ ἀληθές. But in our present passage the idea of refutation remains, for what is proved is the negative proposition ὅτι οὐδὲν πλέον κτλ. Cf. *Theaet.* 166 C ἐξέλεγον ὥς οὐχὶ ἴδιαι αἰσθήσεις ἐκάστῳ ἡμῶν γίνονται.

τὸ πᾶν ἡμῖν χρυσίον γένοιτο, 'all the gold in the world should 6 become ours.'

ἀνευ τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι τῇ ἀθανασίᾳ χρῆσθαι. Cf. Lutosl. p. 210: 'Plato b 1

is so proud of his acquired certainty of knowledge that he would not give it up even for immortality, if not accompanied by knowledge how to use it (*Euth.* 289 B).'

- 2 *ἔοικεν ὄφελος οὐδέν.* The omission of *εἶναι* is not unusual: cf. *Polit.* 280 B *πάλιν οὖν ἔοικεν ἐπανιτέον.* *Crat.* 424 A *ἥδη ἔοικεν ἐπισκεπτέον.*

- 7 *λυροποιούς δεῖν εἶναι* Heindorf, Badham, Burnet. For *δεῖν* we have *δεινούς* in BT, *δεῖν δεινούς* Heusde, *δεινούς ὄντας* Winckelmann, Schanz. This last reading gives the sense:—'It is far from being the case that, if we are clever lyre-makers, we are also in possession of any such knowledge as this which we are seeking.' Heindorf's reading is simpler: 'It is far from being the case that we ought to be lyre-makers and possessed of any such art as this (lyre-making).' There is, I think, no force in Winckelmann's assumption that such an indefinite phrase as *τοιαύτης τινός* must refer to the same kind of art here as in B 4. On the contrary its reference is determined by the nearer context (*λυροποιούς*), and confirmed by *ἐνταῦθα γάρ* following.

- C 3 *διήρηται δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ περὶ* BV, *δέ* is omitted in T. The omission of the whole clause by Schanz is quite arbitrary and unjustifiable. 'The art which makes the lyre is separate from the art which uses it, but though distinct they refer to the same thing.'

- 6 *Ἀλλὰ πρὸς θεῶν, ἔφην ἐγώ,* 'But seriously, said I.'

- 7 *ἣν ἔδει κεκτημένους κτλ.,* 'which we must acquire in order to be happy.' Cf. 282 E 3 *ἣν δεῖ λαβόντα εὐδαιμονεῖν.*

- 8 *Οὐκ οἶμαι, ἔφη, ἐγώ, ὁ Κλεινίας.* For the like order compare 286 E 5.

- d 2 *λογοποιούς.* Cf. Ammonius, *De Diff. Voc.* *λογογράφος μὲν ἐστὶν ὁ τοὺς δικανικοὺς λόγους γράφων· λογοποιὸς δὲ ὁ λόγους τινὰς καὶ μύθους συντιθείς.* The two meanings are, in fact, common to both words; but *λογογράφος* more frequently means a 'chronicler' or 'prose writer,' as in Thuc. i. 21 *οὔτε ὡς ποιηταὶ ὑμνήκασιν . . . οὔτε ὡς λογογράφοι συνέθεσαν.* The *λογοποιός*, or *λόγων ποιητής*, is distinguished from the *ρήτωρ* who delivered the speech, Isocr. *Adv. Soph.* 17 *τοὺς δὲ καταδεεστέραν τὴν φύσιν ἔχοντας ἀγωνιστὰς μὲν ἀγαθοὺς ἢ λόγων ποιητὰς οὐκ ἂν ἀποτελέσειεν.*

- 4 *ἀλλὰ καὶ . . . ἀδύνατοι* D 5, omitted by Winckelmann and Schanz against the authority of the MSS.

θεσπεσία τις, 'inspired as it were.' So in *Theaet.* 151 B, Prodicus e 4 and others are spoken of as σοφοῖς τε καὶ θεσπεσίους ἀνδράσι.

κήλησίς τε καὶ παραμυθία τυγχάνει οὔσα, 'a charming and soothing.' 290 In *Protag.* 315 A the great Sophist is described as κηλῶν τῇ φωνῇ a 4 ὥσπερ Ὀρφεύς. Cf. *Pol.* 358 B ὥσπερ ὅφιν κηληθῆναι. *Phaedr.* 261 A τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἂν εἴη τέχνη ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων, 271 C Ἐπειδὴ λόγου δύναμις τυγχάνει ψυχαγωγία οὔσα, a passage of which there may be a reminiscence in the use of the same phrase τυγχάνει οὔσα.

ἐμέ οἶμαι ἠύρηκέναι. The personal pronoun marks the antithesis: 9 Cleinias having confessed his ignorance, Socrates exclaims: 'I think I have found it.' Cf. Hom. *Il.* xiii. 269 οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδ' ἐμέ φημι λελασμένον ἔμμεναι ἀλκῆς. *Symp.* 175 C, *Pol.* 400 C.

Οὐδεμία, ἔφη, τῆς θηρευτικῆς αὐτῆς ἐπὶ πλείον ἐστίν. For αὐτῆς, BT, b 7 many changes have been proposed: 'δύναμις Heindorf, ἀπάσης Ast, ἄσκησις Orelli, ἱκανότης Vermehren, αὐτῇ Vahlen: post αὐτῆς supplevit χρεία vel ὠφέλεια Badham, οὐδέν pro οὐδεμία scripsit Thompson ad *Phaedr.* 128' (Schanz). Schanz himself marks αὐτῆς† as corrupt, but Routh, Winckelmann, Stallbaum, and Burnet rightly leave it untouched. Ficinus gives a mere paraphrase: 'Nullus sane venationis opus ulterius porrigit quam,' &c. Routh's translation is much better: 'Nulla pars, inquit, ipsius artis venatoriae latius patet, quam ut,' &c.: but he gives no explanation of the construction, which is in fact quite simple. Οὐδεμία agrees with τέχνη understood from the preceding context: τῆς θηρευτικῆς is a substantive, as in *Polit.* 289 A γεωργικῇ δὲ καὶ θηρευτικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ καὶ ἰατρικῇ καὶ μαγειρικῇ πᾶν ὑποτιθέντες ὀρθότερον ἀποδώσομεν ἢ τῇ πολιτικῇ. Thus αὐτῆς marks the distinction between 'actual' hunting, and the metaphorical hunting of the geometers, astronomers, and dialecticians.

οὐ γὰρ ποιοῦσι τὰ διαγράμματα, 'for they are not the makers of c 2 the geometrical figures.' This is explained by the passage in *Meno* 82 B, where Socrates shows that the uneducated slave has in himself the ideas of the geometrical figures.

τὰ ὄντα ἀνευρίσκουσι, 'they discover the existing realities.' Cf. 3 *Pol.* 527 B τοῦ γὰρ αἰὲ ὄντος ἡ γεωμετρικὴ γνῶσις ἐστίν.

τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς. Lutoslawski, p. 331, argues that 'διαλεκτικὴ 5 meaning metaphysical science (is) never used before Plato, and by

- Plato first in *Rep.* vii, cf. *Phaedr.* 276 E; *διαλεκτικός* meaning, not as in the *Cratylus*, *Euthydemus*, and in Xenophon, one who knows how to ask and answer questions, but the philosopher able to discover unity in the variety of particulars, *Phaedr.* 266 B.' But in this passage τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς must indicate in the higher sense the metaphysicians to whom the geometers hand over their hypotheses to be traced up to first principles. In the full description of Plato's 'dialectic' *Pol.* 531 B-536 B compare with our present passage especially 533 B, C: 'And the remaining arts which, as we said, have some small apprehension of true Being, such as geometry and the arts connected with it, we find that though they dream about real Being, they are unable to behold it in a waking state, so long as they leave the hypotheses which they use unexamined, because they are unable to explain the reason of them . . . Therefore the dialectic method alone proceeds in this way,—it carries up its hypotheses to the first principle of all, in order to establish them firmly.' Cf. Dr. H. Jackson's excellent articles on the *Republic* in *The Journal of Philology*, vol. x. p. 143, and Lutoslawski, p. 302.
- d 4 τοῖς ὀρνυγοτρόφοις, 'the quail-breeders,' who bred and trained the birds to fight. Cf. *Ov. Amor.* ii. 6, 27 'Ecce coturnices inter sua praelia vivunt.'
- e 7 'Αλλ' ἄρα, ὦ πρὸς Διός; 'But then, I wonder, was it Ctesippus?' Socrates pretends to have forgotten: for a similar ironical profession of doubt see 286 E 5, note.
- 291 Ποῖος Κτήσιππος; 'Ctesippus indeed?' In this idiomatic use of a 1 ποῖος the interrogation is equivalent to an indignant denial. Cf. 304 E Ποῖον, ἔφη, χαρίεν, ὦ μακάριε;
- 4 μή τις τῶν κρειττόνων; 'Was it some superior being that was there and spoke thus?' Crito perhaps means Socrates himself. 'Vides ad Deum auctorem solita ironia . . . eum referre ea quae ipse dialectica quasi obstetricia arte in iuvene egregiae indolis effecerat: vide *Theaet.* 150 C, D, E.'
- 6 τῶν κρειττόνων μέντοι τις ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. 'It was indeed some superior being, it seems to me, and very superior.'
- b 1 Πόθεν . . . ἤρρομεν; 'Find it, my good fellow? Nay, our case was quite ridiculous.' Cf. A 1 Ποῖος Κτήσιππος; *Pol.* 330 A Ποῖ' ἐπεκτησάμην;
- 2 κορύδους, 'crested larks.' Schol. in loc. Κόρυδοι ὄρνιθες ὀρνυξιν

ὅμοιοι, οὓς ἔνιοι μὲν κορυδάλλους φασί, Γῆς καὶ Ἀθηνᾶς ἱεροί. Cf. Aristoph. *Aves* 471 :

οὐδ' Αἰσωπον πεπάτηκας,
ὃς ἔφασκε λέγων κορυδὸν πάντων πρώτην ὄρνιθα γενέσθαι,
προτέραν τῆς γῆς.

Plutarch, *Mor.* 507 E Κόρυδος ὥπται πετόμενος κράνος ἔχων χρυσοῦν καὶ δόρυ. Chrysost. *Orat.* ix. 141 D οἱ δὲ κόρυθοι πόσῳ τινὶ θάπτον ὑμῶν διέρχονται τὸ στάδιον ;

ὑπεξέφευγον, 'kept slipping away from us.'

b 3

τὰ μὲν οὖν πολλά, 'the long story.'

4

τὴν βασιλικὴν . . . τέχνην. On the βασιλικὴ τέχνη cf. Xen. *Mem.* 5 iv. 2, 11. Stallbaum, *Disq.* 31, points out that the whole argument about 'the regal art' of statesmanship is intended to refute the doctrine of Protagoras, who limited the idea of virtue to prudence in domestic affairs and ability to speak and act for the best in affairs of state : cf. *Protag.* 318 E-328 D, *Meno* 91 A.

ἀτεχνῶς κατὰ τὸ Αἰσχύλου ἱαμβεῖον. Cf. Aesch. *Sept. c. Theb.* 1 d 1 Κάδμου πολίται, χρὴ λέγειν τὰ καίρια | ὅστις φύλασσει πρᾶγος ἐν πρύμνῃ πόλεως | οἴακα νομῶν. On the use of ἀτεχνῶς in quoting proverbial sayings cf. 292 E 3, 303 E 1.

τί ἡμῖν ἀπεργάζεται ἔργον, 'opus aliquod efficit an non?' (Ficinus). 7 The indefinite τί is shown to be right by the form of the answer, πάντως δήπου, 'something most surely.' Schanz, *N. C. P.* p. 80, defends the separation of τί from ἔργον by referring to *Symph.* 194 D εἴ τι ἴσως οἴοιο αἰσχρὸν ποιεῖν : 174 E καὶ τι ἔφη αὐτόθι γελοῖον παθεῖν.

ὑγίειαν (ἄν) φαίης. Ast added (ἄν), which may easily have e 7 dropped out after ὑγίειαν, as before ἀντιλέγοι 286 B 5 ; but see the note there.

τί ἔργον ἀπεργάζεται ; ἔργον B Vind., om. T Burnet. Cf. *Charm.* 292 165 D τὴν ὑγίειαν καλὸν ἡμῖν ἔργον ἀπεργάζεται. *Tim.* 30 B ὅπως ὅτι a 1 κάλλιστον εἶη . . . ἔργον ἀπειρασμένος. *Symph.* 178 D, *Legg.* 801 E, *Pol.* 353 B, 553 C, &c.

ἀπήγγεilas, 'as you report the discussion': on this case of the c 3 aorist referring to what has taken place *just immediately before*, compare the similar use of ἐπήνεσα, ἦσθην, ἐδεξάμην, ἀπέπτυσα, ἔγων, &c.

ἢ ἄλλους ἀγαθοὺς ποιήσομεν ; 'Shall we say it is that by which we d 5 shall make others good?'

e 2 ἡτιμάσαμεν BT Vind. 'We discredited.' The correction in τ ἀπεδοκιμάσαμεν is only an explanatory gloss.

ἀτεχνῶς τὸ λεγόμενον, 'there comes in exactly the proverb "Corinthus son of Zeus".' The Scholiast on the passage relates that when Corinth had sent ambassadors to Megara to complain of their revolt, one argument advanced was that the mythical founder 'Corinthus son of Zeus' would be aggrieved if they failed to exact condign punishment. The proverb came to be used of boastful repetitions of the same story. Cf. Paus. ii. 1, 1 Διὸς δὲ εἶναι Κόρινθον οὐδένα οἶδα εἰπόντα πω σπουδῇ πλὴν Κορινθίων τῶν πολλῶν. Cf. Pind. *Nem.* vii. 104:

ταῦτὰ δὲ τρὶς τετράκι τ' ἀμπολεῖν

ἀπορία τελέθει, τέκνοισιν ἄτε μαψυλάκας, Διὸς Κόρινθος.

Plutarch, *Mor.* 1072 B πολὺς οὖν ὁ Διὸς Κόρινθος ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν ἀφίεται. On ἀτεχνῶς cf. 291 D, note.

5 ποιήσεις BT, ποιήσει Heindorf, Winckelmann, Badham, Schanz, Burnet. Stallbaum rightly defends the optative, referring to Hermann, *Viger De Idiot.* 491. Cf. Aesch. *Choeph.* 594 ἀλλ' ὑπέρτολμον ἀνδρὸς φρόνημα τίς λέγοι; When the optative is used in this potential sense it is not easy to determine in what cases the particle ἄν may or may not be omitted. 'For the boundary between the conditional and unconditional possibility must naturally be very wavering and uncertain' (Bernhardy, *Gk. Synt.* 410). In the dramatists the omission is not uncommon: cf. Eur. *Hippol.* 1186 καὶ θάσσον ἢ λέγοι τις ἐξηρτυμένας. *Iph. in Aul.* 417 μήτηρ δ' ὁμαρτεῖ σῆς Κλυταιμνήστρας δέμας | καὶ παῖς Ὀρέστης, ὥστε τερφθείης ἰδών. In prose writers the omission occurs chiefly, if not solely, in questions as here, cf. Plat. *Legg.* 894 C τῶν δὴ δέκα μάλιστα ἡμῖν κινήσεων τίνα προκρίναιμεν . . . ; *Lach.* 190 B 4 ἡμᾶς τῷδε παρακαλεῖτον εἰς συμβουλὴν, τίνα τρόπον τοῖς ὑέσιν αὐτῶν ἀρετὴ . . . ἀμείνους ποιήσεις; See also Dinarch. *c. Demosth.* 98; Lycurg. *c. Leocrat.* 168; Plut. *Mor.* 75 E.

293 πᾶσαν ἤδη φωνὴν ἡφίειν. Cf. Eur. *Med.* 278 ἐχθροὶ γὰρ ἐξῆϊσι
a 1 πάντα δὴ κάλων. Schol. ἀπὸ μεταφορᾶς τῶν οὐριοδρομούντων καὶ χαλῶν-
των πρὸς τὸ πνεῦμα τοὺς ἀρτέμονας. Cf. Aristoph. *Eq.* 756 νῦν δὴ
σε πάντα δεῖ κάλων ἐξίεναι. Plat. *Pol.* 475 καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ προφάσεις
προφασίζεσθαι τε καὶ πάσας φωνὰς ἀφίετε.

2 ὥσπερ Διοσκόρω, 'apogr. Marcianum 184' (Schanz); διοσκούρων

BT. 'Recte Stephanus et Bekkerus Διοσκόρω . . . Nihil durius quam ἐπικαλούμενος sine accusativo positum; neque σῶσαι aliunde quam a δεόμενος pendere potest' (Badham). Cf. Rutherford, *The New Phrygichus* 310 'Διόσκουροι, ὀρθότερον Διόσκοροι. γελάσει οὖν τοὺς σὺν τῷ υ λέγοντας. Lobeck's note on this article is in his best style: "Nimirum natura ita comparatum est ut dualis numeri longe maior sit usus, apud veteres praesertim, quam plurativi nominis. Διοσκόρω Eur. *Or.* 465; Arist. *Pax* 285; *Eccles.* 1069, &c.'" The mention of the Dioscuri (*nautis* 'optatos Tyndaridas,' Propert. i. 17, 18) shows the origin of the preceding phrase πάσας φωνὰς ἀφιέναι.

τῆς τρικυμίας τοῦ λόγου. Cf. Aesch. *Prom.* V. 1036 κακῶν 3 τρικυμία.

τίς ποτ' ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη. Cf. *Charm.* 174 A τίς αὐτὸν τῶν ἐπιστη- 4 μῶν ποιεῖ εὐδαίμονα; ἡ ἅπασαι ὁμοίως;

οἷόν τέ τι τῶν ὄντων. 'Do you then think it possible for any being b 9 not to be this very thing which it is?

τούτου γε αὐτοῦ, 'just of this thing itself.' Socrates tries to limit c 3 the proposition to some particular case, as again in c 6 ἐκείνου γε.

τυγχάνεις ὦν . . . , 'you actually are, and, at the same time in the 8 same relation, are not the very same that you are.'

κατὰ ταῦτά, i.e. in relation to knowledge.

d 1

εἶεν, 'be it so.' Cf. Ruhnck. *Tim. Lex.* εἶεν' συγκατάθεσις μὲν τῶν 3 εἰρημένων, συναφή δὲ πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα. The Scholiast on Plat. *Polit.* 257 A renders it by ἄγε δὴ: and the Scholiast on Eur. *Phoen.* 856 εἶεν' διηρημένως ἀναγνωστέον. ἔστι δὲ ἐπίρρημα.

καλὰ δὴ πάντα λέγεις BT. Scholiast, Καλὰ δὴ πάντ' ἄγεις, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀγγέλλεις' ἐπὶ τῶν αἴσια ἀναγγελλόντων. πολλάκις δὲ λέγεται καὶ κατ' εἰρωνείαν. Ἀριστοφάνης Γεωργοῖς καὶ Πλάτων Εὐθυδήμῳ. Whether ἄγεις be a right reading or not, the Scholiast's interpretation of the passage is perfectly clear from what follows, and is admirably suited to the passage. Socrates having been declared by the Sophist to know all things pretends to accept the statement as 'good news entirely.' The words καλὰ πάντα had already become proverbial: cf. Theogn. 283 ἡγεῖσθαι θ' ὥς καλὰ πάντα τιθεῖ. Hdt. i. 32 πάντα καλὰ ἔχοντα. Plutarch, *Mor.* 236 B τῶν πολιτῶν πυνθανομένων αὐτοῦ Ποῖά τινα ἐν Ἀθήναις, Πάντα, εἶπε, καλὰ' εἰρωνευόμενος καὶ παριστὰς ὅτι πάντα παρὰ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καλὰ νομίζεται, αἰσχρὸν δὲ

οὐδέν. Winckelmann quotes examples of a similar usage from Plato, *Polit.* 273 B, 284 A, *Phileb.* 26 A, *Legg.* 783 E. The conjecture of Abresch. καλὰ δὴ παταγείς, adopted by Stallbaum, Badham, and Schanz, has no support from MSS., nor from any passage in which παταγεῖν is so used, the usual phrase being φθέγγεσθαι, as in *Theaet.* 179 D τὴν φερομένην ταύτην οὐσίαν διακρούοντα εἴτε ὑγιὲς εἴτε σαθρὸν φθέγγεται. The reading of BT is rightly retained by Burnet. The quotation of the passage in Hesych. καλὰ δὴ παταγείς· καλὰ λαλεῖς is regarded by Heindorf as a corruption of καλὰ δὴ πάντ' ἄγεις.

- 5 ὥς δὴ, 'since forsooth.' Stallbaum refers to the same ironical use of ὥς δὴ in *Pol.* 337 C Εἶεν, ἔφη· ὥς δὴ ὅμοιον τοῦτο ἐκείνω; *Gorg.* 486 E, 492 B, *Protag.* 542 C, in all which passages the ironical sense is evident.
- 8 ἄρα οὕτως λέγεις; 'Is that your argument, and that your wise invention?'
- Ε 1 αὐτὸς σαυτὸν γε δὴ ἐξελέγχεις. 'Yes, surely you are refuting yourself.'
- 2 Τί δέ, . . . σὺ οὐ πέπονθας κτλ. 'What then, are not you in this same plight? For whatever I might suffer in company with you and our dear friend Dionysodorus here, I certainly should not be at all aggrieved.' On φίλης κεφαλῆς cf. Hom. *Il.* viii. 281 Τεῦκρε, φίλη κεφαλὴ. *Phaedr.* 264 A Φαῖδρε, φίλη κεφαλὴ. *Gorg.* 513 C.
- 294 καὶ σύ γε πρὸς. 'Yes, and you too.' On this absolute use of πρὸς
- a 2 see *Protag.* 321 D πρὸς δὲ καὶ αἱ Διὸς φυλακαὶ φοβεραὶ ἦσαν. *Gorg.* 469 B καὶ ἐλεεινὸν γε πρὸς. In 298 D καὶ πρὸς . . . is corrupt.
- 9 'Ἀλλὰ τί; 'But what then?' The complete question represented elliptically by τί may ask either for a reason, 'Why?', or, as here, for an inference, 'What then?' Cf. *Phaed.* 89 B, *Euthyphro* 14 D, *Pol.* 357 D; Aristoph. *Ran.* 489, and see Riddell, *Digest*, § 20; Jelf, *Gk. Gr.* 880, Obs. 2.
- b 2 μόλις ὑμᾶς προυκαλεσάμην, 'I could hardly incite you.' Schanz suspects a corruption in σπουδάζειν.
- 6 νευροραφεῖν, 'to do stitching,' as a part of 'shoemaking,' σκυτοτομεῖν (σκυτική), distinct from καττύειν 'to sole': cf. Xen. *Cyr.* viii. 2, 4 ἔστι δὲ ἔνθα καὶ ὑποδήματα ὁ μὲν νευροραφῶν μόνον τρέφεται, ὁ δὲ σχίζων.
- 8 τοὺς ἀστίρας ὁπόσοι εἰσὶ, καὶ τὴν ἄμμον; Cf. Hdt. i. 47 Οἶδα δ' ἐγὼ

ψάμμου τ' ἀριθμὸν καὶ μέτρα θαλάσσης. Pind. *Ol.* ii. 98 ψάμμος ἀριθμὸν περιπέφενγεν. Euseb. *Praef. Ev.* 212, 230.

ὁπόσους ὁδόντας ἔχει. Cf. Aristoph. *Plut.* 1057 πόσους ἔχεις c 4 ὁδόντας. Aristot. *Rhet.* iii. 5, 4 τύχοι γὰρ ἂν τις μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς ἀρτιασμοῖς ἄρτια ἢ περισσὰ εἰπὼν μᾶλλον ἢ πόσα ἔχει. Lysias, *Fr.* 2, 8 ῥᾶον αὐτῆς τοὺς ὁδόντας ἀριθμεῖν ἢ τοὺς τῆς χειρὸς δακτύλους. This last is the game to which Ctesippus alludes, the modern 'Mora,' or 'How many fingers do I hold up?' Aristotle says that 'Even or odd' ('Ludere par impar') is easier.

μηδαμῶς, 'do not say so.' Cf. *Phaedr.* 234 E, *Menex.* 236 C. 7

φαίνησθε γνόντες, 'be found to have known by my counting.' 9

πάνυ ἀπαρακαλύπτως, 'Ctesippus without any reserve whatever d 3 went on asking anything and everything, at last even the most indecent things,—did they know them?'

ἀνδρείοτατα ὁμόσε ἦτην, 'most valiantly encountered his questions.' 5 Cf. *Pol.* 610 C ἐὰν δέ γέ τις . . . ὁμόσε τῷ λόγῳ τολμᾷ ἵέναι. *Euthyphr.* 3 C. Hom. *Il.* xiii. 337 ὥς ἄρα τῶν ὁμόσ' ἦλθε μάχη. Eustathius remarks that the use of the phrase in Attic writers was taken from this passage of Homer. Cf. Ruhnck. *Tim. Lex.* 'Ομόσε. On the form ἦτην cf. Schanz, *Praefatio in Euthyd.* § 15.

οἱ κάπροι . . . ὁμόσε ὠθούμενοι. Cf. Xen. *Cyr.* i. 4, II οἱ δὲ κάπροι, 6 ὥσπερ τοὺς ἄνδρας φασὶ τοὺς ἀνδρείους, ὁμόσε ἐφέροντο.

[τὸν Εὐθύδημον]. Either this name, or ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, must be 8 omitted, as is proved by ἡκεις following; and τηλικούτος ὢν applies better to Dionysodorus as being the elder.

ἐς μαχαίρας γε κυβιστᾶν. Cf. Xen. *Conviu.* ii. II μέτα δὲ τοῦτο e 2 κύκλος εἰσηνέχθη περίμεστος ξιφῶν ὀρθῶν. εἰς οὖν ταῦτα ἡ ὀρχηστρίς ἐκυβίστα τε καὶ ἐξεκυβίστα ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν (Routh). Plat. *Sympos.* 190 A καὶ ὁπότε ταχὺ ὀρμήσειεν θεῖν, ὥσπερ οἱ κυβιστῶντες εἰς ὀρθὸν τὰ σκέλη περιφερόμενοι κυβιστῶσι κύκλῳ. See the illustration in Smith's *Dict. Class. Antiq.* SALTATIO, p. 106.

ἐπὶ τροχοῦ δινέσθαι. Routh finds a description of this gymnastic 3 feat in Xen. *Conviu.* ii. 22 ὅτι δ' ἡ παῖς εἰς τοῦπισθεν καμπτομένη τροχοὺς ἐμμεῖτο, ἐκείνος ταῦτα εἰς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν ἐπικύπτων μμείσθαι τροχοὺς ἐπειράτο. But ἐπὶ τροχοῦ δινέσθαι can only mean 'to be whirled round upon a wheel,' and this meaning is found in a later passage of Xen. *Conviu.* vii. 3 δοκεῖ οὖν μοι τὸ μὲν εἰς μαχαίρας κυβιστᾶν κινδύνου ἐπίδειγμα εἶναι, ὃ συμποσίῳ οὐδὲν προσήκει. καὶ μὴν

τό γε ἐπὶ τοῦ τροχοῦ ἅμα περιδινουμένου γράφειν τε καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκειν θαῦμα μὲν ἴσως τί ἐστίν, ἡδονὴν δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα δύναμαι γινῶναι τίν' ἂν παράσχοι.

- 3 οὕτω πόρρω σοφίας ἦκεις; The separation of this from the former part of the sentence is rightly removed by Winckelmann, Badham, and Burnet. οὕτω inserted before οὕτω by Schanz is quite unnecessary. 'Surely, said I, you do not also know how to turn a somersault into the midst of swords, or to be whirled round on a wheel at your time of life, having attained to such skill as that?'
- 9 εὐθὺς γενόμενοι, 'from the moment of your birth.'
- 11 Ἐφάτην ἅμα ἀμφοτέρω. 'They both affirmed it together.' Schanz adds a second πάντα before ἐφάτην without authority.
- 295 Πλὴν γ' ὅτι, <ἦν δ'> ἐγώ . . . , 'Yes (I cannot believe), except that
- a 3 you are likely to be wise. ἦν δ' omitted in the MSS. was added by Stephanus from Cornarius. Schanz thinks ἀπιστῶ should be inserted after ἐγώ: but 'I do not believe that you are likely to be wise' is very unlike the ironical courtesy of Socrates. A better word than ἀπιστῶ would be οἶμαι or something similar. Then πλὴν γ' ὅτι ἐγώ <οἶμαι> κτλ., 'Yes, except in so far as I think you are likely to be wise.' Either ἐγώ must be omitted or a verb supplied.
- 6 ἡδιστα ταῦτα ἐξελέγχομαι, 'I am delighted to be refuted on these points.'
- 8 ἔρμαιον. Cf. 273 E 2.
- b 9 ἀλλὰ μὴ . . . A certain correction of ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . , adopted by all editors, except Winckelmann, whose attempt to explain ἀλλὰ μὴν is not satisfactory.
- c 1 Ὑπολαμβάνεις, 'of course you understand something (as the meaning) of what I say.'
- 4 ἄλλῃ ἐρωτᾷς διανοούμενος, 'ask a question intending it in one way, and I take it in another way.'
- 6 μὴδὲν πρὸς ἔπος, 'nothing to the point.' Cf. *Philol.* 18 τὸ τί πρὸς ἔπος αὖ ταῦτ' ἐστίν; The phrase became proverbial, as in Lucian, *Philopseud.* 29 Οὐδὲν πρὸς ἔπος ταῦτα, φασίν. A similar phrase is οὐδὲν πρὸς λόγον, *Philol.* 33 B, 42 E (Heindorf).
- 7 Ἐμοιγε κτλ. 'It will satisfy me, but not you, I imagine.' For a like arrogant speech cf. 296 B Οὐκουν ἡμᾶς γ', ἔφη, ἀλλ' εἶπερ, σέ.
- 10 Οὐκ ἀποκρινεῖ. The future was rightly restored by Bekker, as

repeating scornfully Socrates' refusal to answer. 'You will not answer what you understand from time to time (to be meant), because you are continually talking nonsense, and are too much of a dotard.'

διαστέλλοντι τὰ λεγόμενα. Cf. Aristot. *Soph. El.* xvii. 15 'Ἐν μὲν οὖν d 1 τοῖς κυρίως λεγομένοις ὀνόμασιν ἀνάγκη ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ διαιρούμενον, 'When words are used in their proper sense, we must answer either simply "yes" or "no," or by drawing a distinction.' *ibid.* Δῆλον οὖν ὡς ἐν οἷς ἀσαφὲς τὸ προτεινόμενον οὐ συγχωρητέον ἀπλῶς.

θηρεῦσαι τὰ ὀνόματα περιστήσας, 'to entrap me in his verbal toils.' 2

διεανοήμην B Vind., 'I had determined,' better than διεννοούμην T. 5

Οὗτος αὖ, ἔφη, προσἀποκρίνεται. 'Here again the fellow answers 296 more than is asked.' a 1

'Αεὶ, ὅταν ἐπίστωμαι. Socrates foresees the fallacy involved in 7 'Αεὶ meaning either 'at all times' absolutely or 'at each time.'

παύσει παραφθεγγόμενος; 'again will you not cease from superfluous qualifications?' In Plutarch, *Mor.* 169 D παραφθέγγεσθαι is 'to speak aside,' and in Polybius xviii. 15. 13 'obiter dicere.'

σφήλη BT Vind.; the old reading σφάλῃ was altered by Heindorf 9 to σφαλεῖ, but there is no reason for rejecting σφήλη.

Τοῦτ' ἐκεῖνο, 'There it is again! The same superfluous qualification.' b 7

μηδὲ ἔν . . . ἀφίλης. The Sophist arrogantly tells Socrates that he 9 need not withdraw his qualification, meaning himself to ignore it entirely, as he does in his next question.

δύναιο ἂν ἅπαντα ἐπίστασθαι . . . ; The question is framed on the c 1 assumption that Socrates had admitted ἅπαντα ἐπίσταμαι, and the qualification ἂ γ' ἐπίσταμαι is disregarded.

εἰ μὴ πάντα ἐπίσταιο. The word used at the beginning of the argument was πάντα, but Socrates in his answer B 5 had said ἅπαντα, seemingly without intending to make a distinction between these two words. But in fact πάντα means 'all severally' (καθ' ἐν ἑκαστον 294 D 2), while ἅπαντα (= ἅμα πάντα 296 C 10) means 'all together.' The Sophist takes advantage of the distinction to frame a question which can only be answered without qualification (ἀπλῶς); and the answer τέρας γὰρ ἂν εἴη is equivalent to a simple 'No.'

ἅπαντα γὰρ ὁμολογεῖς ἐπίστασθαι. The Sophist is exultant: he 4

seizes upon *ἅπαντα* (B 5) and entirely ignores the limitation. His argument would run thus in a formal syllogism:

You cannot know *ἅπαντα* without knowing *πάντα*:

You admit that you know *ἅπαντα*:

Therefore you know *πάντα*.

6 "Εοικα . . . ἐπίσταμαι. 'So it seems, said I, since the limitation "what things I know" has not any force, but I know all things.' The last clause is still dependent on *ἐπειδήπερ*.

9 εἴτε ὅταν ἐπίστη εἴτε ὅπως βούλει. Again the Sophist declares his contempt for all limitations such as A 7 αἰ, ὅταν ἐπίστωμαι.

10 καὶ ἅμα πάντα. Cf. B 3 αἰ δ' ἐπιστάμενος . . . πάντα; When αἰ πάντα is taken with the absolute sense of αἰ, it necessarily implies ἅμα πάντα. This absolute αἰ he next proceeds to develop.

d 1 ὅτ' ἐγίγνου καὶ ὅτ' ἐφύου, 'at the time of your birth, and at that of your begetting.' The climax requires this sense of ἐφύου, which might otherwise mean 'growing up' (Jowett).

3 [αὐτὸς] αἰ BT. αὐτός is condemned by all editors, but no satisfactory correction has been found: αὖ Schanz, αὐθις Ast, εὐθύς Heindorf, αὐθις or εὐθύς Stallbaum, ἑσαεί for αὐτὸς αἰ Badham. Possibly αὐτός, which is certainly superfluous, may be only an erroneous repetition from αὐτὸς γενέσθαι just above. Without it the sense is quite clear.

5 ὦ πολυτίμητε Εὐθύδημε. He addresses the Sophist as a god: cf. 273 E σφὼ ὥσπερ θεῶ προσαγορεύω. Aristoph. *Acharn.* 807 ὦ πολυτίμηθ' Ἡράκλεις. *Vesp.* 1001 ὦ πολυτίμητοι θεοί.

7 συμβουλευθείη, 'should be willing to help': cf. *Legg.* 718 B συμβουλευθέντων θεῶν.

e 1 ἀμφισβητοίην . . . ὅπως ἐγὼ οὐ πάντα ἐπίσταμαι. 'As to other points I know not how I could argue with men of such prodigious wisdom as you that I do not know all things.' Cf. *Charm.* 169 E Οὐ τοῦτο . . . ἀμφισβητῶ, ὥς οὐχ . . . αὐτὸς αὐτὸν γινώσεται. *Parmen.* 135 A ἀμφισβητεῖν ὥς οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα. *Pol.* 476 D.

2 τερατώδεσιν. On Plato's frequent use of adjectives in -ώδης and εἰδής see Lutoslawski, p. 113.

297 Διαφθείρεις, ἔφη, τὸν λόγον, ὁ Εὐθύδημος. On the separation of the a 5 nominative from ἔφη compare 286 E, note. Euthydemus is represented as sharper than his elder brother, and so is made the chief speaker throughout.

Ἔασον, ὦγαθέ . . . καὶ μή μοι φθονήσης τοῦ μαθήματος. Cf. *Sympos.* b 4 223 A ἀλλ' ἔασον, ὦ δαιμόνιε, καὶ μή φθονήσης τῷ μειρακίῳ ἵπ' ἐμοῦ ἐπαινεθῆναι.

Φεύγεις, 'You are running away.'

7

ἦττων γάρ εἰμι καὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου ὑμῶν, 'for I am weaker than either 9 one of you.' Cf. *Theaet.* 185 A οὐδ' αὖ διὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου περὶ ἀμφοτέρων αἰσθάνοι' ἄν. *Gorg.* 475 A ἡ τῷ ἑτέρῳ τούτοις ἡ ἀμφοτέροις ὑπερβάλλων.

πολλοῦ δέω μὴ οὐ δύο γε φεύγειν, 'I do not hesitate to run away 10 from two.'

τοῦ Ἡρακλέους. Cf. *Phaed.* 89 C πρὸς δύο λέγεται οὐδ' ὁ Ἡρακλῆς C 1 οἷός τε εἶναι. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐμέ, ἔφη, τὸν Ἰόλεων παρακαλεῖ, ἕως ἔτι φῶς ἐστίν. The Scholiast on the *Phaedo* gives several explanations of the proverb, of which the most generally accepted is quoted from Herodorus and Hellanicus, that 'when Hercules was killing the Hydra, Juno set a crab upon him; and being unable to fight against two he called for Iolaus as his ally, and hence the proverbial saying.' Cf. *Legg.* 919 B ὀρθὸν μὲν δὴ πάλοι τε εἰρημένον, ὥς πρὸς δύο μάχεσθαι καὶ ἐναντία χαλεπόν. Cf. *Apollod.* ii. 5, 2.

τῇ τε ὕδρᾳ διαμάχεσθαι, σοφιστρίᾳ οὔσῃ, 'to fight it out both with the Hydra, who was a lady-sophist, and by virtue of her wisdom, if any one cut off one head of the argument, sent up many instead of the one.' σοφιστρία is found only here, being specially coined for the occasion. Cf. Schanz, *N.C.P.* p. 82: 'Porson ap. Dobree Adn. ad Aristoph. *Plut.* 971 "Vox συκοφαντρία videtur esse ab Aristophane ficta ut σοφιστρία a Platone, *Euthyd.* p. 297 c.'" The second Plutus was acted in the Archonship of Antipater 388 B.C. Plato therefore formed his new word in imitation of the recent coinage of Aristophanes.

νεωστί μοι δοκεῖν καταπεπλευκότι. After μοι B inserts τινι, an evident 5 repetition of τινι immediately above. Dionysodorus, the crab, and his brother had but recently arrived, as is clear from the opening of the dialogue.

ἐκ τοῦ ἐπ' ἀριστερά. Cf. 271 B 6 ὁ δὲ παρ' ἐμὲ καθήμενος ἐξ ἀριστερᾶς 6 . . . Διονυσόδωρος.

λέγων καὶ δάκνων. Cf. *Apollod.* ibid. ἐβοήθει δὲ καρκίνος τῇ ὕδρᾳ ὑπερμεγέθους δάκνων τὸν πόδα.

βοηθὸν ἐπεκαλίσατο. *Apollod.* ibid. ἐπεκαλίσατο καὶ αὐτὸς βοηθὸν 7

τὸν Ἰόλαον. Apollodorus (*circ.* B.C. 140) seems to have followed Plato's description very closely.

- d 1 ὁ δ' ἐμὸς Ἰόλεως [Πατροκλῆς] εἰ ἔλθοι. Patrocles was the nephew (ἀδελφιδοῦς) of Socrates, being the son of his half-brother Chaeredemus (E 7). But the insertion of his name here is probably due to a marginal gloss. ὁ δ' ἐμὸς Ἰόλεως means little more than 'my helper': 'Iolaum pro *auxiliatore* vulgo accipit ostendit Erasmus *Chiliades*, p. 93' (Routh). The author of the gloss failed to see in the words πλέον ἂν θάτερον ποιήσειεν the allusion to Ctesippus and his fierce retorts upon the Sophists.

ἔλθοι. Heindorf thinks that this cannot refer to Ctesippus who was present without some such addition as εἰς βοηθείαν or βοηθήσων. But this idea is already implied in ὁ ἐμὸς Ἰόλεως, 'my helper'; and ἐλθεῖν is used in the same indefinite way without any addition in *Protag.* 310C 5, 335C 5.

- 3 ὁπότε σοι ταῦτα ἔμνηται, 'whenever you have finished this song.' Ὑμνεῖν, like the Latin *cantare* and our English 'canting,' is often used in the sense of 'harping upon' a thing. Cf. *Pol.* i. 329 B καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ δὴ τὸ γῆρας ὑμνοῦσιν, ὅσων κακῶν σφίσιν αἴτιον. *Pol.* viii. 549 E ὅσα καὶ οἷα φιλοῦσιν αἱ γυναῖκες περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὑμνεῖν. v. Ruhn. *Tim. Lex.*

- e 2 παραπλήσιον μὲν τοῦνομα Ἰφικλῆς. But παραπλήσιος is preferred by Schanz, as at one time by Heindorf. The neuter is the reading of B T, but the construction is doubtful, for it is not clear, as Heindorf once thought, that because we find ἀνὴρ ὄνομα Ἰφικλῆς we may also write παραπλήσιον τοῦνομα Ἰφικλῆς. An example of such usage is wanted.

- 6 οὐχ ὁμοπάτριές γε. Socrates tries to add the proper limitation to the undistributed term ἀδελφός, as again 298 A 2 τοῦ πατρός: Τοῦμοῦ γ', ἔφην.

- 8 Πατὴρ δὲ ἦν, ἔφη. Dionysodorus, without noticing the objection of Socrates, passes at once to another question.

- 298 Ἄρ' οὖν πατὴρ ἦν ἕτερος ὧν πατρός; See the note on B 2 ἕτερος ὧν

- a 2 πατρός οὐ πατὴρ ἔστιν.

- 3 τῷ λίθῳ, 'the (proverbial) stone': see the next note.

- 4 μὴ φανῶ ὑπὸ σοῦ ὁ αὐτός. To be like a stone was a common expression of contempt. Cf. *Gorg.* 494 A τὸ ὥσπερ λίθον ζῆν . . . μήτε χαίροντα μήτε λυπούμενον: *ibid.* B Χαραδρίου τινα αὐτὸν βίον λέγεις,

ἀλλ' οὐ νεκροῦ οὐδὲ λίθου. *Sympos.* 198 C μὴ . . . αὐτόν με λίθον τῇ ἀφωρίᾳ ποιήσῃ. The Sophist chose λίθος cunningly, as Socrates would gladly admit that he was not a stone. Cf. *Soph. El.* iv. 528.

Οὐκοῦν . . . ἕτερος ὦν πατὴρ οὐκ ἂν πατήρ εἴη, Τ. ἂν πατήρ ἐστὶν Β. 8 Schanz writes οὐκοῦν, omits οὐκ ἂν, and reads ἐστὶν. These many changes are quite unnecessary.

ἕτερος ὦν πατὴρ οὐ πατήρ ἐστὶν. 'Fallacia est *Accidentis*' (Routh). b 2 Cf. *Aristot. Soph. El.* v. 'Paralogisms which arise from accident are when anything is asserted to be equally true of the subject (τῷ πράγματι) and of its accident (τῷ συμβεβηκότι). For since the same subject has many accidents, it is not necessary that the same should all be present to the predicates and to the subject of which they are predicated; for in this case all things would be the same, as the Sophists say. Such a fallacy is the following: If Coriscus is different from a man, he is different from himself, for he is a man. Or, if he is other than Socrates, and Socrates is (a) man, you have acknowledged, say they, that he is other than man, because it happens that he is other than one who is (a) man.'

The passage in the *Euthydemus* put into a syllogism would run thus:

Chaeredemus is not Sophroniscus:

Sophroniscus is a father:

∴ Chaeredemus is not a father.

There is evidently an illicit process of the minor, 'father' being particular in the premiss but universal in the conclusion.

On this 'fallacia accidentis' see Mansel, *Artis Logicae Rudimenta*, Append. 136. *Diog. Laert.* iii. 33, 53 Δύο δὲ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς εἰσι τρόποι, ὃ τε κατ' ἐναντίωσιν, καὶ ὃ ἐκ τῆς ἀκολουθίας. ὁ μὲν οὖν κατ' ἐναντίωσιν ἐστὶν ἐξ οὗ τῷ ἐρωτωμένῳ περὶ πᾶσαν ἀπόκρισιν ἀκολουθήσει τὸ ἐναντίον οἶον, 'Ὁ ἐμὸς πατήρ τοῦ σοῦ πατρὸς ἦτοι ἕτερός ἐστιν ἢ ὁ αὐτός' εἰ μὲν οὖν ἕτερός ἐστι τοῦ ἐμοῦ πατρὸς ὁ σοὺς πατήρ, πατρὸς ἕτερος ὦν οὐκ ἂν εἴη πατήρ. εἰ δὲ ὁ αὐτός ἐστι τῷ ἐμῷ πατρί, ὁ ἐμὸς ἂν εἴη πατήρ.

οὐ ταῦτὰ ταῦτα πέπονθεν; 'And is not your father in the same plight?'

Οὐκ ἂν συμβουλοίμην, 'I should not wish that,' or more plainly, 7 'I should be sorry if he were.'

- c 5 μή γάρ . . . συνάπτεις. For the construction cf. *Alciō. ii. 139 D* ἀλλ' ὅρα . . . μή οὐχ οὕτω ταῦτ' ἔχει. *Laches 196 C* ἀλλ' ὁρῶμεν μὴ Νικίας οἴεται τι λέγειν. *Theaet. 145 B* ἀλλ' ὅρα μὴ παίζων ἔλεγεν. In this sense, 'whether,' μή may also be used without ὅρα or any similar verb: cf. *Protag. 312 A* 'Ἄλλ' ἄρα μὴ οὐχ ὑπολαμβάνεις, 'Perhaps then you do not suppose.' So, in our present passage, 'Perhaps, as the proverb is, you are not joining like with like,' i. e. the cases which you compare are not similar. See Riddell, *Digest of Idioms*, § 138.
- 6 οὐ λίνον λίνῳ συνάπτεις. Cf. *Aristot. Phys. Auscult. iii. 6, 12* Οὐ γὰρ λίνον λίνῳ συνάπτειν ἔστι τῷ ἅπαντι καὶ ὅλῳ τὸ ἄπειρον. *Simplicius ad Aristot. locum οὐ τὰ συγκλώθεσθαι πεφυκότα συγκλῶθειν* (Heindorf).
- d 4 κωβίων . . . Cf. *Athen. 106 E* Θύννοισι τευθίς, κωβιοῖσι κωρίδες, 'With tunnies cuttle-fish, with gudgeons shrimps.' For κωβίων T, the more usual word βοῖδιων has been substituted in B.
- 5 <Κάπρος> Badham, Καὶ πρὸς BTV. 'Quod καὶ πρὸς in κάπρος invitis omnibus libris mutavi, audacius sane factum est; sed quum ex altera parte sordes et tenebras conspicias ex altera lucem et nitorem, difficile est religionis non aliquando oblivisci' (Badham).
- e 4 πατήρ ὧν σὸς ἐστίν, ὥστε σὸς πατήρ γίγνεται. 'Fallacia haec est quae vocatur *compositionis*, i. e. cum coniunctim accipiuntur, quae erant accipienda divisim' (Routh). Cf. *Aristot. Soph. El. xxiv*, where as examples we find ἄρ' ὁ ἀνδριάς σὸν ἐστίν ἔργον, ἢ σὸς ὁ κύων πατήρ; and the solution οὐδ', εἰ τοῦτ' ἐστίν ἐμόν, ἔστι δὲ ἔργον, ἐμόν ἐστίν ἔργον, ἀλλ' ἢ κτῆμα ἢ πρᾶγμα ἢ ἄλλο τι. See note on 298 B 2.
- 299 πατέρα τύπτειμι BT, πατέρ' ἂν τύπτειμι Sauppe, Burnet. δικαιό-
a 1 τερον ἂν Ast, Schanz. But ἂν is not necessary: see 292 E 5 ποιήσεις, note.
- 2 ὅ τι μαθών, 'that he was so foolish as to beget such wise sons.' Cf. 283 E.
- ἀλλ' ἢ πον, ironical. 'But I suppose the father of you two and of the puppies has gained many good things from this wisdom of yours.' Cf. *Soph. Ajax 1008* ἢ πού με Τελαμών, σὸς πατήρ ἐμός θ' ἄμα, | δέξαιτ' ἂν εὐπρόσωπος ἱλεώς τ' ἴσως.
- b 4 Σὺ ἄριστα εἶπαι, 'You will know best,' i. e. when you have heard what I am going to say.

τοῦτο <τὸ> ἀγαθόν. 'Articulum τό e cod. *Par.* addidi' (Heindorf). 7
τό is omitted in BT Vind., having probably dropped out after the
preceding -το.

καὶ καλῶς ἐκεῖ ἔξει, 'in that case it will be well.' 'Cf. *Theaet.*
172 B ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ, οὐ λέγω, ἐν τοῖς δικαίοις' (Badham). Schanz reads
ἐκείνος, and Heindorf thinks that ἐκεῖ is an interpolation arising out
of the following ἔξει.

τρίψας ἐγκεράσῃ ἑλλεβόρου ἄμαξαν, 'should pound and infuse a 8
wagon-load of hellebore.' Cf. Theophrast. *Hist. Plant.* ix. 10, 2
μίσγεται δὲ πρὸς τὴν πόσιν ὅπως εὐμενὲς ἢ τὸ τῆς ἑλλεβορίνης σπέρμα.
Cf. Menand. *Arreph.* Fr. v. 'Ἑλλέβορον ἤδη πόποι' ἔπιες, Σωσία;
πάλιν πάλιν νῦν πῖθι· μαίνει γὰρ κακῶς. Cf. Hor. *Sat.* ii. 3,
82, &c.

ὁ ἀνδριάς ὁ ἐν Δελφοῖς. Pausanias (Lib. x.) gives an almost c 1
countless list of statues at Delphi, but does not mention any one of
unusual size. Probably the statue here meant was that of Apollo
himself, as 'the Greeks who fought against the king of the Persians
erected a brazen Zeus at Olympia, and an Apollo at Delphi, after
the battles of Artemisium and Salamis' (Paus. 832).

τὸν Γηρυόνην. Cf. *Legg.* 795 C Γηρυόνου δὲ γε εἴ τις φύσιν ἔχων 5
ἢ καὶ τὴν Βριάρεω φύοιτο, ταῖς ἑκατὸν χερσὶν ἑκατὸν δεῖ βέλη ρίπτειν
δυνατὸν εἶναι. Hesiod. *Theog.* 287 Χρυσάωρ δ' ἔτεκε τρικάρηνον
Γηρυονῆα μυχθεῖς Καλλιρόῃ κούρῃ κλυτοῦ Ὠκεάνειο. Cf. Apollod.
ii. 5, 10.

Βριάρεων. Cf. Apollod. i. 1, 1: Hes. *Theog.* 149 Κόττος τε Βριάρεώς 6
τε Γύης θ', ὑπερήφανα τέκνα | τῶν ἑκατὸν μὲν χεῖρες ἀπ' ὤμων αἰσسونτο |
ἄπλατοι, κεφαλαὶ δὲ ἐκάστῳ πεντήκοντα.

καὶ τόνδε τὸν ἑταῖρον. This clause is rejected by Schanz, ap- 7
parently without sufficient reason.

τὰ πρότερον ἀποκεκριμένα. The previous answers of Ctesippus d 1
had reference to the advantage, in some cases, of having many
shields and spears.

The following argument is intended to ridicule the greed for
money which is so severely satirized by Aristophanes in the
Plutus, which was acted in its second form, as we now have it
in 388 B.C.

<Χρῆναι εἶ> Badham. 'Librarius quum ad loci rationem minus 4
attenderet XPHNAIAEI in XPHMATAEI corruptit' (Badham).

e 4 Σκυθῶν . . . οἱ χρυσίον τε ἐν τοῖς κρανίοις ἔχουσιν. Cf. Hdt. iv. 65 (Rawlinson): 'The skulls of their enemies, not indeed of all, but of those whom they most detest, they treat as follows. Having sawn off the portion below the eyebrows, and cleaned out the inside, they cover the outside with leather. When a man is poor, this is all that he does; but if he is rich, he also lines the inside with gold: in either case the skull is used as a drinking-cup. They do the same with the skulls of their own kith and kin if they have been at feud with them, and have vanquished them in the presence of the king. When strangers whom they deem of any account come to visit them, these skulls are handed round,' &c. Cf. Strabo 300.

5 τοῖς ἑαυτῶν. Ctesippus meets the Sophists with their own weapons: as Dionysodorus had argued (298 E 4) πατὴρ ὦν σὸς ἐστίν, ὥστε σὸς πατὴρ γίγνεται ὁ κύων, so Ctesippus calls the skulls which the Scythians had taken 'their own,' and so 'they drink out of their own gilded skulls,' and 'hold their own head in their hands and see inside it.'

300 τὰ δυνατὰ ὁρᾶν. The phrase has two meanings, corresponding
a 2 to the active and passive senses of δυνατός: (1) ἃ δύναται ὁρᾶν, (2) ἃ δύναται τις ὁρᾶν. The former is common and needs no illustration: for the latter sense cf. Aesch. *Agam.* 97 ὃ τι καὶ δυνατὸν καὶ θέμις αἰνεῖν. Xen. *Anab.* iv. 1, 24 δυνατὴν καὶ ὑποζυγίοις πορεύεσθαι ὁδόν. The fallacy therefore may be regarded as belonging either to the class παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν or παρὰ τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν, on which see Aristot. *Soph.* *El.* iv. 526 and 527: as an example of the latter Aristotle gives ἄρα ὁ ὁρᾷ τις τοῦτο ὁρᾷ; ὁρᾷ δὲ τὸν κίονα, ὥστε ὁρᾷ ὁ κίων.

3 Κἀγώ, scilicet ὁρῶ τὰ δυνατὰ ὁρᾶν. The Sophist seems to have acted like Antisthenes when he turned out the rags of his cloak for Socrates to see, Diog. Laert. vi. 8.

5 Τί δέ; . . . Μηδέν. 'But what can they see?' Nothing. Cf. Riddell, *Digest of Idioms*, § 135 'Μή. (a) In indicative sentences expressing a negative supposition. *Theaet.* 192 E Σωκράτης ἐπιγινώσκει Θεόδωρον καὶ Θεαίτητον, ὁρᾷ δὲ μηδέτερον, μηδὲ ἄλλη αἴσθησις αὐτῷ πάρεστι περὶ αὐτῶν.' I have completed the quotation.

6 οὕτως ἡδὺς εἶ, 'sweet innocent as you are.' Cf. *Gorg.* 491 D,

Pol. 337 D, Ruhnke. *Tim. Lex.* 'Ἡδύς' εὐήθης καὶ ἄφρων. Suidas: 'Ἡδύς' εὐήθης, ἐκάλουν δὲ οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ὑπομάρους.

οὐ καθεύδων ἐπικεκοιμηῆσθαι, 'to have fallen asleep with your eyes γ open.' Cf. Lucian, *Alex.* 255 λαμβάνων γὰρ τὰ βιβλία ἐπεκοιμάτο, ὡς ἔφασκεν, αὐτοῖς.

σιγῶντα λέγειν, 'a speaking of the silent.' Cf. Aristot. *Soph. El.* b 1 iv. 528 Παρὰ τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν οἱ τοιοῖδε λόγοι . . . ἄρ' ἔστι σιγῶντα λέγειν; διττὸν γὰρ καὶ τὸ σιγῶντα λέγειν, τό τε τὸν λέγοντα σιγᾶν καὶ τὸ τὰ λεγόμενα. *ibid.* x. 558 διὸ ἡ ἐν τῷ συλλογισμῷ ἔσται τὸ αἴτιον, ἡ ἐν τῇ ἀντιφάσει (προσκεισθαι γὰρ δεῖ τὴν ἀντίφασιν), ὅτε δ' ἐν ἀμφοῖν, ἐὰν ἡ φαινόμενος ἔλεγχος. ἔστι δὲ ὁ μὲν τοῦ σιγῶντα λέγειν ἐν τῇ ἀντιφάσει, οὐκ ἐν τῷ συλλογισμῷ.

φθεγγόμενα . . . λέγεται, 'the irons, if anybody touch them, are γ spoken of as roaring and crying aloud.' For λέγεται, BT, Ast conjectured λέγει. But the passive is right in answer to οὐ σιγῶντα λέγεις;

τοῦτο μὲν ὑπὸ σοφίας ἔλαθες οὐδὲν εἰπών, 'in this your wisdom has γ made you unwittingly talk nonsense.'

λέγοντα σιγᾶν, 'to be silent in speaking.' 8

ὑπεραγωνιᾶν, 'to be over anxious on account of the boy.' Cf. c 1 *Charm.* 162 C I Καὶ ὁ Κριτίας δῆλος μὲν ἦν καὶ πάλαι ἀγωνιῶν καὶ φιλοτίμως πρὸς τε τὸν Χαρμίδην καὶ πρὸς τοὺς παρόντας ἔχων.

τὰ λέγοντα, a necessary emendation of τὰ λεγόμενα BT, adopted 4 by all editors (except Winckelmann) before Schanz, who bracketed τὰ λεγόμενα.

τά γε δήπου λέγοντα. Euthydemus himself tries to limit the 6 universal term τὰ πάντα by a distinction such as he would not allow Socrates to use, 295 B 4, 296 A I οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἐρωτῶ ὅτῳ, ἀλλ' εἰ ἐπίστασάι τῳ.

μέγα πάνν ἀνακαγχάσας, 'with a loud roar of laughter.' Cf. *Pol.* d 3 337 A καὶ ὅς ἀκούσας ἀνεκάγχασέ τε μάλα σαρδάνιον. See 276 D note.

ἐξημφοτέρικεν τὸν λόγον. For the explanation of this phrase 4 Winckelmann rightly refers to *Pol.* 479 C τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ἐστιάσεσιν, ἔφη, ἐπαμφοτερίζουσιν ἔοικε καὶ τῷ τῶν παίδων αἰνίγματι τῷ περὶ τοῦ εὐνούχου τῆς βολῆς περὶ τῆς νυκτερίδος, ᾧ καὶ ἐφ' οὗ αὐτὸν αὐτὴν αἰνίττονται βαλεῖν. The riddle itself is preserved by the Scholiast on that passage.

Κλεάρχου γρίφος

αἰνός τίς ἐστιν ὡς ἀνὴρ τε κοῦκ ἀνὴρ
 ὄρνιθα κ' οὐκ ὄρνιθ' ἰδὼν τε κοῦκ ἰδὼν
 ἐπὶ ξύλου τε κοῦ ξύλου καθημένον
 λίθω βαλὼν τε κοῦ λίθω διώλεσεν.

Νυκτερίδα ὁ εὐνοῦχος νάρθηκι κισήρει.

The point of comparison is that one who 'is and is not a man' strikes that which 'is and is not a bird,' &c. Upon this Plato by the mouth of Glaucon remarks that we cannot form a positive conception of such things either as being or not-being (καὶ οὔτε εἶναι οὔτε μὴ εἶναι οὐδὲν αὐτῶν δυνατὸν παγίως νοῆσαι). Winckelmann also refers (*Proleg.* xxiii. note b) to an anecdote about Menedemus in Diog. Laert. ii. 135 Ἀλεξίνου ποτὲ ἐρωτήσαντος εἰ πέπνυται τὸν πατέρα τύπτων, Ἄλλ' οὐτ' ἔτυπτον, φάναι, οὔτε πέπνυμαι. Πάλιν τ' ἐκείνου λέγοντος ὡς ἐχρῆν εἰπόντα ναί ἢ οὐ λύσαι τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν, Γελοῖον, εἶπε, τὸ ἵς ὑμετέροις νόμοις ἀκολουθεῖν, ἐξὸν ἐν πύλαις ἀντιβῆναι.

Our Sophists in the *Euthydemus* had insisted on the same rule that the answer must be given categorically 'Yes' or 'No'; and Ctesippus shrewdly turns their own chief weapon against them: 'That is not what I ask, but "Do all things keep silence or speak?"' This is exactly the 'Fallacia plurium interrogationum, quando plures quaestiones velut una proponuntur' (Aldrich ap. Mansel, *Artis Logicae Rudimenta*, App. 139, Whateley, *Elements of Logic*, Bk. iii. 9). Cf. Aristot. *Soph. El.* v. 11 ἢ πάλιν, ὧν τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἀγαθὰ, πάντα ἀγαθὰ ἢ οὐκ ἀγαθὰ; ὁπότερον γὰρ ἂν φῇ, ἔστι μὲν ὡς ἔλεγχον ἢ ψεῦδος φαινόμενον δόξειεν ἂν ποιεῖν τὸ γὰρ φάναι τῶν μὴ ἀγαθῶν τι εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τι μὴ ἀγαθὸν ψεῦδος. *ibid.* xxx. Πρὸς δὲ τοὺς τὰ πλείω ἐρωτήματα ἐν ποιούντας εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ διοριστέον' ἐρώτησις γὰρ μία, πρὸς ἣν μία ἀπόκρισις ἐστὶν ὥστε οὔτε πλείω καθ' ἑνὸς οὔτε ἐν κατὰ πολλῶν, ἀλλ' ἐν καθ' ἑνὸς φασίεν ἢ ἀποφασίεν.

In the present case, however, where both sides of the dilemma are to be denied, Dionysodorus might have escaped, if instead of answering 'Yes' or 'No' he had been allowed and contented to answer simply Οὐδέτερον; but 'by adding ἀμφοτέρα he has ruined his argument' (ἐξημφοτέρεικεν τὸν λόγον).

5 ἀπόλωλέ τε καὶ ἡττήται BT, 'he is beaten and done for. 'Prodidit' (Ficinus), ἀπολώλεκε (Heindorf). 'Quid reponendum sit

non exputo' (Badham). The objection that the weaker word comes first is hardly a sufficient reason for tampering with the text of BT.

πλείον ἢ δεκαπλάσιος. 'Aristid. *Orat. Sacr.* i. 494 Ἦδη μὲν τις καὶ 6 ἄλλος χρηστοῦ τινος αὐτῷ συμβάντος καὶ βουλόμενος ἐνδείξασθαι τὴν ἡδονὴν εἶπεν ὡς ἄρα εἴη πλείων ἢ διπλάσιος γεγωνός' (Heindorf).

ὁ δέ μοι BT, γρ. ὁ δ' ἐδόκει μοι ἄτε T, ὁ δ' οἶμαι Badham, Schanz. 7 The reading of BT ὁ δέ μοι πανοῦργος ὦν, ὁ Κτήσιππος, has been rightly retained by Bekker, Winckelmann, Stallbaum, and Hermann: μοι is what is called the *dativus commodi*, frequently used to express the interest or opinion of the person speaking (Jelf, *Gk. Gr.* 600, Obs. 2): if any change were to be made, the best would be μοι δοκεῖ (Burnet), used parenthetically: 'And he, methinks, rogue that he was, I mean Ctesippus, had overheard this very trick from these men themselves, for there are no other men living that have such wisdom. But cf. *Sophist.* 216 D τοῦ μέντοι ξένου ἡμῖν ἡδέως ἂν πυνθανοίμην.

παρηκῆκοι. Cf. Aristoph. *Ran.* 750 καὶ παρακούειν δεσποτῶν ἄτ' 8 ἂν λαλῶσι (Stallbaum).

* Ἄρα ἕτερα ὄντα τοῦ καλοῦ; 'Were they other than the beautiful?' 301 'In these words I see not merely, with Steinhart, "a close approximation to the doctrine of ideas," but the actual enunciation of this doctrine' (Zeller, *Plato* 126, note). Stallbaum more correctly sees here only the *logical* doctrine of universals as held by Socrates, upon which Plato afterwards founded his *metaphysical* doctrine of 'Ideas.' Cf. *Meno* 73 D εἴπερ ἐν γέ τι ζητεῖς κατὰ πάντων. 74 A πολλὰς αὖ ἡύρηκαμεν ἀρετὰς μίαν ζητοῦντες . . . τὴν δὲ μίαν, ἣ διὰ πάντων τούτων ἐστίν, οὐ δυνάμεθα ἀνευρεῖν. *Parmen.* 130 B. Aristot. *Metaph.* i. 6, 2, and see note on 301 A 4 πάρεστιν, κτλ.

ἐν παντὶ ἐγενόμην ὑπὸ ἀπορίας, 'was at my wit's end for want of an answer.' Cf. Wytttenbach, Plut. *Mor., De Sera Num. Vind.* 568 A 'ἐν παντὶ γενέσθαι κακῷ διὰ φόβον. Satis erat ἐν παντὶ γενέσθαι; ut postrema ab annotatore quodam addita videantur. 'Εν παντὶ εἶναι est Attica locutio, quae notat in maximo timore esse. . . . Plato tamen *Pol.* 579 B usus est pleniore forma ἐν παντὶ κακοῦ εἶη.' Cf. Stallbaum ad Plat. *Sympos.* 194 A εὖ καὶ μάλ' ἂν φόβοιο καὶ ἐν παντὶ εἴης. Xen. *Hell.* v. 4, 29 ἐν παντὶ ἦσαν.

ὄτι ἐγρυῖα, 'for putting in my grunt': cf. Aristoph. *Plut.* 598 3 ἀλλὰ φθείρου καὶ μὴ γρύξῃς ἔτι μηδ' ὀτιοῦν.

- 4 *πάρεστιν μίντοι ἐκάστω αὐτῶν κάλλος τι.* Lutoslawski argues (p. 212, note) that the use of *πάρεστιν* in this passage does not correspond to the terminology of ideas in Plato. But on the many various terms including *παρεῖναι* and *παρουσία*, by which Plato expresses the relation between the universal ideas and the particulars of experience, see Jowett and Campbell, *Rep.* ii. 309, and *Classical Rev.* March, 1904, p. 122.
- 5 *ἐὰν οὖν, ἔφη, παραγίγνται σοι βούς.* 'Est fallacia Homonymiae: sita est enim ambiguitas in vocibus *παραγίγνομαι* et *πάρειμι*; nam diverso sensu *παραγίγνεται* alicui bos et pulcritudo' (Routh).
- 8 *Ἄλλὰ τίνα τρόπον . . .*, 'But in what way must one thing be present to another, in order that this other may be other (than it was)?' For example, how must beauty be present to a stone that it may be beautiful? See the full discussion of this question in *Lys.* 217 D, and cf. *Meno* 71 A *ἀρετὴν γοῦν εἴτε διδασκὸν εἴθ' ὅτῳ τρόπῳ παραγίγνεται εἰδέναι.*
- b 1 *τοῖν ἀνδρῶν τὴν σοφίαν ἐπεχείρουν μιμεῖσθαι.* The Sophist had used the predicate *ἕτερον* in a different sense from that which it bore in *τὸ ἕτερον*, where it indicates merely the numerical distinction of individuals. Socrates does what the Sophists had often done before, he changes the meaning of the predicate *ἕτερον*, pretending to understand it in the same sense as in the subject *τὸ ἕτερον*.
- 3 *Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἀπορῶ . . . ὃ μὴ ἔστι;* 'Of course I am at a loss about a thing that does not exist.' Cf. Zeller, *Socrates* 277 'He (Stilpo) rejected, as did Antisthenes, every combination of subject and predicate, since the conception of the one is different from the conception of the other, and two things with different conceptions can never be declared to be the same.' *ibid.* (note) 'Since the conception of *Σωκράτης μουσικός* is a different one from *Σωκράτης λευκός*, the one according to Megarian hypothesis must be a different person from the other.'
- 6 *Ἐὰν ἔμοιγε, ἔφη, δοκῇ,* 'Yes, if it seems so to me.' This is the doctrine of Protagoras that 'man is the measure of all things,' i.e. 'what a thing seems to a man that it is to him.' Cf. 301 E 6; Zeller, *Outlines*, p. 92.
- c 1 *ἀπορήσαι, ὡς οὐ τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερόν ἐστιν,* 'would have doubted that the other is other.'
- 2 *τοῦτο μὲν ἐκὰν παρήκας.* 'This point you purposely omitted, since

in all the rest, like workmen whose business it is to finish each his proper work, you also seem to me to finish in very beautiful style the practice of discussion.'

τίνα χαλκεύειν προσήκει, 'whom it befits to forge copper.' 'Dicit 7 τίνα non τίνι, ut statim ambiguitas sermonis nascatur' (Heindorf).

τί δέ, κεραμεύειν; 'Well again, whom to make pots?' The 8 alteration of τί BT into τίνα, with some inferior MSS., is unnecessary.

τὰ μικρὰ κρέα . . . ὀπτᾶν, 'and cut up and boil and roast the small 9 pieces.' Badham reads τὰ κρέα σμικρὰ κατακόψαντα, 'to cut up the flesh into small pieces': but τὰ μικρὰ κρέα depends on the principal verbs ἔψειν καὶ ὀπτᾶν as much if not more than on κατακόψαντα.

κολοφῶνα ἐπιτιθεῖς. Cf. Strabo 643 'Εκτήσαντο δέ ποτε καὶ ναυτικὴν e 1 ἀξιόλογον δύναμιν Κολοφώνιοι καὶ ἱππικὴν, ἐν ᾗ τοσοῦτον διέφερον τῶν ἄλλων ὥσθ' ὅπου ποτὲ ἐν τοῖς δυσκαταλύτοις πολέμοις τὸ ἱππικὸν τῶν Κολοφωνίων ἐπικουρήσειε λύεσθαι τὸν πόλεμον' ἀφ' οὗ καὶ τὴν παροιμίαν ἐκδοθῆναι τὴν λέγουσαν "τὸν Κολοφῶνα ἐπέθηκεν," ὅταν τέλος ἐπιτεθῇ βέβαιον τῷ πράγματι.

ἐπιτιθεῖς Schanz: ἐπιτιθεῖς B, ἐπιτιθης T. Cf. Rutherford, *New Phrynichus*, ccxx. 'The authority of Porson (ad Eur. *Or.* 141) has induced many scholars to prefer ἷης and τίθης to ἰεῖς and τιθεῖς. Brunck, on Aristoph. *Lys.* 895 and Soph. *Phil.* 992, took the opposite view to that of Porson, and in this case the verdict of the great English critic must be reversed. The authority of the MSS. is wholly on the side of Brunck. Thus in Aristoph. *Lys.* 895 the Ravenna exhibits διατιθεῖς, and on *Eg.* 717 ἐντιθεῖς.' In Soph. *Philoct.* 992 Jebb reads τίθης against the authority of the MSS.

ἐπιγνοίης ἂν αὐτήν . . . ; 'Should you recognize it?' 4

ἀπὸ σοῦ γὰρ δεῖ ἀρχεσθαι, τελευτᾶν δ' εἰς Εὐθύδημον. An imitation 8 of the common mode of beginning an address to a deity. Cf. Theocr. xvii. 1 'Εκ Διὸς ἀρχώμεσθα, καὶ ἐς Δία λήγετε, Μοῖσαι. Theogn. *Gnom.* 'Ω ἄνα, Λητοῦς υἱέ, Διὸς τόκος, οὔποτε σεῖο λήσομαι ἀρχόμενος, οὐδ' ἀποπανόμενος. Hom. *Hymn. ad Dionys.* 17, Arati *Phaen.* 1, Virg. *Ecl.* iii. 59. The same mode of expression is used in Hom. *Il.* ix. 97 by Nestor in addressing Agamemnon: ἐν σοὶ μὲν λήξω, σεο δ' ἀρξομαι.

οἶον βοῦς καὶ πρόβατον, ἄρ' ἂν ἡγοῖο ταῦτα σὰ εἶναι. On this use 302 of the nominative to introduce an object without regard to the a 1

construction that follows see Bernhardt, *Gr. Synt.* p. 68; Jelf, § 477; Kühner-Blass, § 356, 2.

- 5 ἀνακύψοιτο τῶν ἐρωτημάτων B, ἀνακύψοι τὸ τῶν ἐρ. T. 'I knew that some fine result would pop up from their questions.' For the future middle see Aristoph. *Av.* 147 ἀνακύψεται κλητῆρ' ἄγους' ἔωθεν ἡ Σαλαμνία.
- b 3 εἰρωνικῶς πάνυ ἐπισχών, 'after pausing with a very ironical air.' Cf. *Symph.* 218 D ἀκούσας μάλα εἰρωνικῶς καὶ σφύδρα ἑαυτῷ εἰωθότως. *Cratyl.* 384 A οὔτε ἀποσαφεῖ οὐδέν, εἰρωνεύεται τε πρὸς με, προσποιούμενός τι αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ διανοεῖσθαι.
- 6 ἄπορόν τινα στροφήν ἔφηνον, 'I tried to escape by some desperate dodge, and began at once to twist about as if caught in a net.' Cf. *Pol.* 405 C πάσας μὲν στροφὰς στρέφεισθαι.
- 7 Οὐκ ἔστιν. Socrates tries to elude the coming attack of Dionysodorus by what he himself describes as ἄπυρόν τινα στροφήν, 'a helpless kind of twist.' The title Ζεὺς Πατρώος was used in two senses, (1) as he was the ancestor of an individual or of a race, (2) as he was the guardian of piety towards parents. For (1) cf. Plat. *Pol.* 391 E (with Adam's note)

Οἱ θεῶν ἀγχίποροι
οἱ Ζηνὸς ἐγγύς, ὧν κατ' Ἰδαῖον πάγον
Διὸς πατρώου βωμός ἐστ' ἐν αἰθέρι.

Soph. Trach. 287 εὖτ' ἂν ἀγνὰ θύματα ῥέξῃ πατρώῳ Ζηνί. *ibid.* 754 ἔνθα πατρώῳ Διὶ βώμους ὀρίζει τεμενίαν τε φυλλάδα. As Tantalus and Heracles both were sons of Zeus, the title πατρώος is rightly used in reference to them in sense (1). (2) Aristoph. *Nub.* 1468:

ΣΤΡ. Ναί, Ναί, καταιδέσθητι πατρώων Δία.

ΦΕΙΔ. Ἰδοὺ γε Δία πατρώον, ὥς ἀρχαῖος εἶ.

Eur. El. 675 ὦ Ζεῦ πατρώε, where Zeus is invoked by Orestes 'as the god who avenges the outraged name of *Father*' (Paley). Plat. *Legg.* 881 D ἀρᾷ ἐνεχέσθω Διὸς ὁμογνίου καὶ πατρώου κατὰ νόμον. Observe also that neither Tantalus, Heracles, nor Orestes was an Athenian, so that the Tragedians in these passages do not contradict what Plato says here. Thus Socrates imitates the logical tricks of the Sophists by denying in one sense what was true in another. Cf. Lobeck, *Aglaoph.* p. 770.

- C 2 Ἔα, . . . εὐφήμεί τε, 'Ah! said I, speak reverently, and do not harshly lecture me too soon.' Cf. Aesch. *Prom.* 688 ἔα, ἔα, ἄπεχε.

βωμοὶ καὶ ἱερὰ οἰκεία καὶ πατρῶα, 'altars and sacred rites domestic, ancestral, and all the rest of such things that the other Athenians have.'

Ζεὺς ὁ πατρῶος; BT. 'Have not the other Athenians Zeus as their ancestral god?' Schanz rejects the article unnecessarily in his text, having previously proposed ὁ Ζεὺς ὁ πατρῶος.

αὕτη ἡ ἐπωνυμία, 'this ancestral title.'

7

Ἀπόλλων πατρῶος. Cf. Harpocrat. s. v. τὸν δὲ Ἀπόλλωνα κοινῶς πατρῶον τιμῶσιν Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπὸ Ἴωνος· τοῦτον γὰρ οἰκίσαντος τὴν Ἀττικὴν, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης φησί, τοὺς Ἀθηναίους Ἴωνας κληθῆναι καὶ Ἀπόλλω πατρῶον αὐτοῖς ὀνομασθῆναι. The quotation from Aristotle was probably from the opening, now lost, of his treatise *On the Constitution of Athens*: see Kenyon, p. 171. Cf. Demosth. *In Eubulidem* 1315 παιδίον ὄντα με εὐθέως ἤγον εἰς τοὺς φράτορας, εἰς Ἀπόλλωνος πατρῶον ἤγον, εἰς τὰλλα ἱερά. *De Corona* 274 καὶ τὸν Ἀπόλλω τὸν Πύθιον, ὃς Πατρῶος ἐστὶ τῇ πόλει. Cf. Plut. *Alcib.* 2 Αὐλεῖτωσαν οὖν, ἔφη, Θηβαίων παῖδες· οὐ γὰρ ἴσασιν διαλέγεσθαι· ἡμῖν δὲ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, ὡς οἱ πατέρες λέγουσιν, Ἀρχηγέτις Ἀθηνᾶ καὶ Πατρῶος Ἀπόλλων ἐστίν, ὃν ἡ μὲν ἔρριψε τὸν αὐλόν, ὃ δὲ καὶ τὸν αὐλητὴν ἐξέδειρε.

διὰ τὴν τοῦ Ἴωνος γένεσιν. Ion, son of Apollo and Creusa, was represented to Xanthus by the oracle as being his own son by Creusa. The story is told in Eur. *Ion* 64-75.

ἔρκειος, 'defender of the house.' Harpocrat. Ἐρκειος Ζεὺς, ὃς βωμὸς ἐντὸς ἔρκους ἐν τῇ αὐλῇ ἱδρύται· τὸν γὰρ περίβολον ἔρκος ἔλεγον. Ὅτι δὲ τοῦτοις μετὴν τῆς πολιτείας οἷς εἶη Ζεὺς Ἐρκειος δεδήλωκε καὶ Ὑπερείδης (Heindorf). Cf. Aristot. *De Rep. Athen.* [col. 28] ἐπερωτῶσιν δ' ὅταν δοκιμάζωσιν, πρῶτον μὲν τίς σοι πατὴρ καὶ πόθεν τῶν δήμων, καὶ τίς πατρὸς πατήρ, καὶ τίς μήτηρ, καὶ τίς μητρὸς πατήρ καὶ πόθεν τῶν δήμων· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα εἰ ἔστιν αὐτῷ Ἀπόλλων πατρῶος καὶ Ζεὺς ἔρκειος, καὶ ποῦ ταῦτα τὰ ἱερά ἐστίν. The ἱερά seem to have been movable shrines.

φράτριος. A φρατρία was a third part (τριτὴς Demosth. 184) of one of the four ancient tribes into which Attica was divided either by Aegeus and his three brothers, sons of Pandion (Soph. *Fr.* 19, Strabo 392), or according to a different tradition by Ion (Strabo 383). Schol. in Plat. *Axiach.* 371 [Γεννήτῃ] Ἀριστοτέλης φησί, τοῦ ὅλου πλήθους διηρημένου Ἀθῆνησιν εἰς τε τοὺς γεωργοὺς καὶ τοὺς δημιουργοὺς, φυλὰς αὐτῶν εἶναι τέσσαρας, τῶν δὲ φυλῶν ἐκάστης μοίρας εἶναι τρεῖς, ἅς τριτῆας τε καλοῦσι καὶ φρατρίας, ἐκάστης δὲ τούτων τριάκοντα εἶναι

γένη, τὸ δὲ γένος ἐκ τριάκοντα ἑκάστων ἀνδρῶν συνεστάναι. τούτους δὲ τοὺς εἰς τὰ γένη τεταγμένους γεννήτας καλοῦσιν.' Cf. Aristot. *De Rep. Athen.* (Kenyon) 21, *ibid.* Append. Fr. 347.

- 3 Ἀθηναία φρατρία. Under this title Athena was worshipped together with Zeus at the Ἀπατούρια, an annual festival of the phratriae, Xen. *Hell.* i. 7, 8 ἐν οἷς οἱ τε πατέρες καὶ οἱ συγγενεῖς σύνεισι σφίσιν αὐτοῖς. Cf. Hdt. i. 147.

- 8 τί γὰρ πάθω; 'For what can become of me?' Cf. Eur. *Phoen.* 895 τὸ μέλλον εἰ χρὴ πείσομαι' τί γὰρ πάθω; *Androm.* 513, with Paley's note, Hom. *Od.* v. 465 ὦ μοι ἐγώ, τί πάθω; τί νύ μοι μήκιστα γένηται;

- e 5 θῦσαι <δῆ> Schanz, θῦσαι ἂν BT. ἂν, which was omitted by Stephanus and Heindorf, was brought back by Winckelmann and Stallbaum, but changed by Schanz into δῆ. The uncial ΔΗ is very easily mistaken for AN.

- 303 Πυππᾶξ ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ἔφη, καλοῦ λόγου. 'Bravo, by Heracles!

- a 6 what a fine argument.' Cf. Cratin. *Δραπ.* Fr. 7 οἷδε πυππάζουσι περιτρέχοντες. Aristoph. *Eg.* 680 οἱ δ' ὑπερεπήνον ὑπερεπύππαζόν τέ με. Schol. in *Euthyd.* τὸ νῦν βομβᾶξ λεγόμενον πύπαξ ἔλεγον, ὥς καὶ Δυκόφρων φήθη. οὐκ ἔστι δέ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πύπαξ τίθεται καὶ ἐπὶ σχετλιασμοῦ καὶ ἐγκωμίου τὸ δὲ βομβᾶξ οὐκέτι.

- 7 ὁ Πυππᾶξ. Dionysodorus turns the adverb into a proper name.

- 9 ἀφίσταμαι, 'I withdraw,' 'I give up.' 'Sic iam Pindar, *Ol.* i. 82 sq. elegantissimo asyndeto dixit ἐμοὶ δ' ἄπορα γαστρίμαργον μακάρων τιν' εἰπεῖν' ἀφίσταμαι' (Winckelmann).

- b 2 καὶ γελῶντες Badham. καὶ γελῶντε B, γελῶντε T. 'Incredibile est neminem adhuc ad vulgatam lectionem offendisse, quae ipsos Sophistas sibi plaudentes induceret, idque adeo vehementer ut paene deficerent. Unum superest verae lectionis vestigium quod in Clarkiano καὶ γελῶντε scriptum est' (Badham). *ibid.* in App. Crit. 'καὶ e Clarkiano restitui, et dualem in pluralem ter mutavi.'

- 3 ὀλίγου παρετάθησαν, 'were almost killed with laughing, and clapping, and rejoicing.' Cf. *Lys.* 204 C παραταθήσεται ὑπὸ σοῦ ἀκούων θαμὰ λέγοντος. *Symph.* 207 B τῷ λιμῷ παρατεινόμενα. Xen. *Mem.* iii. 13, 6 παρετάθη μακρὰν ὁδὸν πορευθεῖς.

ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἐφ' ἑκάστοις πᾶσι. 'Over the former victories the admirers of Euthydemus alone shouted gloriously over each and all.' 'Iungendum haud dubie ἐφ' ἑκάστοις πᾶσι, quod nescio cur Winckelmannus recte fieri posse negaverit. Nam ἑκαστα

πάντα sunt *singula quaeque*' (Stallbaum). On Plato's use of *pās* or its compounds with *ἕκαστος* see Walbe *ap.* Lutoslawski, p. 126.

καὶ οἱ κίονες. Cf. *Pol.* 492 B πρὸς δ' αὐτοῖς αἱ τε πέτραι καὶ ὁ τόπος, 5 ἐν ᾗ ἂν ὦσιν, ἐπηχούντες διπλάσιον θόρυβον παρέχωσι τοῦ ψόγου καὶ ἐπαίνου. 'Acerba irrisio inest in Socratis verbis' (Schanz, *N. C. P.* p. 84).

παντάπασι καταδουλωθεὶς κτλ., 'being altogether overpowered by c 2 their wisdom I took to praising and extolling them.'

Ἦ μακάριοι σφώ, 'O happy pair, what wonderful genius, that you † have brought so great a subject to perfection so readily and in so short a time!'

ἐν δὲ τοῖς καὶ τοῦτο μεγαλοπρεπέστερον BT, 'but among them just 7 this is especially magnificent.' 'Utrum μεγαλοπρεπέστατον?' STEPH. 'Ita verterat ante Stephanum Cornarius. Sed comparativus mihi magis placet, dum sonat *quiddam plus quam solito magnificum*' (Routh). The change to μεγαλοπρεπέστατον was very easily suggested by the well-known use of ἐν τοῖς with a superlative, to which it gives additional emphasis (Thuc. iii. 81 ἐν τοῖς πρώτη ἐγένετο: Jelf, *Gk. Gr.* § 140, 4; Donaldson, *Gk. Gr.* § 416 (cc)). But as in that idiom the two words seem never to be separated not even so slightly as here (ἐν δὲ τοῖς), it is safer to regard τοῖς simply as the demonstrative looking back to πολλὰ . . . καλά, and used here instead of τούτοις because of τοῦτο immediately following. The comparative is maintained by Winckelmann and by Bernhardt, *Gr. Synt.* 436, who refers to this passage, and apparently by Ficinus, 'in quibus id praecipue magnificum est.'

τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων κτλ., 'for the mass of mankind and for 8 men of importance indeed and of great repute you care nothing at all.' Both words, σεμνῶν and δῆ, are constantly used in irony. For δοκοῦντων εἶναι τι cf. *Gorg.* 472 A. S. Paul, *Gal.* ii. 6.

πάνυ μὲν ἂν ὀλίγοι ἀγαπῶεν ἄνθρωποι ὅμοιοι ὑμῖν, 'very few would be d 2 satisfied, and those men like yourselves.'

οὕτω νοοῦσιν αὐτοὺς B Vind., 'have such a notion of them,' 'so 3 conceive of them': cf. *Pol.* 508 D Οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς νόει, 'thus conceive of the soul also': *Phaedr.* 246 C οὔτε ἰδόντες οὔτε ἱκανῶς νοήσαντες θεόν. The various reading οὕτως ἀγνοοῦσιν T has given rise to many needless conjectures.

δημοτικόν τι καὶ πρῶν, 'a popular and kindly feature.' πρῶν 6

refers to their closing their own mouths as well as those of others. Winckelmann refers to Plutarch, *Mor.* 148 D καὶ τὸν πατέρα τοῖς πολίταις πρῶτον ἄρχοντα παρέχει καὶ δημοτικώτερον.

- 7 ὁπόταν φῆτε μήτε καλὸν εἶναι μηδὲν μήτε ἀγαθὸν πρᾶγμα κτλ. 'Whenever you deny that anything is either beautiful or good': i.e. when you say that there is no unity of substance and attribute, or of subject and predicate. Cf. *Sophist.* 251 C χαίρουσιν οὐκ ἔωντες ἀγαθὸν λέγειν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον. The motive was to avoid admitting that the same thing could be both one and many. See the passages quoted in the Introduction, p. 40.

E 1 ἀτεχνῶς μὲν τῷ ὄντι συρράπτετε κτλ., 'you do in fact simply sew up men's mouths, just as you say.'

- 3 πᾶν χαρίεν τέ ἐστιν κτλ., 'is a most charming result, and does away with the invidiousness of your arguments.'

- 5 ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει ὑμῖν καὶ τεχνικῶς ἐξηγῆται, ὥστε κτλ. BT. Two constructions are in this reading combined, οὕτως ἔχει ὥστε and ἐξηγῆται ὥστε. Cf. 288 A καὶ ὥστε τοῦτο μὴ πάσχειν οὐδ' ὑπὸ τῆς ὑμετέρας πω τέχνης ἐξηγῆσθαι. For ἔχει Schanz reads εὔ, Badham εὖ ἔχει.

- 6 ὥστ' <ἐν> πᾶν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ. ὥστε BT. 'De Platonis more scribendum suspicor ὥστ' ἐν πᾶν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, ut § 74 (303 C 5) ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, § 3 (272 B 3), *Soph.* 234 A, . . . *Apol. Socr.* 19 A, . . . 24 A, 37 B, *Criton* 52 E, et sexcenta alia loca' (Heindorf).

- 7 ἔγνων ἔγωγε. 'Haec cum antecedentibus coniungunt *Ald.* et Basilienses. Melius opinor diviserunt interpretes et Stephanus; et mihi quidem proprium suum in arte sophistica profectum significare videtur Socrates' (Routh). Winckelmann, Badham, and Schanz connect ἔγνων ἔγωγε with the preceding sentence, and, I think, rightly: 'But the grandest thing, that this system is so arranged by you and so skilfully invented that any one in the world can learn it in a very short time—this I myself learnt by observing how quickly Ctesippus was able to imitate you offhand.'

καὶ τῷ Κτησίππῳ. For this use of καί see Riddell, *Digest of Idioms*, § 132 on 'Καί expletive, preceding and indicating the emphatic word.'

- 304 τοῦτο μὲν οὖν τοῦ πράγματος σφῶν, 'This part then of your business a is excellent in regard to its rapid transmission, but not expedient

for discussion in public.' The addition in T of τὸ σοφὸν after σφῶν may possibly, as Stallbaum suggests, have arisen from σφῶν itself.

αὐτῷ πρὸς ἀλλήλῳ μόνῳ. Cf. Cobet, *Var. Lect.* 111 'Alterum indicium eiusdem interpolationis (μόνῳ) est in Platonis *Euthydemo* p. 504 A . . . ubi si μόνῳ in margine apponetur, pristinam sedem et iustam receperit.' Recent editors rightly retain μόνῳ, as adding force to αὐτῷ, according to a very common usage: cf. *Gorg.* 500 B; *Theaet.* 202 A; *Legg.* 667 B.

τὸ γὰρ σπάνιον . . . τίμιον. Cf. Plut. *Mor.* 826 C τὸ τίμιον ἐν τῷ b 3 σπανίῳ τιθέμενον.

ἄγετε . . . ὅπως . . . παραδείξεσθον. After ἄγετε, which involves the 4 notion of exhorting or inciting, ὅπως with the future indicative has its original meaning ὅτῳ τρόπῳ, *quo pacto* as below B 7 σκόπει οὖν ὅπως συμφοιτήσεις: cf. Xen. *Cyr.* i. 2, 3 οἱ Περσικοὶ νόμοι ἐπιμέλονται ὅπως τὴν ἀρχὴν μὴ τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται οἱ πολῖται. Jelf, *Gk. Gr.* 811.

τοῦ χρηματίζεσθαι BT. If we retain this reading of the MSS. c 4 we must, with Winckelmann and others, make a parenthesis of ὁ δὲ καὶ σοὶ . . . οὐδέν, which for convenience of translation we may transpose to the end: 'and (they say) that no limit of capacity or age excludes any one whatever from easily acquiring their wisdom, and what it most concerns you to hear, they say that there is nothing to hinder a man from money-making.' If we adopt the conjectural emendation of Stephanus τὸ χρηματίζεσθαι, or that of Routh, <τὸ> τοῦ χρηματίζεσθαι, the construction is even simpler: 'and (they say) that they exclude no kind of capacity or age, and, what it most concerns you to hear, that not even attention to business at all hinders any one whatever from easily acquiring their wisdom.' Crito seems to have been very keen about his profits from agriculture: cf. 291 E ἡ ὑμέτερα τέχνη ἢ γεωργία.

μανθάνοιμι B, μάθοιμι T. The present is the better tense, as the 7 learning would not be confined to one single act.

κινδυνεύω . . . εἶναι, 'Yet I fear that I too am not one of those who are like Euthydemus, but of those others of whom you were yourself speaking just now, those who would rather be refuted than refute others by such arguments.'

ἃ γ' ἤκουον, 'what was said to me just now.' The use of the d 3 imperfect is like that of ἔλεγες just above.

<ἴσθ'> ὅτι Heindorf, οἴσθ' ὅτι BT. The change from either to 4

the other by a simple itacism is so easy that Plato's usage is the best criterion, and this is strongly in favour of ἴσθ' ὅτι, which also gives the more suitable sense: cf. *Phaedr.* 243 D; *Gorg.* 453 A; *Theaet.* 145 B; *Parmen.* 135 D; *Pol.* 328 D; *Euthyd.* 284 E. 'You must know that one of those who were coming away from you came up to me as I was walking about.'

5 τούτων τις τῶν . . . δεινῶν. As a litigant at Athens was obliged to plead his own cause, a practice was adopted by Antiphon, Aeschines, Isocrates and other rhetoricians of writing speeches to be recited in court by their clients. On the supposed reference here to Isocrates see Introduction, p. 18.

7 ἀκροῦ, 'listen to the teaching.' Φυσικαὶ ἀκροάσεις is the title of Aristotle's lectures on Physics. Cf. *Menex.* 236 A Ἀσπασίας . . . ἡκροώμην περαινούσης ἐπιτάφιον λόγον.

8 οὐ γὰρ οἴός τ' ἦ προστάς κατακούειν, 'for I was not able to hear clearly, though I stood close up.' προστάς BT, 'though I stood forward.'

e 1 ἵνα ἤκουσας. After an historic tense (ἀξιόν γ' ἦν ἀκοῦσαι) indicating an unfulfilled circumstance ἵνα, like ὥς and ὅπως, is used with a past indicative to declare what would have, but has not, taken place: 'in which case' (or 'that') you might have heard.' Cf. *Protag.* 335 C ἀλλὰ σὲ ἐχρῆν ἡμῖν συγχωρεῖν τὸν ἀμφοτέρα δυνάμενον, ἵνα συνουσία ἐγίγνετο. *Crito* 44 D; *Meno* 895; *Soph. Oed. R.* 1386 :

εἰ τῆς ἀκουούσης ἔτ' ἦν

πηγῆς δι' ὧτων φραγμός, οὐκ ἂν ἐσχόμην

τὸ μὴ ποκλείσαι τοῦμόν ἄθλιον δέμας,

ἦν' ἢ τυφλός τε καὶ κλύων μηδέν.

Eur. Hippol. 645.

οἱ νῦν σοφώτατοί εἰσι τῶν περὶ τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους. This, like τῶνδε τῶν σοφῶν D 7, is ironical.

3 Τί οὖν ἐφαίνοντό σοι; If ἐφαίνοντο refers to the Sophists, the answer is framed as if Crito had asked Τί οὖν ἐφαίνεται σοι ἃ οὗτοι ἔλεγον; Τί δὲ ἄλλο . . . ἢ οἷά περ κτλ. But Schanz (*N. C. P.* p. 86) prefers to supply οἱ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι.

5 (οὕτωςι γὰρ πως καὶ εἶπεν τοῖς ὀνόμασι). 'For it was just so that he spoke word for word,' Lat. *verbum e verbo*. Cf. *Phaedr.* 234 C οὐχ ὑπερφυῶς τά τε ἄλλα καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν εἰρησθαι; *Phaedo* 71 B κἂν εἰ μὴ χρώμεθα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἐνιαχοῦ, 'if we do not use the exact terms

in some places.' 'I am quoting, says Crito to Socrates, the very words this person used. . . . This is an intimation that some one in particular is meant, and that the reader is expected to recognize the author by his style' (Thompson, *Phaedr.* p. 181). Cf. Introduction, p. 18.

Ἄλλὰ μέντοι κτλ. 'But surely philosophy is a fine sort of thing.' 6

Ποῖον, ἔφη, χαρίεν; 'Fine indeed? said he.' Cf. 291 A Ποῖος 7
Κτήσιππος;

ὦ μακάριε, 'my blessed fellow,' a polite mode of expressing strong disagreement: 'mein Lieber,' vel 'Beste' (Ast).

οὐδενὸς μὲν οὖν ἄξιον, 'Nay rather, good for nothing.'

ἑαυτὸν παρέχειν, 'to lend himself' as a tool. Cf. *Euthyphr.* 3 D 3
σὺ μὲν δοκεῖς σπάνιον σεαυτὸν παρέχειν. *Meno* 95 A παρέχειν αὐτοὺς
διδασκάλους τοῖς νέοις.

παντὸς δὲ ῥήματος ἀντέχονται, 'lay hold of every word.' 'Cuivis 4
vocabulo adhaerent' (Winckelm.). 'Arripiunt et tumentur quidquid
in solum venit' (Heind.). 'Clark. Vatic. pro ῥήματος nobis
tradiderunt χρήματος, quod, cum effundat bonum sensum, restitu-
tuendum est: scriptor enim universe dicit: "aggrediuntur rem
quamlibet"' (Schanz, *N. C. P.* p. 86). On ῥήμα see Lutosl. p. 430.

ἀλλὰ γάρ, 'But the fact is'; cf. Riddell, *Digest*, 182.

τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι. The distinction between
philosophical discussion in itself and the men who make a bad
use of it is introduced for the sake of what follows, τὸ πρᾶγμα
ἐδόκει οὐκ ὀρθῶς ψέγειν.

οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες, 'Wonderful fellows are the men of this class,' b 4
i. e. such as the critic you mention, ἀνὴρ οἰόμενος πάνυ εἶναι σοφός.

ὃ τι μέλλω εἰπεῖν, 'what I am to say.' Cf. *Gorg.* 455 B ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ 5
τοι οὐδ' αὐτὸς πῶ δύναμαι κατανοῆσαι ὃ τι λέγω. In μέλλω the notion
of what is about to be done is combined with that of what ought to
be done: cf. *Polit.* 291 C εἰ μέλλομεν ἰδεῖν ἐναργῶς.

ρήτωρ τις. The title 'rhetor' or 'orator' is thus appropriated to 7
those who actually speak in the law-courts or assemblies of the
δῆμος, in distinction from those who composed speeches for others
to deliver. Cf. Xen. *Mem.* ii. 6, 15 Ἐώρων γάρ, ἔφη ὁ Κριτόβουλος,
ρήτοράς τε φαύλους ἀγαθοῖς δημηγόροις φίλους ὄντας. The more
powerful of the δημηγόροι were called δημαγωγοί: cf. Schömann,
de Com. Athen. p. 109; Valckenar. *Diatrib. de Aristob.* xxiii. 251 sq.

τῶν τοὺς τοιοῦτους εἰσπεμπόντων, 'One of those who equip and send into court the former class of men, one who makes the speeches with which the orators (οἱ ῥήτορες) do battle.' Stallbaum would omit οἱ ῥήτορες, supposing that the title could not be applied to litigants who used speeches written for them by others. But the reading of the MSS. is retained by Schanz, and rightly defended by Winckelmann, *Proleg.* xxxvii. note a, on the ground that ῥήτωρ is applied to the actual speaker as such, however his speech may have been prepared. Cf. *Apolog.* 18 A, where ῥήτορος refers to Socrates himself, though it was the first time he had ever appeared to address a court. On the ῥήτορες as a professional class see Riddell, *Apolog.* p. x. note.

C 2 ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβεβηκέναι. The same phrase occurs *Apolog.* 17 D 'The preposition has the notion of "presenting oneself to the court." Cf. Isaeus, *Fr.* vii. 1. 15 λέγειν ἐπὶ δικαστηρίου. The ἀναβέβημα refers to the βῆμα' (Riddell). *ibid.* Introd. xv. 'The raised platform, called βῆμα, served for accuser and accused in turn as well as for their witnesses.'

5 Ἦδη μανθάνω· περὶ τούτων. In the older editions these words were connected, but Routh first corrected the punctuation. For a similar use of μανθάνω cf. *Rep.* 524 D μανθάνω τοίνυν ἤδη, ἔφη, καὶ δοκεῖ μοι οὕτω. The absence of any conjunction (asyndeton) before περὶ τούτων is quite in keeping with the rather excited and rapid speech of Socrates (Stallbaum): 'these are the men of whom I was myself going to speak just now.'

6 οὓς ἔφη Πρόδικος μεθόρια κτλ., 'whom Prodicus called borderers between a philosopher and a statesman.' I have not found any other reference to this saying. On Prodicus cf. 277 E 4, note, and on μεθόρια compare the two passages from which 'we obtain a complete notion of what Isocrates meant by "philosophy," a combination of the accomplishments of the ῥήτωρ and the πολιτικός' (Thompson, *Phaedr.* Append. ii. 172). Isocr. *Antid.* 196 οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ὄντες τὰς ἰδέας ἀπάσας αἷς ὁ λόγος τυγχάνει χρώμενος διεξέρχονται τοῖς μαθηταῖς. *ibid.* 290 σοφὸς μὲν νομίζω τοὺς ταῖς δόξαις ἐπιτυγχάνειν ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῦ βελτίστου δυναμένου, φιλοσόφους δὲ τοὺς ἐν τοῖτοις διατρίβοντας, ἐξ ὧν τάχιστα λήψονται τὴν τοιαύτην φρόνησιν. On the question whether Isocrates is here meant see the Introduction, p. 19.

8 πρὸς δὲ τῷ εἶναι καὶ δοκεῖν, 'and (think themselves) not only to be

but also to be so regarded among very many, so that there are none but the philosophers to stand in the way of their universal reputation.' The reading of the chief MSS. τὸ εἶναι must either be altered, as by Stallbaum, to the dative, or altogether omitted, as by Schanz. In this latter case τὸ εἶναι must be regarded as a marginal gloss intended to form a construction for πρὸς, the absolute use of which was not understood: cf. Hom. *Il.* v. 307 θλάσσε δέ οἱ κοτύλην, πρὸς δ' ἄμφω ῥήξε τένοντε. Hdt. i. 71 πρὸς δὲ οὐκ οἶνω διαχρέονται. Eur. *Hel.* 110 καὶ πρὸς γ' Ἀχαιοί.

εὐδοκιμῆν ἐμποδῶν σφίσιν εἶναι. Verbs or phrases expressing hindrance are followed by an infinitive either with or without μή or τοῦ, which Stephanus added in this place. Heindorf refers to Plat. *Pol.* 407 C ὥστε, ὅπη αὕτη, ἀρετῇ ἀσκεῖσθαι καὶ δοκιμάζεσθαι πάντη ἐμποδῖος. Thuc. i. 16 ἐπεγίγνετο . . . κωλύματα μὴ αὐξηθῆναι.

τοὺς περὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἀνθρώπους. The addition of ἀνθρώπους, which d 1 is otherwise unnecessary, is intended to express contempt. Cf. *Phaedr.* 268 C εἵποιεν ἄν, οἶμαι, ὅτι μαίνεται ἄνθρωπος. *Gorg.* 518 C διακόνους μοι λέγεις καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν παρασκευαστὰς ἀνθρώπους, 'a parcel of fellows, ministers and caterers to men's appetites' (Cope).

εἰν τοῦτους εἰς δόξαν καταστήσωσιν μηδενὸς δοκεῖν ἀξίους εἶναι, 'if 2 they reduce these to the reputation of being good for nothing.' For the pleonasm δόξαν . . . δοκεῖν cf. *Crito* 44 C καίτοι τίς ἂν αἰσχίων εἶη ταύτης δόξα ἢ δοκεῖν χρήματα περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι ἢ φίλους; *ibid.* 53 B.

ἀναμφισβητήτως . . . σοφίας πέρι, 'they will at once indisputably 3 carry off the victory in regard to reputation for wisdom.'

εἶναι . . . σφᾶς σοφωτάτους T. For the accusative, instead of the 5 more usual nominative with the infinitive, see 290 A 9, note: both here and there the addition of the personal pronoun is emphatic. In our present passage the MSS. vary, B having σφᾶς σοφώτατοι, from which Schanz adopts σφεῖς σοφώτατοι.

ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἰδίοις λόγοις ὅταν ἀποληφθῶσιν, 'when they are caught in private conversations.' Cf. *Pol.* 499 A ἐν δίκαις καὶ ἐν ἰδίαις συνουσίαις. I do not understand why Schanz prefers ἀπολειφθῶσιν to the well authenticated ἀποληφθῶσιν BT, for which cf. *Gorg.* 522 A ἐν τούτῳ τῷ κακῷ ἀποληφθέντα.

κολούεσθαι, 'are cut short': Schol. κολούεσθαι ἐλαττοῦσθαι, ἐμποδίσ- 7 ζεσθαι. Cf. *Apol.* 39 D μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους κολοῦειν, ἀλλ' ἐαυτὸν παρασκευά-

ζειν ὅπως ἔσται ὡς βέλτιστος. The loose rhetoric which was uninterrupted in a forensic speech was easily refuted by the sharp dialectic of the Sophists: cf. 305 E ἐκτὸς δὲ ὄντες κινδύνων καὶ ἀγῶνων.

πάνν εἰκότως, 'quite naturally': Stallbaum spoils the rhythm of the sentence by his punctuation πάνν· εἰκότως, both here and 287 B. In Plato and in other authors far most frequently πάνν precedes the word which it strengthens, as below πάνν ἐξ εἰκότος λόγου.

8 μετρίως μὲν γὰρ φιλοσοφίας ἔχουν, 'for they think that they are moderately acquainted with philosophy.' Cf. *Gorg.* 484 C φιλοσοφία γάρ τοι ἐστίν, ὃ Σώκρατες, χαρίεν, ἂν τις αὐτοῦ μετρίως ᾄφηται ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ. *ibid.* 487 C. 'The middle position, which Isocrates himself aimed at, is shown to be untenable' (Zeller, *Plato*, p. 132). In these words 'we are inevitably reminded of the description of Isocrates in the *Phaedrus* as one in whose genius ἐνεστί τις φιλοσοφία' (Thompson, *Phaedrus*, Append. ii. 181).

e 2 καρποῦσθαι τὴν σοφίαν. The finishing touch in the picture (ἐκτὸς δὲ . . . σοφίαν) agrees perfectly with the account of himself and his own way of life, which is given by Isocrates with no little self-gratulation in the *Antidosis* (Thompson, *ibid.*).

3 οὐ γάρ τοι ἀλλά, 'for it cannot be denied that.' Cf. 286 C, note.

5 ὄντως Ven. 184, οὕτως BT Vind. Cf. Routh: 'ὄντως. Non liquet fortasse quid legerit Ficinus, qui vertit *ut dicis*.' 'Videlicet grammatici vel scribae ignorarunt usum illum loquendi, quo ὄντως et τῷ ὄντι in dictorum usurpatur confirmatione, ideoque in eius locum otiosum illud atque languidum οὕτως suffecerunt. V. ad *Lach.* 196 D' (Stallbaum).

εὐπρέπειαν μᾶλλον ἢ ἀλήθειαν, 'plausibility rather than truth': cf. *Phaedo* 92 C μετὰ εἰκότος τινὸς καὶ εὐπρεπείας.

306 ὅσα μεταξύ τινοῖν δυοῖν κτλ., 'all other things that are halfway
a 2 between some two and partake of both, if compounded of evil and good, are made better than the one and worse than the other, but if of two things good for different objects, they are inferior to both in reference to any object for which either of those component parts is useful.' This notion is not contrary to Plato's conviction that true statesmanship must be based upon a sound philosophy: cf. *Gorg.* 581 D:

ὅσα δὲ ἐκ δυοῖν κακοῖν κτλ., 'but all intermediate compounds of 6 two evil things not having the same object, these and these only are better than either of those things of both of which they participate.'

μετέχουσιν BT: Hirschig's conjecture μετέχει, adopted by Schanz, b 2 is unnecessary. The thought is really directed, both at first and throughout, not to things neuter but to men, as immediately appears from the next sentence.

ἡ πολιτικὴ πρᾶξις, 'the business of statesmanship.' Cf. *Gorg.* 484 D ἐπειδὴν οὖν ἔλθωσιν εἰς τινα ἰδίαν ἢ πολιτικὴν πρᾶξιν.

οὔτοι δ' ἀμφοτέρων μετέχοντες. Stallbaum takes ἀμφοτέρων as 3 masculine, i.e. τῶν φιλοσόφων καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν: but the close relation to ἐκάτερα shows that it should be referred rather to ἡ φιλοσοφία and ἡ πολιτικὴ πρᾶξις. Cf. *Aristot. Eth. Nic.* x. 9, 18 τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ ἐπαγγέλλονται μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ σοφισταὶ κτλ.

ἀμφοτέρων γὰρ εἰσι φαυλότεροι. Stallbaum's explanation of ἀμφοτέρων is properly applicable to this second occurrence of the word.

οὕτως ἂν τι λέγοιεν ἀληθές, 'in this case there would be some 6 truth in what they say.' If philosophy and statesmanship are both bad, those who have but a little of each are better than those who have much of either.

πρὸς ἑκάτερον, πρὸς δ' ἢ τε πολιτικὴ κτλ., 'for either object, for c 3 which statesmanship on the one hand and philosophy on the other are important.' The conjunctions τε καὶ are here used disjunctively: cf. *Xen. Hier.* i. 2 πῇ διαφέρει ὁ τυραννικός τε καὶ ὁ ἰδιωτικός βίος. *Plat. Laws* 831 D; Jelf, *Gk. Gr.* 758, 1; Donaldson, *Gk. Gr.* § 554.

συγγινώσκειν . . . αὐτοῖς . . . τῆς ἐπιθυμίας. This use of the 6 genitive after συγγινώσκειν appears to be very rare. The accusative occurs in *Eur. Androm.* 840 συγγνώσεται σοι τήνδ' ἀμαρτίαν πόσις.

πάντα γὰρ ἄνδρα χρή ἀγαπᾶν, 'we ought to be satisfied with any 8 man.' Cf. *Cratyl.* 391 C τὰ δὲ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἀληθείᾳ ῥηθέντα ἀγαπῶν ὥς του ἄξια.

ἐχόμενον φρονήσεως, 'bordering on good sense': cf. *Pol.* 496 A οὐδὲν γνήσιον οὐδὲ ἄξιον οὐδὲ φρονήσεως ἀληθινῆς ἐχόμενον. 'Isocrates calls his own philosophy a φρόνησις in *Antid.* § 290' (Thompson, *ibid.* 182).

d 2 *περὶ τῶν υἱέων*. Cf. Diog. Laert. ii. 13 καὶ οἱ παῖδες δὲ αὐτοῦ (*Critonís*) διήκουσαν Σωκράτους, Κριτόβουλος, Ἑρμογένης, Ἐπιγένης, Κτήσιππος, quorum e numero eximendos esse et Hermogenem et Ctesippum vel hic Platonis locus declarat' (Heindorf).

υἱέων B, *ύέων* Schanz (1880). In the Appendix to the *Phaedrus* (1882) Schanz writes: 'In hoc dialogo semper est *υἱός* in BT, et semper *νῦν* δῆ.'

5 Κριτόβουλος. Cf. *Apol.* 38 B Πλάτων δὲ ὅδε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ Κρίτων καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος κελεύουσί με τριάκοντα μυνὼν τιμήσασθαι, αὐτοὶ δ' ἐγγυᾶσθαι.

ἡλικίαν ἔχει, 'is grown up.' This description of his age agrees with the fact of his offering bail for the fine which Socrates proposes to pay. Cf. *Men.* 89 B ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἀφίκοντο εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν, χρήσιμοι γίνονται ταῖς πόλεσιν. *Charm.* 154 A οὕτω ἐν ἡλικίᾳ ἦν. *Lys.* 209 A.

ὅστις αὐτὸν ὀνήσει, 'who will be of use to him,' i.e. as a teacher.

7 ὥστ' ἐμοὶ . . . B, ὥστέ μοι T. Cf. 278 C 7, note.

e 2 αὐτῶν δὲ περὶ παιδείας. The position of αὐτῶν makes it emphatic, 'to take no care of the boys themselves in the matter of education.'

4 καὶ μοι δοκεῖ. Schanz does not attempt to apply the rule about ἐμοί, 278 C 7, because there is no possibility here of making μοι δοκεῖ a parenthesis. Why should it be made formally in the other passages?

5 πάνυ ἀλλόκοτος, 'quite unfit for the task.' Cf. Ruhnck. *Tim. Lex.* 'Phrynichus Προπαρασκ. Σοφιστ. MS. Ἀλλόκοτος σημαίνει μὲν κυρίως τὸ παρηλλαγμένον τῆς καθεστῶσης διαίτης καὶ τρόπου; κτλ.'

307 ὥς γε πρὸς σὲ τᾶληθῇ εἰρῆσθαι, 'to tell you the truth between ourselves.' Cf. *Pol.* 595 B ὥς μὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς εἰρῆσθαι, οὐ γάρ μου κατερεῖτε, 'speaking as between ourselves, for you will not tell of me.'

b 1 ἕκαστον τὸ ἔργον BT: 'τῶν ἔργων Aristides, probavit Heindorf' (Schanz). Cf. *Phaedr.* 274 E περὶ ἐκάστης τῆς τέχνης.

8 αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα, 'the thing itself,' i.e. philosophy.

c 3 τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο. Cf. *Laus.* 804 D τὸ λεγόμενον, πάντ' ἄνδρα καὶ παῖδα . . . παιδευτέον ἐξ ἀνάγκης. *Pol.* 372 B κατακλινέντες ἐπὶ στιβάδων ἐστρωμένων μίλακι τε καὶ μυρρίναις, ἐνωχίσονται αὐτοὶ τε καὶ τὰ παῖδια.

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